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Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement took power in Uganda in 1986 and 
established what it called ‘movement’ or ‘no-party’ democracy. Reacting to a history of 
ethnic conflict-prone parties, the NRM aimed at transforming electoral politics into individual 
rather than organisational competition. Party activities became subject to strict limitations. 
The actual functioning of Uganda’s alleged ‘alternative democratic model’ has not been 
systematically empirically scrutinised. Understanding how it is working is not only an 
important topic in comparative political analysis but also for appraising external donors’ 
policy. Despite the pressures placed on other African countries to open up to organised 
pluralism, donors have been uncritically supportive of Museveni’s regime, failing to examine 
the extent to which ‘no-partism’ can be an authentic alternative to multiparty democracy. This 
thesis critically investigates the no-party arrangement, both empirically and normatively. It is 
based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Uganda in 1999 and 2000, when interviews were 
conducted with parliamentarians, political organisations’ officials, NGO representatives, and 
various policy-makers. The research reconstructs the advent of ‘no-partism’ in the light of the 
Movement’s reading of the country’s political history. It investigates the extent to which 
party-like organisations retain a presence by mapping them empirically. Finally, it analyses 
the way ‘no-partism’ works by scrutinising how political action is organised during elections, 
in parliament, and in policy-making. The thesis demonstrates that the no-party system is 
largely no longer in place -  since the Movement itself has adopted a party-like organisation. 
Uganda currently has a ‘hegemonic party system’. Opposition parties, despite the legal ban, 
have tried to adopt new organisational stratagems. But the ban also prompted the emergence 
of alternative arrangements to surrogate party activities, as it is most apparent in an atomised 
parliament that mainly fails to operate effectively without formal political parties.
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PART ONE
Chapter 1
No m ore parties?
'Movement dem ocracy9 and organisational reform in Uganda
In January 1986, Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) finally 
took power in Uganda and formally established what it claimed was a new type of democracy, 
which soon came to be known as ‘movement’ or ‘no-party’ democracy. After a five-year civil 
war, the new regime restored formal opportunities for political participation. By the late 
1980s, the holding of local elections had been regularised and became the platform for an 
indirectly elected national legislature. Then, direct elections for a Constituent Assembly took 
place in 1994 and, under the new constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections 
followed in 1996 and again in 2001.
The foundation of Uganda’s ‘no-party democracy’ is the principle of what is called 
‘individual-merit politics’. The latter was articulated by the NRM leadership as a reaction to a 
post-independence history of sectarian and ethnic conflict-prone political parties, the alleged 
cause of sequential patterns of ethnic exclusion, political violence and chronic instability. The 
‘individual-merit’ reform aimed at transforming politics -  and notably elections -  into a game 
played by individuals only, rather than by political organisations. Thus, parties were ‘banned’ 
(or, in fact, marginalised) and all Ugandans were declared members of an overarching (if 
hardly structured) ‘Movement’1. While party activities became subject to strict limitations 
prohibiting delegates’ conferences, public rallies, local branches and the sponsoring of 
candidates for election, however, the NRM tried not to exacerbate political opposition by
1 The regime established by the National Resistance Movement soon came to be known as the ‘Movement system’; with the 
1995 constitution and the 1997 Movement Act, the NRM itself was formally re-named ‘the Movement’: hereafter, NRM and 
‘Movement’ are used as interchangeable terms. As Pasquino observes, the ‘movement’ label is often adopted in reaction to 
party politics, and “implies the non-institutionalisation of an idea, a group, an activity ... [Political movements] aim at 
criticising all party organisations and stress their only partial involvement into institutionalised political life” (1990:660-661).
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letting parties ‘exist’ as independent entities (for example, they are allowed to keep a central 
office)2.
The key elements of no-party democracy are thus electoral politics, individual merit 
contests, and strict restrictions on party activities. For a few years,, a ‘broad-based’ 
government was also part of the scheme -  whereby the most prominent party leaders were co­
opted with the offer of cabinet positions -  but this was never logically or necessarily part of 
no-partism. As a result, ‘broad-basedness’ progressively lost momentum and, since the early 
1990s, politicians, public discourse and the country itself have been increasingly divided 
between ‘movementists’ and ‘multipartists’. Through a referendum in June 2000, Ugandans 
decided not to replace the existing system with a full-fledged multiparty democracy but, 
instead, to keep it in place for at least another five years. Major opposition parties, however, 
boycotted the exercise.
The idea of a no-party polity -  an idea which is not exclusive to Uganda3 -  raises a 
number of theoretical, comparative and empirical questions. What is the actual role of parties, 
if any, under a ‘no-party’ framework? Are there really no party or party-like organisations? 
Do individuals actually participate in politics without organising? Did Ugandans devise 
alternative arrangements to coordinate political actions? What kind of arrangements, how do 
they work and to what extent do they surrogate party activities? What does the presence of 
these arrangements imply for the political process? Can a no-party participatory system be an 
alternative to multiparty democracy, as claimed by its supporters? In other words, what 
happens when parties are done away with in a participatory system? These issues are not 
only of critical importance to understanding how the no-party system is currently and 
practically functioning. Any assessment of the evolution and consolidation prospects of such 
a system will have to be based on the answers given to the above questions. A comprehension 
of how the no-party system is actually working also has obvious implications for an appraisal
2 Article 269 of the Constitution (1995) states that: “until parliament makes laws regulating the activities of political 
organisations ... political activities may continue except: (a) opening and operating branch offices; (b) holding delegates’ 
conferences; (c) holding public rallies; (d) sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any way campaigning for or against a 
candidate for any public elections; (e) carrying out any activities that may interfere with the movement political system for 
the time being in force”. Thus, by no-party politics it is not meant that there are no parties at all in Uganda, but that their 
position is heavily constrained. In other words, the commonly accepted use of ‘no-party politics’ is adopted, but the 
substance hidden by this label will have to be appropriately investigated. Individual-merit or no-party political competition 
has also been at the basis of local level politics in Ghana since 1989 (Crook 2001) and of post-genocide local elections in 
Rwanda (Integrated Regional Information Network o f the UN, 9 March 2001, and The Economist, London, 3 April 1999).
3 The frequent calls for banishing political parties, typically made by ruling Elites on the ground that ‘the country is not ready’ 
or that ‘parties are the cause of the country’s troubles’, were already remarked by the early studies of party politics in 
developing areas. The general point was made by Huntington that “a ruling monarch tends to view political parties as divisive 
forces which either challenge his authority or greatly complicate his efforts to unify and modernize his country” (1968:403). 
Identical anti-party calls, however, were made in the West by ‘democratic’ founding fathers such as George Washington 
(Coleman -  Rosberg 1966:663) and Charles De Gaulle (La Palombara -  Weiner 1966:23).
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of donors’ policy. In spite of the significant pressures donors have mounted for other African 
countries to open up to multiparty politics (for example, in the case of Kenya and Malawi, 
albeit with ambiguous results), they have been largely and almost uncritically supportive of 
Museveni’s regime4.
In the following chapters, an empirical investigation is carried out to shed light on 
the above issues. The investigation is divided in two main phases (i.e. Part Two and Part 
Three of the thesis), whose aims are, respectively:
I. to verify the actual absence or weakness of parties in a system that 
formally limits their activities (i.e. to check the correspondence between 
legal output and organisational outcome). This first step is required 
because the existence of parties might not follow constitutional or legal 
prescriptions, as, for instance, parties may develop relatively effective 
underground organisations and activities in a situation of formal 
confinement;
II. to inquiry into the immediate consequences of (I) in terms of the way 
politics is organised at selected junctures o f the political process. For 
example, do parties play a role in the organisation of campaign linkages, 
in the co-ordination of parliamentary activities, and in the policy-making 
process, or are they absent or too weakly organised to do it? Are there 
alternative institutions carrying out these processes in an equally 
effective manner or do such processes remain essentially dis-organised?
Political parties and party-surrogates
The NRM’s anti-party ideology was based on the argument that, since independence, 
political parties and the ethnic and religious antagonisms they promote had been the reason 
for Uganda’s political violence and chronic instability. ‘Movement democracy’, i.e. 
individual-based electoral competition, was thus devised as an alternative model of
4 Despite the ban on party-based political competition, Western donors defined the 1994 Constituent Assembly election as 
'transparent and open’ and ‘a legitimate expression of the will of the people’ (albeit the terms ‘free and fair’ were not 
employed because of minor irregularities). They then funded the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, raising only 
minor criticisms with regard to the political education courses staged by the government and inviting the opposition to accept 
the results (Hauser 1999:627-631).
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democracy which would solve the country’s problems by banning or marginalising political 
parties. But parties in participatory systems are not there for nothing. Political scientists have 
repeatedly focused their attention on the ‘functions’ that parties perform in the larger political 
system. Building on V.O. Key’s classic distinction of the three sides of a political party -  i.e. 
the party in the electorate, the party as an organisation, and the party in government -  Dalton 
and Wattenberg suggest the following comprehensive list of functions5:
Parties in the electorate
Simplifying choices for voters 
Educating citizens
Generating symbols of identification and loyalty 
Mobilising people to participate
Parties as organisations
Recruiting political leadership and seeking governmental office 
Training political elites 
Articulating political interests 
Aggregating political interests
Parties in government
Creating majorities in government 
Organising the government 
Implementing policy objectives 
Organising dissent and opposition 
Ensuring responsibility for government actions 
Controlling government administration 
Fostering stability in government
Parties help organise and order political participation by selecting, aggregating and 
channelling the increasing amount of demands and pressures that the political system is
5 Dalton and Wattenberg (2000:5), with reference to V.O. Key (1964).
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required to address: “the political party is the one agency that can claim to have as its very 
raison d'etre the creation of an entire linkage chain, a chain of connections that runs from the 
voters through the candidates and the electoral process to the officials of government”6.
By promoting political participation and bringing different or emerging social forces 
‘inside’ the political system, parties can increase the latter’s legitimacy7. An effective party 
system structures the participation of new groups in politics8 by giving expression to the 
public’s concerns, by bringing together and conveying a multiplicity of interests, identities, 
values and preferences. Parties enable these demands to reach political salience. They can 
articulate policies and mobilise the popular, political and institutional support that their 
implementation requires. Alternatively, when they are not in government, parties can 
constitute a coherent opposition and elaborate diverse policies9. Party activities also contribute 
to the definition, structuration and stabilisation of the political game in terms of issue 
dimensions, voting patterns, agenda setting, coalition-building, payoff distribution, and so 
forth10.
Party linkages, or the connections through which political parties carry out most of 
the above processes, can assume diverse, more or less commendable forms. Depending on the 
priorities of its leaders and members, for example, a party organisation may be primarily 
oriented towards participatory nexuses (when the party aims at fostering the participation of 
members to the different aspects of state decision-making), electoral links (which should 
ensure the party leaders’ control over elected representatives), clientelistic connections (when 
the main objective is the capture and exchange of state-controlled resources) or directive 
linkages (where the party is functional to the government’s control over its citizens, e.g. 
through educational or coercive practices)11.
Museveni’s claimed justification for the adoption of a no-party framework is the fear 
that ethnically-based parties, uncompromisingly facing each other, would dominate and 
polarise multiparty politics. Similar parties tend to compartmentalise politics, promoting the 
separation and alienation of a communal group from the rest of the society. The more a party 
is rigidly based on a group’s communal identity and concerned with articulating the interests 
of that group only, the less it will be prepared to settle for interparty compromises. This, in
6 Lawson (1988:16).
Cf. Lijphart (1985:107), Apter (1965206), Huntington (1968:412), Sartori (1968273).
8 Huntington (1968:401).
9 Kohli (1994), Mainwaring (1993), Diamond et al. (1995:41); cf. Apter (1965:192).
10 Cf. Sartori (1994), Bartolini (1986), Dunleavy (1991:ch.5), Panebianco (1986). ‘Issue dimensions’ refer to the main lines 
of conflict that shape a party system, such as rural vs. urban interests, socialdemocratic vs. liberal principles, and so on (cf 
Lijphart 1988:139-140).
11 Lawson (1988:16), cf Lawson (1980:13ff).
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turn, may hinder and stifle the capacity of a party system to integrate and accommodate all of 
a polity’s socio-political groupings12. Communal parties are an example of how modernisation 
processes can provide the means -  e.g. party organisations and party-based electoral 
competition -  for the institutionalisation of so-called ‘traditional’ identities, rather than their 
replacement or transcendence. By institutionalising differences, ethnically-based parties can 
be potentially dysfunctional -  from the perspective of the larger collectivity -  up to the point 
of political disintegration13. And yet, even in a situation of strong group differences and 
segmentation, parties can still be instrumental in channelling participation and inputs to a 
successive stage of the political process where the integration of the distinct groups into the 
polity can be achieved. For this to happen, some mechanism for conflict management, 
whereby parties are enabled to seek compromises with other groups, may have to be worked 
out. Examples of such mechanisms include consociational party-based regimes14 as well as 
more explicitly integrationist devices15.
Politics is a collective game, and effective actions in a collective game require co­
ordination. Political parties emerge when the number and variety of different interests and 
unstructured demands require something more than informal interactions to bring them 
together. The more the people and the complexity involved in the game, the more the need to 
organise co-operation:
“the novelty derives from a politically active, or politically mobilized society ... modem 
politics requires a party channelment... A partyless polity cannot cope, in the long run, with 
a politicised society... [which requires] a stabilised system of canalisation... The larger the 
number of participants, the more the need for a regularised traffic system”16.
12 Cf. Dogan - Pelassy (1990: 97).
13 See, for instance, Horowitz (1985:ch.7).
14 Consociational democracies adopt four principles that aim at regulating communal conflicts: power-sharing in the 
executive, proportional representation, (territorial or non-territorial) autonomy for communal groups, and veto power for 
minorities (cf Lijphart 1977, 1985, 1999). The term ‘power-sharing’ itself is often used as a synonym for 
‘consociationalism’, not only because the key aspect of the latter is executive power-sharing, but because the other three 
elements as well imply some kind of ‘participation’ to the exercise of political power in its broadest sense (e.g. through 
legislative representation).
15 See, for instance, Horowitz’s (1991:163) proposals for electoral integration. In general, one might think of ‘aggregation’ as 
referring to less-than-whole entities, such as majority or minority coalitions, and ‘integration’ as referring to units as a whole, 
such as polities. The idea of a no-party polity emphasizes the need for polity-wide integration, and shies away from lower 
level aggregative agencies such as parties that are perceived as risky and divisive devices. A multiparty polity, by contrast, 
gives priority to the interest aggregation process that occurs at the level of each party or coalition of parties, especially where 
there are no deep communal divisions that need be reconciled and integrated. When such divisions exist, however, a party- 




This study is concerned with the quest for effective political institutions for 
development17. Such a concern -  largely shared with the ‘good governance’ agenda -  is 
derived from the core ideas of Samuel Huntington’s polity-building theory18. As participation 
broadens and calls for organised politics, responses to such calls may be manifest in 
heterogeneous attempts at co-ordinating individual political activities. Yet, the development 
of sound institutions is not to be taken for granted nor to be automatically derived as a spill­
over of socio-economic change. Rather, such institutions may have to be purposely built and 
developed. If an effective framework of the polity is needed under conditions of social change 
and increased participation, more sophisticated ways of political interaction have to be 
developed and institutionalised. Differentiated and rationalised procedures and organisations 
have to acquire value, regularity and stability19. In a participatory context, this process of 
political institutionalisation requires some kind of organisation, that is, some “form of formal 
co-ordination of the activities carried out by different individuals”20. In practice, parties can 
contribute to institutionalising mechanisms of response to some crucial political needs of 
developing countries with fragile political systems:
□ parties can make sense of the multiple and complex pressures that 
emerge from society by articulating demands and selecting issues of 
political salience. For example, the de-institutionalisation and detachment 
from society of the pre-1997 Zairian state, where broad regions lacked
17 This research contributes to the expanding field Hpaling with constitutional engineering for ethnic conflict regulation only 
in an indirect way. The study of institutional choices for the democratic management of ethnically-divided societies has 
drawn attention to issues such as the form of state (e.g. unitary vs. federal arrangements; see, for instance, Horowitz 
1991214ff., Davidson 1992:274,286, Lijphart 1979), the electoral system (e.g. majoritarian vs. proportional formulas; see, 
for example, Sisk -  Reynolds 1998, Barkan 1995, Reynolds 1993 and 1995) and the type of executive (e.g. presidential vs. 
parliamentary government; see, for example, Linz 1994, Lijphart 1992, Horowitz 1991205ff.). In particular, attempts at 
engineering the structure of a party system have largely occurred through the choice of an electoral system rather than 
another, on the ground that the chosen system would foster the representation of minorities, the stability of the government, 
or some other feature of the political system (cf. Sisk -  Reynolds 1998, Sartori 1968, Lijphart 1994). Aside from the 
introduction of one-party regimes, by contrast, attempts at shaping the party system in a more direct way (such as by means 
of mandatory two-parti sm, a solution advanced by Nigerian rulers when the return to civilian government was being 
discussed in the late 1980s; see Horowitz 1991:156) was a relatively rare occurrence, hi a sense, the Ugandan case would fall 
in this latter category: a direct attempt at shaping the party system, up to the extreme point of not having any political parties. 
However, these and other issues related to institutional choices for the democratic regulation of ethnic conflict will not be 
directly addressed by this thesis. They will remain in the background of an inquiry that focuses primarily on some 
fundamental aspects of the functioning of Uganda’s ‘no-party’ politics. The way ‘no-partism’ actually works is to be 
understood before its potential as a conflict-regulation tool is considered, and before we treat it as a prescriptive model -  i.e. 
as a reference for other African countries seeking to manage ethnic conflict in a democratic way -  as some observers tend to 
do (see, for instance, Apter 1995:158 and Mamdani 2001).
18 Huntington (1968).
19 Huntington (1968:12).
20 Lanzalaco (1995:105). A distinction is made between private political organisations (parties and other associations for 
interest representation) and public political organisations (state bureaucracies and decision-making organs) based on their 
acting, officially, on behalf of the society as a whole or of specific groups (Lanzalaco 1995:184). Unless otherwise specified, 
hereafter ‘political organisation’ means ‘private political organisation’.
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any sort of contact with the centre, arguably contributed to the 
destabilisation and collapse of the entire political system;
□ parties contribute to structuring and ordering mass participation and 
pressures by channelling and directing them into relatively recurrent and 
recognisable patterns of political interaction. Such patterns, in turn, 
create the behavioural expectations necessary to stabilise politics. For 
example, daily popular votes on all policies and all politicians would 
generate a situation of extreme volatility, incoherence and instability.
Similarly, retrospective sanctions by voters also need a stable structure of 
electoral competition and parliamentary organisation21;
□ parties can create the basis for representing conflicting interests and the 
mechanisms through which these can be compromised and managed, 
thus contributing to the integration of different social groups in a 
common political community. For example, the outcome of the Northern 
Ireland peace process (1994-2000) largely hinged on whether the main 
parties could keep their constituencies from exiting the process and 
violently challenging the system. The concern with integrating the Zulu- 
based Inkatha party and the right-wing Afrikaner minorities in South 
Africa’s transition is a further case in point22.
Doing away with parties -  aside from raising questions concerning the democratic 
character of the polity -  may create more elementary problems of institutional soundness and 
viability of the new system. Political parties can promote the institutionalisation of 
participatory politics and thus the stabilisation and govemability required for a regime to be 
effective. Eliminating parties is likely to open gaps in the wider political system23, unless 
other arrangements are devised to fill the organisational vacuum.
21 Hofferbert (1999:7).
22 The ‘political integration’-concem may be answered by democratic means, as it is currently the case in Northern Ireland or 
South Africa. However, the issue is a broader one and, as pointed out, it has to do with the effectiveness and soundness of the 
system, rather than merely with the latter’s democratic content Indeed, in the short term, problems of political integration 
may be temporarily solved through external wars. When, after two years of border war, Ethiopia invaded Eritrea in May 
2000, the impact on Ethiopia’s socio-political life was reportedly one of increased ‘nationalist’ cohesion (cf. Clapham 2000). 
Whether war can constitute an ‘institutionalised mechanism’ -  and, notably, whether it can be an advisable solution -  is a 
different matter.
23 The dependence of the stability and govemability of democratic regimes upon effective political parties has been illustrated 
by a comparative literature focussing not only on African politics but also, for instance, on the Indian case and on Latin
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In addition to performing the above functions at the macro- or systemic-level, 
political parties are also functional arrangements from the point of view of the individuals that 
are involved in party activities. Voters, party members, legislators, government officials or 
others may more or less directly benefit from the use of parties as “collaborative devices for 
mutual gain”24.
Politicians in government, for example, have a keen interest in steering parliamentary 
activities, which they most often do by means of supportive or controlled party parliamentary 
groups. While parliamentary governments normally depend on majoritarian support in the 
assembly for their survival, presidential executives are no less dependent on such support for 
the effectiveness of their political initiatives.
Similarly, the members of a legislative assembly face strong incentives to devise 
party-like co-operative mechanisms. There are two main theories framing the benefits that 
MPs draw from organising or belonging to party-like groupings25. According to one -  the 
‘one-arena model’ -  legislators focus on the advantages that collective actions inside 
parliament can provide. Parliamentarians need to coalesce to win benefits such as office 
spaces or staff, powers such as committee chairs and membership or agenda setting, and 
policy measures (through the control of the agenda and of the government, through legislative 
initiatives, etc.). A so-called two-arena model, by contrast, emphasises the links between 
parliamentary and electoral politics by focusing on the parliamentarians’ concern with 
ensuring their nomination for the next election as well as the necessary support to actually 
contest it. These concerns can be answered by the organisational, symbolic (e.g. the label), 
and financial resources provided by a political party.
Whichever of the above interpretations one wants to accept -  the one- or the two- 
arena model -  it will point to the fact that party-like arrangements are most likely to emerge, 
whether among legislators only or also in the electorate. The incentive for legislators to 
organise, in particular, may be strong no matter what the role of parties in the electorate, that 
is, even in the context of a general decline of parties among voters. With reference to 
industrial democracies, it has been convincingly argued that the organisation of legislative 
groups is likely to “survive and even prosper” since they “still enjoy tremendous procedural 
advantage over individuals or non-partisan legislative groups ... if parties really are losing
American experiences. Cf. Diamond et al. (1995:33ff.), Shugart -  Carey (1992:ch.9), Kohli (1990,1994), Mainwaring 
(1993222-223), Linz -  Valenzuela (1995:81), Sartori (1994:125,190), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992:9).
24 Stram (2000:182).
25 Bowler (2000). Cf. Cox -  McCubbins (1993).
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their hold on the electorate, it represents a return to their roots as parliamentary 
organisations”26. In this sense, “democracy without parties might be unthinkable, but large 
modem legislatures without political parties is almost inconceivable”27.
Surrogating party activities
While this work assumes that, in participatory systems, there are strong reasons why 
party-like organisations may emerge and become key features of the political-institutional set 
up, the investigation carried out in this thesis will be open-ended. The research is 
operationally structured in such a way as not to pre-empt the possibility of uncovering the 
presence of alternative organisational arrangements as functional surrogates of political 
parties. The study will verify whether Uganda’s political system includes non-party devices 
capable of performing party-like roles and filling in the organisational vacuum that a ‘no- 
party system’ presupposes. A ban on parties may in feet merely produce effects similar to 
those of other criminal prohibitions concerning chugs, alcohol, etc., that is, when something is 
forbidden, people often look for and perhaps find alternatives28. What do Ugandan politicians 
do, for instance, to get in contact with the voters, to aggregate in parliament and to produce 
inputs in policy-making processes? What organisational arrangements do they rely upon, if 
any?
The presence and extent of alternative ways of organising politics -  if any -  will be 
brought to light only as a function of the processes that these alternatives serve. The research 
strategy thus begins with the empirical recognition of specific stages of the political process 
(e.g. electoral politics), which is then followed by the identification of the formal 
organisations or informal institutional arrangements performing them. There is no illusion of 
monitoring every single institution of any kind. The notion of functional equivalence assumes 
that a careful attention to the political context and events should enable to detect the outcome 
of the activities of the relevant institutions and thus suggest the institutions themselves on 
which attention is to be focused. For instance, if a church has a critical part in selecting 
candidates for election, this can be discovered firstly by identifying the ‘process’ itself (i.e. 
the way individual candidates are selected), and then by following it up to its ‘source’ to find 
out which agency plays the major role (the church, in the example). Functional equivalencies 
can be very revealing in a context of weak and informal political organisation, where they can
26 Thies (2000:239, emphasis added).
2' Dalton -  Wattenberg (2000:9).
281 am grateful to Donald Horowitz for suggesting this analogy.
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be used to detect less formal but institutionalised forms of politics29. Uganda’s ‘movement’ 
politics is likely to be a case in point, for no-party politics imply, at least in principle, 
unorganised or weakly organised politics.
The use of equivalencies that focus on the functions themselves, before searching the 
institutional arrangements involved in their fulfilment, can also be instrumental to avoiding 
being misled by ‘parties’ that are such in name but not in fact or ‘functions’30. If the starting 
point is a function (e.g. the aggregation of votes in the legislative or the participation in 
policy-making processes) and the latter brings the attention on party ‘A’ and on an NGO ‘C’, 
the risk of being misled by an organisation labelled party ‘B’, which is actually extraneous to 
the process under investigation, should be avoided.
Some examples of organisational surrogates that have emerged in Uganda as a 
reaction to the marginalisation of parties may further illustrate the concern of this study (each 
of these examples will be discussed in depth in later chapters). The emergence of such 
surrogates constitutes a direct manifestation of the ‘need for organisation’ that is a postulate to 
this research.
The creation of a Movement parliamentary caucus is a first example. The caucus, 
which co-ordinates the action of pro-movement MPs, goes blatantly against the principles of 
individual merit and all-inclusive politics. Not only multipartists, but even moderate 
movementists have quickly acknowledged the contradiction: “if the constitution says that the 
system is based on individual merit, you don’t come here [to parliament] to be whipped into 
line. Although, I know that in practice it’s partly different... But I don’t attend the meetings of 
the caucus, I don’t believe in it. Otherwise, we can go back to multipartism”31. The rationale 
of the caucus is quite clear, however, as the chairman explains: “it’s a consensus-building 
caucus. Although we have individual merit, individual politics then need to come together, 
you know it very well, to reach group consensus. I see it as a filter, and a refiner of possible 
policies before they come to the House”32. And in order to reach consensus, Movement 
leaders “are now proposing to put in some rules for discipline ... The idea is that we shouldn’t 
just discuss things on the Floor -  and come out as divided -  but the Movement people should 
have a common position”33.
29 Cf. Dogan and Pelassy (1990:40).
30 The point is raised by Sartori (1970:1048).
31 Wandera Ogalo, MP, interview (Kampala, June 14, 1999).
32 Gilbert Bukenya, MP, chairman of the Movement caucus, interview (Kampala, July 2,1999).
33 George Wambuzi, MP, interview (Kampala, June 8, 1999).
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The Young Parliamentarians Association (YPA) is another organisation which 
originated in parliament, albeit with a somewhat different agenda. Political socialisation was 
among the association’s initial aims: “we were strangers when we first came here, and 
parliament had no structure whatsoever for any kind of, say, induction. [YPA was created] to 
learn what parliament is and how it works ... to support ourselves in understanding how things 
work and in taking part to the legislative activities”34. Legislative aggregation was another 
concern: “we also do legislative activities, we agree on issues, we discuss them to overcome 
the division between the parties and the Movement, in a non-partisan way”35. But YPA’s main 
task is 'to pool resources’ and to be “the structure that has to organise fundraising for 
activities in the constituencies”36: “they have a ‘development fimd’ for work in the 
constituencies, in which they pay Shs. 100,000 ($60) per month. You know, here we don’t 
have political parties, so MPs need to team up with each other”37.
A further example is provided by the Foundation for African Development (FAD), a 
third sector organisation which partly replaced the marginalised Democratic Party for some of 
the latter’s activities. As the late director of FAD and DP Publicity Secretary put it, in 1980 
“DP hadn’t been revived yet: parties were not allowed, so we founded an NGO”38! Currently, 
the foundation is being instrumentally used by the party as a channel of political 
communication with the grassroots: after all, “when you don’t have party branches to do the 
job, you need something else in place to do it! As a matter of fact, FAD has always organised 
seminars to call and gather party members”39.
A fourth case is illustrated by the 1997 Movement Act. As it predictably happens to 
‘movements’ of various types, they sooner or later face the question of the extent to which 
they can be politically effective with a loose organisation: “they suffer the consequences of 
the unsolved tension between the conception they have of themselves and the constraints of 
political life, which implies the structuration, the creation of hierarchies, the acceptance of the 
rules of the game”40, “the transformation of the movement into a party ... into something more 
stable and permanent”41. In spite of an official mantra referring to the Movement as a system 
rather than a political organisation, the aim of the Movement Act was precisely to develop a
34 Salamu Musumba, MP, interview (Kampala, June 16,1999).
35 Salamu Musumba, MP, interview (Kampala, June 16,1999).
36 Elly Karuhanga, MP, interview (Kampala, June 8,1999).
37 Lt. James Kinobe, MP, interview (Kampala, June 3,1999).
38 Anthony Ssekweyama, late administrator of the Foundation for African Development and Publicity Secretary of the 
Democratic Party, interview (Kampala, June 6,1999). In 1979-1980, post-Amin Uganda experienced a similar though very 
brief spell of no-partism, during which FAD was created. The NGO was then revived as a party substitute under the NRM.





countrywide extra-parliamentary organisation by setting up party-like structures at different 
levels.
Methodological notes
The broader aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence of how some crucial 
components of the current ‘no-party’ electoral regime are functioning, thus filling a gap in the 
literature on Ugandan politics. For this purpose, the thesis tries to shed light on the forms, 
strength and functions of political organisations that exist, resist or are being formed in a 
supposedly no-party context. The study then analyses the role of such organisations, and of 
others that are not primarily aimed at formal politics, in the way electoral and parliamentary 
politics are played out and in the policy-making process.
For the organisational analysis that constitutes the first part of the research, aimed at 
finding out the degree of presence of political parties on the ground, the latter are defined as 
“organisations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government 
positions”42 through a competitive struggle for political power that is not necessarily election- 
based. The stress is not on the electoral process per se, as political competition is more broadly 
conceived, but rather on the common goal of parties. Thus, “a political group that would present 
candidates for public office, but is unable to do so either because it is proscribed or because 
elections are not being held, is also a party”43. These definitions are especially useful to an 
analysis of Uganda’s current regime, where elections are not contested under party banners and, 
still, the overall political game largely is. In addition, the above definitions can and will be 
intended as excluding forms of sub-organisation that are entirely internal to governmental 
institutions, such as parliamentary caucuses lacking an extra-parliamentary organisation.
The specific concern of this first part is with the effective presence and organisational 
depth of Ugandan parties -  i.e. their degree of organisation -  which is defined as “the extent of 
regularised procedures for mobilising and co-ordinating the efforts of party supporters in 
executing the party’s strategy and tactics”44. A number of organisational indicators are identified 
in Table 1.1. The selected indicators are mostly self-explanatory. The presence of a 
headquarters and some central organisational bodies are a necessary minimum for talking of a 
‘party’, with the variations to be observed concerning the level of structural differentiation and
42 Janda (1970:83). In this case, ‘government’ is obviously not limited to executive organs.
43 Mainwaring -  Scully (1995:2).
44 Janda (1970:106). Some of the indicators adopted in what follows are also inspired or directly drawn from Janda’s work.
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the frequency of meetings. Organisational intensiveness and extensiveness can further be 
determined by the existence of a formalised parliamentary group as well as from local branches 
and special organisations (for the youth, women, development groups, etc.). For each party 
organ, ideally, the frequency of meetings should also be traced. The overall membership size 
will also be looked at (within the limits o f reliable figures). Written rules and their 
effectiveness, notably in prescribing internal differentiation of organs and leadership selection 
processes, are a sign o f relatively well-established and regularised procedures, while the 
maintenance o f records tells us about organisational continuity. The availability of some regular 
funding, as well as its size and diversity, is critical for the survival and stability of any 
organisation; party media (newspapers, radio channels, etc.) are another important resource 
Finally, information on the presence of internal institutionalised groupings or external 
affiliation to other organisations improves the understanding of coordinated behaviours.
Degree o f organisation Indicators
(Complexity □ headquarters and central organisational bodies
Effectiveness
Levels of activity) a parliamentary group
a local branches or similar referents




□ maintenance of records
a funding
□ informal but openly recognised internal groupings
□ party’s formal affiliation to (or alliance with) other organisations
Table 1.1: Degree o f  organisation ofpolitical parties: indicators
The second step of the empirical investigation will focus on the way politics is 
organised in two phases o f the political process, namely electoral and parliamentary politics. 
The political organisations that enter or emerge in these two arenas are examined through four
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empirical indicators that are identified in Table 1.2 and briefly explained below. In addition to 
these two stages, a case study of policy-making -  i.e. Uganda’s land reform process -  is 
selected for closer investigation, with particular attention to the presence of organised inputs 
and support for specific positions in the form of policy statements and initiatives.
Variable Indicators
L Electoral organisation □ campaigning organisations
a candidates selection mechanisms
ii. Parliamentary organisation □ parliamentary associations
□ voting discipline
iii. Organisation in policy-making a policy statements
□ parliamentary policy initiatives
Table 1.2: Organisation at the election and parliamentary stages and in the policy process
Electoral organisation. Effective government needs to be linked to the underneath 
society. To avoid a state detached from the citizenry it rules, social interests and necessities 
have to be aggregated so that they can gain political saliency and become the basis of state 
policy. The process requires some form of organisation, including electoral organisation. The 
question is whether parties do play a role in providing linkage at this level or, if they do not, 
whether and which other organisational arrangements are used for electoral linkage45. The 
bottom line is a situation in which the campaigning process is entirely fragmented. On the 
other hand, the presence of campaigning organisations (beyond the temporary and informal 
appointment o f agents) as well as mechanisms of candidates selection (as opposed to mere 
self-selection) will be used, respectively, as direct and indirect indicators of the degree of 
electoral organisation.
Parliamentary organisation. Effective government policy also requires the 
aggregation o f a coherent legislative support. Aside from procedural rules, parliamentary 
activities need political organisation to avoid the inefficiency of fragmentation. The possible
45 Cf. Lawson (1988:14-16).
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role of parties in parliamentary interactions will be compared to that of other organisational 
arrangements that may have been set up, if any. In particular, the existence of parliamentary 
associations and of mechanisms for the enforcement of voting discipline will be adopted as 
direct and indirect indicators of processes of aggregation taking place within the legislative 
assembly.
Organisation in policy-making. To make government policy effective, social 
interests have to be aggregated, gain saliency and become inputs in the form of policy 
pronouncements, proposals or initiatives. The question here concerns the way policy 
formulation is organised: whether parties do play a role or, when they do not, whether other 
organisational arrangements have the capacity to produce policy inputs. Policy statements and 
parliamentary policy initiatives -  with regard to the specific case of land reform -  will be 
observed as indicators.
Before concluding this introduction with the plan of the thesis, some further 
clarifications concerning the type, the scope and the techniques of the research must be made. 
The research is meant to be a theory-disciplined case study46. Technically, such a study will 
consist of a qualitative analysis and explanation of the way and extent to which selected 
political processes are carried out by political parties or alternative organisational 
arrangements. While attention is paid to the country’s historical background and to the first 
years of the NRM regime, the period under examination goes from 1994, when the 
Constituent Assembly was elected, to mid-2000, when fieldwork in Uganda was completed. 
The data used are partly drawn from party documentation, parliamentary archives, press 
coverage and secondary literature. The main source are semi-structured elite interviews with:
□ members of parliament
□ national and local representatives of the Movement and of the major parties
□ representatives of non-party organisations (bureaucratic agencies, NGOs, 
pressure groups, etc.)
Over 50 party representatives (including Movement officials) have been interviewed 
[see Appendix 1], The basic criterion for sampling was office. The focus of these interviews 
was a party’s organisational map (both at the national and at the local level), the process of 
selection of candidates for elections, the way an election campaign is approached, and the
46 Cf. Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein (1975).
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specific policy formulation and initiatives of the parties. While the research concentrates on 
national politics, a sample of districts was also selected for a closer investigation of the 
extensiveness of party organisations. The districts that were chosen are those of Mukono in 
the centre-south, Gulu in the north, Mbale in the east, and Mbarara in south-western Uganda. 
In addition to mere geographical representativeness (i.e. four districts, four different regions), 
the districts selected are all important regional centres, which, resource-wise, makes them 
‘least likely cases’ of the expected party disorganisation. The selection of sub-national units 
that are broadly representative of the country’s socio-economic disparities is also instrumental 
to controlling such variable by finding evidence that cuts across different contexts.
Over 30 members of parliament have also been interviewed [see Appendix 2]. The 
sampling criterion was mere access to them, with attention to retaining a certain balance 
between regions, gender, and political partisanship. The interviews focused on electoral 
networks, parliamentary associations, parliamentary policy-formulation, voting behaviour and 
extra-parliamentary links.
Finally, representatives of non-government organisations and policy-makers have 
been questioned [see Appendix 3]. These include foreign organisations (such as the German 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation or the UK Department for International Development), political 
groupings (such as The Free Movement), Ugandan NGOs (e.g. Uganda Land Alliance or 
Forum for Women in Development) and government agencies (notably at the Ministry for 
Lands). The sampling criterion was ‘relevance’ to the policy process, mostly with reference to 
the case of land reform. The issues addressed in these interviews include party-surrogate 
arrangements, policy-advocacy, policy-formulation and others.
Quite a lot of space is left to interview materials in the dissertation. The text of the 
interviews was occasionally improved to make it fully intelligible. This, however, was only 
done when the message was not ambiguous, with the best endeavour on my part to avoid any 
kind of distortions.
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is divided in three main parts. In the first part, following this introduction, 
a reconstruction of Uganda’s long process of political-institutional reforms is carried out in 
Chapter Two and Three. The reform process is reconstructed in the light of the Movement’s 
own reading of the country’s political history and of its no-party ideology. Thus, a concise
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excursus along the history of Uganda’s political parties is presented in Chapter Two, as a 
basis for an understanding of the broader debate on multipartism. A historical background to 
the land issue is also introduced in view of the analysis of land reform that is conducted in 
Chapter Eight.
Chapter Three focuses on the institutional changes of the 1986-2000 period, that is, 
since the National Resistance Movement took over power -  and started developing the ideas 
and practice of no-party politics -  until the referendum of 2000, which was meant to fully 
legitimise the retention of the current system and the contextual rejection of multiparty 
politics. Over these fifteen years, the country’s political system has gone through a continuous 
process of institutional and organisational reform. The key phases of this process were, in the 
mid- and late 1990s, the entrenchment of no-party politics with the adoption of a new 
constitution, the first direct legislative and presidential elections held under the new regime, 
and the countrywide creation of party-like Movement structures.
Part Two consists of Chapter Four and Chapter Five, addressing the issue of the 
actual presence of political organisations under the current arrangements. The analysis is 
carried out by focusing first on the Movement -  whose organisation has not been studied 
comprehensively so far -  and then on the main opposition forces, namely the Uganda 
People’s Congress and the Democratic Party.
The inquiry into the organisational development of the ruling Movement group 
reveals a continuous process of internal change and of (relative) organisational tightening. In 
spite of the anti-party credo, the Movement group has used parliamentary legislation to 
prompt the development of a fiilly partisan and hegemonic -  if fragile -  political organisation. 
Indeed, the Movement is not a ‘political system’ -  as claimed by Movement supporters -  but 
a partisan organisation: its inclusivist claims clash with a de facto situation where the ins-outs 
distinction is quite clear. The Movement is hegemonic, for its organisation rests on a clear 
supremacy which cannot be challenged by peripheral parties. But the Movement is also a 
fragile rather than a strong organisation: it had virtually no institutions until very recently, and 
its new structures still have only a scant presence on the ground. Yet, in a context where the 
opposition is legally disorganised and the Movement has exclusive access to state resources, 
such a weak organisation is enough to enforce hegemony.
The study of the Movement is followed by a study of the current state of political 
parties. As already noted, parties are not prohibited per se; rather, most of their activities are 
legally banned. A crucial step towards understanding actual political practice beneath formal 
no-partism is to account for the scope for action that political parties retain. This, in turn,
28
No more parties?
requires an investigation into what parties are in organisational terms. The analysis of the set­
up of both the Uganda People’s Congress and the Democratic Party -  i.e. the country’s two 
historical parties and the bulk of the opposition to the current regime -  reveals how parties 
have reacted to existing restrictions to retain a degree of organised presence in Ugandan 
politics. Evidence shows that the two parties have been heavily constrained by the anti-party 
measures, and that their organisational development can be read as a (feeble) attempt to 
devise internal arrangements, or to find external support, which would improve the chances of 
party survival and the effectiveness of their opposition.
The third part includes three chapters. These are meant to provide an account of how 
no-party politics works by focussing on: A) selected junctures of the political process (i.e. 
electoral and parliamentary politics), B) a case-study of policy-making (i.e. land reform).
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven are similarly structured. They address the question of 
how political action is organised in no-party elections and in a no-party parliament, 
respectively. Electoral politics are dominated by the fragmentation that the no-party or 
individual merit principle generates (or rather maintains). No strong organisational 
arrangements have emerged at the election stage. Individual campaigning machines prevail in 
the latter arena, with only weak efforts to coordinate individual behaviours on the part of the 
Movement and of the political parties.
The analysis of the inner politics of what is supposed to be an atomised parliament is 
most revealing. A consistent trend towards the establishment of party-like devices within the 
assembly emerges -  especially in the form of parliamentary caucuses -  as evidence of the fact 
that MPs need to overcome the individualisation of political action by coordinating their 
activities. Similar arrangements run against the original ideas of building a political sphere 
capable to do without political organisations.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, land reform is investigated as a case-study of no-party 
policy-making. The analysis points at a decision process which, predictably, is primarily 
shaped by people in key public offices. In the process, consultative exercises were organised 
by government bodies as well as by independent organisations. In the virtual absence of party 
inputs, occasional contributions came from resource-endowed groups such as the powerful 
elite of the Baganda kingdom and some Kampala-based NGOs.
While the main thread of this thesis is focused on political organisation, the 
dissertation is also attentive to factors such as historical legacies, social formations, resource 
availability, leadership style and external influences, all of which undoubtedly contribute to
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explaining Uganda’s recent political developments. The country’s post-independence 
experience with ethnic politics is taken as the point of departure, in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
P ost-independence politics an d  con flic t-m anaaem en t failures 
Parties, political conflict and land issues in Uganda
Democracy, ethnicity and political exclusion
Political reform in Uganda was professedly aimed at solving a problem of profound 
socio-cultural divisions. The country’s political history had been largely shaped by changing 
power balances among ethnic groups. The politics of exclusion -  whereby dominance by one 
or more communities would come (or be perceived to come) at the expense of other 
communities -  had fostered a chain of violent ethnic and religious conflicts. In turn, the 
‘capture’ of the state by specific groups, be they the Lwo or the Langi under Milton Obote or 
the ‘Nubians’ under General Idi Amin, was reflected in the creation of non-democratic 
regimes as much as in the latter’s instability.
By any definition, ethnicity is based on a cognitive distinction between those who are 
‘in’ and those who are ‘out’ of a communal group1. As a consequence, ethnic politics tend to 
be inherently exclusionary politics. This is true no matter what kind of political regime is 
adopted. While a democratic system does offer the greatest potential for the inclusion of 
different communities by ensuring their representation, democracies in plural societies also 
risk an early loss of this legitimising inclusiveness. Democratic legitimacy is largely if not 
exclusively a form of procedural legitimacy. ‘Free and fair’ elections as a way of selecting a 
political leadership can spread the belief -  and legitimacy is about beliefs -  that the system is 
a ‘just’ one because the rulers are subject to proper procedures (the electoral process) that 
supposedly guarantee their right to rule. The opposition is meant to be constitutionally loyal
1 The terms ethnic and communal are here interchangeably adopted to indicate identities and solidarities based on beliefs in a 
shared past and in ‘real or putative' kinship relationships. Such identities can refer to different attributes as indicators of 
group membership (e.g. language, religion, colour or ‘race’, region, ‘nationality’, etc.), but, to a certain extent, their 
‘activation’ and politicisation can be a function of both inter-group relationships and political manipulation. Cf. Hutchinson -  
Smith (1996), Horowitz (1985), Young (1976), Kasfir (1976).
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and to acknowledge a government that has been empowered by popular vote. The government 
of the day, in turn, accepts the legitimate attempts by the opposition to take over in 
subsequent electoral rounds and the possibility that the existing majority/opposition relation 
might be reversed. In other words, the notion of democratic competition implies the 
opportunity, for every minority or opposition group, to take part in future to the government 
of the society.
The problem with democratic politics in an ethnically-divided context stems from the 
segmentation of the electorate. Voters are likely to vote according to their ethnic identity, and, 
because communal bonds are hardly negotiable, relatively few of them will modify their 
allegiances over time2. Successive elections may simply produce (or be perceived to produce) 
census-like results that reflect the ethnic segmentation of the electorate and the demographic 
size of the different groups. As electoral results tend to mirror socio-cultural cleavages 
without any foreseeable changes, the roles of majority and opposition may appear to be 
frozen, with the virtual possibility, for a demographically majoritarian part of the population 
or an alliance of groups, to be permanently in power. A demographic majority turned into a 
democratic majority would be able to claim a formal legitimacy, but, by permanently 
excluding opposition groups from the governmental sphere, it would in fact alienate the latter 
and undermine the substantive legitimacy and stability of the political system. Thus, the 
democratic system risks generating the conditions for its own implosion. Groups condemned 
to the opposition progressively lose their stake in the existing order and are most likely to 
react with some kind of violent anti-system challenge. Such a pattern is not only supported by 
worldwide evidence -  from Sri Lanka and Burundi to Northern Ireland -  but also by the very 
rhetoric adopted by Ugandan constitution-makers. The latter explicitly pointed at the adoption 
of highly ‘inclusive’ political institutions as the way to reduce occasions and perceptions of 
exclusion and thus to promote political legitimacy and stability.
In divided polities, structuring or engineering the political game in order to avoid or 
limit exclusionary outcomes is a critical task. In particular, the choice of adequate political 
institutions deeply affects the prospects for consolidation of a new democratic regime. The 
relative length of political reforms in Uganda reflects not only complex power struggles but 
also the relevance accorded to constitutional politics and political stability. Political reform, it 
was claimed, was a powerful instrument for shaping the constraints and incentives of future 
actors and thus moderating interethnic competition and conflict. The inclusiveness of the 
emerging regime was allegedly the paramount and specific preoccupation of the country’s
2 See, for instance, Horowitz (1991).
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political leadership when debating the merits of alternative sets of institutions3. The 
Movement political system was a reaction to a history of violent conflicts and was justified by 
the need to keep ethnic and religious identities out of politics. Thus, the new arrangements 
formally rejected communal groups as a legitimate basis for state institutions (such as federal 
sub-units) or political parties (whose activities are mostly banned).
As a background to the no-party reform of the late 1980s and 1990s — the object of 
the next chapter -  the past development of political parties in Uganda is investigated in the 
following section. In addition, the history of the land affairs and related conflicts is also 
introduced, as a basis for the analysis of no-party policy-making for land reform that will be 
carried out in Chapter Eight.
The historical development of Uganda's political parties
When Uganda achieved independence in 1962, the country inherited from its 
colonial master a set of new institutional arrangements that broadly and formally reflected 
British or Westminster-like political structures4. The latter included, for instance, prime 
ministerial executive authority, plurality elections, a single chamber of parliamentary 
representation5, and a lack of central representation for local and regional political- 
administrative units. The most notable exception displayed by the country’s main institutional 
features, when compared to the Westminster model, were the semi-federal arrangements 
envisaged by the constitution. These were only accorded to the four traditional kingdoms of 
Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, creating an asymmetric set-up in which the remaining 
areas merely retained the status of ‘districts’. Thus, “a peculiar form of federalism [was 
established] with political units based on a presumed common ethnic identity possessing 
sharply unequal degrees of power and wealth. The kingdom of Buganda was the only political 
unit with real federal autonomy”6.
In spite of the new participatory set-up left in place by the departing colonial power, 
however, Ugandans had hardly ever organised for modem politics before independence began 
to loom. The politicisation and organisation of social demands and grievances had only
3 See, for instance, Uganda Constitutional Commission Report (1993:7,56) and Museveni (1992).
4 See, for instance, Engholm (1963).
5 While the British polity is formally based on bicameralism, a key feature of the so-called Westminster model is the clear 
predominance of one chamber over the other (the case of Britain), when not a situation of pure unicameralism (as, for 
instance, in New Zealand). See, for example, Lijphart (199924).
6 Kasfir (1994:149).
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occasionally occurred, such as with the agitation of the Bataka (i.e. the Baganda clan heads) 
movement in the 1920s and again in the 1940s. In the latter period, a Farmers’ Union or 
Federation -  which partly overlapped with the Bataka movement -  was also active in 
demanding the break-up of the Asians’ monopoly in the processing and commercialisation of 
cotton and coffee7. Overall, however, “the few pressure groups that existed like the Bataka 
movement, the Taxi Drivers’ Association and the Uganda Farmers’ Association were more 
concerned with specific grievances than with questions of democracy and good governance”8.
While a colonial assembly had been established since the 1920s as an advisory body 
to the governor, it was only in 1958, barely four years before independence, that the majority 
of the African representatives to the Legislative Council were elected by Ugandans. Before 
that, members of the so-called LegCo were appointed by the governor, and the representation 
of African people had been delegated to one or two European members. The first African to 
join the assembly, made up of whites and Asians, was only appointed in 19459. As in several 
other countries on the continent, the lack of any pre-independence experience with modem 
politics and government was as striking as it was complete.
Independence arrived to many African countries somewhat unexpected. It was rarely 
the product of prolonged nationalist struggles, and this meant that nation-wide movements or 
political organisations hardly materialised. In the case of Uganda, in particular, pre- 
independence political issues had largely focused on district-level disputes, resulting in a 
parochial fragmentation and compartmentalisation of political life. The departing British 
authorities themselves, despite trying to leave in place some kind of participatory framework, 
had been highly critical of the formation of political parties on the ground that they would 
bring about populist appeals and sectarian divisions10.
Political parties only appeared in Uganda in the late 1950s and early 1960s -  and not 
without difficulties. During the 1950s, according to Low, “powerful, extensive, nationalist 
political part(ies) failed to develop”11 in the country. Several factors have been identified to 
explain this kind of development. Not only were there no non-African model political 
organisations to emulate, but the lack of a common language and the divisions of colonial 
administration, based on what were supposed to be tribal units now reproduced as electoral 
districts, were further obstacles to the organisation of fully ‘national’ politics12. The virtual




11 Low (1962:7-9). Cf. Kasfir (1976:114).
12 Karugire (1980:145).
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absence of electoral experience further detracted from the development of strong nation-wide 
political organisations.
Thus, when independence arrived, parties did take central stage, but they remained 
very weak arrangements. As a matter of fact, the emergence of sound political organisations, 
such as the Tanzanian African National Union13, was a rare instance throughout the continent. 
In many African countries, the development of strong organisations was also inhibited by the 
fact that, after independence, “the work of the party tend[ed] to be neglected”, since several 
party officials took over government responsibilities in the newly created states14. In Uganda, 
this was the case of the Uganda People’s Congress. In describing this kind of developments, 
some observers went as far as to suggest that, in practice, even “the one-party state in Africa 
has become a no-party state”15. The main political parties that emerged in Uganda shared this 
common organisational weakness and displayed an evident tendency to over-rely on 
individuals:
“[virtually] none of them was a full-time politician. [Party] organisation ... was almost 
invariably the work of these few men -  most usually upon their free week-ends. Parties had 
executive committees in which they sat with a certain number of others. Very occasionally 
-  once, perhaps, in three or four years -  a party convention would be held. Subscriptions 
were sometimes paid... Party branches were nominally established in many parts of the 
country, and from time to time political excitement might be enough to stir local rural 
leaders into activity. But more frequently, party organisation lay moribund. It was only in 
the Congress outside Buganda that branches ever displayed any considerable activity on 
their own, and even the course of these up-country branches was sometimes chequered.. 
one saw nothing at all comparable with the signboards marked ‘TANU Headquarters’...
Even Congress never worked its widespread radical following into a strong party 
organisation”16.
In 1952, the first political party made its appearance in the country. The Uganda 
National Congress (UNC) was formed and led by Ignatius Musazi, who had already been the 
prominent figure in the Bataka movement and was the former head of the Federation of 
Ugandan African Farmers that conducted a riot campaign in 1949. The UNC was a radical 
and socialist-oriented party, named after the Indian National Congress and controlled by a 
predominantly Baganda and Protestant leadership. It largely borrowed its own branch system
13 Low (1962:7-9). Cf. Apter (1961 [1997:307fT.]).
14 Kasfir (1976:244). Cf. Hill (1980:230). The pattern described could still be observed in the mid-1990s, when, in post­
apartheid South Africa, ANC leaders and cadres took over government responsibilities.
Wallemstein, quoted in Kasfir (1976247).
16 Low (1962:36).
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from the fanners’ Federation17, but it did not manage to attain a national scope or agenda18. 
The party remained trapped in a context of highly parochial or localised issues, further 
emphasised during the (Kabaka crisis’. In 1953, the Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II, had been 
deported to Britain upon his refusal to sanction constitutional reforms that the colonial 
authorities envisaged for the kingdom and for its traditional parliament, the Lukiiko, as well 
as their possible integration in a federation of East Africa. In the agitation that followed the 
exile of the Kabaka, the UNC, which was not a prominent voice over this issue, decided to 
take side with Buganda’s ethno-nationalists. This particularistic stance resulted in increased 
factional divisions at the centre and a weaker control over local party branches. In spite of 
these difficulties and of the virtual absence of elections, however, the UNC’s was the first 
attempt at establishing a presence on the ground, with some 50,000 supporters and 10,000 
fee-paying members19. While the party failed to establish itself as a durable national 
organisation, it made significant inroads in areas outside Buganda, such as the northern 
districts of Lango and Acholi20.
If the UNC relied on the Federation of farmers to reach out to the populace, the 
Democratic Party (DP) was assisted by priests and by the Catholic Action movement in its 
effort to take root. A moderate party, the DP was formed around 1954-56 to fight against the 
prospect of another Protestant becoming katikiro (the prime minister of the Buganda 
kingdom, who, according to the new Buganda Agreement of 1955, had now become 
elective)21. The party aimed at a general re-balance in the appointment of chiefs, on the ground 
that Catholics were a relative majority in the country, but Protestants were consistently over­
represented in public offices. In this sense, the DP was actually “a Christian Democratic Party 
... almost exclusively Roman Catholic in origin, inspiration and membership”22. The strategy 
of building upon religious structures proved to be more effective than the UNC’s in making 
the party’s presence a fixed feature on Uganda’s political stage. From the outset, the 
Democratic Party raised a large following in areas that would guarantee the bulk of its support 
for decades to come, notably Buganda in the south and the northern districts where the 
Verona Fathers operated (West Nile, Acholi and Lango)23. The party thus managed, to a 
degree, to bring together people from significantly different areas, especially by bridging the
17 Apter (1961 [1997:312]).
18 Karugire (1988:30ff.) and Low (1962:19).
19 Apter (1961[1997:318fF.,332n]).
20 Karugire (1980:150).
21 On whether the Democratic Party was formed in 1954, before the new Katikiro was appointed, or in 1956, after the post 
was given to a Protestant, see Karugire (1980:157ff.).
22 Low (1962:22-23). Cf. Karugire (1988:30ff.).
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north-south divide. While it may have been the case that “only the Catholic political groups 
have been able to call upon people’s loyalties to lessen the effects of ethnicity”24, however, the 
Democratic Party heavily contributed to a process of politicisation of religious affiliations. 
Protestants, who had occupied the vast majority of appointive offices since the end of the XIX 
century, did not have the same need and urgency to organise politically for the promotion and 
defence of their interests. At least not until Catholics threatened to modify the status quo that 
protected them so well25. These divisions were not only set to make emerging national politics 
highly conflictual, but they also exacerbated political confrontations in the primary setting of 
Ugandan politics — the districts — where religious factionalism “dissipated the energies of the 
political parties at a time where more coherent national politics could have been 
formulated”26.
The DP was led from 1958 by a lawyer, Benedicto Kiwanuka. Aside from the issue 
of how chieftaincies were being distributed, the party pressed for a policy of rapid 
Africanisation of political representation and of the civil service, and for the development of 
social welfare. The immediate achievement of independence, by comparison, was considered 
by the party less of a priority27.
At the time when the UNC and the DP were moving their first steps in the emerging 
politics, a number of other parties made short-lived appearances on the pre-independence 
stage. In the late 1950s, for example, a Progressive Party was organised within the Lukiiko 
assembly by a Westernised but conservative group led by Eridadi Mulira. The party, however, 
only survived a brief spell in the country’s politics (1955-8). Further attempts at making an 
impact followed and failed, including those of the Uganda Taxpayers’ Party, the Uganda 
Labour Party, the Uganda Nationalist Party, and the Uganda Reform Party. None of these 
small formations managed to establish a durable political organisation.
Both the Uganda National Congress and the Democratic Party, by contrast, 
succeeded in having delegates elected to the Legislative Council as soon as, in 1958, they 
were given a chance to do so. In spite of the newly-gained national representation, however, 
most politicians maintained their focus on district cleavages. The Buganda establishment and 
its Lukiiko had even decided to boycott the election, refusing to send the representatives they 
were entitled to. The growing demands and the challenge that the elite at Mengo, the 
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reinforcing and cementing the fears and antipathies that other areas bore against Buganda. As 
the divide deepened, a coalition of anti-Baganda local leaders emerged within the LegCo -  
under the new label of the Uganda People’s Union (UPU) -  bringing together some 
representatives that had been elected as independents and others that were exiting from 
existing parties. The emergence of the Union immediately set in motion an important re­
alignment process in Ugandan politics, causing a split within the still-young Uganda National 
Congress. An internal clash opposed the Baganda members of the UNC, led by Musazi, to the 
non-Baganda. Milton Apolo Obote emerged from among the latter as a charismatic leader 
capable of channelling anti-Baganda feelings in a new party, the Uganda People’s Congress, 
which he formed in March 1960 by merging his wing of the UNC with the recently-created 
UPU.
The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) rapidly took centre stage in the country, 
assembling a majority in the LegCo and positioning itself as a key antagonist in the two 
cleavages that were shaping Ugandan politics. The origin of the party put it clearly on one 
side of the first key divide: “the UPC was specifically an anti-Buganda party right from its 
inception and this was to remain throughout its history”28. At the same time, the party took up 
a political identity as an anti-Catholic coalition, dominated by a Protestant leadership as well 
as based on Protestant associations29. In spite of its success, however, the UPC struggled to 
establish a national organisation:
“both the Uganda People’s Congress and the Democratic Party characteristically featured 
an amalgam of local caucuses rather than a strong national leadership that would try to 
branch out into the districts. This pattern was particularly pronounced in the case of the 
UPC”30.
“the strength of that party did not lie in the coherence of its organs, for these hardly existed, 
but in the fact that most of its leaders had also been leaders of their own districts. ...
Therefore it was impossible to build a coherent party whose machinery could impose 
discipline on all and sundry”31.
Uganda’s new political parties represented the emergence of modem politics, which 
was meant to be based on popular participation and electoral competition for political office. 
While the parties themselves appealed to ‘existing’ communal diversities such as ethnic or
28 Karugire (1988:36).
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religious solidarities, however, they had to face the opposition of political forces that had an 
even stronger historical link with cultural or traditional affiliations. These non-party political 
forces were not going to look on while the parties prepared to fight among themselves for 
power. In spite of the role that parties were acquiring, it could be claimed that “the most 
powerful and well-organised grouping remain[ed] Buganda, which fimction[ed] like a 
regional political party vis-a-vis others, its clientele based on ethnicity”32.
Since the mid-1950s, politics within the Lukiiko assembly had been dominated by 
neo-traditionalists. The latter combined an attachment to old style politics -  and thus an innate 
anti-partism -  with the early recognition that, to respond to the challenges of the emerging 
political parties, they had to structure their own action better. The example of Ghana, where, 
after independence in 1957, the Convention People’s Party had adopted measures that 
strongly penalised traditional institutions33, prompted some prominent Baganda to organise a 
Uganda National Movement (UNM) in 1959. Political leaders such as Mulira and Musazi 
coalesced in this short-lived party, which faded soon after orchestrating a boycott against non- 
African products aimed at hitting the resented Asian processing and marketing activities. The 
UNM, which was only a loose association, was somewhat tightened and formalised with the 
formation of a quasi-party -  the Kabaka Yekka (KY) -  in June 1961. The ‘the king alone’ 
organisation, which was endowed with abundant resources by comparison to other political 
forces34, was bom with an explicit conservative, pro-royalty and federalist political platform. 
Since the Baganda elite at Mengo had been traditionally dominated by Protestants, the KY 
also came into being, in practice, as an anti-Catholic coalition.
As the post-independence political scene began to take shape, therefore, a three-actor 
game resulted from the politicisation of two communal cleavages: an ethnic Baganda versus 
non-Baganda dimension and a religious Protestant versus Catholic alignment. In the new 
politics, the young and semi-organised Kabaka Yekka movement soon scored striking 
successes. It managed, in the year of its very creation, 1961, to orchestrate an impressive 
boycott of the election for the first National Assembly, with only 3-4 per cent of the Baganda 
electorate taking part in the exercise. The success, however, somehow backfired. Mengo’s 
boycott of the election meant that the DP, which won most of the seats in Buganda with only 
a few votes and a further share in other areas, managed to put together an absolute majority in 
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June 1961. The new government -  and the prospect of it becoming even more powerful on 
granting of independence -  sparked fears among Protestant elites and hierarchies, in and out 
of political parties.
Buganda's boycott had meanwhile prompted the decision to repeat the vote the 
following year. On the basis of a fragile anti-Catholic understanding and in spite of all the 
differences separating the two, the Uganda People’s Congress and the Kabaka Yekka resolved 
to join forces. The formation of this coalition was agreed in view of the 1962 election, to be 
held just before independence. The KY was now “confronted by novel problems of electoral 
organisation... but into the breach stepped the now chastened chiefly hierarchy... enjoyed the 
great advantage of being organised already as a functioning political bureaucracy”35, a 
“formidable organization”36. While, during the first election, Mengo had influenced the vote 
by keeping most Baganda away from polling stations, the following year it went straight for 
their votes. In February, the Kabaka Yekka thus won 65 out of 68 seats in the Lukiiko, losing 
only the three seats that were contested in the ‘lost counties’, an area of Buganda which had 
formerly belonged to Bunyoro and was still inhabited by Banyoro people. The remarkable 
electoral success granted the KY the control of Buganda’s 21 representatives to the National 
Assembly, since the kingdom had been allowed to elect them indirectly. While Mengo 
certainly exerted a strong appeal over many Baganda, however, instances of pre-election 
intimidation and harassment on the part of the Baganda chiefs, who were exempted from the 
control of Uganda’s new self-government institutions and still responded to Mengo, were far 
from unknown. The fact that the kingdom fought hard at the London constitutional conference 
of late 1961 to have its representatives to the National Assembly elected by the Lukiiko is 
open to interesting interpretations:
“if the Buganda populace was given a free hand in choosing their representatives to the 
Lukiiko and to the Assembly, they would have unquestionably removed the backwoodsmen 
who had ruled them by bullying and intimidation for so long. ... Thus the Baganda were 
carefully shielded from  expressing their loyalty so directlynyr.
But the crux of the matter was that, for the KY as for the other parties, the focus 
remained on local issues and communal representation, which, in turn, implied that central 
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“Ugandan parties exacerbated ethnic political participation up to 1966. None of them 
developed centralized national organizations. Instead, they were oriented toward district 
politics and vulnerable to the appeals of ethnic movements. The national organization of the 
UPC controlled neither nominations of candidates for the NA nor policy statements of 
district branches ... ‘its structure was based on a conglomeration of tribes’. The DP also 
showed few signs of centralization ... KY ... was an ethnic movement and only in the 
broadest sense a party at all”38.
In both the 1961 and the 1962 elections, the Democratic Party won mostly Catholic 
votes (especially out of Buganda), while the Uganda People’s Congress represented non- 
Baganda non-Catholics, and the Kabaka Yekka controlled a large section of Baganda support. 
Milton Obote, the leader of the UPC, the party that won a relative majority in the second 
election, took office as prime minister on independence day -  the 9th of October 1962 -  while 
the Kabaka became the first head of the newly-born Ugandan state shortly afterwards. But 
contradictions in the coalition between the KY and the UPC -  the latter being a party created 
to fight the Baganda’s economic and political predominance -  were bound to emerge in full 
sooner rather than later. The Kabaka Yekka, which relied on external institutions rather than 
on its own organisational strength and coherence, was rapidly consumed by internal 
factionalism. Defections to the UPC, which controlled the reigns of government and was 
progressively restricting the scope for the Kabaka’s involvement in politics, became 
unstoppable39. Deeply divided, the UPC-KY coalition formed at independence collapsed only 
four years later, in 1966, when prime minister Obote, who by this time could count on a UPC 
majority in the Assembly, staged a coup. But the enactment of a new, so-called ‘pigeon-hole’ 
constitution40 was the end-result of a longer process. It has been claimed that “multiparty 
politics had ceased to exist within a couple of years after independence. After 1964 Uganda 
became a de facto one-party state”41. The organisation of the UPC itself had become 
somewhat marginal to the new politics. After a party conference in 1964, “Obote decided to 
do away with mass organization and replace it with an army ... After that Gulu conference no 
party activity of any significance took place”42. As a result:
37 Karugire (1980:185, emphasis in the original); instances of harassment and malpractices in the 1962 Lukiiko election are 
also presented by Mugaju (2000:19). Another constitutional conference would follow just before independence, without 
changing much the arrangements that had been agreed the previous year, Karugire (1980:188).
38 Kasfir (1976:113,115).
39 Kasfir (1976:126). ‘Floor crossing’ concerned the DP as well: all but 6 of its 24 MPs had, by 1966, crossed to the UPC
the document after they had voted to ratify it, when they found a copy in their pigeon-holes.
41 Mugaju (2000:21).
42 Onyango Odongo (2000:55).
(Mugaju 2000:21). 
The MPs only saw
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“in fact, by 1965, for the UPC as well as for the DP, the only evidence that political parties 
had existed in 1962 were the old battered party flags... to be found fluttering for only over 
some buildings which had functioned as party offices during the electoral campaigns of 
1961 and 1962”43.
In 1967, a third constitutional text was introduced, which merged the figures of the 
head of state and the head of government into an executive presidency with strongly enhanced 
powers44. Traditional kingdoms were abolished, Buganda as a political entity was broken up 
into a number of districts by Obote the northener, and, overtime, a centralising and 
undemocratic tendency became manifest in the progressive elimination of most participatory 
structures, from elections and decentralised representative bodies to opposition parties. As 
Nelson Kasfir has pointed out, the setting aside of state participatory institutions, such as 
parliament or local governments, and the ban on political parties were not a phenomenon 
unique to Uganda. Rather, they were part of ‘departicipation strategies’ that were being 
adopted in a number of other countries on the continent. Many African leaders were trying to 
cope with the politicisation of ethnic solidarities by cutting down the opportunities for popular 
involvement in politics that the participatory arrangements installed at independence 
envisaged. Tanzania remained a most notable (though partial) exception to this common 
pattern. Under Julius Nyerere, participation was maintained at comparatively high levels, 
albeit this was controlled by TANU, which contextually developed a relatively strong 
organisation45.
Elections, parties and  conflict in the 1980s
In many African countries, the legacy left by the virtual absence of organised politics 
before independence contributed to paving the way to the early abolition of participatory 
practices. In Uganda, the tendency inimical to respecting constitutional rule became even 
more evident under the military dictatorship of General Idi Amin Dada, between 1971 and 
1979. After overthrowing Obote with an army coup, Amin not only completed the latter’s 
work of eliminating pluralist institutions by abolishing parliament, but he tried to ban
43 Karugire (1980:190).
44 The president was to be the leader of the party winning over 40 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections, but new 
elections never actually took place (Regan 1995:172).
45 Kasfir (1976:25ff., 276).
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‘politics’ entirely46, ruling by decree and absolute discretion. The army, which Obote had 
made the basis of political power since the mid-1960s, became the central albeit chaotically- 
run institution. In the 1970s, Amin’s Uganda became synonym for civil repression, political 
disorder and unpredictable violence.
In 1978, Idi Amin tried to divert attention from internal problems of economic 
hardship and factionalism within the army by invading and annexing the Kagera river region 
of northern Tanzania. This granted the numerous Ugandan exiles the support they needed to 
overthrow the General. Making the best of Nyerere’s reaction, the UPC-controlled Kikosi 
Maalum forces and Yoweri Museveni’s Front for National Salvation (Fronasa), both based in 
Dar es Salaam, marched into Kampala alongside Tanzanian troops in April 197947. The 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), an alliance of anti-Amin forces formed at the 
Moshi conference the previous month, installed a transitional government with Yusuf Lule as 
president of the country.
The collapse of Amin’s personalistic regime and the factionalism inside the 
transitional bodies, however, meant that Uganda’s politics and administration became 
increasingly chaotic. A divide emerged between the Muganda figureheads of the country -  
Lule first, and Godfrey Binaisa since June 1979 -  and a reconstituted army (the Uganda 
National Liberation Army, UNLA). The latter was dominated by Langi and Acholi elements, 
such as Brigadier David Oyite-Ojok and General Tito Okello, who were loyally committed to 
Milton Obote and to the UPC. In the conflicts among factions that ensued, Yoweri Museveni, 
the vice-chairman of the pivotal Military Commission, was removed from the Ministry of 
Defence in early 1980. Shortly afterwards, UPC Paulo Muwanga, chairman of the Military 
Commission, ousted Binaisa and took over as the third transitional head of state. Muwanga’s 
takeover also implied that the scheduled election would be held under multiparty competition, 
rather than under a UNLF no-party umbrella, as had been previously hypothesised48.
The months that followed still constitute one of the most controversial periods in 
Uganda’s political history, and one which sparked the country’s civil war. With Obote’s 
return to Uganda, in May 1980, the UPC had a transitional head of the executive (Muwanga), 
a prospective president (Obote himself), and a loyal albeit undisciplined army. The party 
immediately started an aggressive election campaign. Soldiers were let loose to harass 
civilians in supposedly non-loyal areas. Candidates and voters became subject to all sorts of 
violence, looting and political intimidation on the part of UPC controlled authorities, party
46 Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:9).
4' Karugire (1988:84ff.), Mutibwa (1992:137) and Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:14fF.).
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activists, and the army. The Democratic Party and its supporters, who seemed to enjoy an 
increasing popularity, were carefully targeted as the main threat to UPC’s electoral success.
To complement the way the campaign was run, when election day arrived, on 10 
December 1980, the UPC intervened heavily to manipulate the voting process and the 
electoral results49. Paulo Muwanga* s decree, on the day after the election, prohibiting the 
Electoral Commission and polling stations Returning Officers from declaring constituency 
winners until he himself gave the green light was taken by many -  including most 
international observers50 -  as the definitive proof that the election was rigged.
While it was the Democratic Party that was probably deprived of an electoral victory, 
the decision to react came from the ranks of a minor party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement 
(UPM). Set up shortly before the election by Yoweri Museveni and other former-UPC youth 
such as Eriya Kategaya and Jaberi Bidandi-Ssali, the UPM had gained some support among 
the urban sections of the population. This, however, did not materialise in a significant 
electoral result, as the party only won one parliamentary seat. Not even the UPM leader, 
Museveni, made it to parliament.
On the ground that the Obote and UPC had returned to power through political 
violence and manipulation, Museveni and 27 others decided to respond to violence with 
violence by ‘going to the bush*. From the very geographical core of the country, the Luwero 
area of Buganda, they launched what would be the first guerrilla takeover of an independent 
state on the African continent. Here, drawing on notions of protracted people’s war and on his 
visits to Frelimo’s training camps during the Mozambican liberation war, Museveni started 
recruiting people and organising civilian ‘Resistance Councils’. The insurgency was allegedly 
aimed at radically changing the politics and socio-economic structure of the Ugandan society, 
as spelt out in the political platform of the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), 
the Ten Point Programme.
In the five-year civil war which resulted, Obote’s controversial army -  a synonym of 
uncontrolled terror for large sections of the civilian population -  was opposed by a new 
politico-military force that made discipline the very foundation of its search for popular 
legitimacy and backing. The infamous accounts of the behaviour of Obote’s soldiers, security 
agencies, local authorities (which were made appointive) and UPC activists played into the
48 Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:17), Mutibwa (1992:134), and Onyango Odongo (2000:67). The latter refers to the Mayumba 
Kumi alternative political system, which was being devised when Binaisa was ousted.
49 See, for example, Karugire (1988:88 and appendices), Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:18), Mutibwa (1992:140).
50 Human Rights Watch (1999:34).
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hands of the NRM/A insurgents51. The population was being terrorised, with some areas being 
especially targeted. In the so-called Luwero triangle, for example, where the guerrillas had 
their operational bases, civilians were massacred for allegedly backing them. The West Nile 
region was hit by violence as the basis of pro-Amin guerrillas and as a DP political 
constituency. South-western Uganda was the resented home area of many NRM leaders of 
Banyankole (especially of the Bahima sub-group) and Banyarwanda origins. In all these 
areas, local people reacted by becoming actively or passively supportive of the rebels. The 
latter appeared to act in a more disciplined manner towards civilians and, through the local 
resistance councils, managed to re-create some kind of order in the areas they came to control. 
Indeed, it was later claimed that “the NRM/NRA ‘bush’ war was a revolution in the sense that 
it transformed the image of the army among the population”52.
Meanwhile, the military failures of the Obote II regime and the growing discontent at 
the social and economic situation of the country nurtured a deep divide between the Lwo 
components that dominated the army. As presidential appointments hinted more and more at 
an attempt to grant foil control of the military to Obote’s Langi people, a coup was organised 
against the moribund regime by some Acholi officers. This, however, could not change the 
outcome of a civil war that was reaching its conclusion. In January 1986, roughly six months 
after Obote had been ousted by Tito and Bazilio Okello, Museveni overthrew the latter and 
took over power in Kampala. It is worth citing the well-known ouverture to his inaugural 
speech as the head of state:
“No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is a 
fundamental change in the politics of our country. In Africa, we have seen so many changes 
that change, as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil. We have had one group getting rid of 
another one, only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced. Please, do not 
count us in that group of people”53.
The land question in Uganda since 1900: an overview
Whether or not genuine and successful, Museveni’s regime has actively promoted 
plans for radical changes of the country’s politics, economy and society. The president
51 For a revealing autobiographical episode, see Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:xiii-xx). For a general account, see Amnesty 
International, Human rights violations in Uganda: extra-judicial executions, torture and imprisonment, September 1982.
52 Eryia Kategaya, former National Political Commissar of the NRM, preface to Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998:xi).
53 Museveni (1992:21).
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himself has been the driving force behind these plans, which responded to a combination of 
political ambitions, developmental convictions and external pressures. In particular, a broad 
policy agenda, largely elaborated by foreign sponsors, provided content and direction to 
Museveni’s reformist impetus. Political and constitutional reform, participatory 
decentralisation, civil service reform, privatisation of state assets and market deregulation, 
universal primary education are among the most important transformations embraced by the 
regime.
Land reform -  the object of Chapter Eight -  was an integral part of this broad- 
ranging framework for change. Developmental and political concerns, intertwining and 
overlapping, made it a key issue in Uganda’s reform agenda for the 1990s. The overlap of 
pre-colonial practices, colonial interventions and post-colonial reforms had left land affairs in 
a state of confusion. Both developmental and political concerns aimed at changing -  or, at a 
minimum, clarifying -  the existing situation. First, land is a critical aspect in the 
modernisation of an economy such as Uganda’s. Orthodox economic tenets hold that land 
rights, management and markets have to be rationalised. The country needed to regulate a 
field which no longer followed the legal dictate of past reforms, and to put in place a set of 
arrangements that reflected more closely the current thinking on property rights and 
agricultural development. The reform was aimed at addressing a confused state of affairs, for 
instance, where “there are practical situations of people with titles who cannot have access to 
their land. We have situations where there are people on the land but they cannot get titles”54. 
Effective recognition of land rights and their possible formalisation were the key points of a 
rationalisation process.
In addition to and overlapping with the need for rationalisation, there was a political 
push to reward groups that had provided the bulk of the consensus for the regime (groups 
variously identified as women, tenants, westerners or otherwise) and a historical quest for 
settling disputes between landlords and tenants. Here, the question was which way the above 
‘confusion’ in the control of lands and titles would be sorted out: who would get what and 
how. The president wanted to reward the poor peasants of the central region for the backing 
they had provided during the guerrilla years, as well as to ensure their continued support. 
Point number eight in the NRM’s Ten Point Programme explicitly referred to “people 
displaced by land-grabbers or through erroneously conceived ‘development’ projects”, 
“misuse of land” and “an emerging problem of landlessness” as issues that the new regime
54 A delegate to the Constituent Assembly, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (6 May 1995, p.4200).
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was meant to redress55. In particular, some form of land redistribution could help cementing 
the alliance between the president and the peasants of the central (and, to a lesser extent, of 
the western) region. According to some, the plan of a similar redistribution “was explicit, and 
a strong motivation for fighters during the guerrilla. For Banyoro people in Kibale and also 
for the Baganda. And for the Banyankole as well”56.
And yet, in spite of the very peculiar trajectory that led the new regime to addressing 
the land question, land reform was not, in the 1990s, a process unique to Uganda. The 
emergence of internal pressures to address the issue was a phenomenon common to other 
parts of the continent, notably to eastern and southern countries such as South Africa, 
Namibia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania:
“in all these countries, the pressure to act is, at least in part, the result of contested 
democratic politics and the perceived need to meet the concerns of rural voters. This is 
most obvious in South Africa but also applies to Namibia and Tanzania. The commitment 
to legislate in Namibia was made just before the general election of late 1994, when the 
government felt the need to respond to a ‘People’s Conference’ on land reform which had 
taken place that year. The enactment of the Agricultural (Commercial Land Reform) Act 
(ACLRA) took place just after the election. In Tanzania, the establishment of a Presidential 
Commission and the drive towards finalizing a national policy occurred as the country 
moved from a one-party to a multi-party system”57.
Land ownership, management and use practices are so deeply embedded in the life of 
Ugandans that presenting a picture of the situation as a background to reform is a daunting 
task. But there is no way around it to appreciate the rationale of the policy process completed 
in 1998. Since the focus of this work is land reform as a process and an opportunity for 
political interests to emerge -  rather than a discussion of the developmental merits and 
drawbacks of alternative solutions -  the pre-reform situation is only reconstructed insofar as it 
matters for understanding the stakes and interests involved in the reform process.
The controversial issues that the reform needed to tackle had deep historical roots, 
and were thus burning well before the land question entered the policy agenda. Soon after 
establishing the protectorate, the British had touched upon land relations in a way that was to 
affect the life of Ugandans for a long time to come. Although the colonial administration did 
not modify customary land with any radical changes, colonial land policies introduced 
elements of Westem-like ownership in Buganda and in the other kingdom areas of Bunyoro,
55 Museveni (19922% 1).
56 Matia Baguma-Isoke MP, Minister of State for Lands and Environment, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000).
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Toro and Ankole58. The 1900 Anglo-Buganda Agreement was “an agreement in equal measure 
about land and about governance”59. But, while nowadays there are few if any traces of the 
provisions agreed to regulate rule in Buganda, clauses 15 to 17 of the Agreement, pertaining 
to land, had enduring consequences. Prior to the Agreement, all land in Buganda was 
communal, and both the king and his chiefs were only recognised rights over people, rather 
than over land. But the British came in with a different view of land ownership, and combined 
it with an attempt to reward a Baganda elite whose loyalty was key to colonial rule over the 
larger protectorate. Thus, they reallocated roughly half the land of the kingdom to the 
advantage of a small minority: of Buganda’s 19,600 square miles, 958 sqm were assigned to 
the royal family and some 8,000 sqm to the new bureaucrat-chiefs. The remaining 9,000 sqm 
were appropriated by the colonial administration as ‘crown land’, and occupants, although 
formally converted into tenants of the colonial state, in fact retained land in customary 
tenure60.
The square miles of land allocated to the king and his chiefs came to be known as 
mailo land. But, and here lay the most consequential aspect of the re-allocation exercise, that 
which was allocated to royals and notables was not unoccupied land. A new landed 
aristocracy was being created by distributing land that was already inhabited by poor peasants 
-  the bakopi -  and had hitherto been regulated by customary norms rather than individual 
ownership. The presence of peasants over mailo land was not accidental but key to the new 
arrangement: “if you were chief, the Kabaka would give you your square mile. Many 
preferred land with people, because the more tenants, the more nvujjo [a share of the 
agricultural produce] you got”61. “...Otherwise what was the purpose of mailo? The mailo was 
to reward the person, to use the peasant labour and make an income”62. Indeed, while ‘crown 
land’ was supposedly carved out of ‘waste or uncultivated land’ (albeit this was far from 
always the case), it was implicit that mailo was land already occupied63. More than ninety 
years after the mailo system was introduced, it was still perceived by some Ugandans as:
57 McAuslan (1998:527).
58 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:675).
59 McAuslan (2000:1).
60 The newly-created ‘crown land’ came to be known in Luganda as mailo kenda (‘the 9,000 square miles’). The figures are 
those provided by Henry West’s Land policy in Buganda, Cambridge, 1972, quoted in McAuslan (2000:1). Cf. Uganda 
Constitutional Commission (1993:676). L.P.Mairs, Native Policies in Africa (1938:158-9) provides slightly different figures: 
of BUganda’s 17,310 square miles, 1,000 sqm were handed to the royal family, 8,300 square miles went to the new 
bureaucrat-chiefs (as opposed to bataka chiefs), and the remaining 9,000 sqm were taken by the colonial administration as 
‘crown land’ (quoted in The Monitor, 4 June 1998).
61 Mulindwa Birimumaso, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4169).
62 Maj.Nuwe Amanya Mushega, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4153).
63 Maliro, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (9 May 1995, p.4234).
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“the greatest broad day robbery of the peasants of Buganda by the British imperialists who 
wanted to bribe the chiefs who overthrew Mwanga.... the British Governor of Uganda at 
the time, Johnstone, his land settlement was a practical attempt to create an aristocratic 
class in Buganda. ... Before the colonial rule, neither the kabaka nor the chiefs had any 
power over land ... for the Baganda ... the chief does not control land, he rules people -  
Tafuga taka, afuga bantu. ... For the Baganda peasants independence did not mean 
decolonisation ... the Baganda peasants are the most degraded, the most despised, the most 
exploited peasants in Uganda ... the perpetuation of the mailo land system ... can be 
regarded as a time bomb”64.
To a degree, however, the customs of the Buganda kingdom with regard to land 
affairs were open to different interpretations. According to a Ugandan scholar, for example, 
prior to colonialism “all land in Buganda belonged to the Kabaka” -  at least in a broad sense -  
rather than to the bakopi65. A detailed reconstruction of customary land practices, and of the 
possible interpretations of such practices, are beyond the objectives of this thesis. The key 
point, however, is that mailo tenure and its relation to traditional norms were extremely 
controversial issues that were bound to originate longlasting divisions.
Dynamics similar to those that followed the introduction of mailo in Buganda also 
developed in the Ankole kingdom. When land allotments were distributed in 1901, the local 
Bahima chiefs made sure their plots would be carved out of the most densely populated areas 
in the district, so that they could extract maximum rent and other services from Bairu 
peasants. The result was an overlap of emerging class-like identities with a deepening ethnic 
divide. This overlap was only in part attenuated when new channels for the upward mobility 
of Bairu elements were opened by a land titling project, between 1958 and 1963, and by an 
increased commercialisation of land in the 1960s66.
In addition to the individualisation of land ownership, the Buganda Agreement had 
also transferred part of the land of Bunyoro kingdom to the more loyal Baganda. This was 
done through a formal transfer of both administration (Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties 
became part of the Buganda kingdom) and ownership (the land in question was turned over to 
Baganda landowners). But the Banyoro peasants who lived on that land remained there, and 
Buyaga and Bugangaizi came to be known as the ‘lost counties’.
64 Chango Machyo [Samia Bugwe South], in Proceedings o f die Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4166), with reference 
to H.West’s ‘Land system in Buganda’.
63 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi argues that “the full saying is *omwaami tafuga taka; afuga bantu’, and thus excludes the 
Kabaka, who has never been ‘omwaami’ (i.e. ‘chief, or husband). “In any case, the so-called clan ownership did not amount 
to members of specific clans living in specifically designated areas. Instead peasants lived on land belonging to the monarch 
but under the custodianship of the incumbent chief in the area. Peasants could shift from one area to another to be under the 
rule of a particular chief [rather than another], or for other reasons” (personal communication).
66 Doombos (1978:80,85,131ff.).
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Thus, the Agreement introduced ownership of land on the part of the king and his 
chiefs; it established semi-feudal mailo relationships between customary occupants and the 
new owners; it created a new category of ‘public’ land; and it transferred to the Baganda land 
that was previously part of the neighbouring kingdom of Bunyoro. The deep resentments and 
patent controversies that each of these changes generated did not take long to resurface.
The creation of landlord-tenant relationships with the introduction of mailo tenure 
raised tensions among the Baganda. From the moment mailo was allocated to the chiefs and 
other notables, the new owners had been asking excessive busuulu (an annual fee) and envujjo 
(a share of the agricultural produce) to tenants whose rights and security went unprotected67. 
The extraction of these benefits, in turn, increased the value of land and the power of the 
landlords, whose number rapidly increased out of sales or inheritance68. When the bakopi’s 
protests were channelled and expressed by the bataka (clan heads) movement, in 192169, it 
became apparent that new legal measures had to be devised to try and sort these problems out. 
The “allocation of the original mailo holdings ... was made without regard to pre-existing 
rights of occupancy and ignored the presence of peasant cultivators ... Thus, it became 
necessary to enact the Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928”70. The law was promoted by 
colonial authorities -  concerned by the decline in the agricultural produce of overexploited 
peasants -  and passed by the Kabaka’s government of Buganda. Similar legislation was soon 
approved in Toro and Ankole71. These new measures provided for the formalisation of 
existing relationships between mailo landlords and those tenants who were either already 
settled on the land or had been allowed to settle in exchange for the rent and labour that 
landlords would obtain. Tenure rights were granted to the tenants in such a way that, 
according to some interpretations, the latter were accorded de facto freehold72: “a social 
compromise that incorporated the Baganda peasantry, and reduced the capacity of the 
[landlords] to develop fully capitalist control over the land they had rented out”73. In fact, the 
rents established by these laws went largely unchanged until the 1975 Land Reform Decree, 
thus losing their effective economic value. A symbolic significance, nonetheless, remained
67 Committee Report on Land Bill (1998:26). Cf. Baguma-Isoke (1998).
68 Mamdani (1976:120ff.).
69 See, for instance, Apter (1961:113,123,147).
70 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:676).
71 The situation in Toro and Ankole was regulated by die 1937 and 1947 Landlord and Tenant Laws. Cf. Committee Report 
on Land Bill (1998:26) and Baguma-Isoke (1998). On the negative effects of busuulu and envujjo over total agricultural 
production, see Mamdani (1976:123).
Marquardt -  Sebina Zziwa (1998:176).
73 E A. Brett, personal communication.
50
Post-independence politics and conjlict-management failures
attached to such relationships, and thus ownership of mailo land maintained its importance as 
an indicator of social status74.
When Uganda was granted independence, in 1962, demands for a solution of the 
‘lost counties’ question also came to the fore. The constitutional provisions agreed at the 
Lancaster House Conference, which recognised the different kingdoms and their territories, 
envisaged that a referendum would be held in Buyaga and Bugangaizi, the two counties 
claimed back by the Banyoro, to determine their future. The planned popular consultation was 
indeed pushed through by prime minister Milton Obote and, as expected, the two counties 
were returned to Bunyoro as Kibale district. The referendum, however, ignited a dramatic 
reaction in Buganda and only solved half of the question. While the administration of the two 
counties was returned to Bunyoro, the formal ownership of land in Kibale was retained by 
absentee Baganda landlords, towards whom the resentment of the local peasants went 
unchanged.
Meanwhile, new dispossessions had occurred between the 1950s and the 1960s. In 
the 1950s, to exterminate the tse-tse fly, the colonial government had evacuated local people 
from areas at the border with Tanzania. These were nomadic pastoralists who then emigrated 
to the Congo and to other areas in the north and east of the country. Then, in the 1960s, based 
on a plan formulated by the colonial government and carried out by Ugandan authorities after 
independence, ranches were established in the area and land was allocated to people other 
than those who had been originally dispossessed. The new owners were not the original ones. 
And, according to some, those who were dispossessed are those currently in power75.
Finally, there was the public land issue. When the British left, the so-called ‘crown 
land’ that had been in the hands of the colonial administration was returned to Buganda and 
vested in a Buganda Land Board76. Thus, for a few years, the Buganda kingdom authorities 
found themselves in control of land they had never previously owned (before colonialism, this 
was in fact customary land). But Obote’s coup in 1966 changed again this situation. 
Following the struggle between the prime minister and the Buganda government, the latter’s 
assets were expropriated and the central administration acquired the control of the contentious 
9,000 square miles as ‘public land’. This was vested in the Uganda Land Commission, and the
74 Cf. Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre (1989:178).
5 Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000).
76 “The 1962 constitution made provisions for what seemed to be two separate arrangements for the holding and management 
of land; for the federal areas and for areas which were not under federal status... However, the underlying principle even in 
the 1962 constitution was that land was still vested in the state” (Ben Wacha [Oyam County North], in Proceedings o f the 
Constituent Assembly, 4 May 1995, p.4109).
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acquisition was sanctioned by article 108 of the 1967 constitution and, later, by a 1969 Public 
Lands Act.
Like all of the country’s previous regimes, colonial or post-colonial, General Idi 
Amin’s rule in the 1970s also left its mark on the land issue. The Land Reform Decree of 
1975 was the last piece of legislation directly dealing with land before the NRM took over 
power. After the decree, things had remained largely unchanged for two decades.
On paper, Amin’s decree -  which declared all land to be public -  implied crucial 
alterations to land tenure. Individually-owned land was now to belong to the state: freehold 
and mailo tenure were formally abolished, or rather transformed into 99-year state leaseholds. 
These leases were to be managed by the Uganda Land Commission and its District Land 
Committees, with a largely discretionary power “to terminate any lease on ‘undeveloped’ land 
and grant it to a potential ‘developer’”77. While customary tenure systems were in theory 
granted continuation, tenants -  now on ‘public’ land -  were much more exposed to arbitrary 
evictions, with private enclosures occasionally sanctioned by the Commission78. Customary 
tenants, whose consent had been necessary, according to the 1969 Public Lands Act, before 
their land could be removed from them, lost this protection. In practice, however, the decree 
was never fully implemented and all four systems persisted79. And so did the repealed busuulu 
and envujjo laws. But because the latter had been formally revoked by the decree, a new 
situation emerged where bibanja holders -  i.e. peasants on mailo land -  lacked security of 
tenure and, from statutory tenants, became squatters or ‘tenants at sufferance’80. According to 
some analysts, on the other hand, the bakopi were in fact protected from eviction by complex 
socio-cultural obligations, and they now had the additional advantage of not paying rent any 
longer. Problems, if ever, would arise when the growing value of land would pit commercial 
interest against social convention, weakening existing obligations and generating new 
problems of landlessness81.
77 Mamdani (1987:197).
78 Cf. Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:678), Mamdani (1987202).
79 The unimplemented decree increased the confusion in the regulation and practice of land affairs. On paper, the decree was 
a valid law and implied that individual ownership no longer existed. But actual practice was more complicated: “the titles, 
particularly freehold and mailo land... were never recalled to be cancelled and made into leaseholds, and the Land Office has 
been treating them as freehold and mailo land” (Urban Tibamanya, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly, 4 May 1995, 
p.4140). Thus, any post-1975 transactions “would be valid by only that the interest passed would not be freehold, but it 
would be leasehold” (Mwesigwa Rukutana [Rusheny County], in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly, 4 May 1995, 
p.4140). One of the tasks that the constituent assembly set for itself was to establish some order by repealing Amin’s decree, 
although it was claimed that “for Ugandans, it does not matter because they were in freehold, then they became leasehold 
purportedly under the 1975 Decree, and now we are to send them back” (James Wapakhabulo, in Proceedings o f the 
Constituent Assembly, 4 May 1995, p.4141).
80 Maj.Gen. David Tinyefuza, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4156).
81 Kisamba-Mugerwa (1991:316-18) and Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre (1989:161). The latter 
study also suggested that, with the growing pressure on and value of land, and with the weakening of social obligations, even
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“customary tenants on public land would be in a ... vulnerable position. Land users, particularly smallholders in all parts of 
the country would be vulnerable to eviction by those who have more political power and are able to convince the Land 
Commission that they should be givem leases with minimal compensation for sitting tenants” (1989:161).
Chapter 3
Political a n d  organisational reform. 1986-2000
The integrationisf claims of the (National Resistance) Movement
It took the National Resistance Movement a five-year guerrilla war to overthrow 
Milton Obote’s controversial regime, as well as the briefly empowered Tito and Bazilio 
Okello, and take over power in 1986. In the course of the war, local Resistance Councils were 
progressively established by the NRM to restore order in the areas it came to control, and to 
widen its support and legitimacy by creating participatory institutions for the local population. 
The NRM was thus re-introducing electoral politics, initially through local councils and later 
at the national level. But Museveni’s Movement also captured a hegemonic control of 
political power: elections under the new regime were to be contested on an individual basis 
only, rather than on party platforms, and the activities of political parties became subject to 
severe limitations. The stage was set for the era of ‘no-party democracy’.
The argument for 'no-party democracy*
The ideological underpinnings of no-party politics were provided by an interpretation 
of Uganda’s post-independence history as a spiral of violent conflicts prompted by ethnically- 
based political parties. The bulk of Museveni’s argument for a no-party model is that Western 
representative democracy can hardly be imported to African countries. The latter’s ethnic, 
linguistic and religious fragmentation combines with pre-industrial development and the lack 
of a modem class structure. In similar contexts, conventional democratic politics promote the 
polarisation of communal antagonisms, because parties and party alignments invariably act as 
vehicles for ethnic or religious appeals and confrontations1.
1 Museveni (1992).
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It is a fact that Uganda displays an extreme communal heterogeneity, a feature 
shared with most African countries. Adding to the complexity of the ethnic map are both the 
lack of a demographically majoritarian group and the presence of a multiplicity of potentially 
salient collective identities to which, in several cases, the same individual can refer. Thus, for 
example, many Ugandans may regard themselves or be regarded, at the same time, as Kakwa, 
West-Niler, Sudanic, Nubi, Muslim, Northener and so on. Although some of these 
overlapping identities can be described in terms of higher- or lower-level loyalties, others 
simply cannot. A Muslim identity, for instance, is one that partly cuts across a multi-religious 
unit such as the Kakwa one. At one point or another in the country’s history, some of these 
identities (e.g. Acholi, Langi, Kakwa, Muslim or Protestant) have represented the power base 
of the country’s political leadership. General Idi Amin, for example, initially relied on Kakwa 
support, but later expanded the ruling alliance through the creation of a broader ‘Nubi’ 
category2. In a somewhat opposite development, the Lwo support on which Milton Obote’s 
second regime relied split dramatically along the Acholi/Langi divide at the time of the 
Okello coup and during the violence that followed, in 19853.
It is also true that, in the two short spells when multiparty competition was allowed -  
in the early 1960s and again in the first half of the 1980s -  this was associated with the 
politicisation of profound cleavages. Both times the country went multiparty, elections 
ushered in exclusion by opening the way to one-partism and electoral fraud, and violence 
inevitably followed. Communal polarisation was primarily reflected in the religious 
antagonism between the Catholic-based Democratic Party and the mostly Anglican Uganda 
People’s Congress. The UPC of the early 1960s also relied on clear ethnic affiliations, being 
“a result of an alliance by the elites of northern, eastern and western Uganda against their 
counterparts in Buganda”4. The emergence of this unfriendly coalition, in turn, contributed to 
prompting the Baganda establishment to organise an ethno-nationalist party, the loose and 
short-lived Kabaka Yekka. Thus, since independence, ethnic and religious antipathies 
appeared to shape Ugandan politics. A partial attempt to de-politicise communal loyalties was 
made by Obote in the late 1960s, by progressively eliminating any opportunities for the 
people’s involvement in politics5. The end result of the process was, initially, the creation of a 
state in which the UPC became the only party allowed, and then, under Amin’s military
2 The emergence of the Nubi was a remarkable example of change in the saliency of communal identities. Amin claimed that 
■‘everybody in Africa is free to became a member of the Nubian tribe”, and many people deliberately ‘converted’ to Islamic 
religion and Arabic language to share the benefits of a privileged linkage to the ruling elite. See Kasfir (1976:30,220).
3 Ondoga-Ori (1996).
4 Ondoga-Ori (1996:33). Cf. Kasfir (1991267).
5 Kasfir (1976). See Chapter Two, p.42.
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dictatorship, the advent of an era when ‘politics’ itself was outlawed. The country, as pointed 
out in Chapter Two, did not fare any better when it tried to go multiparty for a second time, in 
the early 1980s. Obote’s return to power was marked not only by election rigging, but also by 
a deepening of ethnic rivalries and violence -  the alleged cause of the NRM insurgency.
Given the country’s past, the argument went on, an immediate return to multiparty 
politics was inappropriate to Uganda and a transitional period was necessary in which 
alternative participatory arrangements would be adopted. To avoid the kind of exclusionary 
politics fostered by multiparty competition in ethnically divided societies, a ‘movement 
democracy’ was devised which boils down to a few but critical provisions banning most 
activities of political parties6. The NRM was in fact re-launching the idea of doing away with 
opportunities for the politicisation of ethnicity. With the aim of breaking with Uganda’s past, 
its Ten-Point Programme manifesto condemned “sectarian, religious and tribal cleavages” as 
“manufactured divisions”, claiming that “one’s religion, colour, sex or height is not a 
consideration when new members are welcomed in the National Resistance Movement”7. This 
time, though, the process of ethnic de-politicisation would not occur through a ‘de­
participation’ strategy such as Obote’s, but by means of a new ‘dis-organisation’ scheme, that 
is, by retaining popular participation while rejecting party pluralism as the embodiment of 
politically-organised ethnicity.
The problem was then what sort of participatory system would replace party-based 
electoral competition, and the answer came in the form of the ‘individual merit’ principle, the 
foundation of no-party democracy. According to this ‘new model’ of democracy, elections are 
to be held strictly on an individual basis. Political competition among individuals, as opposed 
to parties, is the theoretical core of the allegedly inclusive ‘movement democracy’. This is the 
most original and consequential feature of Uganda’s 1995 constitution -  a blend of old 
institutions, of those already introduced by the NRM, and of others that are entirely new8. 
According to the constitution, the Movement system shall be:
“broad based, inclusive and nonpartisan and shall conform to the following principles: a)
participatory democracy; b) democracy, accountability and transparency; c) accessibility to
6 A rt 269, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
7 Museveni (1992:279).
8 The institutions introduced by the NRM included not only the ‘movement’ (whose structures had been constitutionalised 
through Legal Notice No.1/1986) and the local Resistance Councils, but also others such as the Inspector General of 
Government and the Human Rights Commission. The ban on party activities was never passed as ordinary legislation (save 
for the reference to party campaigning in the 1993 Constituent Assembly Statute) but only as a decree.
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all positions of leadership by all citizens; d) individual merit as basis for election to
political offices”9.
The focus on the individual as the paramount and autarchic actor of politics is the 
only aspect, among those listed by the constitution, with immediate and practical 
implications: candidates standing for office in local, parliamentary or presidential elections 
can only run a campaign on their own credit, without recourse to any political organisation. 
As pointed out, the underlying assumption is that this will ‘eliminate’ occasions for direct 
confrontations between communal groups through the proxy of ethnically-based political 
parties.
A logical consequence of the individual-merit principle, and a necessary measure for 
its implementation, was the ban that denies political parties the opportunity to carry out most 
of their activities. Party conferences, local branches and party electioneering were all 
prohibited. The ban, introduced in January 1986, was initially limited to a four-year 
transitional period necessary to ‘modernise’ the country. But this period was later extended 
and the ban was constitutionalised in 1995. The new framework, however, formally prohibits 
party activities, rather than parties per se. It still allows parties a formal existence and a 
central office, as it is rather their operations that are subject to limitations. This was meant to 
moderate the radicalism of the opposition, notably the country’s historical political parties, the 
Uganda People’s Congress and the Democratic Party. But the prohibition has caused the 
organisational development of Ugandan parties to be temporarily suspended. Scarce activity 
and lack of organised competitive politics has affected both the legitimacy of the parties (the 
DP, for instance, has not held any election for internal offices since 1980) and their degree of 
institutionalisation10. Attempts by new leaders, such as UPC Cecilia Ogwal, to renew their 
parties have been systematically frustrated by the old guard, on the ground that the existing 
leadership cannot be legally challenged without convening a delegates’ conference. While 
some analysts claim that “the old parties have in fact remained very much alive”11, Mamdani 
observes that they are actually “weak structures with shallow roots, at best a collection of 
factions organised around individuals. The pre-1986 parties have been artificially protected by 
a ban on [parties’ activities functioning as a barrier for] new parties”12.
9 Art.70(l), Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995), emphasis added.
10 Dicklicth (1995/1996:107,115). These issues are dealt with in Chapter Five.
11 Oloka-Onyango (1995:171).
12 Mamdani, quoted in Twaddle (1996:324).
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Having banned other political organisations, the NRM -  by now simply known as the 
‘Movement’ -  claimed to provide representation for all Ugandans on the ground of its 
allegedly non-partisan, ‘civil’ origins13 (and, especially, on the ground of a factual military 
victory). The notion that every Ugandan is a member of the overarching Movement umbrella 
-  a notion that was later included in the new constitution -  became the basis on which the 
country’s politics was unilaterally re-founded. Under so-called ‘movement politics’ -  as 
opposed to multiparty politics -  it is individuals that are supposed to take centre stage in 
public life. The country’s different communities would be integrated in the polity through the 
participation of the individuals to decentralised structures, the Resistance Councils, which 
were originally bom as organs of the NRM itself4. This also imply the fragmentation of the 
opposition and therefore an easy co-optation of its individual members on the part of the 
Movement, the only organisation allowed15.
But the claimed inclusiveness of the Movement soon showed clear limitations. On 
the one hand, in spite of the constraints on other political organisations, well-known members 
of the opposition have stood for election against declared Movement supporters. Nobody can 
be prevented from participating in politics, albeit on an individual basis only. The Democratic 
Party leader, Paul Ssemogerere, and Col. Kizza Besigye, for example, run for the presidency 
against Museveni in the 1996 and 2001 elections, respectively. Other opposition politicians 
won important contests, as DP Ssebana Kizito did with the Kampala mayoral election of 
1999. Formally, nobody can be expelled from the Movement. In this sense, the latter is quite 
different from a fully-fledged one-party state -  an option which is officially banned by the 
constitution16 -  and has remained for a long time a very loose organisation. On the other hand, 
in spite of the Movement’s alleged openness and ‘broad-basedness’, the limits of its 
integrationist ambitions became apparent when the multipartism versus movementism issue 
polarised the Constituent Assembly delegates along a north-and-east versus south-west ethno- 
regional cleavage17. The delicate ethnic balance which had originally and informally 
characterised Museveni’s governmental team was progressively and steadily abandoned, with 
the ruling group now commonly perceived to be of western or Banyankole origins. Indeed,
13 Hansen -  Twaddle (1995:141).
14 Cf. Kasfir (1991:270).
15 The Monitor, for example, observed how “over the years, the NRM poached most of the able DP members like the late 
Kafumbe Mukasa, Sam Kuteesa, Gerald Sendaula, Kisamba Mugerwa and Dr Speciosa Kazibwe. It also made Joseph 
Mulenga a judge, which effectively took him out of the party. The Movement's latest catch includes Maria Mutagamba, 
Robert Kitariko and even smaller people like Francis Baingana of Bushenyi”, (Kampala, 9 December 2000). The DP leader 
himself, Paul Ssemogerere, took part to the NRM government up to the mid-1990s. Mayanj a-Nkangi, founder and president 
of the Conservative Party, was still holding the crucial job of Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in 2001.
16 Article 75, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
17 Katorobo (1995), Mukholi (1995).
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while the Movement claims to reject communal identities, politics under the new regime has 
never done away, in practice, with ethnic considerations.
The constitutionalisafion of the ‘Movement system*
Uganda’s institutional set up is the result of a long and incremental process of 
pragmatic reflection and legal reform. When Museveni took over power in the mid-1980s, the 
National Resistance Council -  the main political body of the NRM -  was installed as a 
provisional parliament and immediately issued the consequential Legal Notice No. 1/1986. 
The latter introduced limitations on party activities by simply amending the 1967 constitution, 
and it entitled the NRC itself to bring about further changes by means of ordinary legislation. 
Thus, while the old constitution formally lasted well into the 1990s, when a elected 
Constituent Assembly eventually replaced it, its supposed supremacy was in fact annihilated18. 
If Ugandan politics ever had “strong constitutionalist tendencies”19, they were hardly evident 
in the thirty years after independence.
The restrictions on political parties were instrumental to the consolidation of the 
NRM’s hold on power, which also relied on the Resistance Councils for local-level 
participation and on the ‘movement’ government, a coalition inclusive of elements of the 
oppositions. By the end of the 1980s, once the National Resistance Movement had secured 
control over most of the country’s territory and stabilised the internal situation, Museveni was 
ready to inaugurate a second and longer phase for a better-tuned engineering of the new 
political regime. In 1989, a constitutional commission was established with the task of 
drafting a new constitutional text. The latter served as a starting point for the debates of an 
elected Constituent Assembly, which approved Uganda’s new constitution in September 
1995. The following year, direct national legislative and presidential elections were held 
countrywide. In the process, the restrictions on the activities of political parties, originally 
spelt out as interim measures, were first constitutionalised and then further sanctioned by a 
referendum in 2000. Despite the limits on the freedom of political association, influential 
observers agreed on the democratic beginnings of Museveni’s political reform20.
18 The Constitutional Court, for instance, ruled that legislation banning activities of political parties was to prevail over 
constitutional rights, Regan (1995:163).
19 Engholm -  Mazrui (1967:591).
20 See, for example, Apter (1995:158), Young (1999:31), Mamdani (2001276ff.).
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The so-called Odoki Constitutional Commission was mandated to make proposals to 
“create viable political institutions that will ensure maximum consensus and orderly 
succession to government”21. Its 21 members, chosen by the president and often accused of 
being a homogeneous batch of pro-Movement people, made an impressive effort to reach out 
to the populace. Their first aim was ‘to educate’ Ugandans on the essence of the constitutional 
exercise, mainly by means of seminars for the local elites. Then, a massive consultative 
process was staged, which eventually produced some 25,000 popular submissions in the form 
of memoranda, articles, position papers, school essays and so on. The whole process took 
about four years (1989-1992), and the popular involvement that resulted from this long 
exercise generated great excitement. Even an experienced observer naively described the 
country not only as a model of alternative and no-party democracy, but also as a new form of 
“‘consultative democracy’ ... which can enable people to share and understand common civic 
principles” and thus to diffuse and inculcate a form of democratic culture22. While the Uganda 
People’s Congress, the most radical opposition group, kept denouncing the constitution- 
making process, other groups who had initially been very critical of the commission, such as 
the Democratic Party and the Baganda establishment, eventually accepted the legitimacy of 
its work23. After the traditional kingdoms were restored in 1993, for example, the Baganda 
became more accommodating towards the commission’s proposals24. As a result, and in spite 
of the influence of the NRM, the draft constitution that the commission handed to president 
Museveni with a Report, in late 1992, was held to be broadly representative of the views of 
the people.
With the constitutional reform debate already underway, a Constituent Assembly was 
then elected in March 1994. The no-party politics idea, erstwhile experimented at the local 
level, was thus applied to national politics and elections for the first time. Candidates had to 
run on ‘personal merit’, on the ground that this would eliminate any form of tribal, religious 
or ‘sectarian’ competition. No party, neither partisan nor individual campaigning was 
allowed. Instead, individual candidates, touring together the electoral constituency, would 
take part to parish-by-parish public meetings in which they would briefly present their views 
and then be questioned by the public. In spite of official rules, there was a degree of party 
campaigning, especially, though not only, on the part of the NRM: “many a candidate won
21 UCC Report (1993:4, emphasis added). The UCC was established by a Constitutional Commission Statute (No.5 of 1988), 
it first met on 9 March 1989 and presented its Report and Draft constitution to President Museveni on December 31, 1992.
22 Apter (1995:158-9,174).
23 Regan (1995:169).
24 Furley -  Katalikawe (1996248).
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and lost the election not on ‘personal merit’, but rather on what the voters perceived was his 
or her party political label”25. Yet, over 200 delegates received their mandate through an 
election recognised by foreign missions as ‘open and transparent’ and thus ‘an expression of 
the will of the people’26. Given the individualisation of political competition among 
supposedly non-partisan candidates, however, it was difficult to assess precisely the aggregate 
results of the pro-Movement and the pro-multiparty camps. Estimates of the number of 
supporters of no-partism who made it to the assembly ranged between half to two-thirds of 
members. The NRM could thus claim a success that was mostly rooted in the south-west and 
in parts of Buganda27, obtaining some good results in the north-west as well.
When Uganda’s Constituent Assembly set out to work on the document drafted by 
the constitutional commission, the rhetoric focused on solving the main controversies and 
avoiding the deepening of political divisions. The commission itself had stressed the need for 
‘consensus politics’, and the practice of seeking inclusive agreements was initially and 
successfully adopted by the assembly for the approval of its working procedures28. The 
assembly was bounded to the constitutional text drafted by the commission, which could only 
be amended by two-third majorities. This had the effect of reducing the control on the agenda 
on the part of the assembly29. In spite of the preliminary work of the commission, however, a 
number of long-standing controversial issues were bound to re-emerge. The most relevant 
were the choice of the political system (movementism versus multipartism) and its future 
duration; the role of traditional rulers; the specific type of decentralisation (notably the 
possible introduction of federal arrangements); the adoption of one or more national 
languages; the electoral reform; and the involvement of the army in politics. On a number of 
these and other issues, the NRM group had to negotiate support on a provision-by-provision 
basis. The multipartists were a minority, but they were relatively better organised. Early on,
25 Furley -  Katalikawe (1999:12). Cf. Regan (1995:178).
26 Hauser (1999:627-631). 214 out of 288 delegates to the Constituent Assembly were directly elected from county 
constituencies, with another 39 women indirectly selected by special district electoral colleges. The r e m a i n i n g  members were 
appointed by interest groups and by the president: 10 were appointed by the head of state, 10 were representatives of the 
National Resistance Army, 8 delegates of the four recognised political parties, 4 representatives of the youth, 2 delegates of 
the unions and 1 for the disabled.
27 The election of the NRM’s candidate to chair the Assembly, requiring 2/3 of the votes, has been suggested as a proxy of 
the NRM’s success (Regan 1995:179). The latter was favoured by the large increase in the number of Buganda 
representatives that the district apportionment criteria produced, Geist (1994:97) and Kasfir (1994:160). As for the 
multipartists, UPC candidates were very successful in the north, whereas it was unclear whether a DP/UPC or DP/NRM 
informal agreement was effectively worked out, Geist (1994:95).
28 Regan (1995:183).
29 In addition to the draft constitution, the report of the constitutional commission provided some evidence of what views the 
people held over a number of issues. It showed, for instance, a broad acceptance of the movement system and of some 
representation of the army in parliament (UCC Report 1993:12). On issues for which the popular consultations did not give 
clear indications, the commission advanced its own considerations. The public, for example, was reportedly in favour of 
adopting a national language, but it was divided between the choice of Swahili or Luganda. The constitutional commission 
suggested the retention of English as the official language^ with the promotion of the use of other major languages and their 
possible elevation to official status at a later stage (UCCReport 1993:80, Waliggo 1995:34).
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members of the UPC and of the DP had formed a National Caucus for Democracy to 
coordinate their initiatives in the assembly30. This made life slightly more difficult for the 
NRM which, in spite of the large number of alleged supporters in the assembly, occasionally 
met some problems in finding the majorities it needed to safely promote its own positions. 
The apex of the debate opposing ‘multipartists’ to ‘movementists’ was reached when DP Paul 
Ssemogerere and UPC Cecilia Ogwal moved an amendment to delete from the constitution 
any references to the Movement. The proposed amendment was defeated, and a walkout of 
many multipartists from the assembly followed31.
The heavy limitations on political organisation and on the reform agenda implied that 
there were little chances for constitutional policies other than the NRM’s to make it through 
the decision-making process. The Constituent Assembly only passed a relatively limited 
number of changes to the existing draft. The constitution thus reflects not only most of the 
commission’s allegedly ‘technical’ or ‘neutral’ suggestions, but also the main institutional 
innovations introduced since the NRM took power -  i.e. the movement or no-party style of 
politics and the local Resistance Councils structure. What the multipartists did achieve, 
however, was that “the principal debate in the CA” became “largely a matter of when, not 
whether, no-party democracy will give way to the multi-party kind again in Uganda”32.
Alongside multipartists, the Baganda also raised and backed some significant 
opposition views, in spite of Museveni’s manoeuvres to secure their support by restoring the 
institution of traditional rulers33. Indeed, the nature of the restored kingdoms remained a 
matter for debate, as many in Buganda would have preferred a much broader and political role 
for their Kabaka than the non-partisan one envisaged by the new law. The Baganda also 
demanded that recruitment in the army be proportional to the size of each community -  a kind 
of consociational measure which, eventually, was not constitutionalised34. Most of all, they 
called for a federal form of state to grant Buganda the territorial autonomy that it enjoyed in 
the immediate post-independence period. The issue was not whether some degree of 
decentralisation was appropriate -  decentralised arrangements had been in place in Uganda 
since the NRM took over, and nobody really suggested that decentralisation should be 
reduced -  but rather the specific form of territorial autonomy. Against the existing unitary but 
highly decentralised form of state, the Baganda demanded federal arrangements that would
30 Katorobo (1994:132). An informal electoral agreement between the DP and the UPC to avoid inter-party competition had 
previously failed.
The CP did not leave the assembly, and the amendment was defeated on June 20,1995.
32 Hansen -  Twaddle (1995:150).
33 Traditional Rulers (Restitution o f Assets and Properties) Statute (1993).
34 Nsibambi (1996:15).
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consolidate the districts of Buganda into a single political entity. In a pro-federo 
memorandum (“A case for the restoration of Buganda as a single unit”35), for instance, a 
group of Baganda opinion leaders led by vice-president Simon Kisekka addressed Museveni 
requesting ‘a Buganda restored to its pre-1966 boundaries’. In the end, however, the 
Assembly constitutionalised the backbone structure of the district-based Resistance Councils 
system.
Eventually, the most relevant change to the draft constitution was the abolition of a 
proposed 'council of state’ composed of ministers and parliamentarians. The council was to 
link parliament and executive and it would have probably strengthened the government’s 
control over legislative activity. Such control was meant to minimise the risks of conflict 
between two distinct presidential and parliamentary majorities. The proposed council, 
“incidently was not a people’s idea but was ... ‘smuggled into the draft constitution’ by some 
members of the commission”36. Its rejection, in a sense, partly restored control of the CA over 
the commission’s proposals. Other relevant changes to the draft text concerned the national 
executive and decentralisation. The executive vice-president is appointed by (rather than 
elected with) the president, and, in the case of vacancy of the presidency, fresh elections are to 
be held, rather than the vice-president completing the mandate. As for decentralised 
institutions, the direct election of district chairmen and the option of ‘interdistrict cooperation’ 
(with the relative structures) were introduced by the assembly. Also, while the list of 
competencies of the central government was made much more inclusive than envisaged by 
the draft constitution, non-listed or ‘residual’ functions are now exclusively reserved to 
district administrations37. Albeit interesting and of some relevance, however, the 
modifications to the draft text only touch upon a relatively limited part of the constitutional 
framework.
Local governm ent and minority representation
Decentralisation has been a core aspect of the NRM’s institution-building effort since 
before it took over power. The constitutional provisions of 1995 retained Uganda’s form of
35 The Monitor (Kampala, 22 July 1994).
36 Furley -  Katalikawe (1996:253).
37 These issues are further examined below. On the vice-president, see a it 108 of the 1995 Constitution and art,106(2Xa)/l 12 
oiihe Draft Constitution, on District Chairmen, see art 183 of 1995 Constitution and art.207 of the Draft Constitution', on the 
competencies of the central government, see a rt 189 and Schedule 6 in the 1995 Constitution and art.211 and Schedule 4 in
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unitary but highly decentralised state. The system of strong devolution to so-called Resistance 
Councils -  now renamed Local Governments -  was maintained and constitutionalised, as 
were the principles of decentralisation and devolution38.
Under existing arrangements, local ‘political authority* is primarily vested in district 
councils, which are elected every four years. The districts -  Uganda’s basic territorial units -  
have retained their internal division into lower level local units that pre-existed the 
constitution, i.e. the Resistance Councils system structure. The system consists of five levels 
of decentralised political representation. At each level, starting from the bottom, a 
representative council elects an executive committee whose members meet with committee 
members of neighbouring areas to form a higher level council. The latter, in turn, elects its 
own executive committee that will be part of another, higher level council, and so on. Thus, in 
its original formulation, the decentralisation system provided for direct elections to occur at 
the lowest level only (the village level, where all residents above 18 years of age are 
automatically members of the ‘local assembly*) and then built upon the latter a pyramid of 
indirectly elected councils and committees, as in Figure 3.1. One of the novelties introduced 
by the constitution was the direct election of the district chairman. The latter is the political 
head of an executive committee whose members he himself appoints and the council 
approves39. The direct election of district chairmen was meant to restore a degree of 
accountability in a system largely based on indirect elections.
These local administrations have relatively, comprehensive competencies. District 
and lower-level councils have so-called residual powers, i.e. they have ‘responsibility’ for 
every public function which is not listed among those reserved to the national government40.
The latter areas of central government exclusive intervention include external relations and 
internal order; judiciary; currency, taxation and trade regulation; education, health, industrial, 
agricultural, land and environment policies; energy, transport and communication. The list 
can only be amended through special procedures that require the participation of the districts 
themselves, an arrangement that is usually adopted in federal systems for the protection of the 
territorial sub-units from central abuses41. On the other hand, the fiscal powers of local 
authorities are subject to parliamentary legislation, so that, despite the fact that unconditional
the Draft Constitution', the idea o f‘interdi strict cooperation’ (art. 178 and Schedule 5 of die 1995 Constitution) was not in the 
Draft Constitution.
38 The Local Government Act (1997) regulates the details of the reform (e.g. procedures for the direct election of district 
chairmen, shift from nine- to ten-member committees at all levels, etc.).
39 A rt 183ff., Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
40 See art 189.(3) and Schedule 6 of the 1995 Constitution for the list of functions of the central government
41 A rt 260, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995). If federalism is primarily defined in terms of the constitutional 
protection of the functions of the constituent units -  as Nsibambi (199627-28) seems to do, despite the risk of reductionism 
implied by such a perspective -  one cannot refer to the Ugandan solution as a ‘decentralised unitary system’.
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grants are constitutionally guaranteed, the autonomy and sound financial basis o f the districts 
is somehow put at risk.
9 member DISTRICT committees 
11 
elect
RC5 district councils (= all RC3 elected committees)
9 member SUB-COUNTY committeesn
elect
RC3 sub-county councils (= all RC2 elected committees) 
9 member PARISH committees 
11 
elect
RC2 parish councils ( -  all RC1 elected committees)
9 member VILLAGE committeesn
elect
RC 1 village councils (consist of all adult population)
Figure 3.1: The original structure o f the ‘Resistance Councils'
For a study that focuses on political participation and organisation, the way Uganda’s 
internal administrative boundaries are arranged is most interesting. In colonial times, ‘native 
authorities’ were drawn along ethnic lines42, and after independence the same administrative 
divisions remained partly unchanged. An internal sub-division of districts began in 1966, 
when the traditional kingdoms were dismantled by Milton Obote. At least in its original 
formulation, Museveni’s decentralisation design, while not necessarily going against pre­
existing territorial divisions, aimed at being even less attentive to the underlying communal 
map. The establishment o f the new Resistance Councils was itself a “change from indigeneity 
to residence as the basis of rights”43. This was consistent with the broader objective o f 
movement democracy -  namely, the marginalisation o f the role o f ethnicity in the political 
sphere -  and with its key expression, i.e. the limitations on party activities. Hence, although 
the constitution “attaches ethnic identity on some districts”44, there is a remarkable absence of 
any reference to cultural, ethnic or similar criteria as a basis for the definition of the districts:
42 “Except for the districts of West Nile, Bugisu, Bukedi, Toro and Kigezi where the ethnic units were not considered viable”, 
Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1989:31).
43 Mamdani (2001:262). Mamdani, however, notes that, at the district level, “the practice was to invest leadership in only 
those with ancestral claim to the land”, and that the radicalism of “the reform held for the duration of the guerrilla war, but 
not much longer” (2001:172, emphasis added).
44 Mukholi (1995:100).
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“any measure for the alteration of the boundaries of or the creation of districts or 
administrative units shall be based on the necessity for effective administration and the 
need to bring services closer to the people and it may take into account the means of 
communication, geographical features, density of population, economic viability and the 
wishes of the people concerned”45.
This is not to say that, in the occasional carving out of new districts (whose number 
has already increased from 39 to 52 since the constitution was approved), ethnic identities are 
not major considerations. As a matter of fact, they often are. Nonetheless, the wording of the 
constitution seems to reflect the general philosophy of trying to keep ethnicity out of politics 
and political structures as far as possible. Uganda’s current internal boundaries, compared to 
those prevalent at the time of independence and its aftermath, are relatively less consistent 
with the ethnic map. As Apter observes, “districts whose original boundaries were in some 
rough accord with the distribution of dominant ethnic groups have also altered. Today ethnic 
groups are less neatly contained within territorial boundaries”46. Ethnic ‘areas’, for instance, 
are not so much divided by crosscutting district boundaries (i.e. boundaries that incorporate 
bits of different ethnic regions), rather, they are internally divided into a number of smaller 
districts.
While the large number of districts reflects Uganda’s numerous ethnic units, the 
adoption of small units also implies that large homogeneous communities are fragmented by 
administrative divisions. There is no effort to provide ethnic groups with territorial and 
political recognition as single entities. Thus, Buganda as such has no administrative or 
political organs, as it remains divided into Mpigi, Masaka, Rakai and other districts. The same 
goes for Acholi (made up of Gulu and Kitgum), Bunyoro (Masindi, Hoima and Kabale 
districts) or Ankole (Mbarara, Bushenyi, Ntungamo and Rukungiri). And so on. As a matter 
of fact, the new constitution does provide the possibility for a district to establish autonomous 
co-operative links with other districts47. The implementation of these provisions, however, 
failed even in Buganda, in spite of the fact that autonomistic claims have traditionally been 
very strong and the constitution states that “the districts of Buganda shall be deemed to have 
agreed to co-operate”48. The adoption of cooperative frameworks has been blocked by vested 
interests in defence of the status quo (e.g. local elites whose power base is in the district
45 Art. 179.(4), Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
46 Apter (1995:164). Cf. Regan (1995297).
47 A number of functional areas for which inter-district co-operation is possible are listed by the constitution in Schedule 5, 
Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
48 Art. 178.(3). Cf. New Vision (Kampala, 2 June 1998).
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organs) and by the external deterrence exerted by the government (since smaller units are less 
capable of challenging the central authority).
A decentralisation system that denies a cohesive and autonomous territorial basis to 
homogeneous communities clashes with the widely-held understanding of federo (federalism 
in Luganda language) as “ethnic federalism ... where powers are devolved to regions taking 
into account ethnicity”49. The issue remains unresolved and most likely to re-emerge, 
especially in connection with the land question and with that of traditional leaders. The latter 
were restored in 1993, but they are still prevented from cultivating political ambitions on 
behalf of their communities, as “a person shall not, while remaining a traditional leader or 
cultural leader, join or participate in partisan politics ... shall not have or exercise any 
administrative, legislative or executive powers of Government or local government”50. As a 
matter of fact, there have already been calls for a broader role of customary rulers, and some 
of them have frequently taken open political stances (notably in Buganda, through the 
influential Mengo traditional government)51.
Despite the individualistic and non-ethnic assumptions at the basis of the system, a 
vaguely defined right of minorities “to participate in the decision-making process” is formally 
recognised52. Yet, there is no specific indication of how this right is to be actually 
implemented. The potential impact of local communities on national politics, for example, is 
weakened by the absence a district-based second chamber, which is consistent with the 
aforementioned opposition to the political representation of ethnic and religious groups53. 
Neither is a similar representation favoured by election rules. A direct result of the restrictions 
on party politics, in fact, was that proportional representation electoral systems (PR) were 
ruled out as an option. PR systems are generally considered an instrumental tool for 
moderating ethnic politics, as they allow minorities to gain representation. But most of these 
systems are based on the use of party lists54. The choice of the electoral formula was thus 
reduced to either a plurality system (used in past elections and currently in place) or a fully 
majoritarian formula, such as the alternative vote or the double ballot system. In spite of the
49 Wasswa Lule, MP, quoted in The Monitor (Kampala, 31 May 1995, p. 16).
50 A rt 246.(3Xe), Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995). Hus provision implies that cultural or traditional rulers 
cannot be elected to parliament.
51 See, for example, Nsibambi (1994b:55), who is currently Prime Minister, and New Vision ( K a m p a la ,  27 April 1998).
52 Art. 36, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
53 During the debates of the Constituent Assembly, Crispus Kiyonga and 30 other delegates proposed the introduction of a 
bicameral system, with a Senate representing districts and other political entities. The a m e n d m e n t  was rejected on the ground 
of financial costs. See The Monitor (Kampala, 5 and 7 December 1994).
54 The Single Transferable Vote is the only one, among commonly used systems of proportional representation, which does 
not need party lists. The STV, however, is quite complicate and requires numeracy on the part of the voters.
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campaigning by some multipartists -  notably by members of the Democratic Party -  in favour 
of some kind of PR solution, the constitution states that the electoral system is to be based on 
single-member constituencies55. It is however remarkable that, in spite of the detailed 
arguments advanced by the constitutional commission for the adoption of county- and 
subcounty-based constituencies, there is no reference whatsoever to an ethnic or cultural basis 
of electoral constituencies56. Like most other institutions introduced by the NRM, this was 
consistent with the alleged intention to reduce the political function of communal solidarities.
Institutional developments In Uganda In the late 1990s
In the years immediately after the constitution was passed, Ugandans undertook 
further important steps in the polity-building process. The political system retains the 
dynamism that has characterised it since Museveni took power. The key measure adopted in 
the second half of the 1990s was the aforementioned Movement Act (1997). While increasing 
the confusion on what is the Movement and how it relates to the state, the Act has somehow 
re-launched the old NRM, which had gone into abeyance for some time, by providing for the 
establishment of Movement organs throughout the country. Because the new structures set up 
at the national and local level are partisan ones -  i.e. they concern a political part, rather than 
being systemic features -  the Act violates the very principle of no-party politics, namely the 
idea of doing away with political organisations. The Movement is now a full-fledged party- 
like political organisation, not a political system, regardless of what its supporters claim57.
The creation of the new Movement and its legal protection incensed the debate on 
the status of political parties under the existing regime. The limitations to party politics and 
the constitutional protection of the Movement inevitably raise questions about both the 
democratic character and the sustainability of the current arrangements. Yet, the common 
understanding remains that the movement system will only last for some time, as a 
transitional system, and that, as pointed out, the country will sooner or later shift to
55 Goran Hyden suggested the adoption of a PR system for Uganda (in Hansen -  Twaddle 1995), whereas the UCC had 
suggested a double ballot system for both parliamentary and district elections. Similarly to the South African case, the main 
guidelines for the electoral system have been constitutionalised in Uganda.
UCC Report (1993:272). On paper, the high disproportionality that a plurality system tends to generate might be contained 
by the relative geographic concentration of most Ugandan e t h n i c  communities. The constitutional requirement that 
constituencies should not cut across sub-counties nor, as a consequence, across districts, should further increase the ethnic 
homogeneity of electoral constituencies and limit the cases of minorities that do not gain representation. It r e m a i n s  to be 
seen, in practice, whether and which of such communities pay the price of a plurality system in the form of a reduced 
representation.
37 These issues are addressed in some detail in Chapter Four.
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multipartism. The constitution required that a referendum be held at the end of the first 
parliament for the people to choose between the two systems. Since parliament was meant to 
pass legislation to ensure that ‘any person shall be free to canvass’ for any of the two sides58, a 
Political Organisations Bill was tabled in late 1998. Museveni and his minister for 
Constitutional Affairs, Jehoash Mayanja-Nkangi, however, tried to use the bill to further 
institutionalise restrictions on party activities. Predictably, the controversial bill was fiercely 
attacked by the parties. But even the Movement-dominated parliamentary committee that 
examined the proposed legislation suggested a number of radical amendments along the lines 
of multipartist objections, and the heated debate that followed generated divisions in the 
Movement parliamentary caucus. In the face of criticisms that pointed at the illiberal 
provisions contained in the bill, and of the drastic changes proposed by the parliamentary 
committee, the government decided to drop the proposed legislation in June 199959. Instead of 
introducing clear regulations for party activities in view of the referendum, it was resolved 
that non-party ‘committees’ would be set up to campaign for each side. The idea, contained in 
the Referendum Bill (1999), did not go down well. Lacking support even among Movement 
ranks, this second bill was passed by parliament without the required quorum and precipitated 
a constitutional crisis. State-owned New Vision, usually very supportive of the government, 
described the manoeuvre as “the first case of daylight vote rigging in parliamentary history 
since the tabling of the 1966 ‘pigeonhole constitution’”60. The following year, on the eve of 
the referendum, a petition by DP leader Paul Ssemogerere succeeded in having the Act 
declared null and void by the Constitutional Court, and a new Referendum Act had to be 
rushed through parliament in an even messier and manipulative way.
Eventually, the referendum was held on June 2000. The multipartists boycotted the 
exercise on the ground that the right of association and political organisation is a fundamental 
one, and cannot be subject to political debate nor vote. But the fact that the turnout was not 
very high (51 per cent) may have had little to do with the boycott. As expected, Ugandans
58 Art. 271, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
59 For the subsequent developments concerning the Political Organisations Bill, see note n.3 in Chapter Seven.
60 New Vision (Kampala, 4 July 1999, p.5). The Movement caucus could not reach consensus on the controversial Political 
Organisations and Referendum Bills, and many MPs kept away when the latter was voted upon. The Speaker, Francis 
Ayume, allowed parliament to pass the Referendum Act (1999) without the required quorum. Despite the fact that 157 MPs 
had signed the register when the bill was passed, only about 40 MPs were actually sitting in the House -under the eyes of the 
national press -  well below the necessary m in im u m  of 90 physically-present members. Unfortunately, p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
procedures in Uganda do not envisage a record of who votes and how he/she votes (see Chapter Seven, note 75), and this 
made it difficult to prove that the rules of the House had been blatantly violated. Eventually, however, the Constitutional 
Court deemed the Act uncostitutional. For a new Referendum Act (2000) to be rushed through parliament before the 
scheduled date of the referendum and be accepted by the Court, Museveni had the constitution amended, parliamentary rules 
suspended, and MPs intimidated -  through the Movement caucus and the suspension of secret voting -  into supporting the 
new bill (cf. New Vision, 25 June 1999, p.2-3, 4 July 1999, p.5, 4 November 1999, 16 August 2000; The Monitor, 4 July 
1999, 9 June 2000, 28/30/31 August 2000). Over thirty years earlier, MPs had only learnt the content of Obote’s new 
constitution after they had passed it, when they found a copy in their pigeonholes.
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endorsed Museveni’s regime with a 90 per cent support for the existing Movement system. 
The possible ‘return’ to a multiparty system was thus postponed for at least another five years, 
and Museveni’s own rule -  so far deeply intertwined with the retention of movement politics 
-  was further sanctioned by his success in the 2001 presidential election.
The perpetuation of the no-party transition has been favoured by a combination of 
internal and external factors. A domestic socio-political coalition was cemented by the 
NRM’s military and unilateral take-over, by Museveni’s undisputed charisma and presidential 
patronage, and by a southern-based regional alliance. Such a coalition succeeded in 
entrenching its interests and ideas by enshrining the notion of ‘Movement system’ in the 
constitutional provisions. At the same time, a particular political economy of external support 
protected the new regime from outside pressures to open up to full multiparty competition. 
Museveni found powerful allies in the World Bank and other donors who were desperately in 
need for one of the reform-abiding African states to develop into a success story. Western 
countries such as the US and Britain -  both of which backed the reforms inspired by the 
World Bank -  also provided key economic and political support aimed at strengthening a 
friendly state in an extremely volatile region61.




The M ovem ent
A partisan organisation in disguise
Political system or political organisation?
The Ugandan government usually describes the Movement as a political ‘system’, a 
term which is also enshrined in the 1995 constitution. The conceptualisation of the Movement 
as a system (i.e. a set of governmental institutions and relationships, including the terms of 
participation and competition to access such institutions) as opposed to a private political 
organisation (i.e. a partisan association for regularising and formalising the co-ordination of 
political activities carried out by members and supporters1) has crucial implications. In line 
with such an approach, for example, the Political Organisations Bill which is currently being 
discussed explicitly excludes the Movement from among the ‘political organisations’ (read 
‘political parties’) that it seeks to regulate2. Thus, as a new and all-encompassing ‘system’ to 
which everybody is supposed to belong and be loyal, the Movement can make legitimacy 
claims that would not be possible for a partisan organisation.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, however, Uganda’s new constitution does not 
go beyond abstract principles in defining what ‘Movement democracy’ is about. It merely 
specifies that electoral competition has to be based on ‘individual merit’ as against party 
platforms. Other than that, the elaboration of this ‘new model of democracy’ boils down to 
vague notions of ‘broad-basedness’, ‘participation’, ‘accountability’ and ‘accessibility’. 
Indeed, parliament is left complete discretion in providing content to the Movement system 
through contingent and flexible legislative measures:
1 Cf. Lanzalaco (1995:105,184), quoted in Chapter One, page 17.
2 “The definition of ‘political organisation’ shall not include ... the movement political system ... and the organs under the 
movement political system; pressure groups; civic organisations”, Republic of Uganda, Political Organisations Bill, No. 18 
(December 1998), art.2.
The Movement
“parliament may create organs under the Movement political system and define their roles; 
and prescribe from time to time any other democratic principle of the Movement political 
system”3.
Such vagueness explains the frequent contradictions by pro-movement officials and 
politicians when describing the rationale and the working of the new system.
From the notion of the Movement as a system also stems the constitutional provision 
that makes all Ugandans its members. But declaring everybody a ‘Movementist’ is not 
enough to make them so: in practice, some Ugandans are movementists in beliefs and 
behaviour -  these were the people lining up for the ‘Movement bus’ in the 2000 referendum 
campaign posters -  others are not, or do not wish to get on board. Indeed, its formal 
camouflage as a public arrangement can hardly disguise the fact that the Movement is a full- 
fledged organisation aimed at the conquest and retention of state power by a specific and 
partisan group (this, incidentally, would be a party’s legitimate goal in a multiparty polity). 
As a partisan organisation pursuing the goal of placing and maintaining its avowed 
representatives in government positions4, the Movement can be analysed using the same 
parameters adopted for other parties and spelled out in the conceptual checklist of Table 1.1 
(see Chapter One).
In addition to contending that the Movement is best Understood as a political 
organisation, rather than as a ‘system’, this chapter suggests that its relation to other political 
actors is one of hegemony, rather than monopoly, and such hegemonic position is maintained 
in spite of the Movement’s traditionally loose organisational set up. Before turning to an 
analysis of the current features of the Movement, the next section concentrates on its 
historical origins and structural evolution.
From the NRM in the bush to the Movement In the constitution
The National Resistance Movement was created in the early 1980s as the political 
wing of a guerrilla organisation -  the National Resistance Army -  set up to overthrow Milton 
Obote’s newly established second regime. The NRM drew its origins from other 
organisational efforts previously embarked upon by some members of its core leadership, 
such as the Fronasa paramilitary group and the Uganda Patriotic Movement party. To talk of
3 Art.70, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995, emphasis added).
4 Cf. Janda’s (1970:83) definition, quoted in Chapter One, p.23.
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fully-fledged organisational continuity5, however, is to overemphasise the permanence of a 
few leaders and to disregard changes in the institutional arrangements. As Prunier points out, 
for example, after Amin was overthrown in 1979, Museveni formally disbanded Fronasa, 
which only “remained as a network of friends”6. It is thus more appropriate to think of the 
NRM as an essentially new organisation, heavily shaped by a specific guerrilla experience 
and a peculiar no-party thinking7.
Fitting and descending from the Maoist notion of ‘protracted people’s war’, the 
NRM’s cultivated image portrayed it as a people’s organisation, non-partisan and ‘civic’: an 
open, broad-based and inclusive organisation of all Ugandan citizens, bom out of a radical 
rejection of traditional parties and their ‘sectarian’ divisions. Backing such imagery was the 
actual establishment, since the guerrilla years, of local Resistance Councils all over the 
territory falling under NRM control. The RCs -  whose pyramidal structure culminated in a 
National Resistance Council (NRC) -  were instrumental in reaching out to the populace, 
mobilising resources for the guerrillas and organising a broadly legitimate new system of 
government based on popular participation. While the RCs helped the NRM in extending its 
support to areas other than the ones from which it originated8, the bulk of the consensus came 
from a Baganda/Banyankore/Banyarwanda (and partly Banyoro) alliance9, with its centre in 
the south and west of the country. Indeed, the regime had been immediately referred to as the 
first one in Uganda led and supported by southerners, or fow/w-speakers.
The so-called ‘broad-based government’, meant to bring under a common umbrella 
the different strands of Ugandan politics, and the anti-party stance that Museveni was 
gradually articulating were functional to establishing more firmly the new organisation:
“no previous Ugandan political organisation was less well-known, and only the Okellos, 
and perhaps Amin, had been socially less representative than the NRM was at the moment 
it took power. The NRM desperately needed a formula that would provide it with national 
acceptance. ‘Movement’ democracy provided part of the answer to this dilemma”10.
5 See, for example, Kasfir (1991:270). Most NRM top leaders, including Museveni, were UPC up to around 1970 (see, for 
example, The Monitor, 5 January 1997, p. 17).
6 Prunier (1997:68).
7 See also Museveni’s (1997) own reconstruction of how the NRA/NRM emerged.
8 In the 1996 presidential election, for example, Museveni obtained almost 60 per cent of the vote in Nebbi and Moyo 
districts (all in the northern West Nile area, where the NRM had ended the local people’s sufferings at the hands of Obote’s 
regime). He also performed well in Teso (in Kumi district, for instance, he received 43 per cent of the votes), where 
presidential challenger Paul Ssemogerere could win but not with the large majorities he piled up in other northern districts 
such as Arua (also in West Nile), Apac and Lira (Lango), and, especially, Gulu and Kitgum (the two Acholi districts home to 
the rebellions of the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord’s Resistance Army). In the 2001 election, Museveni was again 
successful in parts of West Nile (Nebbi and Adjumani) and in Kumi, while Kizza Besygie obtained large majorities among 
the Langi and Acholi voters, and also won in Arua, Soroti and Kampala.




The no-party thinking, however, inevitably affected the NRM’s internal working by 
justifying a hollow organisational set up. A loose structure at the centre suited Museveni’s 
undisputed and unrestricted control as much as it reflected the overarching anti-party and 
individual-merit ideology. Indeed, while expanding its reach and inclusiveness, the NRM 
developed a very centralised and leadership-oriented modus operandi which kept it heavily 
dependant upon its leader’s personal charisma and patronage linkages. The fact that the NRM 
“never had a national organisation comparable with those of UPC or DP”11 was as much the 
result of its comparatively recent emergence as that of a studiedly different strategy:
“the NRM itself believed that the lack of a political organisation was not a sign of its 
weakness but of its strength: precisely because it had no political organisation of its own, it 
could be home to all organised political tendencies called political parties”12.
“the NRM expended little energies or resources in consolidating itself institutionally. The 
NRM secretariat ... received a small budget, was staffed by few powerful officials, but 
played only a modest role in setting the direction of government policies. Popular 
organisations for women, youth, and labour were discussed, but nothing was done to form
them”13.
Far from being a static arrangement, however, the National Resistance Movement 
repeatedly underwent internal transformations. Oloka-Onyango identifies three main phases 
in the NRM’s evolution. The initial one covers its first years in power (1986-89), when a 
transitional broad-based coalition was in charge of re-building basic state structures. The 
second one goes from 1989 to 1993, in which period the NRM became permanent and 
exclusivist by progressively marginalising other political groups. And the third phase consists 
of the 1993-96 period, during which the Movement sought consolidation through 
undemocratic steps14.
Internal transformations largely concerned the NRM’s claims of inclusiveness as 
well as its organisation. Actual inclusiveness lost momentum after the broad coalition of the 
first years in power, and the top political leadership of the Movement came to be increasingly 
identified by its western or Ankole origins. Simultaneously, the path of internal change led the 




14 Oloka-Onyango, paper presented at The Free Movement seminar, Kampala, October 1998.
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political organisation and the implicit dismissal of the latter’s relevance. Organisational 
changes were brought about through either practice or legislation, spanning from some 
loosely co-ordinated interventions in election campaigns to the creation of a movement 
parliamentary caucus and the recent establishment of full scale nation-wide structures by an 
act of parliament.
The key aspect of the process of change was the dynamic relation -  both at the 
national and at the local level -  between Movement and state institutions. At the national 
level, the original situation was one of ‘fusion’, whereby “organs of the Movement were not 
separable from the state”15. When the NRM gained power, its National Resistance Council 
(NRC) had been installed as the country’s parliament. The NRC was then gradually opened 
up, first with the co-optation of ministers (including those of other political forces who had 
joined the ‘broad-based’ government), and, after 1989, with the inclusion of indirectly elected 
representatives. With the latter expansion, a National Executive Committee was also 
appointed as a standing organ of the NRC16. In the resulting institutional set up, however:
“...the situation was not like now. These structures were fused: the chairman of the political 
body (the National Resistance Movement) was automatically the president of the country, 
and ... was also the chairman of the legislative body (the National Resistance Council).
Now there has been a re-structuring. So you have the speaker of the ex-parliament, the 
chairman is no longer automatically a member of parliament The chairman of the 
Movement is not necessarily, automatically the president of the country. Although, at the 
moment this one [Museveni] is holding both. But it is possible to have a president elected 
and the chairman also separately”17.
It was only from 1996-98 that the NRC and its chairmanship were replaced, 
respectively, by separate and directly elected parliament and presidency. At the same time, the 
Council’s politico-partisan functions (as opposed to the legislative ones) were handed over to 
an expanded Movement Secretariat and a restructured and more autonomous executive 
committee. These developments created a new situation where:
“the Secretariat ... is a political organ within the Movement political system [read 
"organisation’]. It is not part of government. Offices in the movement political system are
15 James Wapakhabulo, National Political Commissar, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
16 The original NEC consisted of 38 ‘historicals’ (the NRM leaders of the bush days), 10 presidential nominees, and one 
representative per district (elected by the NRC members of each district). Wapakhabulo (interview, 19 July 1999) and 
Dicklitch (1998:78).
17 James Wapakhabulo, National Political Commissar, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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political offices. They are not public service offices within the meaning of the 
Constitution”18.
A parallel process of progressive separation between state and Movement structures 
took place at the local level with the Resistance Councils. The latter were introduced during 
the civil war as both NRM organs and para-statal structures. Their original functions included, 
on the one hand, the recruitment of soldiers and the provision of resources such as food for 
the guerrillas, and, on the other hand, administrative tasks such as local dispute resolution and 
the distribution of selected basic resources19. Since the end of the war, however, local councils 
increasingly came to resemble administrative structures controlled by locally-elected 
politicians regardless, in theory, of the latter’s political views and affiliations. Around 1987, 
for instance, a large number of local assemblies were reportedly ruled by Democratic Party 
people20. This process was later further developed, to the point that “since the adoption of the 
1995 constitution and the 1997 Local Government Act, local councils at all levels have 
become more clearly part of the state and less part of the NRM’21. To reflect the change, 
Resistance Councils were re-christened Local Governments by the 1993 Decentralisation 
Statute, on the ground that the term ‘resistance* had to be eliminated “to distance them from 
the National Resistance Movement”22. The functions of partisan mobilisation previously 
carried out by the RCs were formally taken over by newly-established local ‘Movement 
committees’. The latter were meant to be “a political instrument of the Movement system 
[read ‘organisation’]. Unlike the Local Councils ... they are not an integral part of the state 
hierarchy or administrative apparatus”23.
The emerging tendency to separate state and Movement organs reflected a 
recognition of the need to set up a strong, autonomous and more effective political 
organisation -  this recognition had been delayed by the initial reliance on state institutions 
and the ideological aversion to party-like arrangements. The Movement Act (1997) marked the 
beginning of a fourth phase following to the three identified by Oloka-Onyango. The new 
law, which reformed and potentially boosted the Movement, embodied the answer to precise 
organisational problems. The pressure on the NRM to improve its organisation and to behave





22 For this paragraph -  including the quoted recommendation by ‘The Commission of Inquiry into Local Government 
System’ (1987:28) - 1 rely on Golooba-Mutebi (1999:3n).
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more and more like a party was the result of converging factors, including an increasingly 
sharp political polarisation, the re-opening of national electoral competition, the resilience of 
old party affiliations, and the requirements of an effective policy-making and legislative 
action.
The NRM’s partisan character and the boundaries separating its people from non- 
NRM people had fully emerged at the time of the Constituent Assembly. The NRM group had 
already become “sufficiently organised to win a majority of seats at every level in 1989 and 
every subsequent election”24. By the time of the 1994 election campaign for the Constituent 
Assembly, the NRM was dropping its previous and conscious lack of organisation to turn into 
something closer to a political party, or at least into something similar to African parties, 
which have never been very disciplined nor effective in controlling nominations25. The results 
of the CA election were naively hailed by Museveni as a victory for Movement candidates. 
This made it plain that, while all Ugandans are formally members of the Movement, there 
were in fact ‘non-Movement’ candidates: “before that, one could say that the NRM was 
different from political parties, different in that it had no organisation, only a headquarters. ... 
With the CA elections, we are witnessing the birth of NRM as a political party. With that 
change, the Movement vs. party question is no longer a question of principle”26.
The politics of constitution-making allowed an evident and deep divide between 
movementists and multipartists to emerge and crystallise. The constitutionalisation of the 
‘Movement system’ prompted opposition parties to take a more radical stance in the face of 
the self-entrenchment of the ruling group. But the culmination of the process was the 
Movement Act of 1997. By setting up less porous boundaries at the exclusion of non- 
movementists, by identifying the organisation’s constituency (i.e. ‘movementists’) and by 
specifying an hierarchy of authority embodied in the political secretariat, the Act contributed 
to defining the Movement more clearly as an organisation. According to a recent report, the 
new dispensation “in fact replicates the structures of a political organisation that is a party in 
all but name -  the National Resistance Movement -  as structures of the Ugandan state, 
creating a state-sponsored political organisation disguised as a ‘political system’”27. The 
current set up of the Movement is the object of the next section.
23 The Movement Newsletter (Kampala, November 2,1998, p.5).
24 Kasfir (1998:58).
25 Mamdani (1995237), Kasfir (1994:173).
26 Mamdani (1995), quoted in Furley -  Katalikawe (1999:19).
27 Human Rights Watch (1999:59).
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The current organs and activities of the Movement
Devising the organs of the Movement was a task that the constitution entirely 
delegated to parliament. As pointed out, a. Movement Act was thus passed in 1997, providing 
for the establishment of national representative and executive bodies as well as a complex 
hierarchy of local committees. The Act closely resembles a party statute -  some would claim 
that it is actually a party statute -  even though Movement members adopted it in a public 
forum (parliament) as opposed to a formally partisan one. There are important aspects of this 
law, however, that would not be found in the statute of a party under multiparty politics. For a 
start, membership is by citizenship: according to the constitution, as already mentioned, all 
Ugandans belong to the Movement. But the idea of doing away with a boundary that formally 
discriminates the ins and the outs does not reflect political and organisational reality: in spite 
of the Movement’s inclusivist claims, what ultimately counts is whether there is a de facto 
distinction between those who behave as members and those who do not. While the dividing 
line may be blurred and more permeable for the Movement than in other cases, it indeed 
exists. Reports of pro-parties activists or Movement supporters publicly crossing the floor to 
join the opposite camp are part of the country’s political folklore28. Yet, an all-inclusive 
membership -  or the formally ‘compulsory nature of membership’29 -  has significant 
implications. Nobody, for example, can be forced out of the organisation. And, if expulsion is 
not an option, the internal discipline required to promote a consistent political line -  say, on 
the part of pro-Movement MPs -  will have to rely on alternative sanctions. Whether and 
which alternative sanctions are actually available is an open question, which was tentatively 
addressed by setting up a Movement parliamentary caucus.
A second peculiar aspect of the Act is that, because the Movement is disguised as a 
public arrangement, its structures recruit exclusively on a state office-holding basis30. District 
Movement Committees, for example, consist of local officials such as Resident District 
Commissioners, MPs, district-level councillors and chairpersons of county and sub-county 
councils. In other words, unless somebody already occupies a political office, there is no 
chance of finding him in the structure. This virtually complete overlap or penetration of state
28 In the run-up to the referendum, for example, the New Vision (Kampala, 28 May 2000) announced with a full front page 
that “4,000 Lira UPC join Movement”, while the The Monitor (Kampala, 23 May 2000) reported smaller-scale moves in the 
opposite direction. As pointed out,-at least since the Constituent Assembly election of 1994, the Movement also dealt with 
and presented election results in partisan terms. In 1998, for instance, counting the number of ‘movementists’ that were 
elected to local government bodies, Museveni claimed that the Movement had won 88.9 per cent of the districts {New Vision, 
Kampala, 22 April 1998).
29 Human Rights Watch (1999:58).
30 Village-level Movement committees formally include all the local population, but they are chaired by the LC1 or village 
chairman who is also the ex officio (unelected) representative of the village in the parish-level Movement committee.
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structures on the part of the Movement contradicts previous attempts at separating the two. 
Yet, this recruitment mechanism, which is aimed at taking on board those who count, does not 
inhibit officials who are against the Movement to keep out, in practice, of the latter’s 
organisation (e.g. the mayor of Kampala, DP Sebaana Kizito, reportedly opted out).
Thirdly, the Movement receives its funding directly from the national budget31. The 
need for public funds is partly the consequence of an all-embracing membership: so long as 
its affiliates are not required to pay fees, an organisation will need alternative sources of 
income. While state funding is increasingly becoming the rule in Western multiparty systems, 
the key aspect in the Ugandan case is that a single organisation is given monopolistic access 
to such funds32. The opposite is also true, however; that is, state funding also makes the 
Movement organisation formally dependent upon parliament and the treasury, with 
potentially important implications33.
The central leadership and administrative organs
The Movement Act represents a turning point that has a major potential for 
strengthening the organisation. The internal elections introduced by the Act, for example, may 
have provided the Movement with some degree of renewed participation and legitimacy. 
From national to local Movement leaders, most office-bearers in the organisation are now 
elected: the whole structure was somehow democratised and extended to include many more 
faces than those who were in the bush34. The process was a mixture of cooptation and 
election. It began in June 1998 with the establishment of Movement committees at district, 
county, sub-county, parish and village level, closely mirroring the local government 
hierarchy. The introduction of Movement committees was extremely controversial, not only 
because they consist of co-opted state officials, but also because it is difficult to think of them 
as substantially different from (prohibited) party branches.
31 The budget for the Movement is first drawn by the NEC, then it is presented to parliament by the Minister of Finance, and 
finally it is approved as part of Uganda’s consolidated fund with the rest of the national budget (James Magode Ikuya, 
Deputy Director for Information at the Movement Secretariat, interview, Kampala, 1 July 1999).
32 With regard to funding, the Ugandan case may not be substantively different from that of formal multiparty polities where 
a hegemonic party enjoys an unparalleled and illegal access to state resources, such as the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional did in Mexico for several decades.
33 The dependence of the Movement on state funds implies that it would be easier, for a hypothetical multipartist-dominated 
parliament, to deflate the Movement organisation by blocking its resources rather than by introducing a ‘multiparty system’. 
The complex procedures for the introduction of a multiparty system require either a referendum (initiated by at least half of 
all MPs, or by majority votes in half of all district councils, or by a complicated popular petition) or, upon petition by 2/3 
majorities in half of all district councils, a 2/3 parliamentary majority (Section 74, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda, 
1995).
34 Magode Ikuya, interview (Kampala, 1 July 1999).
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Shortly after the election of local committees, a five-day National Conference was 
convened, which consisted of about 1,300 delegates from various territorial or functional 
organs of the Movement and of the state35. Amidst reports of lively internal politics -  with so- 
called ‘historicals’, "moderate movementists’ and Young Parliamentarians identified as the 
most active groupings36 -  the Conference allocated national leadership positions. The three 
top jobs went unopposed to Museveni (chairman), Emmanuel Kigongo (vice-chairman) and 
James Wapakhabulo (National Political Commissar)37.
The de facto head of the whole organisation is the National Political Commissar 
(NPC), who controls and directs Movement structures through a central co-ordinating body, 
the Secretariat. The latter was originally established during the bush days, in 1981, and then 
formalised in 1986-87 with the creation of 12 directorates and of the NPC office38. The 
mandate of the Secretariat, whose expiration in 1996 sent it into abeyance for some time, was 
revived with the approval of the Act that the constitution required for the establishment of 
Movement organs39. The reformed Secretariat retains by and large unchanged its previous 
220-strong staff”0. The figure includes not only the general staff but also about 80 so-called 
‘mobilisers’ -  “activists on political attributes”41 -  of which another 200 or so are to be found 
in the districts, attached to RDCs offices. The personnel is distributed in six re-structured 
directorates, each led by a political official who is accountable to a 100-member National 
Executive Council (the reformed political executive, that initially met only once a year, in 
July 1998 and April 1999)42.
33 A second conference was reportedly to take place on 2 9  September 2 0 0 0  (New Vision, Kampala, 9  September 2 0 0 0 ) .  The
full Conference would actually consist of around 2 0 0 0  members: the president of the republic; the Movement chairperson,
vice-chairperson and National Political Commissar, all MPs; all members of district executive committees (local 
governments) and all Resident District Commissioners; chairpersons of division/municipal/sub-county and town Movement 
committees; ten members each elected by the army and private business; five each for the police, women, youth, trade 
unions, veterans and disabled; and three for the prisons’ service. See Movement Act of 1 9 9 7 .
36 See, for example, Charles Onyango-Obbo in The Monitor (Kampala, 2 4  June 1 9 9 8 ) .
37 The National Political Commissar is actually elected by the National Executive Council from among three nominees 
proposed by the chairman.
The directorates were later reduced to 8, and two deputy NPCs w oe introduced (one for administration and one for 
political affairs).
After the constitution was passed in 1 9 9 5 ,  the Attorney-General denied all funds to the NRM as long as it held an informal 
rather than a legal status, Kasfir (2000:73). As a matter of fact, the Secretariat had also been leaderless since Eriya Kategaya, 
former NPC, received a m i n i s t e r i a l  appointment (Magode Ikuya, intervew, Kampala, 1 July 1 9 9 9 ) .
40 Matia Kasaija, interview (Kampala, 2 8  May 1 9 9 9 ) ,  and Magode Ikuya, intervew (Kampala, 1 July 1 9 9 9 ) .  See also The 
Monitor ( 2 8  May 1 9 9 9 ) .
41 Matia Kasaija, interview (Kampala, 2 8  May 1 9 9 9 ) .  In line with the general process of re-structuring, a ‘rationalisation’ 
exercise was decided by NEC and undertaken by the Secretariat in mid-1 9 9 9  whereby all members of the central staff were 
required to re-apply for their jobs. The aim was to downsize the whole structure and produce a full record of the people 
actually employed by the Secretariat. Reducing the number of employees was meant to be a pre-requisite to improve their 
pay and increase organisational efficiency. The application and registration exercise, on die other hand, was to be 
instrumental to moving more mobilisers from the headquarters to the countryside, where there’s greater need for them, 
especially in view of the referendum campaign. Cf. Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 1 9  July 1 9 9 9 ) .  See The Monitor 
(Kampala, 2 8  May 1 9 9 9 ) .  The measures were controversially implemented by the director of Mobilisation, Birimumaso.
In addition to the six directorates (Mobilisation, gender, youth and interest groups; Information; External relations; 
Research; Economic affairs; and Legal affairs) a permanent secretariat is in charge of Finance and administration.
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With its pivotal and permanent focus in the Secretariat and a privileged access to the 
executive, the Movement organisation is in a strong position to influence the policy process. 
Indeed, since president Museveni was elected chairman of the Movement (although he is 
rarely personally involved in its activities), the Secretariat has a line of direct input in 
government activities. At the most general level,
“the Secretariat is responsible for generating ideas and policies for the government. At the 
National Executive Committee meeting that we had in April, a number of ideas and papers 
were presented for discussion. For example, we proposed ... the expansion of the original 
NRM’s 10-point programme to a 15-point one, which has been elaborated by the NEC 
through the Secretariat, through the work we did to collect the views of the people. These 
and others, they come in the form of policy papers. We don’t really produce bills as such.
For instance, on corruption, the Secretariat comes up with something and the government 
initiates a bill to address the issue we have raised”43.
The scrutiny of governmental action on the part of the Movement is further improved 
and regularised by practices such as having the NPC sitting ex officio with the cabinet or 
making comments available to the national executive before any government bill is 
introduced in parliament. When carrying out these activities, the Secretariat is allegedly 
guided by a specific rationale, as the National Political Commissar explains:
“we are involved in appraising every legislation from the political point of view ... we do 
also not just comments on bills but comments on things like the budget, on its impact, or 
activities like closing banks ... you look at the policy and how that policy -  if  you 
implement it -  what political implications it carries with it. Favourable and unfavourable.
My directors will carry out also research in the field, through our political intelligence.
How is that going down? Will it go down well or will it go down unwell? Government 
departments are not worried about that For them, they are more concerned about whether it 
is good or not good for the economy. Someone may come with measures which appear to 
be very good for the economy, but are they politically [good as well]? So you may have to 
say: ‘Okay, let’s slow down’ or ‘Let’s push it through now, because this is the time.
Otherwise you will only be getting problems’. So we also look at it from that angle. ...
[When] I attend cabinet, then, I would raise the political implications, and I would insist 
that every bill must state political implications as well as other implications - constitutional, 
economic, legislative, financial implications”44.
43 Beatrice Lagada, Deputy Director for Mobilisation, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
44 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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In addition, the Secretariat also interacts with the legislative assembly. Five out of 
the six original directors, for example, doubled up as members of parliament. In this capacity, 
they were instrumental in directly promoting the positions of the Movement Secretariat in 
parliament45. Moreover, all directors are invited to attend the meetings of the Movement 
parliamentary caucus, where they can present their views on the issues that are on the table. 
The caucus itself is somehow financially dependent upon the Secretariat, which is responsible 
for covering small expenses such as hiring halls or serving refreshments46.
Going local: the new Movement committees
The establishment of party-like directive linkages at the local level can be 
instrumental to the effectiveness of government action and to the political mobilisation of the 
population. In a hegemonic context, “the manipulative party’s need for a strong local presence 
[is] necessary to limit the operation of opposition parties, promote political socialisation, and 
ensure compliance with national directives”47. In the early times, the long hand of the 
Secretariat reached out to the districts through District Administrators (later re-named 
Resident District Commissioners, RDCs), who had been in charge of setting up local 
Resistance Councils. “Now, the RDCs are civil servants, for the general supervision of local 
governments for things such as their powers and finances, and, although they retain some 
mobilising functions, this partly shifted to the Movement Committees, which are directly in 
charge”48. Although the reality on the ground is actually one where Resident District 
Commissioners, who directly depend from the President’s Office, are key figures in fostering 
political support and obstructing the oppositions.
The new committees established in 1997 are meant to be formally autonomous and 
representative bodies of the Movement at different levels. As at mid-1999, however, at least 
at district level such committees had largely failed to function and regularise their meetings. 
Officials at the Secretariat refer to ‘different levels of activity’ or to ‘destructive’ behaviour 
on the part of those LC1 chairmen that are actually against the Movement: “in the areas where 
we have strong believers, there is more activity.... The maximum of activity is in western 
Uganda, and central Uganda, then east, and last in the north -  but even in the north is in the
45 Wapakhabulo himself, for example, played a key role in having the controversial Referendum and Other Provisions Bill 
1999 and the Referendum (Political Systems) Bill 2000 passed by parliament. He was also directly involved in the 
formulation of Uganda’s foreign policy at a critical stage of the Congo war, when Museveni appointed him Chairman of the 
National Coordination Committee on die Region (see, for example, The Voice, Kampala, 12 June 2000, p.2).
46 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
47 Lawson (1980:18), with reference to the political hegemony of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico.
48 Lagada, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
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increase”49. While Lira and Apac are among the districts where activity has reportedly failed 
to materialise, cadres in Gulu and Kitgum (two relative exceptions in the north), Mbale and 
Kabale are allegedly among the most active. But ‘activity’ here is exclusively measured in 
terms of Mchaka Mchaka or political education courses50, which do not depend on the 
committees as such, but merely on individuals -  i.e. the committee chairman and the RDC. In 
Gulu, for example, the latter two have worked closely together (the RDC even supplied a 
small office to the chairman) to organise numerous courses, but virtually no committee 
meetings have been held at either district or lower levels.
The crux of the matter is that most of the district committees held no more than an 
inauguration encounter. In some cases, a second meeting was called six months to one year 
later, after the NEC had gathered. Moreover, these initial meetings were only procedural: they 
were about holding the internal elections required to fill in the different positions, and they 
did not in any sense help in firmly establishing the committee nor district-level Movement 
offices. In the absence of meetings, chairmen of Movement district committees lack 
opportunities to divulge the content of the publications and policy positions they occasionally 
receive from the Secretariat. And the virtual non-existence of these bodies at district level also 
implies that, in the unlikely event of lower committees holding meetings, they would lack any 
contact with the Secretariat. While directors would at times call a visit, this is much more 
likely to happen in major districts such as Gulu, Mbale or Mbarara than peripheral or minor 
ones.
Understandably, weak committee activities are complemented by the poor feedback 
that the Secretariat gets: “it is difficult to say areas where they are not active... we don’t know 
much about their activities”51. But this may also be a consequence of a heavy emphasis and 
concern with hierarchical communications: indeed, the committees’ “principal activity is to 
keep the population informed”52, rather than reaching out to the populace to gather and bring 
back information to the top. The alleged aim is to raise an awareness of what policies the 
government is trying to implement:
“when there’s a specific programme, such as Universal Primary Education, at times, unless
the LCs and the committees get involved it will be difficult to get it to work: the people, the
49 Kasaija, interview (Kampala, 5 May 1999).
50 See below.
51 Lagada, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
52 Matia Kasaija, Deputy Director for Mobilisation, interview (Kampala, 5 May 1999).
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communities have to understand what the programme is about, they have to actually send 
the children to school!”53.
“We have some mobilisers, we go to mobilise the people for awareness, for peace and 
development, for economically viable projects, for the Local Governments A ct, for the 
referendum and so on. We go and talk to them - for instance about peace or about 
abductions - we tell them the government's good intention with the amnesty [law]... We go 
there, few of the Movement committee, not all, as we lack funds”54.
But over one year after the establishment of these organs, one may run into district 
Movement officials who are entirely unaware of what they are supposed to do, even in the 
broadest terms: “...I haven’t received the guidelines yet, so I don’t know which activities we 
will carry out”55. And this is indeed a problem which is acknowledged at the Secretariat:
“[local committees] haven't been very active in the last year, since they were elected, for 
financial and logistical reasons. ... also, some of them have been waiting to be given clear 
mandates. We were preparing the documentation. We have had a year of preparing 
documents -  some of them I have just mentioned -  before these meetings can be held.
Because there is no point in just coming to meet, what are you going to meet about?”56.
Lack of facilitation is the main reason identified by local Movement leaders to 
explain the overall absence of activity. Indeed, organising a meeting is certainly no easy 
thing, as each committee does not only include local district councillors but also members of 
parliament and chairpersons of lower level councils scattered all over the district. ‘Lack of 
facilitation’, however, also refers to the fact that the job of Movement officials remains 
unpaid, and, as voluntary work, it creates a situation of complete dependence upon individual 
initiative and will. At least until mid-1999, local committees received virtually no funding, 
with some minor exceptions where some little money would come in for Mchaka Mchaka 
courses or else where indirect financial support would be provided by the RDCs. In Mukono 
district, for instance, lack of resources prevented the holding of meetings and also forced a 
short-lived Movement office to close down57.
To tighten central control and internal discipline in the new local and national 
structures, a ‘Code of Conduct for Movement leaders’ was adopted at the NEC meeting of
53 Lagada, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
54 Mills John P’Odur, secretary of Gulu district Movement committee, interview (Gulu, 5 July 1999).
55 Lawrence Wasukira, secretary of Mbale district Movement committee, interview (Mbale, 9 July 1999).
56 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
57 Paul Kalule Kagodo, chairman of Mukono district Movement committee, interview (Mukono, 24 June 1999).
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April 1999. The Code applies to all persons holding offices in the Movement organs, it sets 
some general rules against corruption, sectarianism and so on, and establishes ‘disciplinary 
committees’ at district and sub-county/municipal level. The committees are telling of the 
operational dilemmas posed by an all-inclusive membership and reflect the same rationale 
behind the creation of a parliamentaiy caucus:
“the disciplinary committees are just to create discipline without expelling people from the
Movement. We are not going to expel anybody. But it’s just to show displeasure at certain
conducts. I think there must be a ‘code of conduct’ in any organisation”58.
Almost as telling, however, is the way these ‘disciplinary committees’ are structured. 
At the local level, they consist of the chairman and secretary of the local Movement 
committee and five members elected by and from among other members. Likewise, a national 
disciplinary committee includes the Movement vice-chairman, the NPC and 7 members of the 
National Conference appointed by the chairperson of the Movement and approved by NEC59. 
A similar kind of set up implies that there is hardly any distinction between those who 
monitor and those who are supposed to be monitored.
Between political education and  coercion: the Mchaka-Mchaka courses
Along with the partisan use of local governments and the recent establishment of 
Movement committees, so-called Mchaka Mchaka or political education courses have been 
the most prominent instrument of political socialisation adopted by the Movement 
organisation. While Mchaka Mchaka are here treated after other structural components, it is 
important to understand the centrality they currently hold as a chief tool for the presence of 
the Movement on the ground. They are a major device both because committees are not yet 
operative and because, even if they were, they would not reach out beyond political office­
holders.
Mchaca-mchaka is a Swahili onomatopoeic word for the sound that jogging boots 
make during a military march. As a matter of fact, the courses date back to the guerrilla 
setting of the early 1980s:
58 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
59 For the code of conduct, see Movement Newsletter (Kampala, 23 April 1999, p.2).
85
The Movement
'‘the Mchaka Mchaka have been organised since the bush days, in the army, for training 
civilian groups in arms and ideas. [They taught] basic things, for people not in the front­
line. Then, when we took power, the programme was that people - especially their leaders - 
had to be trained as leaders through politicisation programmes. A political leader needs 
elementary knowledge on security. For example, on the gun - to understand and not to fear 
it. ... It’s like scouting ... It’s a situation of common discipline to which these people are 
exposed for the first time”60.
Although no record of the courses is held at the Secretariat, in the first half of 1999, 
thousands were being trained every month throughout the country. The Mchaka Mchaka are 
coordinated by Resident District Commissioners -  the political representatives of the 
executive in the field -  with some recent but minor participation by the chairmen of 
Movement committees. While the Secretariat has a role in ‘promoting’ the courses, it is only 
when the largest groups are trained that it provides some actual support (i.e. a couple of 
‘mobilisers’ per course). Otherwise, the courses are very flexible and decentralised: they can 
be organised virtually at every level (parish, county or other), allegedly when ‘asked by the 
community’. Some little funding comes from the centre, while another part of the money is 
raised from among the ‘volunteers’ attending the courses.
While Mchaka Mchaka are presented as entirely voluntary exercises, “attendance at 
the politicization schools is essentially mandatory; that is, if anyone is to advance to any 
position of prominence within society”61. This was made explicit by the director of Mass 
Mobilisation:
“RCs [Resistance Committee and Council members] who are not willing to undergo 
political education courses should resign because they will not be able to lead in future 
[sic]... in future, people who will not have undergone political education training will not be 
elected to any RC office”62.
A special place among those targeted for these two- or three-week courses, which 
would include subjects such as Ugandan history, decentralisation or military science, are 
potential opinion leaders. Civil servants, teachers, local councillors, university students and 
other influential people can be instrumental in further spreading the Movement’s gospel. For 
them, a National School of Political Education was specifically created at Kyankwanzi. The 
Kyankwanzi political school, where participants are taught national-level courses over




slightly longer periods, is strategically aimed at producing cadres with the task, in the words 
of the NPC, of ‘marketing Movement ideas’ among the people63.
Western donors and Ugandan parties have repeatedly expressed concern that Mchaka 
Mchaka would be manipulatively used as indoctrination exercises and campaigning tools with 
a clear anti-party and pro-Movement bias64. Open calls were made to end “political education 
programs, which advance the view that political parties are responsible for Uganda’s past 
troubles and serve to justify violations of civil and political rights”65. Such pressures, 
combined with lack of money, caused the courses to be discontinued at the time of the 1994 
Constituent Assembly and then again, for a couple of years, between 1996 and 1998. But the 
fact that “political education was also a very effective way of winning support for the 
Movement” is openly admitted in NRM circles66. Thus, their restoration became an 
inescapable strategy as the referendum approached67.
In addition to mass socialisation through the courses, the political propaganda of the 
Movement is further disseminated by means of the media and through specific publications. 
The current mouthpiece of the organisation is an irregular Newsletter which was recently 
launched as a weekly paper (November 1998) but, allegedly because of limited funding, is 
only being published once a month. About 10,000 copies of the Newsletter are supposed to 
reach downwards and be distributed to all lower committee (“we have done it in this resistant 
paper so that it’s not used for other purposes...”68):
“[it] contains some of the funding principles.... That’s the main link [with the Secretariat].
And we distribute it to the Movement chairmen at sub-county and LC3, and sub-county 
chief (the administrator). No, not at the county nor at the village level... the Newsletters are 
few, we can’t give them to all of them”69.
62 New Vision (Kampala, 10 September 1992, p.2), quoted in Dicklitch (1998:72).
63 New Vision (Kampala, 14 July 1998). After a few years of inactivity, in late 1998 the Secretariat re-started at Kyankwanzi 
political school the countrywide courses for mobilisers drawn from district executives (New Vision, Kampala, 21 October 
1998 and 6 January 1999) as well as those for senior six leavers; the latter were informed by the NPC Wapakhabulo “to 
register with the RDC’s offices with immediate effect” (New Vision, Kampala, 24 July 1998).
64 Weekly Topic (Kampala, 1 October 1993).
65 H u m a n  Rights Watch (1999:10).
66 The statement is by an NRA official and is quoted in Human Rights Watch (1999:66).
67 Cf. Human Rights Watch (1999:67).
68 Magode Ikuya, interview (Kampala, 1 July 1999).
69 P’Odur, interview (Gulu, 5 July 1999).
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“We have been receiving about 100 copies, and recently they asked us to provide them a 
list for about 500 people (leaders, councillors, religious leaders, and so on), and institutions 
(like schools or others) to send it to them. I myself prepared the list”70.
Much more influential than the Newsletter, however, is the state-funded and formally 
independent New Vision, which, with a circulation o f25,000 copies a day, is the most widely- 
read newspaper in the country. On occasions, the New Vision has been quite critical of the 
regime. But, on balance, the paper is an openly pro-Movement tool, which also hosts regular 
commentaries as well as occasional interventions by top Movement leaders.
Other sources of information for Movement followers include a monthly paper (The 
Heritage) that was to be launched in late 1999 to replace The Mobiliser issued under the 
NRM71. In addition, the Secretariat makes use of slots on the radio, notably on Radio Star, 
which was “established specifically to counter ‘attacks’ from ‘hostile’ private radio stations, 
especially CBS (a.k.a. Radio Buganda) whose anti-NRM rhetoric reached new heights during 
the land reform controversy”72. In exceptional cases, such as in Gulu district, radio 
programmes are also employed by local committee chairmen to publicise Movement 
activities73.
Committees, Mchaka Mchaka, publications and all other activities of the Movement 
are sustained by a budget most of which, as already mentioned, comes from state coffers. 
Indeed, “all assets and property of organs under the Movement shall be deemed to be assets of 
the state”74. Thus, the Secretariat “depends entirely on the treasury: when the money doesn’t 
come, when there’s no money, we are affected as any other ministry”75. In 1998, for example, 
some alleged financial difficulties derived from a budget which did not provide for specific 
funding (the National Conference had only taken place after the budget was read), and the 
only available funds thus came from ‘a small department for mobilisation in the President’s 
Office’, whose staff and funds were absorbed by the Secretariat76. To diversify its sources of 
income, the Movement has tried its fortune with commercial businesses more than once. A
70 Fred Tumusiime, Secretary of Mbarara district Movement Committee, interview (Mbarara, 15 July 15, 1999).
71 Magode Ikuya, intervew (July 1,1999).
72 Golooba-Mutebi, personal communication.
73 Charles Odora Qryem, chairman of Gulu district Movement committee, interview (Gulu, 6 July 1999).
74 Art.35, 1997 Movement Act. In spite of prohibitions of private donations to political parties, the Act allows the Movement 
to receive donations by national or foreign individuals and entities, with the simple requirement of a formal approval by the 
Minister of Finance. Donations, however, do not seem to have come in in any significant amount
75 Lagada, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
76 Magode Ikuya, intervew (Kampala, 1 July 1999). An additional reason for the budgetary increase was that the 1998/1999 
budget was based on four directorates, but the NEC then met and established seven, so the new budget had to provide for 
them, Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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first attempt brought blame when the infamous Dame company, set up to generate income for 
the organisation, was found guilty of not paying taxes. At a later stage, Movement officials 
acknowledged that a second commercial company, the Heritage Terminal, had been created 
to run the Internal Container Depot at the inland port of Nakawa as a legitimate business 
permitted by the Movement Act11.
Regardless of these controversial activities, the Secretariat is oiled by abundant state 
funding. Its budget passed from Shs.3.4bn [$2.2m] for the 1998/1999 fiscal year to about 
Shs.6.9bn [$4.5m] for 1999/2000, doubling in the space of only one year78. Most of this 
money allegedly goes into wages, while only about Shs.lbn is reserved for ‘activities’, with 
Mobilisation (Shs.400m) and Information (Shs.l80m) obtaining the largest shares and the 
other directorates following at a distance79. The generous availability of funds, by Ugandan 
standards, is also testified by the comprehensive refurbishment, in 1999, of the well-sized 
Movement headquarters -  the building of the former Uganda Development Corporation, 
positioned as a watchdog right in front of the parliamentary building.
Neither monopoly nor pluralism: a hegemonic party system
The internal reform process undergone by the Movement over the last few years and 
its impact on the political landscape in late-1990s Uganda have been interpreted in different 
ways, notably with regard to the actual room permitted for organised opposition. Some 
observers have suggested that the NRM “have permitted a de facto, though unacknowledged, 
form of party competition to become the basis for the actual practice of Ugandan electoral 
democracy”80. The claim is that, in spite of the ban, the country “in reality operate(s) more or 
less as a three-party system, with the NRM increasingly taking on most of the characteristics 
of the other parties [i.e. DP and UPC]”81. But opposite interpretations have been advanced as 
well, propounding, for example, that “it is difficult to see the role of [the arrangements 
introduced by the 1997 Movement Act\ ... except as a form of partisan party structure 
normally associated with one-party states”82; indeed, that “the ‘new’ Movement... is simply a 
state-supported political organisation -  a single-party in all but name”83.
77 New Vision (Kampala, 9 September 2000).
78 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
79 Magode Ikuya, interview (Kampala, 1 July 1999).
80 Kasfir (1998:58).
81 Ssenkumba (1998:179).




While both these interpretations have elements of truth, Uganda’s political system, as 
it is currently working, is best conceptualised as something closer to a hegemonic party-state 
system. That is, neither a fully-fledged one-party state (i.e. political monopoly) nor a three- 
party system (i.e. political pluralism), but a situation of political supremacy on the part of a 
single organisation, with smaller opposition groups not able, so far, to put up any significant 
challenge. Two assumptions underlay this argument. The first one is that, as pointed out, the 
Movement is a partisan political organisation -  rather than a "system’, as claimed by its 
leaders -  driven by the aim of placing and keeping its people in positions of power. The 
mantra of an all-embracing ‘system’ cannot hide this fact. Also implicit in the notion of a 
hegemonic party system is the idea that, if party systems are defined as “the set of patterned 
interactions in the competition among parties”84, a key distinction concerns the actual degree 
of competition that characterises such interactions. On the one side, monoparty systems 
display a complete lack of it; on the other side, two- or multiple-party polities are an 
expression of pluralist competition. In what remains an unsurpassed understanding of parties 
and party-like political organisations, Sartori provides the best synthetic description of the 
features displayed by hegemonic party systems. Such systems belong to a:
“variety of arrangements that are one-party centered and yet display a periphery of 
secondary and indeed ‘second class* minor parties.... [The latter] may be an empty fagade 
... [or else] may be relevant in some substantive respect... The pattern can be described as 
follows. The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for 
power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are 
not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal 
basis. Not only does alternation not occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the possibility of a 
rotation in power is not even envisaged.... No real sanction commits the hegemonic party 
to responsiveness. Whatever its policy, its domination cannot be challenged. ... A 
hegemonic party system is definitely not a multiparty system, but is, at best, a two-level 
system in which one party tolerates and discretionally allocates a fraction of its power to 
subordinate political groups”85.
The Freedom House, whose regime classifications are widely acknowledged as an 
important reference, prefers the term ‘dominant’ rather than ‘hegemonic’. Its
84 Mainwaring -  Scully (1995:4).
85 Sartori (1976:230-231). While Sartori holds Poland and Mexico to be the best examples of hegemonic party systems, 
among the other cases he examines is Portugal, particularly when Caetano succeeded to Salazar and organized elections in 
1969 and 1973: one party only was allowed to exist, but “during the one-month preelectoral period independent candidates 
were permitted to campaign and present opposition slates. [Although] this opposition did not have a party status, [and] was 
disbanded after the election” (Sartori 1976:236).
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conceptualisation, however, is quite similar to Sartori’s: “dominant party polities are systems 
in which the ruling party (or front) dominates government, but allows other parties to organise 
or compete short of taking control of the government”86. Ultimately, hegemonic and dominant 
party systems are best understood as analytically different categories, where the first indicates 
a non-competitive regime, while the second points at a least competitive one87. Yet, both 
systems can display a situation where the governing organisations’ “political survival is to a 
large degree due to the fact that even prior to the founding election they had staked a strong 
claim to represent the new nation (or regime, or dominant racial/ethnic group) with its 
particular historic project, and had managed to occupy a strategic position of power”88. In 
particular, the instrumental role of no-party elections in securing the Movement’s hegemony 
in Uganda compares strikingly with the emergence of dominant-party systems in Mexico, 
Taiwan, Malaysia and South Africa. In the latter countries, initial decisions concerning the 
kind of electoral system and competition had a profound impact on the nature of the emerging 
ruling group and on its control over its own members and over the oppositions and the society 
at large89. In Uganda, the individual-merit principle granted a degree of legitimacy to the 
system by enabling the Movement to co-opt a fragmented and largely neutralised opposition: 
“the idea of personal merit is all embracing because no one is denied the right to vie for 
political office ... a person like Hon. Cecilia Ogwal [i.e. the UPC secretary general] who does 
not believe in the concept of personal merit is nevertheless a member of parliament”90.
For the country’s opposition parties, the reality on the ground has so far been a 
mixed one. Parties are restricted by the constitution. While constitutional restrictions have the 
status of a fundamental law, the specification of how breaches to such general norms are 
actually to be prosecuted -  i.e. the statutory law that is necessary to implement the word of 
the constitution -  is not there. Thus, for example, there is no definition of the punishment that 
a party leader organising a public rally would incur. This lacuna allows parties some 
occasional scope for action91. Yet, repression has most often been practised at the hands of 
government organs, especially by the powerful Resident District Commissioners. The police
86 Quoted in Simians (1999:50). Coleman and Rosberg identified two tendencies among the uniparty and one-party-dominant 
African states of the 1960s, one being a revolutionary-centralizing type, the other a pragmatic-pluralistic trend. With regard 
to the latter, they pointed at a characteristic climate of “tolerated but controlled pluralism” that echoes some aspects of 
Sartori’s ‘hegemonic party system’, Coleman -  Rosberg (1966:6).
87 Sartori (1976).
88 Giliomee -  Simkins (1999:2).
89 See Giliomee -  Simkins (1999:13).
90 Wapakhabulo, in New Vision (Kampala, 10 May 1999, p.29).




itself has been at times deployed to break up political gatherings by force92. The margins of 
action for parties have varied from region to region, mirroring the stronghold of the 
government over different parts of the country as much as the discretion of local authorities. 
Parties have been allowed a broader room of manoeuvre in the northern districts, for instance, 
whereas they have faced a much stricter regime in areas such as western Uganda. An outright 
exception has been the Kampala, where they have been relatively free to access para-political 
activities such as seminars. In the capital, candidates linked to the opposition were even able 
to win two consecutive mayoral elections. By and large, however, the limited organisation 
that parties had in the past has virtually disappeared throughout the country. What is left are 
so-called kakuyege activities, or informal and secretive, mostly one-to-one politics. 
Unsurprisingly, the real extent of restrictions fully emerged during election times. Both at 
national and local level, political competition was due to be based on "individual merit’ as 
opposed to party affiliation, but the NRM -  and, at times, parties themselves -  entered the 
field and bend the rules on more than one occasion. In the 1996 presidential campaign, 
discrimination and manipulation on the part of the ruling group were allegedly widespread. So 
much so that parties reacted with a boycott of the subsequent parliamentary election, with 
only a fraction of UPC and a few DP individuals standing and gaining office.
In the current politics of Uganda, the Movement’s hegemonic status thus derives 
from two main factors. First, the very absence of any seriously organised competitor, i.e. the 
broader context of unorganised politics that the principle of individual merit generates. 
Secondly, the Movement can still count on a privileged as much as ambiguous relationship 
with the state, which further reinforces its advantage over all other political organisations in 
terms, for example, of access to patronage resources or manipulation of the oppositions. In 
this sense, the effectiveness that the Movement organisation retains in spite of a legacy of 
scarce attention to internal organisational problems (and of the fact that the structures 
established by the Act are far from being fully operative yet) is the result of exogenous 
factors, rather than a reflection of the Movement’s own organisational strength. In other 
words, it is strictly a relative or contextual effectiveness. Hegemony and organisational 
fragility coexist in the Movement. The latter, which up to as recently as 1998 was entirely 
identified with Museveni for it lacked virtually any institutions93, retains a questionable
92 As, for instance, in Mbale and Kabale (Paul Ssemogerere, President of the Democratic Party, interview, Kampala 12 July 
1999), in Tororo, Kamuli and Mbarara (BBC World Service 12 July 1998, The Monitor 14 July 1998, and AFP 19 June 




organisational effectiveness even after the internal changes brought about by the Act. In the 
words of a longstanding observer of Ugandan political developments:
“they have invested little energy in building a vibrant Movement. The NRM’s National 
Secretariat is a moribund organisation with little sense of direction. ... Why don’t they 
create a political party and challenge the opposition?... Part of the answer is that they failed 
to use their time in power to create a strong organisation ... the hollow shell that the NRM 
has become would become apparent to everyone”9'1.
The 1997 Movement Act envisages the co-optation of state officials such as 
parliamentarians and local councillors into Movement bodies. This added confusion to a 
previous trend towards a clearer distinction between state and Movement organs95. The 
cumbersome presence of MPs in the Movement’s national executive, for example, re­
introduces a degree of overlap between the Movement organisation and the legislative 
assembly, something that earlier reforms were meant to end. The consequence of a similar 
overlap is not only that the ‘neutrality’ of national and local politico-administrative structures 
remains (politically, of course, but also legally) dubious, but also that the actual functioning 
and the capacity of Movement organs will at best require more time to be fully manifest. 
More relevant, however, is that the overlap between state and Movement personnel, which is 
instrumental to getting influential people involved in Movement politics, may well backfire. 
The organisation maintains a strong dependence on the state, rather than reinforcing its own 
autonomy. This, in turn, creates a problem of overload, with different demands for mobilising 
efforts falling on the shoulders of the same people. As pointed out, for example, Movement 
district committees include, by statute, all the councillors of the district administration 
(alongside other officials, such as MPs from the area). These Movement committees tend to 
elect the head of the district administration as their chairman. Thus, two thirds of the heads of 
district governments double up as chairmen of Movement committees96 and may not find it 
easy nor particularly rewarding to devote time to Movement meetings. This partly extends to 
those other members of the Movement committees who already meet as councillors in the 
local administration. Neither does the Act solve the question of making organisational 
boundaries clear. The most vocal multipartists can still access an ill-defined organ such as the
94 Kasfir (2000:75-76).
95 Human Rights Watch refers to a ‘continuing convergence between NRM and state structures’ (1999:68). While the report 
is a very useful and well-researched one, this specific interpretation is incorrect. As we have seen, there is rather 
‘discontinuity’ in the dynamic relationship between state and Movement, where an initial process of progressive separation 
has been halted and partly reversed by the overlapping organs established by the 1997 Act.
96 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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Movement parliamentary caucus97. This ambiguity and “openness ... means [that the 
Movement] is not always able to deal properly with ineffective elements within its ranks”98. 
As predictable within “a loose multi-ideological aggregation with unrestricted entry and 
exit”99, different tendencies have emerged inside the organisation. While strong anti- 
government stances like those taken by influential Movement moderates such as Winnie 
Byanyima or Wandera Ogalo can be a healthful sign of internal vitality, the bottom line is that 
any organisation aiming at effective action requires internal coherence.
Finally, the Movement pays the discontinuous and disorganised attempts at 
expanding its support among the local grassroots, something parties have done relatively 
better in spite of the ban. Even the new local structures introduced by the Act are far from 
being on the ground yet, with some possible exception in the run up to the referendum, when 
committees were controversially re-launched as funds allegedly became available in late
1999100
During the June 2000 referendum campaign, Ugandan politics prominently showed 
the features highlighted in this section. A part of the population was mobilised to support a 
relatively well-defined and certainly partisan Movement. Museveni conducted an 
unchallenged campaign not so much a result of the boycott on the part of the parties, but 
rather as a reflection of the well-entrenched hegemony of the ruling organisation. The local- 
level mobilisation of support, however, still largely hinged on ad hoc ‘referendum 
committees’ and presidential patronage (along with the use of local authorities) rather than on 
a well-established and autonomous political structure101.
97 Norbert Mao MP reportedly attended a meeting of the Movement Caucus in which the controversial Political 
Organisations Bill was discussed (New Vision, Kampala, 4 November 1999).
98 Regan (1995:161).
99 Ssenkumba (1997:17).
100 New Vision (Kampala, 7 December 1999).
101 Museveni, for example, oiled his district-to-district campaign on the ‘Movement bus’ with pledges such as a district status 
for Yumbe county in Arua, re-stocking funds for Apac district, a university of agriculture and environmental studies for 




The s ta te  of parties in a  no-party  s ta te
The (weakly) organised opposition of 
the Democratic Party and the Uganda People's Congress
The aim of the clever institutional set up established by the National Resistance 
Movement, as pointed out, was not only to restore electoral politics, but also to neutralise 
other political organisations without entirely alienating them. Thus, while Ugandan political 
parties are severely limited in what they can and cannot do, they have not been outlawed. In 
addition, several of their most prominent members were initially offered cabinet positions and 
co-opted into the NRM ‘broad-based’ government. This was notably the case for the 
leadership of the Democratic Party: the likes of Paul Ssemogerere, Robert Kitariko, Zachary 
Olum -  to mention but a few -  all held ministerial posts for a number of years. The same goes 
for the small Conservative Party, whose founding father Jehoash Mayanja-Nkangi is still 
currently in charge of such a prominent and crucial department as the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs. Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress was partly a different 
matter. The party bore the stigma of the hated, defeated and unrepentant enemy -  the former 
president himself is still in exile -  and from both the government side and the UPC side there 
was a persistent lack of will to compromise. Nonetheless, in spite of the UPC’s reiterated calls 
for electoral boycotts, even senior party leaders actually stood for election to local councils, to 
the National Resistance Council (the supreme political body of the NRM, which acted as the 
country’s legislative for a decade), to the Constituent Assembly, and to the first directly- 
elected parliament in 19961.
1 At least nine UPC members, for example, were in the NRC and publicly stated that party supporters were free to participate 
to RC elections on the understanding that nobody would represent UPC (New Vision, Kampala, 20 February 1992; cf. The 
Monitor, Kampala, 7 September 1993, p. 16). On occasions, UPC stalwarts even joined the executive: Daniel Omara Atubo, 
for instance, was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation between 1987 and 1991, while Philemon 
Mateke became Minister of State for Industrial Relations in 1999 (both are listed by Cecilia Ogwal as UPC).
The state of parties in a no-party state
The so-called broad-based government, however, progressively lost its inclusiveness, 
and Ugandan politics entered a new phase when the Constituent Assembly was convened in 
early 1994. The NRM’s successful attempt to entrench the no-party design in the new 
constitutional order made it plain that such an arrangement -  and the ‘Movement’ itself -  
were being progressively institutionalised, rather than being a temporary set up due to be 
dismantled any time soon. This further polarised political forces, with the DP fully joining the 
UPC in the opposition camp and a movementists-vers-MS-multipartists divide becoming more 
and more apparent. The constitution re-stated what the no-go areas for parties are. Listed in 
the key article 269, as previously mentioned, are delegates’ conferences, public rallies, local 
branches and the sponsoring of candidates for election. And yet, the no-party set up still 
allows existing parties to maintain their central headquarters as well as other assets such as 
party publications. Nor was party membership formally outlawed. This is the background 
against which the actual involvement and the impact of the political parties on Ugandan 
politics is to be investigated. As a first step, this chapter aims at identifying the strategies and 
the organisational forms pursued by Uganda’s two ‘historical’ political parties -  namely, the 
Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress, which are commonly held as the two 
main components of the country’s opposition politics -  as a response to the no-party set up.
The organisational strategies of opposition parties
Along with the legal or institutional restrictions currently in place, strategic choices 
also help to explain the kind of organisation that opposition parties have been relying upon 
over the NRM years. Three broad options were available to existing opposition parties: 
integration, boycott or violence.
The first possible line of action was to join the system in full, which would provide 
the opportunity of working from within core institutions (whether at the central or local level) 
either with the aim of pushing for change or merely of monitoring the working of such 
institutions in the most effective manner. For example, being elected to parliament enabled 
opposition MPs to scrutinise closely government policies, to have a say on their making -  
notably by means of influential parliamentary committees -  and even to lobby Movement 
MPs for support on specific issues. In some cases, party politicians could even be made 
ministers and thus become most directly involved in the process of policy formulation. This 
Trojan-horse strategy, however, had its own critics, for it would lend some legitimacy and
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credibility to a regime to which multipartists were ideologically adverse. Furthermore, 
integration was a risky step in that it would favour the government’s attempt to co-opt its 
opponents, especially in the absence of electoral or parliamentary parties binding individual 
members of the opposition together.
Secondly, a compromise option between integration and recourse to violence was a 
cohesive and substantial boycott. The latter would put political and moral pressure on the 
legitimacy-seeking efforts of a government that claimed to be democratic, participatory and 
‘broad-based’. The evident drawback of such a strategy was a loss of influence on the 
institution-building process underway, as well as on specific government policies, especially 
as long as the regime could count on a strong international legitimacy. In other words, the risk 
of a boycott was to give up any remaining channel for a constructive input and, possibly, to be 
left with an even worse and unreformed system.
The third alternative was that of an armed reaction. With the NRM itself as an 
example of the rich premium that would accompany a military success, the threat of ‘going to 
the bush’ became rhetorically recurrent. Former president Milton Obote himself occasionally 
called on the people to find a military leader for a general insurgency2. The two rebel 
movements that have ravaged the north of the country since Museveni took over power -  i.e. 
Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and its successor, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army -  demonstrated the practical incapacity of the NRM to close the way to military 
challenges. But popular exhaustion at the mere prospect of the country plunging again into 
civil war and being devastated afresh at the hands of armed factions may have proved a 
difficult hurdle in organising a guerrilla take-over. Moreover, the strong economic 
performance of the regime provided it with significant consensus among broad sections of the 
population and, at the end of the 1990s, a substantial part of the political class had ‘a stake in 
stability’3. If anything, the average age of the DP and UPC leaderships made the two parties 
unlikely torch-bearers for an armed challenge, with all the sacrifices and strong will that the 
latter would require.
In addition to the legal restrictions in place and the strategic options available, non- 
institutional factors also influenced political parties in choosing and developing their 
organisational strategies. Such elements included the legacy of past conflicts, the availability
2 The Monitor (Kampala, 11 October 1998 and 2 May 1999, p.2).
3 Augustine Ruzindana, MP, interview (Kampala, 28 April 1999).
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of international and popular support, the resource gap between Kampala and the rest of the 
country, and the sheer benefits o f ‘joining in’.
Whether ideological, communal or merely politico-partisan, deep-seated historical 
conflicts shaped the motivations of party leaders and supporters. This was especially true for 
the uncompromising attitude that opposed former president Milton Obote’s UPC to the NRM, 
which, as demonstrated below, heavily contributed to the internal developments of the former.
With regard to international support, parties tried hard to lobby pro-Movement 
donors to switch their position and increase external pressures for opening up the system to 
multiparty competition. The strategy of the Democratic Party was profoundly affected by the 
availability of indirect funding coming from a German NGO that favoured political reform. 
The UPC, by contrast, faced a reiterated refusal by a similar NGO to restore the close ties that 
had linked the two organisations in the 1960s and 1980s.
Resource constraints outside Kampala were a further consideration. They inevitably 
created a huge gap between the capital and other parts of Uganda in terms of the levels of 
existing and potential activities: the strategies adopted for the urban centre of the country 
were hardly applicable to most rural areas.
The prospect of benefiting from joining the system also played a role. This is true for 
both individual gains, such as the influence and the salary that an opposition politician would 
obtain by becoming an MP, and such collective benefits as government resources being 
steered to ‘loyal’ areas (or merely to ‘pacifying’ strife-torn regions).
Finally, opposition parties had to appraise the extent of their own popular backing 
(people are generally more supportive of the opposition in northern Uganda than in the west, 
for example). They had to consider the positions taken by other forces (with complete and 
unconditional adherence, for instance, the boycott of the 1996 parliamentary election would 
have had a different impact). And, to a significant extent, they depended on the changing 
disposition of the Movement to co-opt, co-operate or compromise with opposition groups.
To summarise, the organisational development of parties was primarily dependent 
upon: 1) legal or institutional restrictions, 2) non-institutional constraints, and 3) overall 
strategic choices. Given the background of constraints and options briefly sketched, what 
have been the actual organisational strategies adopted by the two most prominent parties, the 
Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress, in trying to retain influence and gain 
power?
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The Democratic Party had been the closest ally of the NRM since the latter took over 
power. By the late 1980s, however, a gradual but steady reduction in the number of DP 
ministers became evident, and, by the early 1990s, the DP began to insist on ending the 
interim period with a complete lifting of the ban on party activities. In the space of two years, 
the Constituent Assembly and the presidential and parliamentary elections brought about a 
complete U-turn by the party leadership. First, the DP moved from being a government 
partner to being the ‘official’ opposition when Ssemogerere ran for the presidency. Then, the 
party shifted to an extra-parliamentary opposition with the boycott of the parliamentary 
election. The move could be read as the consistent pursuit of a prominent party objective 
(multipartism) in view of the NRM’s perpetuation of the interim period. This is however a 
minor point here. Rather, it is interesting to observe what the subsequent moves of the party 
have been.
Two lines of conduct guided the action of the DP after 1996. First, a partial re­
thinking of the boycott strategy. To some extent, the DP found nowhere to go after it opted 
out of the parliamentary election. The boycott by opposition forces had been incomplete, 
notably because Cecilia Ogwal’s faction of the UPC went to parliament. And yet the bush was 
never in the agenda for an organisation with a non-violent tradition. Thus, by the time of the 
1998 local elections, the DP had gone some way back on its track. This was apparent in the 
two successive Kampala mayoral contests, in 1998 and 1999, through which DP members 
won the important office. By the time of the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
the party strategy did not include any calls for boycotts. But there was also a second, related 
route which was being pursued by the DP. A so-called ‘rejuvenation’ of the party scheme was 
planned and partly implemented by means of a youth wing, of an ancillary NGO, and of what 
may be termed the politics of kakuyege4. It is through these three elements that the DP has 
been showing a relative liveliness and a certain unity of purpose.
The Uganda People’s Congress, after the experience in the Constituent Assembly, 
saw the emergence of two distinct factions within its leadership ranks. The presidential 
election of 1996 put the cohesion of the party under heavy stress over the issue of supporting 
DP Paul Ssemogerere as a common candidate for all multipartists. When the election 
allegedly proved to be rigged -  or, for that matter, was perceived and said to be so -  UPC 
leaders could no longer agree on whether to go on with the parliamentary election or to 
restore the party’s long standing strategy of not taking part in the new regime. This 
immediately caused the party to split. Obote and his closest allies in Kampala (the
4 See below.
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Rwanyarares and Odakas) brought back Uganda House to a position of uncompromising 
distance from ‘the Movement’s constitution and parliament’. The Secretary General, Cecilia 
Ogwal, and other younger or independent-minded members (like Ben Wacha and Omara 
Atubo, Aggrey Awori and the late professor Akiiki Mujaju) challenged the party president, 
tried to obtain the backing of the party on entering parliament, and thus forced a rupture in the 
party. The division is one between an ideological and symbolic opposition, and a more 
pragmatic -  though hardly less radical -  approach. As a result, the UPC is currently bi­
headed. But the creation of two distinct leadership bodies is only in part reflected at lower 
levels, where such divisions are not always understood. Under existing limitations, it would 
not be easy for the party to double up that little organisation that may occasionally be in place.
The remainder of this paper provides an empirical account of the current organisation 
of the UPC and the DP. An investigation into the degree of organisation that parties retain 
under existing restrictions is a necessary step. The presence and the effective organisation of 
political parties may not depend solely on constitutional or legal prescriptions. Even in a 
situation of formal repression, they may still develop underground organisations and 
activities. As pointed out in Chapter One, the effective presence and organisational depth of 
parties -  i.e. their degree of organisation -  is defined as “the extent of regularised procedures 
for mobilising and co-ordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s 
strategy and tactics”5. Accordingly, a number of key organisational indicators have been 
identified in Table 1.1 (see Chapter One) to facilitate a more specific and focused analysis. In 
what follows, the Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress will be presented in 
the light of this conceptual framework.
Continuity and lack of formalisation in the Democratic Party
Over the 1986-1996 decade, the Democratic Party progressively re-defined its role 
on Uganda’s political landscape from being the closest partner of the NRM in government to 
leading the opposition. Key to this move was the experience of the Constituent Assembly, 
which changed the perception of what the ‘broad-based Movement government’ was about 
and how the DP and its members could relate to it:
5 Janda (1970:106).
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“in 1986 we lost many. Virtually everybody went into the Movement. DP itself went, and, 
in the process, people joined the NRM. Then in 1995, during the Constituent Assembly, 
things came out -  that it was not an interim government, that it was here to stay. And 
people started to come back, to identify themselves as DP”6.
“After 1995, with the constitution, to most people it became increasingly clear that the 
NRM was forcing members to become its members while restricting other organisations.
So, the contrast between the two, the feet that one had to be either NRM or DP, became 
more evident”7.
By the time of the 1996 presidential election, the party leader Paul Ssemogerere, who 
had been a minister up to the previous year, was challenging Yoweri Museveni on a pro- 
multipartism platform. The DP’s decision to boycott the subsequent parliamentary election, 
officially explained because of rigging on the part of the Movement, signalled the moment of 
most evident rupture with the regime. Two years on, however, the party was to some extent 
back into the game, successfully running two consecutive mayoral elections in Kampala.
Despite having an extremely weak -  at times and places a hardly detectable -  
presence, the DP has been in recent years the most prominent and organised political force in 
Uganda, barring the Movement. But what does the Democratic Party amount to, today? The 
DP has a Catholic-based party tradition which dates back to the mid-1950s and has long been 
‘institutionalised’ in the identities of many Ugandans. In this sense, the party includes and 
represents a significant segment of the population as well as of the current opposition, as 
much as it did during every single one of Uganda’s post-independent regimes. In more 
practical terms, the Democratic Party is a poorly furnished and severely under-funded office 
in central Kampala (the telephone line was ‘recently cut off), a well-known party leadership, 
the thousands supporters in town, and the people who every day come and go from its City 
House headquarters. In addition, the party has a largely inactive upcountry membership -  
whether formally affiliated or only quietly supportive -  which is scantily informed and often 
hardly interactive with the central organs.
Given the very weakness of political parties under the existing conditions, struggling 
for fully-fledged multiparty freedom and competition is a gigantic effort. Quite 
understandably, the leadership organs of the Democratic Party have devoted much of their 
attention, energies and practical efforts to this unique issue. Two complementary lines of
0 Maria Mutagamba, Deputy Secretary General of the DP, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
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action have been pursued for the achievement of this objective. On the one side, the party 
mounted pressures on the current power-holders to open up the political process to non- 
Movement organisations. This was the aim of activities such as lobbying the international 
community, electoral boycotts, anti-referendum press releases and seminar speeches, inter- 
party coalition-building, occasional policy proposals (notably on the Political Organisations 
Bill) and so on. At the same time, an undercover strategy was devised to revive party 
structures -  or to ‘rejuvenate’ them, in the DP’s internal discourse -  without waiting for 
parties to be legally free to do so. Efforts in this direction include questioning the party 
leadership, underground and at times open campaigning, re-establishing central and local 
organs, making use of parallel organisations (such as the Foundation for African Development 
and the Uganda Young Democrats) and the occasional fielding of candidates. It is this second 
aspect which is of direct concern for this chapter.
The central organs and  party membership
The core organs of the Democratic Party may be expected to fere better than their 
ineffectual counterparts in the countryside, and, to some extent, they actually do. Despite their 
success in maintaining a tenuous organisational continuity, however, the party headquarters 
and central organs suffer from an extreme lack of resources, and their ability to meet is 
irregular at best, but sporadic to non-existent.
The last time the party convened a Delegates’ Conference was back in 1980, when 
Ssemogerere was elected to the DP presidency. Several explanations have been advanced as 
for why this party organ has not been gathered ever since to re-launch the organisation and 
internal democracy of the DP. Between 1981-1984, the party became so invariably harassed 
by Obote’s government that organising a Conference allegedly proved to be impossible 
without provoking the regime’s violent reaction. Later, when restrictions were introduced in 
the late 1980s, it was initially the DP itself which, in view of the disruptions brought about by 
the civil war, essentially accepted the NRM’s idea of an interim period under a broad-based 
no-party government. By the early 1990s, when the DP began to question the actual intentions 
of the NRM to free political parties, Museveni had created a climate where full restoration of 
party organs was institutionally repressed and did not enjoy widespread sympathy among 
Ugandans. The party statute, which requires such a conference to be convened every two 
years, clashes with the country’s new constitution, which explicitly prohibits such general
7 Damiano Lubega, Organising Secretary of the DP, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
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meetings. Some party leaders stress the danger or sheer impossibility of convening such a 
forum under existing circumstances. When, for example, a self-styled ‘Mobilisers Group’ 
emerged from within the party and twice tried to convene a public rally in central Kampala in 
1993, it was forced to call it off in front of the intolerant security showdown displayed by 
Museveni8. Other prominent members of the party, however, point at a mere lack of political 
will or financial resources to call the conference. When voices emerged within the DP asking 
that the party forced its way through to a conference, Ssemogerere himself came under attack 
for blocking the only forum which could challenge his mandate as party president9.
In the absence of a full-fledged conference, it is mainly in smaller organs such as the 
National Executive and the National Council that the party does retain a degree of internal 
coherence and effectiveness. While the National Executive Committee (NEC) is the real brain 
and heart of the party, the National Council is an intermediate body between the NEC and the 
Delegates’ Conference. In a situation where the delegates cannot be heard in full, the 
Council’s approval provides some broader legitimacy to the actions and the decisions of the 
party executive.
Since 1994, the National Council has been meeting very irregularly (there’s a high 
degree of variation in answers regarding the mere frequency of meetings) and never more 
than twice a year. The Council consists of the 36 members of the Executive and an additional 
45 representatives, one from each district. Compared to the NEC, this organ evidently 
requires extra logistic and financial efforts to convene, as the majority of its members come 
from upcountry. In an early 1999 meeting, it still had an uncertain number of district 
representatives missing (between 2 and 15).
Meetings of the National Executive Committee have been somewhat more regular, 
especially after 1995, when its officials got together roughly every one to three months. 
Nevertheless, the NEC itself was grossly incomplete for a long time. Up to the beginning of 
1999, defection, inactivity, death and retirement had downsized its effective membership to
8 Human Rights Watch (1999:38).
9 See, for instance, The Monitor (Kampala, 12 November 1993 and 29 March 1996), New Vision (Kampala, 12 June 1993 and 
1 June 1998), Weekly Topic (Kampala, 18 June 1994). Inmid-2000, Ssemogerere again managed to derail the process for the 
renewal of the party leadership. The president initially declared his post to be vacant and allowed seven candidates to 
complete the formalities for nomination. Shortly afterwards, he successfully petitioned the High Court to issue an order 
preventing the meeting of the National Council where a new party leadership was to be elected. The process ended up in a 
wrangle between a southern faction of the leadership (including Ssemogerere, Ssebaana Kizito and Damiano Lubega), 
backed by the youth wing, and a break-away one with some prominent northern members (the likes of Zachary Olum and 
Mariano Drametu). While, in view of the March 2001 election, mainstream DP officially agreed to support Kiiza Besigye’s 
independent bid for the presidency, the break-away faction tried to sponsor framer party secretary general Francis Bwengye. 
who only obtained 0.3 per cent of the popular vote. See The Monitor (Kampala, 20 July, 5 September, 25 November 2000,11 
and 25 January 2001) and the New Vision (Kampala, 14 December 2000).
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around 15. At the February 1999 meeting of the National Council, the executive was fully 
reconstituted by electing to each vacant office one of three nominees put forward by an 
especially-appointed ‘credentials committee’. The relative formalisation and complexity of 
this latter procedure points at a degree of capacity retained by the inner circle of the DP.
A similar capacity is also apparent in the fact that aspiring members still have to go 
through an informal procedural screening10:
“one becomes a member either by invitation or by application”n . “We need to know 
something about new members, we have to screen them to make sure they have good 
intentions. This has become necessary: we have known of people who buy cards for 
themselves and for others, then they go and denounce their membership! En masse\ Say, 
for instance, a group of some sub-county wants to be heard and noticed as being pro- 
Movement what do they do? Well, they make this collective statement, denouncing their 
membership and drawing attention upon them: ‘we are 100, and we are crossing from the 
DP to the NRM’”12.
Similar allegations are made by the leaders of the youth wing of the party:
“we also had cards, but then the government would bribe thugs who would buy cards, then 
they would do some act of hooliganism, and the government would arrest them and say 
‘You see, these are the Young Democrats! ’. So we had to stop that”13.
This partial control over the effective functioning of the party, however, does not 
extend much beyond the headquarters. After the political polarisation fostered by the 
constitution-making process, for example, the DP reaffirmed a clearer notion of party 
membership. The party subsequently began a registration exercise, but, at present, it seems to 
lack the very structures that would be necessary to carry out the process countrywide. Thus, 
the only available membership data remain those of 1980, and no party official dares to 
estimate the actual number of party adherents. Some district party leaders do show an 
awareness of the need for counting heads, and they made attempts at providing lists of local
10 The importance of recruitment criteria has been highlighted by different authors. Janda, for example, suggests that the 
stricter the requirements to join a party, the stronger the ‘involvement’ of the members “as the intensity of psychological 
identification with the party and commitment to furthering its objectives by participating in party activities” (Janda 
1970: 111). Cf. also Panebianco (1988).
11 Mariano Drametu, Secretary General of the DP, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
12 Lubega, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999). In the run up to the referendum, for example, the ‘conversion’ of some 15 
alleged multiparty activists was publicly announced by Museveni -  and by the former activists themselves -  at a political 
rally in Kabale; see “Multipartists defect to Movement”, in New Vision (Kampala, 8 May 2000).
13 Michael Mabikke, Secretary General of UYD, interview (Kampala, 24 June 2000).
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members14. A complete registration process has not occurred, however, both because of the 
disorganisation of the party and because of the dangers that derive from the anti-party 
regulations. Selling party membership cards is seen as a hazardous way of exposing followers 
to discrimination by government and Movement authorities. Fear is also increased by the 
confusion surrounding the legality of selling or holding party cards. While party leaders are 
by and large aware that there is no formal ban on such activity, the common perception at the 
local level is that cards are simply outlawed:
“in 1996 we realised that we did not know who our members were. So [in 1997] we started 
selling cards to identify them. But it’s only those few people who are not intimidated that 
buy them. People fear, that’s the big problem”15.
“No way, we don’t sell party cards: there’s a ban on selling cards! If you are caught that’s 
an offence!”16.
Therefore, aside from the central organs, a low degree of formalisation permeates 
what is left of party activities. In part, this reflects the weak institutionalisation and the 
marked reliance on individual leaders that are typical of African parties even where conditions 
of full political freedom prevail17. In Uganda’s case, however, the low formalisation of party 
activities is brought to the extreme by the need to keep them undercover, by the decline over 
time of inactive party structures, by the recourse to surrogate forms of political action, and by 
the sheer lack of funding. These elements are worth addressing one by one.
The branches and  the informal politics of kakuyege
A prominent feature of the low formalisation of DP politics is what party officials 
refer to as ‘doing kakuyege’. The word kakuyege is a diminutive form for the Luganda 
nkuyege, meaning ‘termites’, and thus suggests ‘small termites’. In Museveni’s words, 
“enkuyege are very small ants which operate in huge numbers. Once they invade an area, they 
are able to cover a large piece of ground, penetrating through every crevice in the grass”18. 
Thus, just like ants that “typically array themselves in a line as they travel around hunting for
14 Kerubino Uma, DP branch chairman for Gulu district, interview (Gulu, 5 July 1999).
15 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
16 John Mugisha, DP youth leader for Mbarara district, interview (Mbarara, 15 July 1999).
17 Cf. Kasfir (1976:246).
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food”19, small groups of individuals would engage in secretive, often door-to-door 
campaigning. The politics of kakuyege is therefore made of “quiet work, like that of the 
termites: nobody notices it, but the job gets done”20. Kakuyege is the secret politics of furtive 
individual contacts, of mouth-to-mouth messages, of nightly small gatherings. But it is also 
the shrewd use of any social occasion and event -  parties, funerals and weddings, public 
functions and seminars -  as a pretext and opportunity to meet members and followers. In this 
way, local members:
“are somehow active. House-to-house, or at funerals, weddings, in the churches... We send 
messages to focus the point and those persons find the way to get it across. This can also be 
through a government function. When you have a minister coming, for instance, everybody 
is to be there, and that’s a good occasion to meet our people”21.
“In a struggle like this one, you know, you just need to use all opportunities available to 
reach out”22.
“Organising a meeting is not, per se, necessarily a problem. You can do it. For instance, I 
would organise a party in my house, for a birthday of somebody in the family. You create 
the occasion”23.
The very aim of doing kakuyege is to awake the party’s ‘silent membership’24, to get 
messages across, to reach out those followers that are still eager to talk politics, who want to 
do it without talking Movement, but who cannot do it in an open manner. A fragile and 
intermittent underground network is thus created, linking the top leadership with the 
grassroots, Kampala with the countryside. In this sense, kakuyege is both a complement to and 
a substitute for more orthodox, formalised, open and official politicking:
“party organs are all run down, they are still down. None of them is functioning except the 
National Executive. The rest is kakuyege\ ... Right now you can’t say we have branches.
But we have structures, people who are there and operate the way I said, through kakuyege, 
not openly”25.
18 Museveni (1997:211) refers to kakuyege as a ‘method of mobilisation’ to reach out the lowest and most marginalised 
sectors of society, notably the peasants. According to some, Museveni himself is the one who gave the word a political 
meaning.
19 Tamale (1999:181n).
20 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
21 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
22 Mabikke, interview (Kampala, 24 June 2000).
23 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
24 A DP representative in Mbale who requested anonymity, interview (Mbale, 9 July 1999).
25 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
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The presence of local branches -  at regional, district or lower level -  is the main 
manifestation of the extensiveness of a party organisation. Investigating the current situation 
of local branches, however, is a particularly demanding task. Parties are allowed to maintain a 
central office with leadership organs, but branches are prohibited. Activities in Kampala are 
relatively easy to carry out as well as being more open and more frequent. At the local level, 
by contrast, the party has to face the toughest resistance of a government which, far from the 
direct attention of foreign missions and backed by the illiberal legislation, clamps down on 
the moves of party activists and followers. A long period of scant operation and recruitment, 
the repression at the hands of Resident District Commissioners and other local authorities, 
defection to the Movement, and lack of funding have produced a situation where, in several 
areas, the DP no longer has full-fledged branches but only individual adherents:
“in the 1990s, local branches were decimated, they almost disappeared. And they are now 
virtually non-existent. There were not any longer full committees, but one or two 
individuals, who, at times, would try to meet, but secretly”26. “There were not enough 
people filling formal positions... We only found there the die hard people”27.
Variations do occur, however, between district and district, due to different traditions 
of territorial presence of the party, the whims of local authorities, and the capacity of local 
party leaders:
“in many districts, party structures had collapsed. But, still, in every district there would be, 
if not a full executive, a few individuals. And in some districts they would have their 
structures in place, such as in the four districts of West Nile. I was regional co-ordinator of 
district branches there between 1993-99,1 was based in Arua. They were active, organising 
meetings. In Arua, 1 had 12 people ... and we had three levels, with 5 people at county 
level, 5 at sub-county and 5 at parish level. ... Then, as a co-ordinator, I called 8 people -  
the chairman and the secretary of each of the four districts -  perhaps four times in a year, 
plus for occasional, important meetings. We were definitely organised. And we did deliver: 
Ssemogerere got 90 per cent of the vote in the area in the 1996 presidential election! ... But 
it varies form region to region. It depends on the officials, the LC5 chairman, on the RDC, 
and so on, on whether they implement the restrictions and how they do it. In Arua, for 
instance, we had officials who did not have any problem with any meeting, as long as we 
notified it. But I know there are new officials now, and things are a bit different. I
26 Robert Kitariko, former General Secretary of the DP, interview (Kampala, 13 May 1999).
27 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
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understand in Mbarara holding a meeting with more than 8 people is a problem, whereas in 
Gulu, for instance, there’s no problem”28.
Party surrogate: the Foundation for African Development
The porous definition of inter-organisational boundaries and the mixing up of roles is 
another sign of the largely ad hoc character of party arrangements. This is best illustrated by 
the skilful use the DP has made of the Foundation for African Development (FAD). FAD was 
created in 1980, along the lines of German political foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation (KAS) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), which had been operating in the 
country since the 1960s. While FAD is a registered NGO, formally independent of the 
Democratic Party, its founders were prominent DP figures like Paul Ssemogerere and 
Anthony Ssekweyama. As the latter explained, in 1980 “DP hadn’t been revived yet: parties 
were not allowed, so we founded an NGO”29. Party leaders themselves consistently 
characterise FAD as ‘not independent of the party’, ‘a DP organisation’, or even a ‘quasi­
organ of the party’. “It’s the NGO of the party, it has its roots in the party”30. An open overlap 
between the office bearers of the two organisations was avoided in the past, but in 1998 the 
DP Publicity Secretary was appointed to head the foundation.
The relationship between the DP and FAD is a politico-financial one: while FAD is 
politically dependent upon the DP, financially it is largely the other way round. The 
Foundation for African Development does have a substantial budget (roughly DM350,000 or 
$200,000 a year) which it entirely receives from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Thus, 
through the inter-mediation of FAD on the Ugandan side and KAS on the German side, the 
Democratic Party is indirectly connected to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the 
political referent of KAS. This linkage can be explained on the basis of a common Christian 
conservative background: as Low points out, the DP itself is “a Christian Democratic Party”31.
The stated objectives of FAD include the promotion of civic education on democratic 
values and developmental issues. But educational activities are largely directed to DP 
members32. Party cadres, for example, are the ones who are systematically invited to 
development workshops and political seminars, and they receive free copies of The
28 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
29 Anthony Ssekweyama, late administrator of the Foundation for African Development and Publicity Secretary of the DP, 
interview (Kampala, 6 June 1999).
30 Mabikke, interview (Kampala, 24 June 2000).
31 Low (1962:23). A partnership identical to the DP-FAD one used to exist between the UPC and the social-democratic 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation up to the early 1980s.
32 The activities of FAD are not only pro-DP ones, nor do initiatives only come from party leaders or supporters.
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Messenger periodical or other written material on political issues published by the NGO. 
Political seminars, in particular, have been so skilfully used as to become a surrogate -  a weak 
surrogate, but an important one under existing circumstances -  for party branch activities. 
This reflects the elementary idea that “when you don’t have the branches to do the job, you 
need something else in place to do it! As a matter of fact, FAD has always organised seminars 
to call and gather party members”33. A similar apparatus is all the more relevant since church 
networks appear to play an increasingly marginal role in Ugandan politics:
“seminars upcountry are mostly used as DP meetings, to brief and educate our people.
Especially the ‘political’ ones -  the ‘training of trainers’ -  they are DP and FAD meetings 
with our people. ... Yes, they are a sort of branch meetings. But technically they are not 
illegal. It’s an experiment, a way of starting to revive the branches”34.
While speeches to a seminar plenary would be used to get the party line across, the 
focus would largely be on the collateral contacts, briefing, recruitment and branch-building 
opportunities that the forum provides:
“we make sure that some of our members are invited [to the seminars], though not 
exclusively. Of 50 people that are invited on average, 2/3 might be party members. And 
then at the seminar we talk both formally and informally. Formally, for instance, a paper 
might be presented. And we are very selective in recruiting presenters, to make sure that the 
message gets across. And informally, we talk during a break, mainly person-by-person, or 
even in somewhat larger groups, especially when it’s an overnight seminar”35.
“at the end of the seminar we often hold what we call a ‘debriefing’, a meeting, a discussion 
for members only. Especially if there is some specific issue to be discussed, such as if we 
have to elect district representatives. So, after the seminar, you would have the district 
structures established,3<s.
“... after the official seminar, we do kakuyege. So you might have DP people. We are able 
to meet people we would not otherwise be able to meet. In the process, you also make the 
recruitm ent*1.
33 Kitariko, interview (Kampala, 13 May 1999).
34 Ssekweyama, interview (Kampala, 6 June 1999).
35 Lubega, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
36 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
37 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
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‘‘this has been systematic and regular ... in the course of one year, we would have 10 
national seminars in Kampala, and one in each district. I went campaigning around the 
whole country”38.
The instrumental use of FAD with respect to the development of party cadres 
allegedly became even more systematic between 1998 and 1999, when a comprehensive and 
countrywide programme of ‘training-of-trainers’ seminars was set up in view of the 
referendum:
“the aim is to gather 30-50 people for each seminar who will be our local ‘trainers’ -  
individuals who will meet and educate other people — and go into detail on the issues of 
democracy, constitutionalism, human rights and their relations with the referendum. Well, 
you see, we don’t go there directly as DP, but we think that our grassroots leaders -  DP 
leaders -  need to be equipped. We go through our DP leaders at the district level, and they 
identify the people for us. We give them some educational requirements, such as being able 
to speak English, to read and communicate. ... This kind of activities ... has increased 
awareness among our leaders. Local leaders had lost enthusiasm, they had bought the 
Movement propaganda about the evils of parties. But now they are awakening, and, 
psychologically, it’s very important for them to see that even non-NRM cadres can go and 
talk politics, speak out their minds! And they now make a difference between pluralism and 
other systems. They now begin to understand that the referendum is not on ‘political 
performance’ but on political rights”39.
In addition to those arranged by FAD, seminars organised by other partners of the 
DP, such as the Friedrich Ebert and the Konrad Adenauer Foundations, have also been helpful 
in keeping the party alive. In this latter case, post-seminar party briefings would still be held, 
although there would be less control on the issue discussed at the seminar and on the selection 
of a DP audience40. In addition to workshops and seminars, the circulation of pro-DP 
publications has been useful in reaching out to DP members. This practice began at the time 
of the very establishment of FAD, when The Citizen and Munnansi were printed and 
distributed all over the country, and has been revived in recent years with the circulation of 
The Messenger to the districts.
The help provided by FAD is not only strategic, but prominently financial. The 
difficulty in learning about the sources of party funding lies less in an understandable
38 Kitariko, interview (Kampala, 13 May 1999).
39 Ssekweyama, interview (Kampala, 6 June 1999).
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discretion surrounding the issue than in the mere weakness and volatility of such sources. 
This is reflected as much in the dilapidated condition of the party central office as in the 
admission, by party officials, that “we always prepare our budget, but we generally never 
realise it as prospected”41. Membership cards, as pointed out, have been sold scantily and only 
since around 1997. At present, they constitute a symbol of the survival of institutionalised 
party identities, rather than providing any significant contribution to party finances. Thus, 
most of the little funding that goes into the party coffers comes from domestic donations by 
“individuals who want us to be strongly organised”42. Friends and businessmen, ‘people of 
good will’ are called upon by party leaders to give help. Foreign sponsors provide support in 
an indirect fashion only. Aside from FAD/KAS, the Westminster Foundation, the British 
Labour Party43, the European parliament and the South Africa-based Union of African Parties 
for Democracy and Development have been providing resources for conferences and 
seminars.
At the local level, party funding shows more regularity only in that it is entirely and 
consistently non-existent. In fact, “the real issue is [often] how to finance”44 a local meeting. 
Members who do not live in the urban centre of a district may simply not be able to afford 
transport fares. Cases where party leaders visit a district branch and ‘finance’ a meeting by 
covering the costs of transport, accommodation, food or merely sodas, with some little 
individual money, are unique rather than rare instances. Other than that, local party members 
are entirely left to their own, with the district leaders occasionally claiming that they have put 
personal money to arrange a meeting.
Mobilising the youth: the Uganda Young Democrats
A further component of the ‘rejuvenation project’ that the party initiated after the 
national constitution was passed was the creation of a youth wing, known as the Uganda 
Young Democrats (UYD):
“the circumstances that brought to its creation were those of a constitution-making process 
from which we had expected the solution to some political questions, such as those of 
multipartism and federalism. Unfortunately, the final document reflected the hold on power
40 Kitariko, interview (Kampala, 13 May 1999).
41 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
42 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
43 The Monitor (Kampala, 8 December 1999).
44 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
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of a small clique, not the aspirations of the people; the entrenchment of the Movement's 
monopoly and the rejection of demands such as federalism, which had been put to the 
Uganda Constitutional Commission by the people. We were subjected to radio and mchaka 
mchaka propaganda against multipartism, they said that people don’t want it. It was a 
process of indoctrination of the youth against the parties. So, in response to this, the youth 
in the country -  initially from the higher institutions of learning such as Makerere or 
Nakawa -  got together to set up this organisation, to stand for things such as multipartism, 
federalism and social justice”45.
Set up between 1995 and 1996 as an offspring of the Democratic Party, “to by-pass 
government restrictions and harassment, the UYD was organised as a formally independent 
pressure group, a semi-autonomous organisation”46. But the autonomy of the youth wing goes 
some way beyond its formal status: while the youth leader is a member in the executive of the 
DP, the UYD as such is not required to consult the party before taking an initiative, and, as a 
matter of fact, it mostly acts on its own. An excessive dependence of the young democrats’ 
actions on the party would probably stifle their dynamism, particularly under existing 
restrictions. The DP leadership, aware of how important it is for the party to penetrate 
Ugandan society and to network among the youth, confines itself to encouraging rather than 
determining the activities of the UYD, the only requirement being that “all they do must not 
contradict the DP constitution”47.
The radicalism and energy typical of youth organisations have made the UYD a key 
element in the broader attempt to revive the party. The minimal capacity to reach the populace 
that the DP retains has depended in significant part on the activism of the UYD. Of course, 
first of all “the youth are very important for quick electoral mobilisation”48. They are the ones 
who did the advance groundwork for Ssemogerere’s presidential campaign and later provided 
the teams for the Kampala mayoral elections. But there is more to it than that:
“our main activities are seminars, door-to-door campaign and community outreach. ... 
Door-to-door campaign, or kakuyege, as we call it, means that we go and talk individually 
to influential people: not to the people in the street, we target people who are most 
important to convince. The way this is actually organised varies a lot, from time to time and 
area to area. For example, we did it in Mpigi (in 1996), in Masaka (in 1996-7), in Gulu (in 
1998), Tororo (in 1998) and in Luwero (in 1998). Community outreach is when we 
organise teams of four people who would arrange small private meetings, about ten or
45 Mabikke, interview (Kampala, 24 June 2000).
46 Leander Komakech, President of UYD, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
47 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
48 Drametu, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
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fifteen people, to have quiet talks. This works all over the country.... [Then] we hold about 
five seminars, or workshops, every year: four regional and a national seminar. Both in 1997 
and 1998. At the national seminar last year we had 1,200 people! The title was ‘The 
Uganda we want’. And we’ll hold six seminars on the referendum from July up to 
December this year”49.
The DP is a direct beneficiary of UYD seminars, which, following the same pattern 
of those organised by the Foundation for African Development, are used:
u... as a cover. After the presentation of papers, at the end, we would meet into discussion 
groups with specific questions to work on, to answer and provide recommendations. And 
all this is legal. Then we hold party briefings. We often do it by splitting in the rooms of the 
lodges or hotels which host the seminar. And so we create networks, and distribute 
information to the local members”50.
The government is well aware of the risks of a manipulative use of so-called 
seminars and, on particular occasions and in tightly controlled areas, it reacted quite heavily51. 
Nevertheless, in a few years, the UYD has established itself as a committed force whose 
advocacy for a ‘reactivation of the debate on pluralism5 has often gained the attention of the 
media.
The young democrats claim over 50,000 affiliates, with concentration peaks where 
the party itself is stronger -  in Kampala, Gulu, Arua and Mbarara, for example -  some 
presence in the east of the country and a feebler one in parts of the west due to government 
repression (although western Uganda was never an area of strong DP tradition). Members are 
allegedly recruited on the basis of ‘commitment5 (“first, a would-be member has to do 
something for the organisation, to show his commitment, then he is registered!5552) and then 
organised in branches that are closely connected with the local party sections. Their activities 
are partly funded through the collection of private contributions (including those of 
businessmen and of party leaders who depend on the UYD for campaigning, such as MPs). 
Some project-related financing comes from NGOs traditionally close to the DP (like the 
Foundation for African Development and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation) or other partner 
organisations. But finance is a problem for the youth wing as it is for the DP. After issuing
49 Komakech, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
50 Komakech, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
51 See, for example, New Vision (Kampala, 22 July 1998). In an attempt to infiltrate the UYD at its very top level, at some
point it also corrupted the UYD president, Joseph Luzige (and later co-opted him to work in president Museveni’s office),
who was caught by his colleagues and dismissed.
52 Komakech, interview (Kampala, 19 May 1999).
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The Democrat during the presidential campaign, the UYD had launched and published two 
periodicals for a few years, a Luganda paper, Munnansi, and the Microscope, in English, 
which allegedly circulated between 3-5,000 copies each. The publication of both papers was 
‘temporarily’ suspended in late 1999 due to funding and management problems.
The kakuyege strategy and the help of the Foundation for African Development and 
of the Uganda Young Democrats are the distinctive ways in which the Democratic Party has 
addressed the issue of surviving, acting in a somewhat co-ordinated manner, and playing an 
opposition role in Movement times. Several of the activities that the UYD and FAD have tried 
to carry out -  notably the seminars -  have often incurred a repressive response from the 
authorities53. As weak and irregular as it is, the DP’s remains the better organised effort in the 
modest landscape of Uganda’s non-Movement forces54.
Conflict over the ‘method of work' within the Uganda People's Congress
External restrictions and internal political developments have combined to make the 
organisational set up of the Uganda People’s Congress quite intricate. The formal structures 
prescribed by the party constitution have been turned upside down as a result of several 
factors, including the divisions within the national leadership, the creation of several extra­
constitutional organs, the accession to parliament of some influential party members, and the 
fact that Milton Obote, the party leader, has remained in exile in Lusaka, Zambia.
When the NRM regime was established, the UPC denounced it as illegitimate and 
illegal, claiming that the party would not take part in coercively imposed and self-serving 
structures: the UPC “cannot co-operate with a system that does not want UPC to exist!”55. 
When offered token participation in the constitution-making process, for example, the 
Congress refused to appoint the two delegates to which major parties were entitled. At the 
same time, those UPC members who were elected to the Constituent Assembly (some 40), 
and the 15 or so who later went to parliament, were never acknowledged by Uganda House as
53 The intervention of the security forces to disperse specific s e m in a r s  -  notably between June and July 1998 in the towns of 
Tororo, Mbarara, Kamuli and Masaka -  is documented, for example, in Human Rights Watch (1999:4,76ff.).
54 It must be noted that, in the space of a few months during 2000, the DP lost two of its most skilled organisers, namely 
Maria Mutagamba, who defected to the Movement and was duly appointed to a cabinet position, and Anthony Ssekweyama. 
who died in one of Uganda’s all too frequent road accidents.
55 Patrick Rubaihayo, member of the UPC Presidential Policy Commission, interview (Kampala, 12 June 1999). As recently 
as 1999, for example, Uganda House referred to the ‘movement parliament’ as a ‘partisan organ with no moral authority’; see 
Uganda People’s Congress, The Uganda Peoples Congress position on the Political Organisations Bill 1998, UPC, Kampala, 
February 1999.
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representatives of the party. Rather, they were normally dismissed as “people who claim they 
are UPC” but “are only there on an individual basis”, or, at times, even as people who “have 
nothing to do with the party”. The original position of the Congress was neither to oppose nor 
to support such individual choices:
“you cannot say we are boycotting parliament, as, in fact, there is no room for parties to 
participate. And we could not swear allegiance to the NRM -  which everybody is required 
to do before taking office -  as a UPC member cannot swear allegiance to another political 
organisation!”56.
Abiding by the above position in a consistent and cohesive manner, however, proved
too difficult for the party leadership. Step by step, different ideas about the role of the exiled
president as well as that of the party itself resulted in the emergence of internal factionalism. 
Several UPC members, at all levels, blamed this on the NRM regime, arguing that the latter 
keeps a lid on parties “so that members can eat each other like ensenene [grasshoppers] inside 
a sealed bottle”57. The idea is that convening a delegates’ conference would solve all disputes 
by restoring internal democracy and party unity. While this may be partly true, it was actually 
a combination of ideological, strategic and generational factors that ignited the internal 
struggle leading to the 1996 semi-formal split of the party.
A group of younger leaders in their forties and fifties, led by acting Secretary
General, Cecilia Ogwal, increasingly clashed with the passive resistance policy followed by 
the old guard that, under Milton Obote, had governed Uganda in the 1960s and again in the 
early 1980s58. A strategic difference -  described by one member of parliament, Ben Wacha, as 
concerning “the method of work” -  separated the two factions. As already mentioned, Obote’s 
group had always been very resistant to participating in any of the new institutions. This 
position reflected the party’s long experience of uncompromising and confrontational politics. 
The UPC was originally created as an anti-DP and anti-Baganda organisation, and the history 
of the party was deeply shaped by such conflictual events as the 1966 Buganda crisis and the
56 James Rwanyarare, chairman of the UPC Presidential Policy Commission, interview (Kampala, 5 May 1999).
57 The Monitor (Kampala, 29 May 1995, p.l).
58 Ben Wacha and Patrick Mwondha are prominent members of Ogwal’s faction, while Sam Odaka, James Rwanyarare, 
Badru Wegulo and Patrick Rubaihayo belong to Obote’s. The following extract is telling of the aging leadership of Uganda 
House UPC: “the vice-chairman [of the PPC] shall be elected from among the Youth in the PPC. For this purpose only, Youth 
is someone under 45years” (A Milton Obote, Message to the Presidential Policy Commission, Lusaka, 9 June 2000, p. 13, 
emphasis added). Badru Wegulo points out that “the Young Congress is not within our constitution. It’s a creation of Ogwal. 
She was trying to copy the Uganda Young Democrats. We do have a youth wing in the constitution, but it cannot operate. 
Exactly as the branches cannot operate. ... there is no activity organised by the youth. And, you know, the youth are difficult 
to manage. In Soronko, in Mbale district, for example, the recently stoned the Movement bus. Those were UPC youth, but 
they were not organised, they just did it out of their heads. Oh no, we were not happy. That’s not our policy. They were
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contentious election of 1980. Moreover, the Congress was ousted from power as a result of 
the guerrilla war waged by the NRM, which made the new ruling group unpalatable to most 
UPC leaders and activists. The party leader’s enduring exile would be reason enough for UPC 
members not to indulge in conciliatory attitudes towards the NRM. To make things worse, the 
skilful propaganda used by Museveni to legitimise the new regime attributed to the Congress 
the responsibility of virtually all political wrongs in Uganda’s post-independence history. The 
president’s 1996 campaign posters, for instance, played on a public fear of Obote’s comeback 
by showing pictures of skulls, the result of the massacres carried out by the army in the 
‘Luwero triangle’ during the early 1980s.
The relative old age of several in Obote’s faction made the latter an unlikely 
prospective ruling group. And the group ostensibly refused to believe in the possibility, under 
current restrictions, of having an impact on policy-making. Those party members who had 
been elected to the National Resistance Council parliament, in 1989 had contested their seats 
in spite of an official party boycott of the election (although the party agreed not to take any 
sanctions against them as long as they did not claim to represent the UPC). When the 
Constituent Assembly was elected, the prospect of shaping the new institutions and 
reintroducing political freedoms made the party oscillate between calls for a renewed boycott 
and more supportive statements. (In the end, while the UPC as such was kept out by its 
leaders, as much as by the law, a desk was set up at the Uganda House headquarters to assist 
individual party members who had won seats to the assembly).
Over this period, Cecilia Ogwal progressively established herself as a pragmatic and 
reformist leader. After her experience as a CA delegate, she spearheaded the formation of the 
Inter-Political Forces Co-operation (IPFC) to campaign jointly with the DP for the 1996 
presidential election. She then went on with a few other members to contest and win a handful 
of parliamentary seats. This younger wing of the party, which includes several MPs and is 
closely linked to many others, was more oriented towards pragmatically acquiring power and 
shaping the country’s future: “we want to be involved in active politics. We are keeping 
Uganda running: telling them do this, do that. We can’t wait for somebody [i.e. Obote] 
coming back”59.
acting like babies. But the problem is that they don’t have jobs, or they see that things around themj the administration, is not 
working”, interview (Kampala, 22 June 2000).
59 Abna Natifu, former UPC chairman of the IPFC for Mukono, interview (Mukono, 24 June 1999).
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Splitting the leadership
The divergent attitudes of Obote and Ogwal proved critical in precipitating the actual 
split, which dates back to the period between the two elections of 1996, the presidential and 
the parliamentary. But the conflict had developed over a much longer time:
“normally these issues are not determined by a single happening: it boils over time until it 
cracks. Basically, the problem was that the president was not in the country”60.
“A group of us felt that it was no longer possible for the party to be run from outside the 
country: a number of decisions were made that did not take into account the current 
political landscape. The party needed to have some effective leadership in the country. And, 
number two, Obote was becoming an instrument of the Movement leaders, who used him to 
scare the people about a possible return to multipartism”61.
Obote’s remote control had been exposed since the death of the vice-president of the 
party in 1991, after which the ‘leadership question’ had been raised time and again in 
Kampala by prominent UPC people as close to the exiled president as Sam Odaka, Patrick 
Rubaihayo and Otema Allimadi62. The position of Uganda’s ex-president was indeed unclear. 
Was he to direct the party from abroad, as he did for instance, by instituting the Presidential 
Policy Commission? Or only to veto decisions made in Kampala, such as when he denied the 
participation of the UPC to the 1996 parliamentary ballot? Or, else, should he merely advise 
the party (his appointments to the PPC, for example, were an ex post reflection of agreements 
reached at Uganda House)? As Obote’s executive leadership and external control over the 
party were increasingly put under question, the clash became more evident and the divide 
more difficult to mend. The issue also involved the question of whether to amend, by-pass or 
respect those provisions of the party constitution that, in the absence of a delegates’ 
conference, prevented any leadership change63.
60 Patrick Mwondha, Secretary of the UPC Interim Executive Council (Ogwal faction), interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999).
61 Ben Wacha, MP, interview (Kampala, 6 June 1999).
62 See, for instance, The Monitor (Kampala, 1 February 1994 and 23 January 1995).
63 Obote’s ongoing attempt to hold on to the party presidency was revealed, for example, by these words of his to UPC 
representatives: “I must warn you... that the Uganda dictatorship and agents of governments in the older democracies will do 
anything, including bribery, to get you to accept... the Movement system.... You will be faced with a campaign that, since 
the party leader is not in the country... he must be replaced. The Christians among you know how the snake pretended to be 
friendly to Eve and made her to eat some fruit... when God had forbidden them not to eat that fruit. The result was the fall of 
man from the Grace of God. In the case of the UPC, the deposition of the party leader is not forbidden by a command from 
God. It is even allowed by the Constitution of the Party, but must be done, if it is to be done, only as provided in that 
Constitution. If it is done in any other way, the action ceases to be against the party president and becomes a gross derision of
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These issues began to degenerate and cause real stir when Ogwal, the party leader in 
Kampala, decided to run in the 1994 election for the Constituent Assembly. Despite the fact 
that she claimed that -  in accordance with the ‘individual merit’ principle -  she was not 
representing the party but only her own constituency (i.e. Lira municipality and the Langi 
people), Ogwal was in fact questioning the official line of not taking part in the illegitimate 
‘NRM institutions’. Other UPC members who also decided to run for the CA were 
disappointed by Obote’s initial opposition. The party president’s change of heart caused a 
delay in launching and organising the campaign, making it more difficult, in the short time 
remaining, to run an effective campaign and even to short-list a unique candidate for each 
constituency64.
Obote also expressed his opposition to the formation of the National Caucus for 
Democracy -  the alliance among multipartist delegates operating within the CA -  as he was 
afraid of establishing close ties with the Democratic Party and losing control over his own 
organisation. When the UPC in Kampala agreed to support DP Paul Ssemogerere as the 
common presidential candidate for the multiparty camp -  and even to form joint electoral 
teams under the name of Inter-Political Forces Co-operation (IPFC) -  Obote originally vetoed 
the initiative, claiming that it would amount to betraying the party65. But after reluctantly 
conceding the party’s participation in the presidential race, he more than welcomed 
allegations of electoral rigging by the NRM and pushed hard for the party to pull out of the 
subsequent parliamentary contest.
In fact, after the alleged rigging of the presidential election of May 1996, the Inter- 
Political Co-operation Forces had decided that they would not take part in the parliamentary 
election due in June. On the same day, however, the UPC leadership held a separate meeting 
at Uganda House, where Cecilia Ogwal raised the point of whether it was strategically 
appropriate to withdraw from the contest even in those areas under UPC or multipartist 
control -  by and large meaning the north of the country -  and to abandon ‘UPC people’ to 
NRM political repression. The Presidential Policy Commission thus agreed that, while the 
party would abstain from the race, individuals were free to contest. Here, versions differ as to 
whether lower cadres only or leaders as well were meant to run. However, a prominent 
member of Obote’s camp, Patrick Rubaihayo, concedes that Cecilia Ogwal “had an 
understanding with us, that she would resign as soon as she got elected. So we kind of
the Constitution, which, in turn, will lead to disintegration or dissolution of the UPC ... You will be faced with the voice of 
the snake or Satan” (A. Milton Obote, Message to the Presidential Policy Commission, Lusaka, 9 June 2000, p.6-7).
64 Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999). Mwondha may actually overemphasize these organisational difficulties, as 
he himself lost the contest in his constituency.
65 Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999).
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protected her, to the extent that this was possible, by telling Obote that she was ‘on leave, 
pending resignation’. But then, two days before the election, Obote wrote her the letter to 
suspend her”66. This letter was delivered by a delegation of two -  James Rwanyarare and 
Darlington Sakwa -  returning from Lusaka. While Rwanyarare immediately replaced Ogwal 
as chairperson of the PPC, Sakwa was recently appointed a member of the latter and the 
chairman of its financial committee. Ogwal and her followers, however, challenged the 
decision and, after Rwanyarare’s refusal to have the issue discussed by the PPC, they gathered 
the National Task Force. The latter condemned the party president’s decision and endorsed an 
Interim Executive Council which “would still hold Obote in an advisory capacity”67.
The division was physically sanctioned by a struggle for the occupation of the 
historic and symbolic site of the UPC, Uganda House. Although Ogwal’s supporters initially 
took over the office, the latter was eventually retained by the Rwanyarare faction by virtue of 
Sam Odaka being the head of the Milton Obote Foundation, which legally owns the building. 
The former group -  which includes over half of the people originally working at the UPC 
headquarters -  is currently based in one of the members’ private office.
The ‘improvisation’ of ad hoc party organs
The disagreement within the leadership contributed to modifying the UPC’s original 
position -  namely, to stay away from ‘NRM institutions’. The latter has in fact evolved and 
changes have occurred. Ogwal’s group largely consists of parliamentarians: MPs who are 
party members and others who are simply close to the UPC are informally invited to the 
meetings of its Interim Executive. This faction of the UPC has come some way into being 
integrated in the new regime: “we have done so much for this country, we have achieved a lot, 
but by working with our friends in the Movement camp”68. But moderate changes have also 
occurred in mainstream UPC. While Uganda House only holds contacts with one MP (who is 
not even allowed to sit in the PPC), when the parliamentary committee dealing with the 
Political Organisations Bill requested formal submissions to the parties, in early 1999, it 
received one from each factions, that is, including Obote’s.
Relevant changes also concerned party organs. While the notion of ‘rejuvenating’ 
party structures is recurrent in DP language, UPC leaders often talk of ‘improvisation’, 
meaning that, in a inhibiting context, the rigidities of the party statute have continuously
66 Rubaihayo, interview (Kampala, 12 June 1999).
67 Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999).
68 Wacha, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
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required by-passing through the creation of ad hoc organs. Less officially, however, the term 
hides the party’s need to adapt its structures to two key internal developments: Obote’s 
absence from the country and the subsequent split of the party.
Obote himself started the whole process of ‘improvising’ new arrangements when, 
under pressure to appoint a new vice-president after Paulo Mwanga’s death in 1991, he came 
up with the idea of a Presidential Policy Commission (PPC). Claiming that “he had found an 
opening, a window of opportunity in the party constitution”69, he in fact set up a provisional 
executive that in theory and in name allowed him to retain full control over the party70. 
‘Improvisation’ of extra-constitutional organs thus started well before the divide -  the term is 
actually used by both factions -  but, after the split, the process went even further. The 
National Task Force, which was created in 1995 as a provisional structure in view of 
forthcoming elections, one year later became the permanent districts representative body for 
Ogwal’s faction, and was instrumental in legitimising the latter’s Interim Executive Council.
In the other camp, Rwanyarare’s group replied by gathering district delegates in a 
Party Representatives Council (PRC) in 1997. The ad hoc delegates were selected by party 
constituency and district representatives to national executive organs, as listed in an old 
register from the early 1980s (though in certain cases they were directly hand-picked by the 
centre). In the process, an additional and updated register was created. The first meeting of the 
PRC, in turn, provided the nominations from which the party leader appointed an expanded 
Presidential Policy Commission. It was almost three years later, however, that the new PPC 
was actually gathered and, simultaneously, the second PRC meeting was held. Yet, the 
original PPC, has been meeting without interruptions, albeit irregularly, as documented by its 
quite detailed minutes. The de facto party executive was convened roughly ten times a year 
between 1994-1999, with a peak of 21 meetings in the eventful 199671. In addition to these 
meetings, the commission reportedly met the president in Lusaka a couple of times in the last 
few years.
69 Sam Odaka, member of the UPC Presidential Policy Commission, interview (Kampala, 2 June 1999).
70 “Any tendency to create a cabal or to undermine any member [of the PPC] shall be a cause for termination of appointment. 
... Your tenure is at the pleasure o f the Party President but shall not be less than three years” (A. Milton Obote, Message to 
die Presidential Policy Commission, Lusaka, 9 June 2000, p. 13, emphasis added).
71 It is quite likely, however, that part of the meetings have not been documented: although the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  staff claims 
that the records are complete, most U P C  leaders -  including some of those who left the P P C  at the t i m e  of the split -  t a l k  of 
weekly meetings of the commission.
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The state of the branches
An attempt to revive the party’s local branches apparently took place between 1991- 
1993, with veteran party members re-organising district and lower organs, throughout the 
country, by holding internal elections and setting up ad hoc committees72. In early 1993, after 
launching Agenda 21 to revitalize the party, Cecilia Ogwal was reported touring the country. 
She visited districts such as Tororo, Arua, Mbale and especially Lira, where, at times, she 
would address small political rallies in spite of warnings from the government73. Indeed, on a 
number of occasions, Ogwal was briefly detained because of these activities74. But the relative 
momentum was soon followed by a slowdown in the party revival75, and the latter was further 
affected, a couple of years later, by the impact of leadership rows upon local-level organs:
“from about 1990, UPC decided to go out to the countryside and test the ban. We went to 
Mbale, Soroti, Tororo, Arua, Kabale, Gulu, Kitgum. And that is when the branches started 
being active again. We capitalised that during the presidential election, for they mobilised 
the people. And they [had] helped us a lot in the election to the Constituent Assembly: we 
ended up with about 40 UPC, and DP had about 30. But in 1996, with the directive issued 
by the party president, many areas simply gave up. It created confusion among the people: 
we were speaking with two different languages. Fewer and fewer branches were active, 
even now, and the Movement machine is more and more intimidating. And many other 
candidates just gave up. So we got a greatly reduced number of MPs”76.
The general weakness of party branches has contributed to minimizing the diffusion 
and impact among the grassroots of divisions at the centre: “at the grassroots level, there is no 
knowledge of this split. People have heard about it, but they haven’t followed them”77. When 
and where local structures currently exist, they certainly did not split in any consistent or 
systematic manner along the lines that divide the leadership. It is only in some cases, such as
72 Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999). hi mid-2000, a UPC document signed by Obote and circulated by Uganda 
House called for the reactivation of local branches and of party membership ‘at any costs’, New Vision (Kampala, 12 June 
2000). Admittedly, however, there was no plan yet on how, in practice, to revive branches (Badru Wegulo, UPC National 
Chairman and Chairman of the Party Representatives Council, interview, Kampala, 22 June 2000).
73 See, for instance, New Vision (Kampala, 30 January, 5 March and 5 November 1993), The Monitor (Kampala, 11 May 
1993). Although no other party leader mentioned anything similar, Ogwal claims that national party representatives also 
toured the country between October 1998 and March 1999.
74 Ogwal provided details of ten different times in which she was detained without charges during the period 1991-1993, 
Human Rights Watch (1999:37).
75 Weekly Topic (Kampala, 28 May and 13 August 1993).
76 Wacha, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
77 Mustafa Masaba, representative of Uganda House UPC in Mukono and, since May 2000, member of the UPC Presidential 
Policy Commission, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
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in Mukono district, that there has been an attempt at sharing local members through a 
duplication of the party.
At times, district committees may be in place but entirely detached from the 
grassroots, as they lack lower level branches bridging the distance with members in the area78:
“it’s a fluid situation ... The party structure is not there. What you have is the people’s 
committee: just like in the former Soviet Union, they delegate you from above and appoint 
people at the grassroots, and try mobilisation. It’s a committee appointed from above, by 
the chairman of the PPC”79.
In most cases, the very presence and situation of party local organs is variously 
described as ‘dormant5 or ‘in dead silence5, ‘casual5 or ‘occasional5, ‘non-formal5 or ‘ad hoc5, 
and so on. There are:
“no organised groups ... party members do meet and consult occasionally, but only in very 
small groups, not in large numbers. There are no regular contacts with local members, no 
reporting on a regular basis between them and us. It’s a casual thing”80.
The UPC representatives from Arua, Mukono, Mbarara and Gulu districts largely 
report of ‘non-operational5 structures and non-existent activities, at least since the 1996 
election campaign, and, in some places, since before that. Occasionally, some members talk 
of meeting people ‘on individual merit5 (“they visit me or I visit them, one by one...5581), but it 
is only exceptionally, and not without contradictions, that local leaders claim party activities 
in a district do have some regularity82. Again, however, the situation varies not only from 
region to region but also from district to district:
“[contrary to where we have to operate clandestinely,] in my area, in Lira, there are no 
longer problems. Nobody is scandalised to hear that we hold a meeting and we can actually 
do it as much as we want”83.
78 Frederick Wako, UPC branch chairman for Mukono district, interview (Mukono, 24 June 1999), and Darlington Sakwa, 
Uganda House UPC representative in Mbale and, since May 2000, member of the UPC Presidential Policy Commission, 
interview (Kampala, 10 July 1999).
79 Isabirye Fremont, youth representative in Mukono for Uganda House UPC, interview (Kampala, 17 July 1999).
80 Edward Ochwo, Uganda House UPC chief administrative secretary, interview (Kampala, 3 May 1999).
81 Masaba, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
82 Peter Labara Oola (interview, Kampala, 23 June 1999) and James Otto (interview, Gulu, 7 July 1999), chairman and vice- 
chairman, respectively, of Obote-UPC for Gulu district
83 Ogwal, interview (Kampala, 7 June 1999).
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“In some areas this is working, in other areas much less. Bushenyi, for example. And 
Lango, West Nile (some areas), Gulu, Kabale, Mukono, Fort Portal, Tororo. These are all 
areas where we have structures in place ... But it’s only in a minority of areas. All the rest -  
in the rest of the country -  we don’t have structures, they are not working”84.
Regional variations in the state of the local branches are also related to the latter’s 
capacity to field candidates for election. Internal primaries for the selection of Constituent 
Assembly and parliamentary candidates were reportedly held in a few northern districts, but, 
then, “in the West, South and East there was no party candidates. It was only in the North. ... 
[Everywhere else] the circumstances said there was no point in standing”85. In areas where the 
UPC is particularly weak, such as in Buganda, Busoga and parts of western Uganda, local 
leaders invited party supporters to back DP candidates in the CA contests86.
Membership and  funding
More or less the same considerations are valid with regard to party membership. 
Although some talk of short-lived attempts to register members in some districts around 1996 
or 1998, membership is in fact entirely informal: there is not much more to it than showing an 
old card or merely claiming to be UPC. Not even this is very common, given the idea that 
selling cards is illegal and the harassment that follows being exposed as a UPC. As in the case 
of the DP, the last membership data were collected in the mid-1980s -  when the figure of 4 
million members was allegedly achieved87 -  but this information went missing during the 
troubles of the short-lived Okellos regime. The absence of membership subscriptions, in turn, 
has obvious implications for party funding, which came to depend entirely upon the Milton 
Obote Foundation and the occasional private contributions:
“we only get money ‘by luck’! Somebody may come from London, or from abroad, and say 
‘Well, here is $50’, or somebody comes from the village and gives Shs.5,000 [$3]. Or there 
may be one who says ‘You don’t have a computer’, and he gives a computer”88.
Similarly to what happens in the DP, there is a wide discrepancy between the 
planned budget -  which may be as high as Shs.350m ($240,000) per year89 -  and the money
84 Wacha, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
85 U P C  interim chairperson for Mbarara district who requested anonymity, interview (Mbarara, 14 July 1999). U P C  primary 
elections were reported, for instance, in The Monitor (Kampala, 13 July 1993 and 19 June 1996).
86 Weekly Topic (Kampala, 28 May 1993).
87 Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 1999).
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actually realised by the party. As Ogwal puts it, the budget is ‘flexible’ and ‘task-targeted’90, 
and -  except during the 1996 electoral campaigns, when more substantive private 
contributions were made — it does not cover much more than administrative expenditures91. 
Needless to say, local branches have not seen any shillings coming from Kampala for a long 
time: “I should fund the meetings, but I personally have no funds for it”92. Although the 
budget of the central office may be greater than the DP’s -  given the availability of sources 
such as MOF, external bureaux and, possibly, MPs -  the party lacks something similar to 
FAD to bring some minimal resources down to the grassroots.
Requests of foreign assistance have been systematically turned down by 
organisations such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Westminster Foundation, the 
National Democratic Institute or the Development Fund for Democracy. This may have more 
to do with the UPC’s controversial past than -  as the official explanation goes -  with the ban 
and legal prohibitions. In fact, the DP does get more or less direct assistance from similar 
institutions. As the director of FES put it, UPC “used to be our natural, logical partner up to 
1984. [But] we took very seriously what happened under Obote H: that killed our potential co­
operation. As long as Obote is there, there is no room whatsoever for us to work with them. 
Though I still get a call every second week by UPC or MOF. They say ‘Hey, Hajo, we used to 
work well together, why don’t we do this and this...’”93. The extent to which lack of funding 
has jeopardised party operations is difficult to establish. While financial constraints are 
unquestionably a hurdle, political will may be as big an obstacle. Uganda House UPC, for 
example, was granted funds by MOF for the long due second meeting of the broad-based 
Party Representatives Council that it never went on to convene94.
The tarnished image of the party has not only made it harder to collect resources, it 
also increased the practical difficulties of organising certain activities. “I’m telling you: 
however developmental the idea, if I initiate a programme, they [the government] wouldn’t 
allow me. I have tried several times, especially to associate the youth for development. But 
they told them not to associate with that man”95. To some extent, the treatment of the UPC 
with regard to this subject compares unfavourably to that of other parties:
88 Wegulo, interview (Kampala, 22 June 2000).
89 Rwanyarare, interview (Kampala, 5 May 1999).
90 Ogwal, interview (Kampala, 7 June 1999).
91 Such expenses are around Shs^.'Sm ($1500) per month for Ogwal’s group and Shs.6m ($3600) at Uganda House.
92 Dick Nyai, MP, Publicity Secretary of Uganda House UPC and Arua district UPC vice-chairman, interview (Kampala, 14 
June 1999).
93 Hajo Lanz, head of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, interview (Kampala, 17 May 1999).
94 Odaka, interview (Kampala, 2 June 1999), and Rubaihayo, interview (Kampala, 12 June 1999). The Party Representatives 
Council is supposed to meet twice a year.
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“we haven’t organised seminars. It’s the DP that does it, through their foundation. We 
didn’t have an outside foundation. MOF was actually supposed to organise for education, 
which is quite similar But, then, you can’t expect MOF to organise a seminar anywhere in 
the country: it’s seen as too close to the party, they would say it’s UPC which is organising 
it  But, anyway, we didn’t even try. Nor we have anything like that We just keep a low 
profile. You see, I think the government is willing to allow some activities of DP, but not of 
UPC. Actually, I believe they might even allow them any activities if we were not 
around”96.
As a matter of fact, this may explain some strategic and organisational differences 
between the UPC and the DP. The Democrats, as pointed out, managed to replace their 
parliamentary role with an access to alternative forums and opportunities for giving voice to 
the opposition (such as through the activities of the youth wing and of FAD). The lack of 
similar options (e.g. a much weaker Youth Congress was only launched in 1998) is likely to 
have contributed to the decision by part of the UPC to go to parliament, as well as to the use 
of ‘external bureaux’ (probably a few members with access to an on-line computer) in places 
such as Toronto, Nairobi or London97.
The fragile survival of organised opposition in a hegemonic system
Little research has so far been devoted to investigating the actual role of parties 
under Uganda’s no-party framework. As a first step towards filling this lacunae, this chapter 
focused on what parties are -  in organisational terms -  in today’s Uganda. Unsurprisingly, 
evidence confirms that the organisations of both the Democratic Party and the Uganda 
People’s Congress are impeded from growing effective by the legal sanctions that restrict 
their activities. The organs of both parties are virtually all run down and, at best, characterised 
by improvisation and low formalisation. Funding is poor and extremely precarious, and it is 
virtually in the core executives only that party meetings retain some kind of regularity. 
Formal membership and local branches are largely notions belonging to the past.
What is perhaps more interesting are the specific organisational strategies and forms 
that the two parties have adopted. Both parties have been able to respond to existing 
constraints by adapting their organisations to ensure their political and institutional survival.
95 Masaba, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
96 Rubaihayo, interview (Kampala, 12 June 1999).
97 See, for instance, The Monitor (Kampala, 25 May 1993,17 July 1995 and 16 April 1998).
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This is evident, for example, in the rupture that occurred in the UPC leadership as well as in 
the ancillary organisations the DP has been relying upon. The tough clampdown on UPC 
activities by the NRM government contributed to splitting the leadership of the party. On the 
one side, Obote’s mainstream UPC continues to reject NRM institutions: while the former 
president remains out of the country, his group in Kampala stays out of parliament. On the 
other hand, a breakaway wing of UPC progressive leaders decided to adopt a different 
‘method of work’ and enter parliament. A weak but vocal parliamentary opposition was 
meant to provide a safer way of being heard and of protecting, rather than exposing to 
repression, local party members. The DP, by contrast, capitalised on the legacy of a largely 
co-operative and non-conflictual past between the party and the NRM, and enjoyed the 
advantage of a relatively softer control by the government. The party was thus able to use its 
youth organisation and the Foundation for African Development to keep the organisation 
alive and to seek to advance the cause of multipartism.
The UPC and the DP have managed to strike a fragile balance between disputing the 
legitimacy of the regime while rejecting the most extreme ways of doing it, notably ‘going to 
the bush’ for a guerrilla challenge. This has granted political stability at least to some parts of 
the country, while leaving the existing system constantly on the edge for its disputed 
legitimacy. In the light of these organisational developments, an investigation into the actual 
impact of parties on key political processes such as elections, parliamentary activities and 
policy-making is required. Do UPC members of parliament, for example, provide the party 
with a bridgehead in legislative activities? Does the support of extra-parliamentary 
organisations help the DP in co-ordinating its electoral activities? These issues are examined 




The electoral politics of ‘no-Dartism’
Individuals, parties and parfy-surrogates in the e/ection process
This chapter and the one that follows examine the way electoral and legislative 
activities are carried out in Uganda, in a context where party-based co-ordination and 
collective actions are legally inhibited. The aim is to learn about the extent to which any 
organisational arrangements -  parties, party-like organisations, or entirely different devices -  
play a role in these phases of the political process. The focus is therefore on the first two 
variables identified in Table 1.2 (Chapter One), namely electoral organisation and 
parliamentary organisation.
According to the ‘individual merit’ principle, political competition in communally- 
divided societies should not allow ethnic-like diversities to crystallise into political parties. 
When this happens, the argument goes, inter-group antipathies become polarised and tend to 
give way to spirals of political exclusion and violence. Rather than having party-based 
political competition and all that it implies, therefore, individuals should participate in politics 
exclusively on their own credentials. In other words, political organisations should not be 
there when an individual decides whether to stand or not for election (selection process); they 
should not be there when a candidate canvasses for popular support (electoral campaign); and 
they should not be there when elected representatives co-operate or clash in working out 
national policies (parliamentary activities).
The presence of independent candidates and MPs is something to be valued. But the 
presence of independents only implies a complete atomisation that is bound to generate 
practical problems. Elected representatives are part of a state’s political links with the 
population and a crucial component in the process of aggregation of diverse political interests. 
To provide such connections in an effective manner, deputies need institutionalised linkages 
with their constituents. A candidate may campaign as an independent, setting up an ad hoc 
election machine that will put him through the election process and then be disbanded. Both
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during and after an election campaign, however, the assistance of an established organisation 
is an important asset in reaching out effectively to constituents, to communicate and exchange 
information with them. A similar argument is also valid with regard to parliamentary politics. 
It is one thing to have a number of autonomous voices inside the legislative assembly, quite 
another to have a parliament whose self-reliant members are in constant need to find 
precarious and contingent ways of acting together. If this was the case, for every issue, every 
MP would have to: work out what the policy is about and what the policy options are; go back 
and hear where the interests of his constituents lie; learn what the position of every other 
member in the House is; lobby other MPs for support on a one-to-one basis; and so on. All of 
these are collective activities that require some kind of co-ordination. This is why, in 
countries where party pluralism prevails, parties normally play a major role in electoral and 
parliamentary politics. If  therefore, Ugandan parties are prevented from being actively 
involved in these processes -  something which is itself an open question -  one may 
reasonably expect other organisations to step in, either on their own initiative, or because they 
are solicited by individual politicians who have to perform the activities in question. 
Atomised politics automatically turns the spotlight on collective-action dilemmas, as pro- 
‘ individual merit’ politicians have soon discovered for themselves.
In this chapter, I focus on the modes of selection of candidates and on the specific 
forms of campaigning developed by supposedly self-reliant contestants. In the next chapter, I 
will examine parliamentary activities and try to identify regularities in the interactions among 
MPs who do not rely on party networks. For both sections, evidence is largely drawn from the 
1996 parliamentary election and from the assembly that was formed thereafter (the Sixth 
Parliament, which operated between 1996-2001)1. Occasional reference is made to the 1994 
Constituent Assembly, the 1998 local elections and the 2001 parliamentary election.
The election process is conceptualised as two-fold, with each of its two phases 
implying a potential relationship between individual office-seekers and sponsoring 
organisations. Firstly, an election presupposes the selection of the candidates running for 
office, which is itself “one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making 
process”2. In making their decision to stand, individuals are affected by the availability of 
organised support. Depending on the degree of reliance on the latter, potential candidates may 
either be selected (‘nominated’) by some existing organisation, or independently decide to run
1 For the analysis of election campaigns, the focus is on the 214 single-member constituencies through which most 
parliamentary seats are assigned. In addition to directly-elected members, the 282-member Sixth Parliament comprised 45 
women representatives (one per district, indirectly elected by an electoral college made of selected members of the district7 s 
local government bodies), 10 representatives of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces, 5 youth representatives, 5 
representatives of the disabled and 3 of the workers. Ministers are ex officio members of the House without a right to vote.
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(what may be termed ‘self-selection’), with some mixed options falling in-between these two 
extremes. Secondly, regardless of whether a candidate was ‘nominated’ or ‘self-selected’, he 
will have to actually canvass for support. This can be done either by setting up a personal 
election machine, or else by seeking assistance from organisations that are involved in the 
political contest or available to join in.
Mechanisms for the selection of candidates
In a politically-mobilised society, effective government action needs to rely on 
linkages with the diverse components of the citizenry: “creating linkages is itself an extremely 
important function of politics. ... a [hidden] function that contributes to the carrying out of 
other functions”3. Political linkages are instrumental to minimising centre-periphery or 
society-state gaps. These interactive connections are critical to channelling the people’s needs, 
interests and identities within state institutions. They also make the people more accessible to 
the state, lessening, for instance, resistance to the implementation of public policies. Thus, 
political connections operate in two directions: “citizens seek some way to interact with the 
larger political system, influencing how it carries out its functions. The leaders of 
governments depend on being able to connect themselves to the loyalty and energies of 
citizens”4.
But linkages are most effective when they are organised rather than extemporaneous. 
To prohibit political organisations from sponsoring candidates for election may imply a 
situation where the linkages between individual representatives and their constituents is weak 
and scarcely institutionalised. Under no-party rules, the question is whether candidates devise 
any arrangements to keep in touch with their constituents over time and whether they do this 
by co-ordinating with other prospective representatives.
As a matter of feet, any election process is likely to involve some kind of interaction 
between individuals standing for office and existing organisations. Regardless of whether an 
individual candidate is a member of the latter organisations or not, he may either be 
approached by an organisation looking for prospective contestants, or else he may decide 
himself to contact, consult and involve an organisation in actively supporting him. In 
particular, under Uganda’s no-party politics, one would expect a candidate’s selection process
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to follow one of four possible patterns. The first is one where the Movement, while formally 
proclaiming individual-merit elections, in practice exerts pressures for this or that individual 
to stand or to withdraw his candidature. The second occurs when opposition parties, despite 
being legally prohibited from taking part in elections, manage to organise and put up their 
own challengers. Thirdly, other organisations -  such as local government organs, a church or 
other religious institution, elders’ councils, and so on -  may decide to step in and field or 
support specific contestants. Finally, in compliance with the individual-merit rule, individuals 
may make the decision to stand on their own, without much regard for the above 
organisations or any other external pressure.
Attempts to select candidates by the Movement
As a party-like organisation, the Movement has a keen interest in seeing supportive 
candidates, rather than anti-Movement ones, running for office and going through. It is not 
difficult to understand why. The prospect of managing the country’s affairs cannot but make 
any political force -  including the Movement -  sensible to the character and orientation of the 
individuals who will form the legislative body. Individualised competition, in the unlikely 
case of everybody abiding by it, may in theory annul the need to identify winners and losers 
in terms of groups (i.e. parties). But it does not diminish the actual reliance of the government 
on some co-ordinated support on the part of parliamentarians, and thus the executive’s 
dependence on the composition of parliament. As a consequence, two related objectives have 
guided the Movement leadership: securing a parliamentary majority and ensuring its internal 
cohesion.
The Movement needs to make sure that it has a majority inside parliament, before 
thinking about the latter’s cohesion. To win the largest share of seats, it is necessary that it 
minimises the number of ‘movementist’ candidates running in any given constituency. 
Splitting the pro-Movement vote would often mean losing the seat to a multipartist. The need 
to co-ordinate pro-Movement candidatures to avoid unnecessary electoral defeats is 
something Movement leaders are fully aware of. The distribution of potential office-seekers 
has been regularly monitored and appraised, constituency by constituency. In the run up to the 
election of the Seventh Parliament, Museveni stated plainly that he needed “MPs who will 
help him implement his manifesto”, and ‘advised’ that, where there were several Movement 
candidates contesting against a multipartist, all but one should step down in favour of the
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stronger among them5. On exceptional occasions, in the past, the threat of losing a seat 
prompted decisive and sophisticated interventions6.
But interfering with selection processes was not only aimed at promoting the largest 
number of Movement MPs. Centrally-controlled nominations can significantly affect the 
cohesion of the legislative bloc or caucus that emerges in an elected assembly7. Wary of 
keeping their undue interventions away from the spotlight, Movement leaders frequently 
made clear efforts actually to select contestants. Loyal supporters would be encouraged and 
promised assistance at the expenses of other aspirants, discouraged and marginalised on the 
ground of their weaker ‘pro-movement’ credentials. During the 2001 parliamentary campaign, 
the president repeatedly met with the Movement caucus in an attempt to veto ‘undesirable’ 
Movement candidates8. The encouragement or marginalisation of different candidates, 
however, have largely occurred through private consultations and informal pressures rather 
than by means of an open selection process9:
“of course ... you see people agitating on different lines. So you say ‘Let’s test the ground.
Why don’t these Movement people stand?’ We did evaluation of people who stood, of 
trends of people. You co-ordinate with those who are mobilising along democratic lines, to 
get them political education, to make informed decisions”10.
“You have a natural tendency to support somebody who talks well about the Movement, 
who speaks the same language, and so we quietly campaigned on his side. But not openly, 
because that would go against our principle. But the Movement might quietly come in and 
say: ‘Look, there are too many of you, too many Movement candidates in a single 
constituency. This way none of you is going to get elected. Would you let this guy go on?
We know he can make it’. But we only advise people”11.
Since the Movement’s main concern is to promote the greatest number of 
trustworthy candidates -  albeit not running against each other -  and to ensure a cohesive and
5 New Vision (Kampala, 13 June 2001).
6 In the 1996 legislative election, the decision was made to field a second Movement candidate in Bungokho constituency, in 
Mbale district, so to help out the Movement’s favourite contestant. The dummy candidate obtained a share of the vote in 
Nakaloke county -  thus directly eroding the multipartist candidate’s support base -  and thus favoured the success of the 
candidate that the Movement wanted to see through, who received his votes from a different area (i.e. Makonde county) 
within the same constituency. Mujaju (1996:29).
7 Bowler -  Farrell -  Katz (1999:6), Carey (1997).
8 The Monitor (Kampala, 10 June 2001).
9 In one occasion, some kind of ‘internal’ primary election was reportedly held to select the NRM candidate for a Constituent
Assembly by-election in Mbale. See The People (Kampala, 17 August 1994) and Weekly Topic (Kampala, 31 August 1994). 
,u James Magode Ikuya, Deputy Director for Information at the Movement Secretariat, interview (Kampala, 1 July 1999).
11 Matia Kasaija, Deputy Director for Mass Mobilisation at the Movement Secretariat, interview (Kampala, 28 May 1999); 
emphasis added.
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efficient action in parliament, demonstrated loyalty is an obvious asset for a candidate seeking 
help and facilitation:
“I have been a senior movementist mobiliser ... At the time of the NRC by-election, the 
Movement contacted me as they thought I was suitable for the job. I used to be based at the 
President's office... when the discussion was raised on who could run in the area, my name 
came up. In the end, I was to contest with five other people, including a member of the 
Uganda People’s Defence Forces, a current Resident District Commissioner and others who 
were clearly on the Movement camp. But I had been with the Movement for longer time, 
and so it was me that the Movement wanted to be elected. They tried to convince other 
people not to stand against me. In the beginning, it was actually 10 others who wanted to 
run, then many pulled out”12.
In addition to informal pressures and interventions, the Movement also employs 
selective funding -  choosing among the candidates “those that it will finance more than 
others”13 -  to affect the balance of the different contests. But the most effective instrument the 
Movement can count on to control candidatures is the least material and visible one, and it 
impacts directly on an individual’s will and readiness to stand. While Ugandans have 
experienced worse regimes, intimidation, harassment and fear are a constant presence under 
Movement politics14. Opposition politicians, especially at the local level, frequently show 
great concern at being exposed as multipartists. It can be safely assumed that a large number 
of people prefer not to seize the formal opportunities for political contestation, as this could 
expose them to vexation on the part of the ruling group. By implication, most of the 
candidates who do come forward are likely to be committed Movementists who do not risk 
jeopardising their tranquil existence by laying their ideas open.
In spite of the awareness of the need to behave strategically, however, the Movement 
has often appeared to be caught in-between the professed ideal of individual-merit elections -  
i.e. elections with no interference on the part of political organisations — and the practical 
difficulty of imposing its own choices to aspirant candidates: “in 1996, for instance, many 
refused these advises and went ahead. Some of them won, some lost”15. The Kampala mayoral 
election of 1998, which was lost to a multipartist because the pro-Movement vote was split
12 An MP who requested anonymity (Kampala, May 1999).
13 Wasswa Lule, MP, in the report of a seminar organised by The Free Movement (Kampala, October 1998).
14 Cases of harassment and repression are well documented throughout Human Rights Watch (1999). See, for example, the 
widespread abuse of pre-trial detention and treason charges against members of the opposition (Human Rights Watch 
1999:130ff.).
15 Kasaija, interview (Kampala, 28 May 1999).
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among different candidates, was a case in point. The following year, a by-election for the 
same post highlighted the dilemma that the Movement leadership so frequently faces:
“there were those who felt that the Movement should present one candidate, while others 
took the view that there was very little that divides the candidates and the Movement should 
keep out. To satisfy the first group, consultations were carried out with the candidates 
professing movement politics so that one of them remains in the race. These consultations 
were not successful. The position of the latter group was therefore preferred [!]”16.
Overall, the efforts to control candidatures (i.e. more or less formally to nominate 
people) have neither been as systematic nor as effective as a full-fledged party organisation 
might allow. Not only must direct interference with candidatures be somehow disguised, but 
there is also a lack of enforceable sanctions for individuals who do not abide by the directives 
or the ‘advises’ that they receive:
“what we tried to do -  if you take, for instance, any constituency in Kampala which is held 
by a multipartist MP -  the Movement supporters there refused to be advised to stand down, 
because they all said they were going to win. So we said ‘Ok, so you go and fight it’, 
because we knew they were going to lose. If you look at [multipartist] Ken Lukyamuzi, he 
won with about 35 per cent of the vote. The Movement supporters - 1 think there were three 
- they got the rest, but they divided it between themselves! That is the same thing that 
happened in the Lubaga North constituency, and in Lubaga South... But in such cases we 
sometimes said we supported none. We would say: ‘Unless the three of you stand down and 
leave one to contest, the Movement will lose it’. But they would say: ‘I am the one who is 
going to win’, ‘No, I am the one who is going to win’...”17.
C andidate selection by the oppositions
The fielding of candidates on the part of political parties is inhibited by a 
combination of factors. For a start, there is obviously the longstanding legal ban on party 
activities. This not only weakens the parties’ presence on the ground by disallowing public 
rallies or local branches, but it specifically prohibits parties from sponsoring individuals 
running for office. Indeed, up to the Constituent Assembly contest of 1994, it was somehow
16 James Wapakhabulo, National Political Commissar, article in The New Vision (Kampala, 25 June 1999). The previous 
year, a Kampala city mayoral candidate, John Kulubya, withdrew from the race on the ground that he did not want to split the 
Movement vote (New Vision, Kampala, 18 September 1998).
17 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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accepted that elections would be more or less run on an individual basis. In a situation where 
politics was not yet as polarised, party activities were kept to a minimum.
The subsequent 1996 parliamentary election, by contrast, was approached by parties 
in a much more antagonistic manner. They made some preparations in view of the election 
and got there somewhat better organised. The question had to be addressed, for example, 
whether parties could agree, constituency by constituency, on single candidates standing for 
the whole multipartist camp. This was of critical importance as, under plurality election rules, 
dividing the opposition vote in a constituency increased the chances of a local defeat to the 
Movement side. The DP and the UPC reached an agreement to share the electoral districts so 
to minimise multipartist-against-multipartist contests. The original plan was to field 
candidates in most constituencies. One month before the first direct parliamentary election 
under Movement politics was to be run, however, the InterPolitical Forces Co-operation 
(IPFC) -  inclusive of both the DP and the UPC -  officially resolved to boycott the race on the 
ground of election rigging during the just concluded presidential contest. As a result, parties 
went back into virtual inactivity, and most of their candidates allegedly withdrew from the 
race18.
Below the surface, however, things were ultimately more complicated. In spite of the 
official boycott, the DP and a faction of the UPC left it to individual members to determine 
whether they would stand on their own capacity or not. Thus, exceptions to the ‘keep out* 
decision were far from unknown. Notably in northern districts, such as West Nile and Acholi, 
and in Kampala, several multiparty candidates decided to stand. In these areas, opposition to 
the Movement had traditionally been strong and anti-party measures had been more loosely 
enforced than in other parts of the country. It was in this handful of constituencies, where 
parties eventually field their challengers, that they made an effort to avoid inter-party and 
intra-party contests. Neither was such effort always successful. Given the legal restrictions 
and the boycott, candidatures could only be influenced in a decentralised way, by relying on 
semi-autonomous resolutions taken at the local level: “the party depended very much on the 
local leadership then in place in identifying and encouraging members of the party, capable 
members of the party, to be involved”19. This is the way local party leaders describe the 
situation for the DP in the north:
“the last election, we boycotted it in parts of Uganda. But for the North, we were able to 
convince our colleagues of the need to run, though initially they were sceptical. Candidates
18 Mariano Drametu, Secretary General of the DP, interview (Kampala, 12 May 1999).
19 Paul Ssemogerere, President of the DP, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
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would come forward. And if you had two or three in one area, the party leadership in the 
local area would sit down and try to persuade one only to stand... In Gulu and Kitgum, we 
had those cases: there were 11 constituencies, and in almost all we had this problem. And in 
all we ended up with one candidate only. There were several considerations at the basis of 
the choice: some don’t have the experience, then we ask the opinion of local committees, 
who in fact represent what the voters think, and, also, it depends on the ability to raise 
resources. All was done at the local level, and then you inform the headquarters”20.
“In 1994, there had been no agreement between the two parties. Each one stood on his own, 
but we supported Zachary Olum as DP. And in Omoro another one who went through.
Then, in 1996, we had joint meetings to select candidates ... the two parties formed the 
Inter-Political Forces Co-operation and we worked very hard to make sure our candidate, a 
DP, was the official one: our supporters would come in large numbers for the election [i.e. 
nomination]! With Zachary’s constituency, we managed to convince him -  the other 
candidate -  to stand down. And a woman UPC as well was defeated in a joint meeting of 
UPC and DP. She got less votes”21.
The situation was not very different for the Uganda People’s Congress. Following 
the IPFC agreement to boycott the parliamentary races, the party had initially adopted the 
official line that it would not be involved in the election process. In fact, in large parts of the 
country -  notably in the west, in the south and in the east -  the UPC simply did not field any 
candidates. Several of those who had been preparing to stand, withdrew their candidatures:
“some members took part, but they did not receive official guidance nor support by the 
party... there was no attempt to campaign by the district executive. I myself decided not to 
stand despite I had good support, and the headquarters supported me in my decision”22.
But the question of whether to allow individual members to stand on their own -  
while boycotting the exercise as a party -  was raised by the acting secretary general, Cecilia 
Ogwal. As pointed out23, the debate that followed sparked the split of the party. Ogwal argued 
that, to concede ground to the Movement in UPC traditional strongholds would have been 
both a betrayal of local supporters and a strategic mistake. In the end, Ogwal and several other 
candidates stood successfully in a number of constituencies. Virtually all the seats won by 
UPC people were concentrated in the north, where the party had remained somewhat more 
active.
20 Zachary Olum, MP and Vice-President of the DP, interview (Kampala, 1 July 1999).
21 Kerubino Uma, DP branch chairman for Gulu district, interview (Gulu, 5 July 1999).
22 Darlington Sakwa, UPC leader in Mbale district, interview (Kampala, 10 July 1999).
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Again, however, the efforts to influence the selection of candidates often failed not 
only to produce a common multipartist nomination, but, on occasions, even a single 
contestant for the UPC:
“we met with 100 and over people. But it was done in a semi-clandestine way, here in 
town. We would inform our people, the representatives of the parishes, and some aspirants 
for election. We were doing our nominations. In Omoro constituency, for example, we 
nominated and assisted Abednego Ongom. There were six contestants for the nomination 
by the party. And we chose Ongom. Some accepted the decision, others decided they were 
still standing. [But,] no, this was not done for all MPs. As Olum was a DP, and Reagan 
Okumu went through on his own. And then Noibert Mao, also apparently on his own effort.
We did have a UPC candidate against Okumu, and one also against Mao, but not in the 
constituency of Olum”24.
Where parties tried to nominate candidates, this could only be done in a somewhat 
informal manner. Since there was no DP or UPC badge to struggle for, no effort to contain the 
number of multipartists running for office in a given constituency could be enforced upon 
rebellious aspirants. As a consequence, these endeavours were not entirely successful and this, 
predictably, caused the loss of several seats to the Movement camp:
“...because there was no way of stopping them ... despite the advice of these leaders of the 
party... there were other cases which were unfortunate - like in West Nile - where, because 
of several DP standing in an otherwise DP constituency, the constituency was lost. What 
happened then, we didn’t have a forum. And the law, the administration did not recognise 
the candidate on the basis of his political allegiance: no, it’s just ‘John’. And 1 believe that 
the government or the NRM had a hand in this, in encouraging ... some kind of silent 
rebellion within the party ... In 1996, you can say it was slightly better organised ... wc 
found that there was a way of consulting different political parties, and we reached an 
agreement on a single candidate. And some kind of joint work under the IPFC. But it was 
not as would have been the case if the parties were free”25.
In the end, both the parties and, to a lesser extent, the Movement found it relatively 
difficult to manage the selection of candidates in any systematic and effective manner.
23 See Chapter Five, pp.l 14ff..
24 James Otto, UPC vice-chairman for Gulu district, interview (Gulu, 7 July 1999).
25 Ssemogerere, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
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Non-partisan ways to the electoral contest
Most elected representatives describe their own decision to run as a ‘personal* or 
‘individual merit decision’, a ‘self-initiative*. On occasions, this was the case even when party 
members decided to run or when candidates retained a close relationship with a party:
“my decision to stand was a personal decision: I was not encouraged by anybody and 1 
didn’t discuss it with anybody. My party [UPC] did not sponsor any candidate. No, we 
didn’t even discuss the need to select the candidates. The election was purely run on 
individual merit, and thus you had situations where you had two candidates from the same 
party in the same constituency”26.
Several MPs claim that they received requests or pressures to stand on the part of 
their ‘community’, ‘my people’ or ‘local opinion leaders’, and portray their decision to run as 
a response to such calls. While, in a few instances, a request from below seems to have 
actually occurred, in most cases what MPs describe as a ‘call’ is merely an all-too-obvious 
process whereby a prospective candidate pays attention to the suggestions and the feedback he 
receives. In other words, any successful candidate must have met with an array of locally- 
influential people. Each of them would consult or be consulted by elders, priests, local 
councillors, teachers or other. Some of these people -  perhaps those backing the prospective 
candidate -  may have been (perceived to be) somehow representative of sectors of the 
community.
At times, however, a more straightforward and precise reference to a specific 
organisation, such as the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, convincingly points at the 
influence of a ‘community’ or a representative organ of it on the decision of aspirant 
candidates:
“the voters themselves asked me to run for the CA ... They said ‘You are a lawyer, you 
know these things and how to talk about them’. It was especially the people of my faith 
who were putting pressure on me, both informally and through formal organisations, such 
as the Uganda Muslims Supreme Council, because they thought I was qualified for it”27.
26 Omodi Okot, MP, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
27 Med Sozi Kaggwa, MP, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999).
137
The electoral politics o f  ‘no-partism ’
\
The direct impact of the local community, informal as it may have been, also seems 
less ambiguous for those few individuals who based their decisions to contest on requests 
advanced by the elders -  a particularly important constituency in northern districts:
“[already] before the 1980 election, the elders in Kitgum wanted me to stand. But I 
declined, I did not feel I was ready. ... [Then, again,] before the 1996 election - 1 think it 
was in January - the elders came to me to ask me to stand.... They told me they had already 
done the ground work. So I took a leave and made some preliminary consultations - this 
was in February - and I decided to run. It was clearly the elders who pressed me to stand.
They probably wanted me because of my role in the government, because of the contacts 1 
had, especially for my experience in the land commission. 1 had helped many people to get 
their land”28.
“Before the 1994 Constituent Assembly election, some elders - representatives of all the 
elders - came home and said ‘You must stand*. These were the same people who had said 
no in 1989 [when I then lost the election]! So I said myself ‘No’, and gave them a list of 20 
graduates from the constituency for them to go and seek for a suitable candidate. But they 
came after a week and said ‘You have to stand’. You know, it was the community who was 
asking it, the community where 1 was raised”29.
Although there were different patterns in the way individuals decided to put forward 
their candidatures, contestants rarely had to go through any kind of screening process. 
Whether an aspirant felt he was answering to a call, whether he thought he could ‘contribute’, 
or he merely reasoned of the possible benefits of becoming an MP, the decision was virtually 
invariably a personal one. The cases of those northern districts where multipartists put up 
something similar to internal primaries are individually interesting, but they are also an 
exception rather than a representative picture of over two hundred electoral constituencies. 
When somebody did try to block a candidate’s choice to stand, it was more often the 
candidate’s own wife than anything like a local party leader or the head of another 
organisation. As pointed out, however, it is important to keep in mind that a more subtle and 
indirect way of influencing candidatures operated in the background. The repression 
frequently and quite overtly employed by the regime, before and during the campaign, 
doubtless had an impact, although its effects are difficult to quantify. Not only party leaders 
were harassed, beaten or arrested, but plenty of other people simply kept away from a similar 
environment to avoid personal troubles.
28 John Livingstone Okello-Okello, MP, interview (Kampala, 11 June 1999).
29 Dick Nyai, MP, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
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Getting organised for campaigning
Formal restrictions on the way campaigns are to be run are key to the no-party 
politics model. When electoral contests were first re-established at the local level, in the late 
1980s, local councillors were to be selected by gathering voters in a public meeting and 
having them queue behind their favourite candidate. Aspirants were only allowed a short 
presentation to help voters make up their minds on their ‘individual merit’. When direct 
elections were then organised at the national level, in the mid-1990s, a similar scheme was 
retained. While voters would now cast a secret vote on polling day, candidates would still 
meet the voters by touring together the constituency in a series of parish-by-parish public 
gatherings, over a longer but still limited period of time. Yet, if the rules confined candidates 
to “15-minute interventions to introduce ourselves to the people”, with some additional time 
for voters to pose questions, the practice was, from the very beginning, pretty different: “I was 
quite naive in thinking that there was no actual campaigning”, admits one30. In fact, as another 
parliamentarian put it, “you do a lot of canvassing before the official one”31. As a result, 
according to some observers, in most constituencies voters were well aware of the candidates’ 
political affiliations32. Others, however, maintain that, in spite of occasionally intense 
campaigning, it often remained difficult to identify the partisan alignments of the candidates33. 
What is certain is that the moment campaigning moved beyond the scheduled public 
meetings, new options opened to prospective MPs.
Similar to what happens in the selection process, actual canvassing by individual 
candidates can also follow different patterns. The Movement, for example, may step in and 
employ its own personnel and finances to assisting the preferred candidates in their search for 
votes. Alternatively, the political parties may agitate in a more or less co-ordinated fashion to 
support their own challengers. As a third possibility, individual candidates may base their 
campaigns on the mobilisation of organisations that are not officially nor primarily created to 
compete in elections (for example, an NGO or an elders’ council). Finally, a contestant may 
set up an entirely independent and contingent election machine, purposely devised for a single 
election of a single individual.
30 Kaggwa, MP, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999). The comment was made with regard to the Constituent Assembly 
election.
31 Johnson Nkuuhe, MP, interview (Kampala, 28 April 1999). Cf. Kasfir (1994:165) with regard to the Constituent Assembly 
election.
32 Cullimore (1994:710) with regard to the Constituent Assembly election.
33 Kasfir (1994:178) with regard to the Constituent Assembly election.
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Personal campaigning machines
By far the most common way of arranging an election campaign under no-party 
politics in Uganda has been the creation of a personal campaigning machine. What is peculiar, 
here, is not so much the appointment of personal agents nor the clientelistic relations that 
emerge -  similar arrangements can be found virtually everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa — but 
rather the clear-cut independence of a most of these structures from parties or any other pre­
existing political groupings. In this sense, the ban on the activities of political organisations 
increases the compartmentalisation of the devices that the various contestants set up for 
electioneering. These interim arrangements are hierarchically organised, side by side, with 
virtually no networks connecting the different constituency-based experiences.
In a standard case, a pyramid of agents would be used to cover the territory of the 
electoral area, that is, one or more administrative counties, totalling around 70,000 residents34. 
The dimension of these pyramidal arrangements shows a great deal of variation -  partly due 
to different understandings of what an ‘agent’ is -  some counting just around 50 emissaries, 
others with an alleged 2,000-to-4,000-strong workforce. In the latter cases, the candidate 
would get in touch with lower level agents only occasionally, controlling the whole structure 
through a core group of intermediaries and area campaign ‘managers’. But each agent would 
receive a few instructions on basic political issues and electoral strategy, either directly from 
the candidate, meeting them in small groups, or from the candidates’ middlemen. Then, they 
would go out and divulge their patron’s gospel to the people living in the area they have been 
assigned. The following is a non-understated account of how things would be arranged by the 
better organised aspirants:
“mobilisation is the first thing you have to learn in politics. I had myself a good background 
since my experiences with students’ politics. Like in economics, you need to identify your 
SWOTs: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. And you need to recruit the 
appropriate managers! Some of them might be people who do not hold formal positions, 
they are out of the system, but they can be extremely influential. And you need to identify 
them.... I had many managers. The network you use goes down to village-level. You need 
to start to know the people who will give you the right names, you can’t know people in 
every area. I had a manager and a 12-people core team at each level, including one person 
targeting women, one for the youth, one each for the main tribes, and so on. So you have 
this kind of team in each of the 3 sub-counties, in each of the 20 parishes and in each of 83 
villages. This means 996 individuals, plus 240, plus 36. Plus a 12-people team at the top. It
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makes 1284 agents covering the whole area. It was a personalised network, parallel to the 
one left in place by the presidential campaign. You know, you have to use the presidential 
team itself, but it might not fully work for you, so you need a complementary network. Of 
course, you tend to lose contact with your own agents, you cannot stay in touch with all of 
them so you tend to delegate authority downwards. By the time you reach the village level 
everybody is a campaign manager...! And then, I also had 2-3 intelligence people - separate 
from and without the knowledge of the 12-people ‘official’ team - who report to you to tell 
you whether things have been done, whether the posters or other things you sent have been 
delivered and put up or else somebody has taken them”35.
The abundance of unemployed people plays into the hands of candidates: getting 
involved would offer the agents the chance to obtain some small but immediate rewards. 
Activists would be given sodas and, at times, even some little money: “this was a full time 
job, so somebody might have a long way to walk and ask for, say, Shs. 1,000 [$0.6] to eat 
something during the day”36. Moreover, in the long term, the agents might hope to share some 
of the spoils of power, or merely to be associated with a winning candidate in the future:
“...others were just voters, or little more than that But every person asked for a letter of 
appointment and even now, at times they come and show it to you to get something, they 
say ‘Do you remember me, I was your agent... ’”37.
Aside from vague appointment letters, though, recruitment could be so informal that 
a candidate would not even be able to estimate how many agents he actually ‘employed’.
Oiling the agents’ pyramid with the handout of soft drinks, soap or similar, normally 
constitutes a large part of a candidate’s disbursement. Taking into account some additional 
expenses for things such as petrol, posters, photographs, manifestos and -  on rare occasions -  
even t-shirts and radio programmes, the operational cost of individual electoral machines by 
and large fluctuates between Shs.6m and Shs.20m (i.e. between $3,600-$12,000). Upper 
peaks can be achieved by candidates who, for example, would not just buy soft drinks but 
would occasionally offer entire meals (this allegedly raised an MP’s expenses up to 40 million 
shillings). At the lower end, restrained aspirants who abstained from satisfying the agents’ 
hunger could apparently make it to parliament with less than 2 million shillings.
It was only in exceptional cases that a relatively complex electoral machine was 
retained after the election and transformed into a semi-permanent structure. In the Mbarara
34 Kasfir (1994:159).
35 Nsubuga Mayanja, MP, interview (Kampala, 31 May 1999).
36 Kaggwa, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999).
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municipality area, for example, Winnie Byaniyma’s 1,500-strong Unity network was 
preserved not only to keep the MP in touch with her constituents and to facilitate mobilisation 
in future contests, but also to campaign for the election of her associates to local councils. A 
logic of reciprocity of the kind “support me and if I win I will in turn support you”38 appeared 
to operate in these cases, whereby the agents’ motivations to get involved included the 
prospective use of the same network of loyal volunteers for personal ambitions.
As pointed out, the most interesting features of the electoral machines employed by 
Ugandan MPs are their almost ubiquitous diffusion and their autonomy from political parties 
or other organisations. Yet, the adoption of similar arrangements was not incompatible with 
the use of party supporters.
Party campaigning
Political parties, having to fight a hegemonic force from a legally restrained position, 
could only rely upon two strengths: their historical presence on the territory (by now 
ideological rather than physical) and the unifying effect that dealing with a common political 
enemy produced on the multipartist camp:
“campaigning in 1994 was veiy much on individual-merit... Then in 1996 the divisions 
[with the Movement] emerged. All multiparti sts were together. We had a common fund and 
a campaign team with members from all parties. And each party was responsible for those 
constituencies where it had strongholds, so, for example, in a UPC area the chairman of the 
team would be a UPC”39.
Party-based campaigning, however, was inhibited by three obstacles -  much as the 
selection of party candidates was. First of all, parties were not allowed any formal role in the 
exercise; rather, they were legally supposed to keep out. Second, while parties had made 
preparations for the 1996 parliamentary election, they eventually decided to boycott the race. 
Thirdly, had they wanted to try and truly challenge the government, parties lacked the 
minimal financial resources required to launch and organise an electoral threat of any 
significance.
Party headquarters simply did not have the local branches that were necessary to 
sustain a campaign. This situation largely reflected the legal ban, which exempted party
37 Benedict Mutyaba, MP, interview (Kampala, 26 May 1999).
38 Tamale (1999:164ff.).
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central offices but affected party outposts at the local level. The establishment of the local 
task forces of the InterPolitical Forces Co-operation did not modify this state of affairs, as the 
task forces had only been in place for a short time before the presidential election and had no 
mandate for the parliamentary contest. By 1996, government intimidation and harassment had 
become widespread, though regionally differentiated. Political parties tried to strike a balance 
between the official decision to boycott the election and a discreet encouragement for those 
candidates that, in a limited number of areas, had decided to stand:
“we boycotted the parliamentaiy elections. Even in practice, yes, those people who were 
going did so as individuals. There was no effort, from the party, to support anybody.
Although we told those who wanted to stand that they could use our local people. But UPC 
helped some of them, I think. In the end, of course, you had de facto party candidates,
yes”40.
“[During elections,] we would just support a person, like Norbert Mao or Zachary Olum or 
Reagan Okumu. In the back of our mind we know he is our man. And our supporters would 
be informed. My house is used as a kind of information centre to send messages all over the 
district. As chairman, I would invite the executive and supporters from various parts of the 
district, and they would bring the information to the grassroots. We were also able to do 
this because of financial support by candidates (Olum, and Mao, and also Matthew Okello, 
who was defeated). Two, three months before the election, about three times per month.
And we supplied campaign managers at county, sub-county level and so on. And agents. In 
1996, when UPC and DP decided to back Ssemogerere, we tried to come together. Zachary 
Olum also got support by the UPC. He even decided to have a UPC manager at county 
level. Both Olum and Okello, and Regan Okumu as well”41.
The mainstream Uganda People’s Congress was, among opposition forces, the one 
that most neatly objected to getting involved in the process. Uganda House denied that it was 
actively supporting any candidate (if one excludes the short-lived experience of the IPFC 
presidential campaign). In practice, however, the official line in Kampala did not mean that 
the UPC people on the ground would not move at all:
“still, candidates -  and MPs -  have to say they are UPC if they want to get votes in the 
areas where people are UPC, to get the grassroots votes. Otherwise they have no chance of 
being elected! And UPC local executives did campaign in a spontaneous manner, not
39 Maria Mutagamba, Deputy Secretary General of the DP, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
40 Mutagamba, interview (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
41 Uma, interview (Gulu, 5 July 1999).
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organised from the top, although this was only door-to-door campaigning, undercover, to 
avoid the reaction of the government”42.
“My UPC contacts [were quite important]... as it was a UPC area.... UPC people saw me 
as the least evil among the competing candidates and presented me saying: ‘He is our man, 
even though he belongs to the Movement’. UPC might not have been fully active as a party, 
but people knew who the local UPC leaders were. And the Movement knew I was running 
in a UPC area, and it did not come up openly: they didn’t mind the way I got my support - 1 
mean -  by sympathising with UPC”43.
The Ogwal faction of the party was more favourable to implementing the official 
boycott only in part. The acting secretary general was reportedly able to canvass and gather 
some huge rallies -  especially in Lira, but occasionally also in other districts -  though not 
without incurring the repressive reaction of the regime. Yet, in most districts, UPC people 
were only incoherently mobilised by individual candidates, whether in connection with other 
multipartists or not:
“in 1994,1 was a candidate to the CA, but I didn’t go through. I met UPC committees in 
different areas so that they could campaign for me. But the other candidate scared people 
saying that, if they elected me, 1 would bring Obote back. We were campaigning on 
personal merit, so 1 had a mixture of people, UPC and non-UPC. Some were UPC
„ 4 4committees, some were not .
"in 1996 we met twice to campaign for the candidates to parliament. Door-to-door, through 
personal contacts. To campaign for whoever was the multipartist. You could ask somebody 
to organise some people in a house, to explain them that was important to support a 
multipartist. Oh no, not only a couple of times, you keep doing it day after day! It is not 
only the 14 people of the executive, they also involve other groups”45.
There was hardly a multipartist who could rely on established party structures or use 
them alongside a personal network. Those few candidates who made recourse to their party 
links did it by employing local party leaders and members as relevant contact persons, or by 
integrating them into independent and personalised electoral teams:
42 James Rwanyarare, Chairman of the Presidential Policy Commission of the UPC, interview (Kampala, 5 May 1999).
43 Nsubuga Mayanja, interview (Kampala, 31 May 1999).
44 Frederick Wako, UPC branch chairman for Mukono district, interview (Mukono, 24 June 1999).
45 Wako, interview (Mukono, 24 June 1999).
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“I wasn't sponsored by any organisation, but I had a lot of support from the multiparti sts. In 
terms of agents, for example, they gave me people to help establish myself, to get known.
They would send them to me recommending them"46.
“I got nothing from DP. DP had no money! And then the party as such had decided to 
boycott the election, so I didn’t even use DP structures. But I had been district campaign 
manager for Ssemogerere during the presidential campaign, so we had structures in place 
that I used. It was both DP and UPC people”47.
The overall scenario, however, was again characterised by geographical differences. 
On the DP side, for example, some organised party support could be found in traditional 
strongholds such as Kampala, West Nile or Acholi, while party candidates and organised 
backing were virtually absent from areas such as Mukono or Mbarara. For the UPC, areas like 
the historical party strongholds of Mbarara and Mbale were practically out of reach because 
of intense hostility on the part of local authorities towards any non-Movement political 
activity, and, therefore, the local party did not get involved in politics.
Enter the Movement
Political opponents regularly accuse the Movement of not sticking to the individual- 
merit principle it established when elections were re-introduced in the late 1980s. They claim 
that is biased, rather than neutral, and it has often actively supported specific candidates. As a 
matter of fact, when the Movement intervened in the election process, it was possibly more 
effective at the stage of facilitating contestants rather than at the previous one of selecting 
them. In the latter stage, as pointed out, it never had a completely free hand in picking up and 
fielding candidates and in making sure they would not be challenged from within the 
Movement’s own camp. The actual campaigns, by contrast, exposed the fact that “the NRM 
was the only organisation with full political freedom during the elections, in addition to its far 
greater access to state resources for campaign purposes”48.
During the election for the Constituent Assembly, incumbent members of the 
National Resistance Council (the legislative body) and of the cabinet were often favoured by 
district officials who would allow them to ‘explain the constitution’ in purposely convened
46 Mutyaba, interview (Kampala, 26 May 1999). Mutyaba defines himself as a ‘moderate’ or ‘independent’, close to both 
camps.
47 Rainer Kafiire, MP and Women Leader of the DP, interview (Kampala, 15 June 1999).
48 Kasfir (1994:173-4).
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seminars that actually worked as political campaign tools49. Ministers were reported travelling 
to various constituencies to sponsor other candidates both in 1994 and 1996. In Tororo, for 
example, members of the executive came and addressed rallies under the pretext of explaining 
government policies, while de facto campaigning for specific candidates to the Constituent 
Assembly50.
Discrimination and intimidation on the part of the authorities were allegedly 
widespread. Civil servants were reportedly warned that they risked losing their jobs if found 
supporting the wrong candidate. Voters were told their man would be killed if elected. 
According to some multipartists, even the army became actively involved in campaigning in 
areas such as Acholi. During the 2001 parliamentary election, the UPDF public relations 
officer pointed out that there was no law stopping an army officer from campaigning for any 
candidate51.
Local authorities were often instrumentally active for the government. It was 
observed that “some of the local council structures serve as a partisan NRM body during 
election time and target multipartists and their supporters”52. Local councillors, Resident 
District Commissioners and Local Defence Units have all been accused by NGOs such as the 
Uganda Law Society, the National Organisation for Civic Education and Election Monitoring, 
and the International Foundation for Election Systems for not being neutral and for abusing 
the populace into supporting Movement candidates. The effect of such interventions is 
increased by the fact that local people cannot organise or call upon parties to resist similar 
mistreatments.
Movement candidates occasionally admit receiving financial assistance, with 
estimated figures ranging between a few hundred thousands shillings and an astonishing 
Shs.30 millions ($18,000) per head. The Secretariat does not deny this practice, but defends it 
as follows:
“but... the budget was not used for that at all. Even in the 1996 election.... we didn’t spend
government money. We have friends, both local and external, and they made contributions.
And, then, these contributions, we used them to support our candidates, like for posters and
fuel”53.
49 The Monitor (Kampala, 21 September 1993, p. 16).
50 Mujaju (1994:17).
51 New Vision (Kampala, 11 June 2001).
52 Human Rights Watch (1999:54-56).
53 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999).
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According to Movement officials, this kind of interventions were targeted to 
constituencies where multipartists mounted prominent challenges:
“in 1994 we didn’t have any specific operation, really. Except that there was financial 
assistance to some of our candidates where there was an outright... a position from the 
multiparty camp who were trying to reduce our numbers in the Constituent Assembly. But 
where we had only Movement people we didn’t bother, we let them fight, and whoever 
came through”54.
Some observers expect the Movement interventions and control over candidatures -  
to reduce the number of aspirants, the divisions of the pro-Movement vote and the risks of 
electoral defeats -  to increase due to the rising criticisms and opposition that the ruling group 
has to face55. During the 2001 parliamentary election campaign, past practices became even 
more open. It was plainly conceded, for example, that each Movement candidate received 
between Shs lm and Shs 5m ($600-3,000) for his campaign56. The Secretariat, however, again 
claimed that funding did not come from the Treasury but was raised by Museveni, as 
chairman of the Movement, in the form of private donations.
The alternative cam paign
As repeatedly exposed by the opposition, the hegemonic role of the Movement and a 
relatively widespread confusion on whether local councillors are supposed to take sides or not 
has favoured the frequent misuse of local government organs during election campaigns. 
Public institutions that were not supposed to enter the electoral contest often did, and they did 
it in a partisan way57. At times, Movement candidates would openly acknowledge their 
recourse to the councils:
54 Wapakhabulo, interview (Kampala, 19 July 1999). The same idea was expressed by Museveni with regard to the 1998 
local government elections (New Vision, Kampala, 22 April 1998) and the 2001 parliamentary election (New Vision, 
Kampala, 13 June 2001).
55 Human Rights Watch (1999:60).
56 The Monitor and New Vision (Kampala, 19 June 2001).
57 Oloka-Onyango claims that, “in the 1996 elections, Resistance Councils were critical in ensuring that Movement 
candidates retained their hold over power, negating any claim to neutrality and non-partisanship” (2000:41). However, he 
does not really provide any evidence of this, and merely refers to a 1996 book on the 1994 Constituent Assembly election as 
his source.
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“to get in touch with the people ... 1 used the Resistance Councils. 1 told them, ‘I am your 
chairman, if you think I have delivered and you want me to deliver, you have a duty to 
assist me’. And this obviously created a network for a start, and electoral team”58.
According to multipartist MPs, however, the councils in the north (especially at the 
parish level and above) were too unpopular and distant from the people to be usefully and 
successfully employed as a campaigning tool. Moreover, the councils often proved to be too 
internally divided to be consistently employed as a cohesive sponsor for candidates running 
on a Movement ticket:
“the RC3 -  the sub-county that covers the constituency -  were divided. Four councillors 
were for me, one was neutral, and four were against! So there was no way the council could 
be used as such: I only used those individuals that were supporting me, and my rivals were 
talking to the others. Unfortunately, a crucial man, the secretary in charge of information, 
was on the other side!”59.
“The incumbent... was supported by the district council, by the chiefs and possibly by an 
individual Catholic priest, though lower level councils were supporting me”60.
Other than local councils, there is very little evidence of other organisations getting 
involved in election campaigning. The vast majority of MPs that have been interviewed, for 
example, claim that churches were of no relevance during the 1996 election, since they mostly 
kept themselves out of the contest. As a deputy synthesises, “I stayed away from the churches 
... and the churches themselves now tend to stay away from politics”61. Overall, religious 
institutions appear to be less directly involved in partisan politics than may have been the case 
in the 1960s. While religion is still closely related to party membership, this may increasingly 
be a legacy of the past rather than a deliberate decision to defend sacred beliefs and secular 
powers.
With regard to processes of electoral aggregation, inclusive of both the selection and 
campaigning phases, four main points sum up our findings.
Political parties as organisations play a very marginal role in the electoral process. 
For a start, they are legally marginalised, restricted and repressed. They are not able nor they
38 Kaggwa, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999).
59 Wandera Ogalo, MP, interview (Kampala, June 14,1999).
60 Nkuuhe, interview (Kampala, 28 April 1999).
61 Nkuuhe, interview (Kampala, 28 April 1999).
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are given the possibility to organise coherently or to raise resources. When parties were given 
a partial chance to organise some kind of challenge, as in 1996, they only gave it a go in the 
presidential contest. But they then retracted to the margins when they decided to boycott the 
subsequent parliamentary election. On occasions, nonetheless, party members did exert an 
impact by joining forces with other multipartists or by enrolling into the personal machines of 
multipardst candidates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that parties did not get much more 
involved in the 2001 campaign.
Restrained by the no-partism ideological principle and by a delay in developing its 
organisation, the Movement’s own effort resulted in the poorly co-ordinated backing of some 
of its candidates. This needs to be doubly qualified. Firstly, both state authorities (at the local 
and national level) and resources got heavily involved in the election process, whether 
directly through the hands of incumbents or because they were mobilised by the Movement 
leadership. Secondly, the somewhat repressive climate in which elections have so far taken 
place, and the multipartists’ boycott which partly resulted from such climate, lessened the 
pressure and the urgency for a better organised effort on the part of the Movement.
Non-party groups such as elders, churches or other -  i.e. non-strictly political 
organisations -  only got significantly involved in extremely rare instances, through a semi­
organised backing of candidates.
The stated objective of an individual-based political competition has in part been 
achieved. Under no-party rules, most candidates to national elections were extremely isolated, 
they lacked virtually any contact with each other as well as with political or social 
organisations. While this may partly reflect the broader deficit of organisations which is 
common to most of Africa, Uganda has apparently brought this to an extreme. The prevalence 
of highly individualised electoral machines and of candidates’ self-selection processes marked 
an overall fragmentation in political competition: country-wide connections and continuity 
between social organisations and candidates were weak at best, non-existent in several cases.
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The parliam entary  politics of ‘no-partism*
Individuals, parties and party-surrogates in the legislative process
This chapter investigates the implications of ‘no-partism’ for parliamentary politics. 
How do non-partisan, supposedly atomised, parliamentarians translate their individual actions 
into effective political activities within the legislative assembly? To what extent does 
parliament rely, for its inner working, upon individualised contacts among MPs as opposed to 
group-based political interactions? Have elected representatives set up any devices through 
which they can surrogate the co-ordinating functions of legislative parties? And how effective 
are these alternative organisational arrangements in imposing discipline upon their members’ 
voting behaviour?
Understanding the inner working of parliament and its role in Uganda’s politics 
requires a prior understanding of its position in relation to the presidency. A directly-elected 
executive tends to magnify the implications of the atomised assembly that the individual- 
merit principle generates. The legitimacy and the mandate of a popularly-elected presidency 
do not derive from a parliamentary vote of confidence. Executive and legislative powers are 
therefore more clearly separate than is the case in parliamentary systems1. This not only 
reduces incentives for MPs to aggregate and to stick to partisan alignments in the legislative 
assembly, it also involves potential conflicts and deadlocks between the House and the 
government.
The members of Uganda’s Sixth Parliament (1996-2001) have devised several 
arrangements to co-ordinate their activities. In particular, in spite of the independent mandate 
of the executive and of the large majority of pro-Movement MPs, it soon became evident that 
the government needed some form of political organisation inside parliament. A legislative 
party-like Movement caucus was thus formed to exert influence on the behaviour of MPs
1 See, for example, L i j p h a r t  (1992) a n d  Sartori (1995).
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when critical parliamentary votes are taken. This has favoured the projection on the assembly 
of the ruling group’s broader political hegemony. Yet, the cohesion of the pro-government 
group in parliament has remained weak -  partly due to a relative lack of binding sanctions -  
pushing the government, in extreme instances, to force its way through parliament and cause 
constitutional crises.
Uganda has a full-fledged presidential executive. The president is directly elected by 
a double-ballot formula and can have his five-year mandate renewed only once2. He is both 
head of the state and of the government. As such, the president appoints and directs the 
cabinet, whose members are responsible to him. While the government is not subject to a 
parliamentary vote of confidence, on the other hand, parliament has a fixed term and cannot 
be dissolved by the president. The latter, however, is endowed with an American-type veto 
power on all legislation that can be overruled only by a 2/3 parliamentary majority3.
Presidential systems are prone to the emergence of antagonism between a legislative 
body and an executive organ that enjoy formally separate legitimacy, as the political 
majorities they represent might be different or even opposed to each other. The divide that can 
emerge between legislative and executive power-holders, where each of the two owes its 
mandate directly to the electorate, has long been a point of critique of presidential systems4.
While a parliamentary system creates incentives that tend to bind together the MPs of 
the government majority and the executive -  for the fortunes of the two are to some extent 
tied -  these incentives are not as strong in a presidential context. An executive presidency is 
not the expression of a parliamentary majority, nor, in general, does the survival of the former
2 In presenting their nominations, presidential candidates need to collect a hundred signatures from each district, which is a 
relatively bland version of more rigorous requirements for the geographical distribution of electoral support: meeting such 
requirement will merely demand a minimum of organisation rather than the pan-ethnic appeal that is usually the rationale 
behind the adoption of similar measures. Cf. Horowitz (1991:184).
3 Art. 91, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995). Museveni has repeatedly used his veto power to block bills passed 
by parliament, asking the latter to reconsider them. In early 2001, for example, he refused to sign the Parliamentary Elections 
Bill, claiming that the proposed nomination fee -  up to 2 million shillings ($1,200) from 200,000 shillings in 1996 -  would 
benefit sitting MPs, and he also asked the restoration of electoral colleges for the election of district woman MPs (see note 31 
below) and other minor changes. The Movement caucus agreed to the president’s proposals (The Monitor, Kampala, 19 
February and 22 March 2001). Shortly afterwards, Museveni returned to the House an approved version of the Political 
Organisations Bill which, while still prohibiting parties from sponsoring candidates (and even from holding s e m i n a r s  or 
meeting below the district level), allowed them to open up branches at district level. The president asked that party activities 
remained confined to the ‘national headquarters’, “in line with the decision of the National Executive Committee and the 
National Conference of the Movement. ... Political organisations ... should not be allowed to operate at district level and 
below” (New Vision, Kampala, 19 April 2001).
4 Presidentialism has been identified as an important variable in explaining the breakdown of several democratic regimes, 
especially with reference to Latin American experiences, because of the conflicts and deadlocks that can develop between 
separate legislative and executive majorities, the temporal rigidity of their mandates, and the scarce inclusiveness and 
possible abuses of power of a monocratic executive. See, for instance, Linz (1990, 1994), Lijphart (1992), Mainwaring 
(1993) and Sartori (1995:185-186). Horowitz (1991:205ff.) and Shugart and Carey (1992), on the other hand, argue that it is 
not presidentialism per se, but rather some particular features -  such as plurality presidential elections, party system 
fragmentation, weak separation between the legislative and the executive, or executive powers that are too strong -  which 
may have caused specific presidential regimes to collapse.
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depend on the stability of the support it receives from the latter. Although the origin and the 
survival of an executive president are independent from those of the assembly, however, an 
effective action on the part of the government still largely depends on whether the latter is 
supported or not by the House. For presidential systems too, it holds true that “cohesion and 
discipline matter ... The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a 
crucially important feature of parliamentary life”5. The lack of legislative support may 
“contribute to chronic conflict between the branches of government, which can in turn 
generate constitutional crises”6, as evidence from other presidential countries in transition to 
democracy demonstrates (most recently, for instance, such crises occurred in Peru, in 1992, 
and in Russia, in 1994-1995). In Africa, the absence of a presidential majority in the assembly 
contributed to the collapse of electoral democracy in at least two cases, in the Congo of the 
early 1960s, and in Niger, in 19967.
In Uganda’s case, the question concerns the cohesion of a ‘no-party’ majority and the 
extent to which a president has to and can rely on it. In the context of a no-party system, the 
limits on political organisation and the consequent risk of atomisation of MPs may further 
reduce the chances, for government initiatives, to find parliamentary support8.
During the mandate of the Sixth Parliament, president Museveni’s ruling group did 
enjoy the support of a decisive majority in the House. Yet, the country’s politics does not lack 
handbook illustrations of the troubles that presidential executives may generate when dealing 
with legislators. Museveni, for example, often complained that he was ‘tired of arguing’ with 
MPs -  as well as with bureaucrats -  when they delayed important legislative measures:
‘"when I was elected, I signed a contract with the people of Uganda, and government is 
supposed to implement programmes. Unless this is done it will cause a political crisis. We 
cannot go on like this. We cannot sign a contract with the electorate and some groups 
frustrate it. ... Parliament is another confusion. Traditionally, I have been having 
bureaucrats but now there are M Ps... How many wars shall I fight?”9.
5 Bowler -  Farrell -  Katz (1999:3).
6 Carey (1997:69).
7 In spite of the electoral success of Moise Tshombe’s Conaco, who had won 122 out of 167 seats in the legislative elections 
of 1965, president Joseph Kasavubu picked his prime minister from the opposition Front Democratique Congolais, and the 
government thus failed to assemble the necessary support in the House. On the Congo-Kinshasha, see Vanderlinden 
(1998:989). In Niger, the farmer single party MNSD led the opposition front that won a majority in the 1995 parliamentary 
election: a power struggle with the presidency ensued, which was terminated by a coup in 1996 (Sandbrook 1996:78, Bratton 
-  van de Walle 1997:244).
8 Cf. Mainwaring (1993).
9 The Monitor (Kampala, 4 November 1999; emphasis added). To the remarks made, by the president at a World Bank 
conference, MPs replied by inviting Museveni to stop using Parliament as a scapegoat for the declining economy and to 
‘wake up’ to the realities of democracy. Later in the month, the president restated his position saying that if Uganda had been
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The capacity of a representative assembly to keep a directly-elected president under 
check is one of the claimed advantages of individual merit. The latter principle, the argument 
goes, enables parliamentarians, who are not under the pressure and control of party 
leaderships, freely and fully to oppose the spread of corruption or the entrenchment of 
personal interests into public policy legislation. As a prominent Movement thinker suggests:
“a parliament where the element of personal merit is more preponderate is more effective.
In Ottawa, the party calls the shots and the MP is marginalised. A member who dares 
disobey a position taken in caucus does so to the peril of his or her political future. In 
Colorado, most of the legislation is originated by the individual members. Political parties 
play a secondary role. The General Assembly of Colorado works hand in hand with the 
people through referenda to be very effective in checking and supervising the executive.... 
Parliament, though young and underfacilitated, is playing an ever increasing role in 
supervising the executive. I am however sceptical that this refreshing development can be 
maintained under the multiparty system given the dominant role of the party caucus and 
whip under that system”10.
It is true that the independence from the executive occasionally displayed by the 
Ugandan parliament is partly the consequence of weak (Movement) or non-existent (party) 
whipping. While political parties still have a presence in the minds of many Ugandans as well 
as in extra-parliamentary politics, they hardly have any relationship with parliament or any 
influence on parliamentary activities. Parties are legally kept out of what is meant to be a no- 
party parliament, and the leaders of the two main opposition forces are not even members of 
the assembly (UPC president Milton Obote is still in exile, while DP leader Paul Ssemogerere 
only run for the presidency). In the relative absence of the old parties, a new and independent 
generation of opposition leaders emerged from among the ranks of legislators. The likes of 
Winnie Byanyima, Norbert Mao or Wandera Ogalo are only the most visible ones. The 
courage they recently exhibited has its roots in the experience of the Constituent Assembly: 
“in 1994 there was not much talking, there was a very hostile situation against multipartists. 
But Wapakhabulo [the CA chairman] did a very good job, he allowed us to speak out our
Britain, he would have dissolved parliament for new elections over the privatisation issues that were on the table, for “it is 
not acceptable to go on paralysing the country” (The Monitor, Kampala, 24 November 1999).
10 Article by James Wapakhabulo, National Political Commissar, in New Vision (Kampala, 10 May 1999, p.29). According to 
Mcauslan (2000:19n): “while there is a movement caucus in Parliament consisting of backbench MPs, there is no party 
discipline and MPs cannot be whipped into the Government lobby. This makes for greater democracy in Parliament but 
creates considerable difficulties for die Executive. Many Ministers have been forced out of office because of critical reports 
of Parliamentary committees on their handling of their Ministries. It is an ironic commentary on the notion of democracy that
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minds, to elaborate our ideas, and now we can make jokes and get a coffee together”11. But it 
was especially during 1998 and 1999 that these leading MPs encouraged parliament to 
scrutinise government legislation more vigorously and effectively, to monitor the activities of 
the executive, and to censure allegedly corrupt ministers12. This process augmented and 
legitimised the authority of the assembly, promoting a sense of belonging even among 
multipartist MPs who are radically opposed to the Movement: “this is a very strong 
parliament: it has done better than any other before it”13.
The autonomy of parliament, which is doubtless still very limited, was manifest, for 
example, when the controversial Political Organisations Bill (1998) was tabled by the 
government. The parliamentary committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs openly and 
strongly objected to the government’s restrictive views. Its report suggested changes that 
would have eased party freedoms and, in this sense, it went some way in satisfying the 
demands of the UPC and of the other parties. Opposed to such measures, however, the 
executive opted for withdrawing the bill altogether. The instance was quite telling of the 
three-cornered game that characterises Uganda’s current political scenario, with the 
Movement, the extra-parliamentary opposition of the old parties, and a non-entirely- 
controllable parliament facing each other.
Parliament’s attempt to build up some independence in the field of legislation, 
however, suffered its worst setback when the government-sponsored Referendum Bill was 
passed in flagrant defiance of procedural correctness14. With regard to the contention that 
individual merit fosters the strength of parliament, the evidence is therefore mixed. The case 
of the referendum law would rather bear out the idea that, in general, “individual merit 
weakens parliament because members, as individuals, are open to executive control and 
manipulation”15. But the question of how an entirely atomised assembly would, in the long 
term, interact with the executive had already been pre-empted. The moment the Movement 
created its own parliamentary caucus to impose a degree of order among its rank and file, the 
no-party assembly was, to a significant extent, no longer atomised. The claimed individualism 
of the assembly was in fact swept away: practical necessities overrode ideological claims,
the Ugandan system is regarded by donors as not fully democratic because political parties cannot contest seats in Parliament 
yet, as a result, the Executive has far less control over the Legislature than in most Western European states”.
Dick Nyai, MP, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
12 For instance, Nsibambi (1994a:45). In 1997 and 1999, some MPs also proposed measures to have ministers removed from 
parliament, allegedly to strengthen the latter and create a full separation of powers (The Monitor, Kampala, 29 January 1997, 
p.l, and 2 June 1999).
13 John Livingstone Okello-Okello, MP, interview (Kampala, 11 June 1999).
14 See Chapter Three, p.69.
15 While the quote is from an article by the National Political C o m m i s s a r , James Wapakhabulo (New Vision, Kampala, 28 
May 1999, p. 15), he only makes this point to summarise a view that is commonly held by the opposition and to argue against 
it in the rest of his article.
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demonstrating that that of a no-party parliament can hardly be a sustainable project. Museveni 
himself recognised the need to use caucus-like arrangements to solve contentious issues and 
organise parliamentary politics: “even those long term multipartists -  these others who are 
allergic to the Movement -  you can start slowly in parliament and form a caucus. In the UK 
parties started in parliament.. .”16.
In what follows, attention is first turned to the different groups that were formed 
within parliament, and an account is then provided of the way MPs vote in the House -  
whether according to unrestrained freedom of choice, or to the pressures brought to bear upon 
them by these semi-organised networks.
The formation and the features of the parliamentary caucuses
Where MPs are supposedly elected on the basis of individual platforms, 
parliamentary politics is meant to be characterised by an extreme fluidity17. The formation of 
parliamentary groups runs against the ‘individual-merit’ aim of promoting non- 
confrontational politics, since, the argument goes, any crystallised political alignments in a 
segmented society are likely to express ethnically-based antagonisms.
In practice, Ugandan parliamentarians generally claim that they indeed enjoy a very 
broad margin of freedom and scope for individual positioning on parliamentary issues. 
Lobbying focuses on individuals -  rather than groups -  and the former are comparatively free 
when casting their votes. This is notably the case when non-controversial matters are being 
dealt with. The other side of the coin is that not only voting, but also more down-to-earth 
tasks, such as collecting information on the issues discussed, are largely left to individual 
MPs. To learn more about the issues that are in the agenda, for example, members of the 
assembly may have to rely on parliamentary committees or to refer back to their constituents 
through local hearings. Neither private members have any ready-made network for the 
articulation of grievances and statements or the submission of legislative measures to the 
House. There is no question that “the legislative task is collective in nature, and collective 
dilemmas will readily emerge”18: individual legislators acting on their own lose out the 
benefits (e.g. control on the distribution of appointments and other perks, on the agenda, on
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policy-making, and so on) that they can gain by co-ordinating their actions19. But how have 
things actually worked in the Ugandan parliament? How do almost 300 MPs organise 
themselves to deal with parliamentary issues? What patterns of association have emerged, if 
any? Do co-operative arrangements impose restraints on the behaviour of individual MPs? If 
so, to what extent?
The most notable form of party-surrogate that has emerged under no-party politics in 
Uganda is the parliamentary caucus. The word caucus, which is of American Indian origin, 
derives its political meaning from US politics, where it describes: “1. a private meeting of 
political party members in order to seek agreement on a common course of action ... 2. an 
organisation of members ... [which] may be officially recognised, as are the House majority 
and minority caucuses, or they may be unofficial groups of members having shared legislative 
interests”20. Hereafter, the term is adopted to indicate the more or less formalised and 
regularised arrangement of meetings for a qualified, selected or otherwise restricted group of 
MPs.
A tendency towards the formation of caucuses became evident at least since the mid- 
1990s, after direct elections were held nation-wide. The first caucus was formally inaugurated 
by the 70 or so multipartist delegates to the Constituent Assembly, under the name of 
National Caucus for Democracy21. This was a direct response to an unanswered question: how 
were elected representatives to develop common strategies and collective discipline within the 
assembly? It was not by coincidence that such an answer emerged from the ranks of the 
pluralist camp: “electoral politics is about organisation, some minimum programme and 
political discipline based on defined political lines. The multipartists were better prepared for 
this game”22.
Although no discussion by NRM leaders had ever hinted at the need to organise 
elected representatives in political groups, it did not take them long to learn from the 
multipartists and to further develop this kind of forums:
19 Cf. Cox -  McCubbins (1993:83ff.).
20 Shafritz (1993:73).
21 See, for example, TheMomtor (Kampala, 15 July 1994) and New Vision (Kampala, 17 July 1994 and 11 April 1995). The 
highest estimates of the number of multipartists among the delegates elected to the Constituent Assembly put the figure at 
100, against a 114 pro-NRM majority (Weekly Topic, Kampala, 15 July 1994). In addition to a majority of elected members, 
however, the NRM also enjoyed the support of most of the 72 special representatives, and that of some multipartists who 
crossed the Floor. Charles Onyango-Obbo, a renown observer of Ugandan politics, estimates that roughly 80 elected 
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“it’s in the Constituent Assembly that I realised the importance of a caucus. The first were 
the multipartists. When they introduced a position, you realised it was a strong one, that 
they had been meeting together the night before to prepare it. And if you want to give a 
strong answer, a strong argument, you have to work and consult on it as well”23.
Pro-NRM delegates in the CA were promptly summoned into a rather informal 
caucus and, by the time the new parliament was elected in 1996, the picture had been turned 
upside down. It was now the Movement that rapidly organised its MPs through its own 
caucus. The multipartists, heavily reduced in their numbers, allegedly decided they were 
better off avoiding any rigid identification as a provocateur group. Thus, while the caucus 
strategy originated in the multipartist camp, it was the Movement that quickly adopted it and 
gave it a somewhat more stable and elaborate format.
Far from being restricted to the movementists-veAras-multipartists divide, the fashion 
of caucuses soon spread beyond that, as other grounds were found which were suitable for re­
grouping members of parliament. Among these, the Young Parliamentarians Associations 
(YPA), which assembled all young or first-time MPs, acquired fame for its cohesion in 
fighting anti-corruption battles. A number of ethnically-based caucuses also emerged -  such 
as the Acholi and the Buganda parliamentary groups -  which challenged the integrationist and 
‘anti-sectarian’ ideas of the Movement leadership24. On a still smaller scale, several individual 
districts formed their own caucuses (Pallisa, Moroto and many others). A ‘Minority tribes of 
Uganda group’ had been reportedly formed in the Constituent Assembly by delegates 
representing the Karimojong, the Sarnia, the Madi, the Kakwa, the Bamba, the Bakonzo and 
the Baruli, and, in 1999, even a Parliamentary Pastoralists Association was launched, banding 
together MPs from Ankole, Karamoja, Teso and other cattle-raising areas25.
These caucuses differ not only with regard to their size, but also in terms of political 
objectives. Some are meant to operate as links with the constituencies, others to represent 
ethnic communities, to support government policies, and so on. Yet, their broader and 
common aim is the co-ordination of collective actions in parliament:
“any form in which people can meet and discuss issues is good. They galvanise consensus 
and make life easier to and in parliament. It’s impossible to get a chance to say something
23 Grace Akello, MP, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
24 Albeit the Buganda parliamentary association includes non-Baganda MPs from the region (Sam Kuteesa and Israel 
Kayonde, for instance, are both Banyankole), the members’ focus is in fact on ethnicity. This would contradict the Movement 
credo concerning political groupings, as expressed, for example, in the constitutional provisions stating that, in case of a shift 
to multiparty politics, “membership of a political party shall not be based on sex, ethnicity, religion, or other sectional 
divisions” (Art 71, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda, 1995).
25 New Vision (Kampala, 2 September 1994) and The Monitor (Kampala, 10 July 1999).
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on everything, every time. Yes, they do aggregate the different ideas. They mediate. If you 
wait to speak in parliament you would never speak! Fortunately, you can do it in the
caucuses”26.
“Caucuses are very useful. They take stances.... When there is an issue and a caucus has an 
interest in it, it generally gets more serious. Even whether they are effective, depends on the 
issues. There are some issues that caucuses don’t even discuss. But on issues where 
caucuses take a position, they do have an influence”27.
Parliamentary caucuses Membership
(approx.)
Membership criteria Main objectives
M o v e m e n t  c a u c u s 211 Partisanship Support for government policies
Y o u n g  P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  
A s s o c ia t io n
93 A ge/
Parliamentary experience
Lobbying for positions 
Constituency activities 
Anti-corruption campaign
U g a n d a  W o m e n  
P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  A s s o c ia t io n
51 Gender Women s rights
B u g a n d a  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
A s s o c i a t i o n
78 Ethnicity / Region Land
Traditional institutions
A c h o l i  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
G r o u p
12 Ethnicity / Region Customary institutions 
Security from rebels
P a l l i s a 4 District Resources for the district
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  P a s t o r a l i s t s  
A s s o c ia t io n
n.a. Productive activity 
of the constituency
Pastoralists’ interests
Table 7.1: Parliamentary caucuses: membership and main objectives
Table 7.1 exemplifies the size, the membership criteria and the objectives of these 
semi-organised parliamentary networks. In addition to inquiring into the above three aspects, 
the following analysis o f Uganda’s caucuses will also concentrate on elements such as: the 
frequency and regularity o f caucus meetings; the type and latitude of the issues addressed; the 
representation and/or consultation links with specific constituencies; the involvement in so- 
called ‘developmental’ activities; the capacity to provide policy information to their members;
26 Elly Karuhanga, MP, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
2 Sam Lyomoki, MP, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
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the influence on policy formulation and policy-making; and the effective lobbying and impact 
of caucuses on the voting decisions of MPs.
The Movement caucus
Since the presence of an informally co-ordinated grouping in the Constituent 
Assembly had “proved to be a good experience, ... the initiative was prompted by the 
President’s High Command”28 (or, in a slightly different version, by a ‘pressure group’ of 
MPs close to Museveni29) to set up a more stable caucus in the parliament that was elected in 
1996. The more or less explicit need was “to bring order in parliamentary activities ... to 
understand and make clear what is our position and what is the government position, and to 
see whether there is any discrepancy between the two”30.
The caucus remained entirely informal, and there is no mention of it among the 
organs established by the 1997 Movement Act. The parliamentary association initially 
consisted of about 90 MPs (all women district representatives31 and one member elected by 
parliamentarians originating from the same district), but it was then expanded, in 1998, to 
include all members of parliament willing to join it:
“now the idea is that we should all go to the Movement caucus, disbanding sub-groups and 
the idea that some [among pro-Movement MPs] are more ‘movementist’ than others! This 
thing of having the full Movement caucus comes from above, from the President - I’m sure.
After the censure votes. They let us know, somehow. You hear it  And it also appeared in 
the papers, that the caucus wanted full meetings”32.
Because of the all-inclusive membership of the Movement, every parliamentarian is 
formally a legitimate member of the caucus. Brushing aside the theory of Movement politics, 
however, the chairman of the caucus provides the precise and commonly-held figure of 211 
effective members. This implies that the notion of who belongs to the caucus -  and who does 
not -  is quite clear and demarcated. Thus, multipartist MPs have systematically attacked the 
caucus as illegal, since, by law, every Ugandan is meant to be a member of the Movement. On 
the other hand, because membership cannot be formally restricted, even an outspoken
28 Gilbert Bukenya, MP, chairman of the Movement parliamentary caucus, interview (Kampala, 2 July 1999).
29 Karuhanga, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
30 Karuhanga, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
31 As pointed out, in addition to MPs that are directly elected through single-member constituencies, every district also 
chooses a ‘women representative’ MP through an electoral college made of selected members of the district’s local 
government bodies.
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multipartist such as Norbert Mao could show up and attend an important meeting of the 
Movement caucus33.
Like the parliamentary group of any government under multiparty politics, the 
caucus mediates among three sides, i.e. the executive, the Movement extra-parliamentary 
organisation and the activity of supportive MPs:
“we are closely linked to the chairman of the Movement as well as to the Secretariat.
Although in the day-to-day business we are independent from them ... we examine the 
government: whether it is performing according to the principles of the Movement... It is a 
matter of harmonisation of the Movement policies in parliament”34.
The above statement would somehow fit the normal working of most representative 
assemblies. But professor Gilbert Bukenya (chairman of the caucus) and staunch movementist 
and minister Mondo Kagonyera, provide straightforward explanations of the rationale behind 
the creation of the caucus. They explicitly link it to the detrimental situation of an ‘individual 
merit’, atomised parliament:
“everywhere in the world, aside from parliamentary activities, politicians need to meet 
informally. It’s a consensus-building caucus. Although we have individual merit, individual 
politics then need to come together - you know it very well - to reach group consensus. I 
see it as a filter and a refiner of possible policies before they come to the House. This is a 
young democracy. If people were to see the very leadership conflicting, they would be 
scared ... Politics is a game of solving problems, if you do it in public you are finished ...
Then we vote on the issues we have been discussing. I call it a ‘consensus vote’: I have 
directed the caucus in building consensus. You know, when it ends up divided, with two 
positions and two groups that are not reconciled, I don’t take it as a good caucus”35.
“We can’t afford just to go on the Floor of parliament and create problems with each other, 
wash our dirty linen in public! So, when controversial issues arise, we have to discuss them 
in the caucus. It is usually the very politically-charged and controversial issues ... We are 
not a bunch of undisciplined people!”36.
On the other hand, a similar forum does not only serve the concerns of the 
leadership. The caucus performs a very clear function from the point of view of the MPs as
32 Arthur Bagunywa, MP, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
33 New Vision (Kampala, 4 November 1999).
34 Bukenya, interview (Kampala, 2 July 1999).
35 Bukenya, interview (Kampala, 2 July 1999).
36 Mondo Kagonyera, MP and Minister of State at the Office of the Prime M i n i s t e r , interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
160
The parliamentary politics of \no-partism ’
well. While it does not circulate written documentation, the speeches and debates that are 
presented provide important information to MPs who would otherwise be left to their own 
efforts:
“I have also been going to the Movement caucus. At first I didn't. But then a friend told 
me: ‘how are you going to know what's going on in the Movement and in parliament?’.
And 1 decided it was reasonable to attend”37.
“The caucus is good. It's always an eye opener. You get to know in depth. People 
brainstorm and it helps you getting the true picture, the government position, and the way 
the debate will go”38.
The government has repeatedly tried to steer the activities of the Movement caucus 
and exert control over parliament, both through the Secretariat and through direct presidential 
involvement. Ministers and, at times, the president himself have turned up at the caucus 
meetings to explain their positions and make clear what they expect from the members: “to 
ensure support on the matter ... we are encouraged to be active in the debate to persuade the 
House”39. In the scornful words that multipartist MPs use to describe it, the Movement caucus 
“is just a forum to influence spineless MPs, for bulldozing them to support the government 
position. An instrument of the president”40, “trying to push, to get involved and manipulate 
parliament”41.
Attendance to the more or less monthly meetings of the caucus fluctuates and largely 
depends on the issues on the table, with full participation when Museveni himself addresses 
the forum. But it is especially “where the multipartists have an interest, and we need to find a 
common position, then we have to meet”42:
“at times the agenda is stated, you find a copy in your pigeonhole that tells you when the 
meeting is and, occasionally, also what the issues are. At times the agenda is only 
communicated at the meetings. But what is common is that there is usually a background of 
national public debate. ... It's the chairman who points out the position of the Movement, 
and sets the agenda, after consulting with the highest political organs in the Movement. The 
outcome is almost anticipated. They brief you, give you the background and try to persuade
37 Bagunywa, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
38 Hellen Amongin Aporu, MP, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
39 Peter Logiro Ngorok, MP, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
40 Norbert Mao, MP, interview (Kampala, 7 June 1999).
41 Lyomoky, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
42 Logiro Ngorok, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
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the members. Yes, it’s very top-down. Though sometimes members react, there is 
discussion and we might not agree”43.
The latter statement points at the core problem of the caucus strategy: despite its top- 
down arrangements and all the spin, what if members cannot sort out their differences and 
disagreements in the caucus? This is a point we shall soon come back to.
The multipartists and the decision to go individual
The National Caucus for Democracy that was formed in the CA counted over 70 
members. Compared to such a figure, the parliament that was subsequently elected certainly 
saw a decline in the number of multipartists. But the question of how many multipartist MPs 
are to be found in the assembly is not easy to answer. The names of some twenty prominent 
multipartists -  mostly vocal and influential MPs -  are well known to Ugandans. But 
multipartism enjoys sympathies among a much larger spectrum of parliamentarians then sheer 
numbers would tell. Indeed, between key multipartist figures and fully-fledged movementists 
there is a significant grey area that includes low-profile multipartists, ‘independents’, and 
unenthusiastic or critical movementists. Thus, “there’s an increasing number of MPs 
somehow moving to the multipartists”44, and the most optimistic estimates reach the figure of 
about 50 to 70 elected representatives in the House. Similar estimates, however, depend on 
the extent to which being critical of the Movement is equated to being a multiparty supporter.
It is this uncertain boundary that allegedly convinced the multipartists in the new 
parliament to avoid the formation of a formal association. Retaining a maximum degree of 
fluidity and openness was meant to encourage independent-minded colleagues to join forces 
on specific issues where common positions could be found:
“as far as I know, there are about 12 multipartists. Then, others might not speak out. But 
multipartists don’t have a caucus. We may set up one, but it doesn’t exist. We didn’t want 
to be provocative: this is not a multiparty democracy. But now that the Movement has one, 
we might form it. Generally we hold meetings with those outside also. To organise for 
election, to raise money. But it’s all up to those who want to volunteer to come: there is no 
formal or regular arrangement”43.
43 Logiro Ngorok, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
44 Nsubuga Mayanja, MP, interview (Kampala, 31 May 1999).
45 Mao, interview (Kampala, 7 June 1999).
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“There is no multipartist caucus. We don't need it. We are running this parliament by the 
force of our arguments. We are only 23 or 25, a small fraction of MPs. But the ideas come 
from us, as a core group in parliament. ... We learnt from the Constituent Assembly. If we 
had a caucus they would try to infiltrate it and, once they knew our position, they would 
meet and agree how to defeat it  It’s better this way, to be free agents. We don’t need 
formal meetings. It’s just one-to-one exchanges. We know what we want, and we all want 
and say the same thing”46.
There is an element of truth in these claims. Whether good or bad, the battle fought 
by multipartists is a straightforward one -  probably clearer, for example, than what 
‘movementists’ stand for -  and one whose terms had been largely spelt out during the 
Constituent Assembly. Once the constitution had been approved, and political parties had 
been confined to their current marginal position, there may have been much less to discuss 
together and much more to divide their camp. In addition, it could be argued, the absence of 
any real chances to get to power -  i.e. the lack of effective political competition -  diminished 
the urgency of group discipline47.
The multipartists thus gather only on a very irregular and ad hoc basis. They ‘know 
who they are’ and any of them can convene a meeting. Indeed, it was when, in late 1998, the 
Political Organisations Bill was tabled and the common struggle for multipartism re- 
emerged, that a slightly less irregular forum was convened. But this was an extra- 
parliamentary (and short-lived) coalition that brought together parties and pro-partism MPs: 
“what we have created just recently - three months back - is a multiparty caucus outside 
parliament, with DP, UPC, TFM and CP. We have already held four meetings at parliament, 
although some people such as Ssemogerere and Lubega also come from outside”48.
The Young Parliamentarians Association (YPA)
A most revealing case of autonomous organisation on the part of MPs is the Young 
Parliamentarians Association (YPA). The association is both a potential surrogate for the 
electoral party, for it largely concentrates on promoting the image of MPs in their own 
constituencies, and also has a significant impact on parliamentary politics. Indeed, “many are
46 Nyai, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
47 Cf. Bowler -  Farrell -  Katz (1999:13).
48 Juliet Rainer Kafire, MP, interview (Kampala, 15 June 1999).
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calling for it to be transformed into a political party”49. Talks or fears of a similar 
development, when the time will come, are commonly heard.
The YPA emerged at the very outset of the new parliament, in October 1996, on the 
initiative of a young generation of committed MPs (including Onyango Kakoba and Patrick 
Kiggundu, Salamu Musumba and Lt. James Kinobe):
“we were strangers when we first came here, and parliament had no structure whatsoever 
for any kind of, say, ‘induction’, to learn what parliament is and how it works. We were 
new, and, as we got here, we were in the dark. We thought that with a caucus we would be 
able to support ourselves in understanding how things work and in taking part to the 
legislative activities of parliament”50.
As much as the YPA reflected the alleged concern, on the part of young or first-time 
MPs, of ‘being left out’, it also revealed a more disenchanted attempt to maximise the 
members’ leverage as a pressure group:
“it was aimed at strengthening the position of the new members of parliament. You, know, 
there’s a tendency in politics by which young politicians are usually marginalised and have 
little influence. ‘Young parliamentarians’ refers not only to age, but also to political 
experience. You have some who are not really young, but who are new to parliament. And 
there are also some members who were already in the House, but who are still young in 
age, so they are included”51.
On the basis of these two qualification criteria -  age and parliamentary experience -  
the association enrolled 93 members. The caucus plenary meets more or less every two-to- 
three months, whereas a nine-person executive keeps in touch regularly and holds fortnightly 
meetings. The Young Parliamentarians constitute one of the most formalised and structured 
among Uganda’s parliamentary caucuses. They are registered both within parliament and with 
the Registrar, and their statute specifies membership requirements and fees as well as 
positions in the internal executive. The fact that the managing body includes the figure of a 
‘development co-ordinator’ is quite telling. In fact, a significant part of the activities of YPA 
are devoted to the mobilisation of electoral constituencies for ‘developmental’ activities:
49 Med Sozi Kaggwa, MP, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999).
50 Salamu Musumba, MP, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
51 Onyango Kakoba, MP, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
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“[initially,] it was started to avoid the marginalisation of young MPs, but then we realised 
we had to come together for development So we established a contribution of Shs. 100,000 
[ $ 6 0 ]  per month from each MP. This money is pooled together and then they are used as a 
development fund. Normally, during our fundraising activities, YPA puts a minimum of 
Shs. 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  per constituency each year. Then, when we cannot organise the fundraising, 
we give the money to the MP who makes sure that it reaches the constituency”52.
In lowly-developed African countries, the assessment of a parliamentarian’s 
performance by his constituents can be highly dependent upon his capacity to initiate local 
activities and to attract resources from the centre53. Thus, regardless of the developmental 
merits of a similar initiative, the arrangement no doubt helps parliamentarians in building and 
promoting their personal image in the constituency. The fees that MPs have imposed upon 
themselves are, by Ugandan standards, quite high, and few of them would disburse such 
money if the benefits involved were not so clearly superior to the costs that members have to 
meet54:
“the problem is that the system is now very expensive, even financially, as you are left 
alone to mind your constituency. There's no party which tells you ‘You have to do this, you 
have to do that’55.
Given that parliamentarians might not be able to rely upon political parties and their 
networks for future electoral campaigns, building a positive personal image is all the more 
relevant for a sitting MP. ‘Political’ initiatives or events such as a constituency visit by a 
group of prominent personalities -  something that the YPA frequently organises -  can project 
a favourable light on the local representative. In this sense, the YPA is only a group of MPs 
who pool and co-ordinate the use of scarce and dispersed resources ‘to support each other’. 
The single-member-constituency system ensures that the MPs involved will not be running 
against each other, which is why they can associate in a ‘cartel’ of sitting parliamentarians all 
looking forward to getting a new mandate:
“they even pay subscription fees of Shs. 100,000 per year, and they have ‘development 
fund’ - for work in the constituencies - in which they pay another Shs. 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  per month.
You know, here we don’t have political parties, so M Ps need to team up with each other.
52 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
53 Barkan -  Okumu (1980).
54 As Strom (2000:181) observes with regard to political parties, “it is not sufficient that parties perform some political 
function if the benefits of this function are not worth the costs to those who sustain the party”.
55 George Wambuzi, MP, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
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An MP writes to ask for funding for some project - such as to support a school - or for 
fundraising to promote some community activities, and MPs contribute this in excess of the 
monthly contribution”56.
While the association was initially meant as an effort to avoid the marginalisation of 
young MPs and to organise them for constituency-oriented initiatives, an increasing 
awareness of its relative strength pushed the YPA towards a more forward approach to 
parliamentary politics:
“we realised we were also coming to play a crucial role in parliament.... And YPA mixes 
multipartists and movementists, which is a basic advantage over other groups. To most 
people the generation aspect is more relevant than other partisan affiliations. ... I identify 
much more easily on the basis of my generation rather than of the Movement's history or 
ideology”57.
“Although YPA were initially basically a Movement organ, then many youth have become 
frustrated and are now moving closer to multipartists. Now YPA is probably in-between 
Movement and multipartists, and it has become more and more influential. The Movement 
cannot dictate to them. ... they mobilise extremely well on a person-to-person basis, and 
they are also very influential and popular with the media”58.
As a matter of fact, the YPA is possibly the sole non-party organisation that enjoys 
some respect among leading multipartists -  the like of Ben Wacha, Dick Nyai or Norbert Mao 
-  who do subscribe to the association. But the strong public image of the Young 
Parliamentarians goes beyond that. The media, for example, have been sensible to their 
crusade against corruption and quite supportive of it. In addition, the YPA have occasionally 
joined forces with other ‘progressive’ and independent pressure groups, such as the Uganda 
Land Alliance and The Free Movement. Contacts have allegedly been established with the 
international community as well, including UNDP, Danida, the British High Commission and, 
especially, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). The latter was eager to find alternative 
partners after it cut links with the UPC. A relatively close and regular contact was thus 
established with the YPA, largely aimed at funding the organisation of extra-parliamentary 
seminars that deal with supposedly content-neutral issues, such as governance and 
transparency:
56 Lt. James Kinobe, MP and secretary of the Movement parliamentary caucus, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
57 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
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“the majority of YPA members are Movement, but we still make proposals to improve the 
Movement system. For example to improve participation, or the electoral system, or the 
management of the affairs of the state. For instance, on the issue of how do we have a real 
democracy in a one-party, or, well [laughs], a no-party system”59.
The case of the Young Parliamentarians is most interesting for the incremental spill­
over effect that the original organisation produced. The latter was bom to prevent the 
sidelining of young MPs, but it soon moved on to promoting constituency-based collective 
activities, and it finally engaged in a more active role in parliamentary politics. As pointed 
out, a key question concerns whether such an arrangement could at some point be turned into 
a political party:
“I think it would be difficult to retain all the people while transforming into a party. Even if 
the Movement were to do so, it would face the same problem. There are people who are
there because they believe in that, and if you change the aims of an arrangement or 
organisation, many would simply leave”60.
Museveni’s tolerance, which was already strained when the YPA independently 
decided to propose Maj. John Kazoora for the crucial position of National Political 
Commissar, may reach its limit if the association were to be transformed into something 
different61. But an even greater obstacle would be the conversion of an elitist and exclusive 
club of parliamentarians into a nation-wide political organisation capable of gaining 
significant support among the electorate. “I wouldn’t commit myself to transform it into a 
political party, for the time being. You know, by the time you reach it, the bridge may no 
longer be there...!”62. If time only will tell which developments await the YPA, what is
currently relevant is the impact that the association presently bears upon the behaviour of its
members within the assembly, something to which we will return.
The ethnically-based caucuses
A further set of somewhat structured groupings which materialised in the 1996-2001 
parliament consists of the ethnic community-based caucuses. Most MPs nominally belong to
58 Mayanja, MP, interview (Kampala, 31 May 1999).
59 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
60 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
61 Nyai, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
62 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
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a parliamentary group made up of representatives elected in a same ‘historical’ area of the 
country (a past political or administrative entity, in turn based on a supposedly homogeneous 
ethnic identity). This is in spite of the fact that such areas are currently divided into different 
administrative districts (Busoga, for example, consists of Iganga, Jinja and Kamuli districts; 
the Acholi people are split between Gulu and Kitgum; former Ankole comprises Mbarara, 
Bushenyi and Ntungamo, etc.).
Ironically, these caucuses run counter to Museveni’s assumptions in two senses. 
First, because they were set up as organised arrangements within a supposedly individualised 
parliament. Secondly, because this was done on the basis of the very ‘organisational 
principle’ on which Museveni declared war, namely ethnicity.
Although these caucuses certainly give expression to very relevant identities and 
common concerns, some MPs observe that “they are not strong, it’s rather to give a feeling of 
belonging: they are just tribalistic things”63. Others wholly condemn the underlying idea: “a 
caucus should be larger than tribal... these are just ethnic groups, not really caucuses”64.
On occasions, however, community caucuses may come to play a role on matters that 
do not appear to be immediately related to any specific ethno-regional area. When the local 
government reform was tabled, for example, “parliamentarians [were] busy forming caucuses 
to map out common positions on the controversial Article 108 of the Local Government BilT\ 
which required O-level qualifications for candidates to sub-county chairmanships. Some MPs 
worked out their positions on the issue through local caucuses such as the Mbale group 
(which reportedly rejected the controversial provision) and the Acholi Parliamentary Group 
(which largely accepted it)65.
Community caucuses, however, primarily organise around locally-defined and 
locally-relevant issues. To this kind of group or area advocacy in parliament, the Buganda 
Parliamentary Association adds constituency-based concerns, with a fund for ‘development’ 
activities that operates along the lines of the Young Parliamentarians’. With 78 members 
(including representatives of the army in parliament), Buganda’s is not only the largest among 
these groupings but, on paper, a numerically powerful parliamentary force.
In spite of the very significant membership that some of the community caucuses 
have, however, their actual effectiveness and impact on Ugandan politics has been relatively
63 Wandera Ogalo, MP and chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, interview 
(Kampala, 14 June 1999).
Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 11 June 1999).
65 The Monitor (Kampala), 7 February 1997, p.24.
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modest. The internal cohesion of these groups is considerably constrained by the ideological 
differences that divide their members:
“well, we do meet when we need to, as for the land issue. Probably every two months, but 
it’s only recently that they’ve met once a month, with the questions of the Kabaka’s 
wedding or palace to be discussed. Cultural issues. Otherwise, I don’t think we really have 
a common position. So we try to avoid political issues, for we would not agree: there’s 
movementists, federalists, multipartists and so on. The only thing that holds us together is 
the Kabakaship as a political institution - although it’s difficult to draw the line between 
political and cultural roles - all of the 73 believe in it. But out of 73 members, you are lucky 
if you get 15 who come to a meeting. It’s mainly for lack of support, and lack of a common 
position. There is a main divide between movementists and non-movementists”66.
The Acholi Parliamentary Group seems to face similar dilemmas. The security 
problem was an issue on which the twelve Acholi MPs could easily find common ground (as 
they also did on the related questions of cattle restocking, compensations for lost properties, 
and general economic development). On the issue, they manoeuvred quite effectively and 
lobbied jointly the president, parliament and foreign representatives, until an Amnesty Bill for 
the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army was tabled and passed in the second half of 1999. 
Similarly, they also acted collectively for the recognition and protection of customary land 
tenure - the predominant tenure arrangement in Acholi - when land reform was discussed. On 
the other hand, the politically-charged issues at the core of the national political discourse 
were deliberately avoided, as it was made clear during a joint consultative tour by Gulu and 
Kitgum district MPs. In the words of the Democratic Party vice-president and MP Zachary 
Olum: “we have no common position on the referendum and the party bills. I’m a renowned 
multipartist while my colleague Pen Mogi is a Movement supporter. We don’t want to send 
wrong signals to the people that once you don’t agree on an issue, you can’t agree on 
others”67.
The Uganda Women Parliamentarians Association (UWPA)
The gender issue became prominent in Uganda after the NRM took power. Ever 
since, the country’s political scene has seen different women gaining significant influence,
66 Bagunywa, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
67 The Monitor (Kampala, 19 May 1999, p.9).
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from Winnie Byanyima to Cecilia Ogwal, to Miriam Matembe. Indeed, a woman also holds 
what is formally the second highest political office in the country, i.e. the vice-Presidency.
The recognition and improvement of women’s status in Ugandan politics has been 
instrumental to and largely guided by Museveni himself. Introduced in 1989, the whole 
“affirmative action policy did not emerge directly from the struggle and demands of women’s 
grassroots organisations. Rather, it was imposed from above for reasons having more to do 
with political manoeuvring than a genuine commitment to women’s rights”68. All the same, 
however, such policy came to be protected by constitutional and legislative measures.
As a result of the NRM’s favourable stances, both the 50 woman delegates to the 
Constituent Assembly and the 51 woman MPs have played quite a visible and significant role. 
It was especially during the CA that women became influential. This was a critical time for 
guaranteeing an overall protection of women’s position and interests, traditionally 
marginalised in the Ugandan society. Aware of the crucial moment, women mobilised quite 
successfully and provided a gender input for a number of constitutional provisions, ranging 
from property rights to political representation. Workshops, dissemination of information, and 
lobbying male colleagues were thoroughly pursued by female delegates. And “how were the 
token female CADs [Constituent Assembly delegates] able to make such monumental 
achievements in an assembly as skewed as the CA? ... The answer is caucusing”69.
Building on the experience in the CA, women MPs organised in the Uganda Women 
Parliamentarians Association (UWPA) in the 1996 parliament. The caucus occasionally 
includes members of parliament representing other marginalised groups -  such as people with 
disabilities, workers, and youth -  under the label of Special Interests Groups Caucus. The 
arrangement enables these diverse groupings to gather together their small numbers and trade 
their reciprocal support.
In addition, the women’s parliamentary group has close links with extra­
parliamentary organisations such as the Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE), the 
National Association of Women’s Organisations in Uganda (NAWOU), the Uganda 
Women’s Network (UWONET) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. These contacts were 
instrumental to finance and organise workshops where women MPs, for example, could 
acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to fully understand and influence parliamentary 
debates on political and economic issues70.
68 Tamale (1999:91). The first affirmative measures actually date back to 1987, when the system of the Resistance Councils 
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Exemplary achievements on the part of UWPA include the amendment of the Local 
Government Act (1997) to provide for reserved seats for women, and the adoption by the 
government of a National Gender Policy71. On the land issue as well, women mobilised quite 
effectively (see Chapter Eight). Finally, while it is not easy to relate this to the activities of 
UWPA, after being reserved affirmative action parliamentary and local council seats, women 
also obtained several ministerial positions.
Similarly to the case of the community caucuses, however, the limit to the 
manoeuvres of UWPA is also set by the need to bridge over political differences, so that 
“avoiding divisive issues is vital to its success”72. The high points that women scored during 
the Constituent Assembly probably marked the peak of their accomplishment, their highest 
achievement. After that, their role and effectiveness as a group was somewhat diminished. 
The partial loss of thrust of women’s parliamentary action led to a call for the ‘revitalisation’ 
and ‘reconstitution’ of UWPA73.
Aligning the vote: independence and discipline among MPs
Parliamentary groups become relevant to Ugandan politics to the extent that they can 
actually articulate specific positions on political issues, put these positions forward in the 
course of legislative debates, and back them in the assembly. A key feature of the country’s 
parliamentary life, however, is a virtual lack of direct sanctions for caucuses to make sure that 
individual MPs stick to and back the group’s line on particular bills or motions. The absence 
of binding sanctions is both an aim and a consequence of individual-merit or no-party politics. 
Uganda’s arrangements compare strikingly, for example, with the multiparty set up adopted 
by South Africans in their transition to democracy, between 1994 and 1999. In South Africa, 
political parties were strengthened by ‘anti-defection’ constitutional provisions that prevented 
parliamentarians from neglecting party directives when voting in the assembly. Anyone who 
did it would be expelled from his party, which would automatically cause him to lose his 
parliamentary seat. As a result, South African party organisations had complete control over 
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National Congress government, at least for its first year in power, developed a parliamentary 
practice of passing legislation without even holding a vote74.
In Uganda, the question is whether and to what extent parliamentary caucuses that 
lack direct disciplinary instruments can make use of indirect ways of shaping or influencing 
the vote. What are the specific mechanisms that have been developed for this purpose? Do the 
caucus arrangements succeed in exerting persuasion — or even control — over the voting 
behaviour of their affiliates? In assessing the presence of voting discipline in the House, the 
fact that a roll-call analysis could not be carried out must be kept in mind as an important 
limitation of the inquiry. An analysis of the votes cast by each parliamentarian on specific 
issues could not be conducted because: a) a precise mapping of the caucus affiliations of 
Ugandan MPs is not available, b) multiple membership (i.e. MPs belonging to different 
caucuses) would make the exercise extremely complex, c) roll call records were not 
available75.
The Movement caucus and available sanctions
Parliamentarians show a great deal of variation in their assessment of how effective 
the Movement is in using the caucus to secure cohesion among its supporters in the assembly. 
Such an assessment is complicated by two factors that have partly reduced the importance of 
discipline in the sixth parliament and contributed to disguise defections: the size of the pro- 
Movement parliamentary majority, and its unclear organisational boundaries. In practice, 
neither it is necessary for the Movement to have the backing of all its declared supporters to 
ensure that a specific bill or resolution is passed, nor is a straightforward identification of 
defectors easy to carry out where group divisions remain so loose.
The Movement caucus is widely (though not unanimously) held to be the most 
influential of all parliamentary associations. This is largely because of its size, both in
74 Most of South Africa’s anti-defection clauses were only in place between 1994-1999 and were then dropped with the frill
implementation of the country’s ‘final’ constitution. See Carbone (2001) for a discussion of the role of parties in the South 
African transition. Curiously, in case Uganda shifted to multipartism, similar ‘anti-defection’ provisions would come into 
effect (see article 83.(lXgy(h) and (2), Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995) to try to avoid the migration of 
opposition MPs to the ruling group that occurred so often in the past 
The outcome of most parliamentary votes is ‘assessed’ by the Speaker without any precise counting taking place (also 
implying that no names are recorded): “when the question has been put by the Speaker ... the votes shall be taken by voices 
of ‘Ayes’ and ‘No’ and the result shall be declared by the Speaker”. A division may be ordered either by the Speaker “in his 
or her discretion”, or if, after a result is declared, forty or more members “stand in their places signifying their disapproval”. 
In either case, “the Speaker ... shall direct the ‘Ayes’ into the lobby on his or her right and the ‘Noes’ into the lobby on his or 
her left and appoint two tellers for each lobby to count the votes”, but only the names of members who abstain would be 
recorded. Secret voting is adopted for constitutional amendments, for the election or removal of individuals holding 
constitutional offices, and for any other matter “if the House so decides” (art. 73, 76-77, Rules of Procedure of the 
Parliament of Uganda).
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absolute terms and when compared to other groups. To some degree, however, its relative 
strength is also due to the kind, extent and effectiveness of the pressures that it can bring to 
bear upon its members. Informal pressures and kickbacks are available and frequently used to 
obtain compliance and ensure support for the official line. As a leading movementist put it, 
“there’s no power to whip, although informally we do prevail on people”76. Museveni’s use of 
the caucus to hastily push a new Referendum Bill 2000 through and thus pre-empt a 
constitutional crisis prompted a commentator to note that “there is now a real likelihood that 
the unconstitutional, undefined, secretive and unaccountable Movement caucus is to 
increasingly assume the role of Parliament”77. In a surprisingly candid fashion, the chairman 
of the caucus explains how the Movement exerts its control over its MPs and how it is 
planning to tighten it:
“in fact, when people come to a consensus and you belong to that ideological group, you 
tend to stick to it. A party can discipline, if you behave badly. And, indirectly, we do it too.
Yes, for example, through assistance at the next election. People don’t want to lose their 
belonging to a certain group. We’ve introduced new rules, a ‘Code of conduct’ that was 
approved by the last NBC. It includes a ‘Leadership code’: how you should behave.
Otherwise, you can be thrown out, marginalised - although this is not done formally”78.
Ugandan elections are formally fought on a non-partisan basis. Nevertheless, the fear 
of having to run, in practice, against the informal pressures and without the financial support 
of the Movement, can be a further, powerful reason for an MP to comply with directives 
coming from above:
“you know, if you want to be re-elected you might have a lot of opposition orchestrated, 
engineered by the authorities - for example through the Resident District Commissioners - 
projecting a bad image. Other than that, there is not much else. People can be sponsored 
against you, or you would be left out of an eventual financial support”79.
Promises of financial or political backing for future elections and immediate material 
rewards can be particularly effective in a context where poverty is widespread, democratic 
practices are young, and alternative organisations are few:
76 Kagonyera, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
77 New Vision (Kampala, 10 June 2000, p.25).
78 Bukenya, interview (Kampala, 2 July 1999).
79 Logiro Ngorok, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
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“although there is no evidence, they have some ways of putting pressure to control their 
MPs. It’s mainly patronage: appointments as ministers, or when you have Moses Kigongo 
[the vice-chairman of the Movement] who distributes money to some key members of the 
caucus”80.
“The government do have instruments to tiy to control voting within parliament They 
blackmail you. They tell you: ‘what did you say? you cannot say that and that! If you want 
to have any chance of becoming a minister...’”81.
“[The caucus and voting are] a voluntary thing. Though I heard of some quiet distributions.
Two or three times parliament changed its position”82.
Ministerial appointments, money, businesses and travels abroad are among the perks 
allegedly employed to induce MPs into supporting certain positions:
“well, of course, there is always patronage. For example, in the business in the House, such 
as trips abroad to international forums, in the programmes for international exposure: you 
might not get them. There are complaints that some people go more often than others. It’s 
the speaker who decides”83.
“At times we even meet on developmental issues, on the development of our 
constituencies. For example, the donors can come to the Movement caucus to make sure 
they distribute their funds broadly over the districts. So that then the Minister can have 
support when he goes to the House proposing a specific distribution”84.
In the run up to the June 2000 referendum, for example, some MPs confirmed that 
between Shs.500,000 and Shs.lm (i.e. $300-$600) had been dished out to Movement MPs by 
the National Referendum Committee through the caucus. Such money was officially 
distributed for ‘facilitation’ activities in the local-level referendum committees. But it was 
only handed to ‘active Movement supporters’ and to members who regularly attended the 
caucus, “with some MPs being referred to Bukenya [the caucus chairman] for clearance”85. 
Rather than being mere tools of the caucus, these instruments are actually employed in a 
triangular interaction between the government, the caucus and the extra-parliamentary 
Movement organisation or Secretariat.
80 Lyomoki, interview (Kampala, S June 1999).
81 An MP who wished this comment to remain anonymous.
82 Ogalo, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
83 Logiro Ngorok, pro-Movement MP, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
84 Amongin Aporu, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
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Even after taking the initiative for the formation of the caucus, however, the 
executive has not always managed to be consistently in command of its members. Museveni 
let it be known that he would not tolerate any Movement leaders or ministers taking positions 
different from the official line86. But the question of sanctions for other ‘errant members’ 
remains to some extent unanswered. Much, for example, depends on the method of voting 
which, on a case-by-case basis, is adopted by the House. In those rare instances when voting 
is secret, “the opposition numbers swell”87. This may explain why, since the time of the 
Constituent Assembly, the ‘division lobby’ method has been prevalent. Such a manner of 
voting implies a lack of privacy which has been heavily criticised, as it tends to create 
situations whereby “people are being cajoled or coerced to vote ... against their conscience ... 
delegates say ‘I agree with you ... but I can’t afford to be identified with you’”88. At least as 
relevant to the way MPs vote is, of course, the particular matter that is being debated. 
According to some, the “caucus is very effective on voting when issues are not controversial, 
that is, when there is consensus in the caucus”89! This would imply that, while the caucus can 
be a relevant discussion and information gathering forum, it does not really affect how MPs 
vote in the House but only acts as a ‘conditionally active’ coalition: “when we don’t agree, 
people would go their own way”90 without necessarily buying the government’s line.
“The president calls them to strategize ... They tiy to stick together, when voting. But it’s 
one thing to say ‘We shall do this’, quite another thing to actually vote that way. Many just 
want to listen the debate, but they can be persuaded otherwise”91.
The House records include numerous instances in which members of the caucus 
ended up splitting their vote. Among such cases are, for example, the by-election of the 
parliamentary speaker (where several movementists decided to support multipartist Ben 
Wacha92); the rejection of the ministerial appointment of the president’s brother Salim Saleh,
85 New Vision (Kampala, 21 June 2000, p.l).
86 Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister in charge of the Presidency, in New Vision (Kampala, 25 February 1999).
87 Logiro Ngorok, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999).
88 The Monitor (Kampala, 9 September 1994, p.l).
89 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
90 Logiro Ngorok, interview (Kampala, 30 June 1999). The idea that party-based parliamentary majorities may be no more 
than ‘conditional coalitions’ (i.e. they reflect existing agreements among elected delegates, rather than being able to impose 
upon them any decisions taken by the party leadership) has been employed to describe the inner politics of the US House of 
Representatives. See Cox -  McCubbins (1993:5).
91 Juliet Rainer Kafire MP, interview (Kampala, 15 June 1999).
92 In 1998, Francis Ayume became the new Speaker of the House with 152 votes. Multipartist Ben Wacha obtained 94, most 
of which must have come from the Movement side. The importance of the Speaker was evident, for example, when Ayume 
had the 1999 Referendum Bill passed without a quorum. It is unlikely that this would have happened had Wacha been
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who lacked basic educational requirements and was well-known for his ambiguous dealings; 
the censure votes passed on corrupt ministers; and such crucial legislative measures as the 
Land Bill (‘although eventually we changed the bill to find consensus’), the Local 
Government Bill, the Political Organisations Bill and the Referendum Bill. It was these 
‘control failures’ that prompted the Movement to further tightening its grip over its own MPs: 
“they are now proposing to put in some rules for discipline. It comes from the National 
Executive Committee [of the Movement], and it was discussed in the caucus. The idea is that 
we shouldn’t just discuss things on the Floor — and come out as divided — but the Movement 
people should have a common position”93. A number of members, however, rebelled against 
these attempts to dictate to the caucus from above. The caucus chairman, for example, was 
heavily criticised when he ‘consulted with other leaders outside’ parliament about the 
handling of the Col. Kiiza Besigye case (a military officer who wrote an extremely critical 
and controversial paper on the Movement). In the event, the chairman was forced to back 
down by some members who insisted that “the caucus is a loose association, and not a formal 
Movement organ required to take orders from the President”94. Contextually, several members 
also shied away from the formal endorsement of ‘oaths of allegiance’ and ‘codes of conduct’ 
put forward by Movement leaders. These were rejected as “an attempt to bind them to a 
political party of sorts, which has been formed without their knowledge or consultation, 
because one can’t pay allegiance to a system”95, as the Movement is often described.
The multipartists: individual MPs betw een parliament and  the parties
The very idea of somebody ‘controlling’ the vote of multipartists is far from obvious 
and most difficult to frame. By and large, multipartist MPs went to parliament without owing 
allegiance to any organisation. This was both because of the individual-merit principle and 
because the Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress had officially boycotted the 
parliamentary election.
Once in parliament, multipartist MPs could have somehow regrouped, whether along 
party lines or through the formation of a larger and more influential unit comprising 
multipartists of all colours. As a matter of fact, they had already set aside their differences in
elected: as an MP put it, Wacha had “been seconded by ourselves not by any power. His allegiance is clearly to this House 
and not to somebody else”, New Vision (Kampala, 29 July 1998).
93 Wambuzi, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
94 The story of the caucus and its positions on Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye’s case can be found in The Monitor (Kampala, 10 
December 1999).
95 The Monitor (Kampala, 10 December 1999).
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the Constituent Assembly, where the experience of the National Caucus for Democracy 
generally left a positive impression. And they had done the same with the formation of the 
InterPolitical Forces Co-operation during the presidential campaign. Thus, a legacy upon 
which to build further parliamentary co-operation was there, and one would have expected 
some kind of common arrangement to be worked out.
Multipartist MPs, however, allegedly decided that they did not wish to set up a clear 
boundary between them and independent or pro-Movement members of parliament. After all, 
‘we all know what we want’, as one of them put it. Rather than adopting any stable structure, 
multipartists opted for retaining a degree of fluidity that would allow them to lobby, join 
forces and vote along with ‘well-wishers’ -  and vice versa. This was meant to avoid the risk 
that, in the words of a movementist MP, “at times, a multipartist position would be 
systematically defeated, at any cost, even though they have substance”96.
Party-based policy and strategic divisions may have also played a role in preventing 
the formation of a formal parliamentary caucus between DP, UPC and CP members. In 
addition, while several multipartist MPs do hold official positions in the ‘old’ parties, the 
weakness of the latter makes any co-ordination effort rather difficult. As a result, the 
relatively strong impact that multipartists have had on parliamentary life has so far hinged 
very much on individual initiatives. Those few instances of co-ordination that can be found 
generally concern policy initiatives rather than group discipline.
The Young Parliamentarians Association
The motivations behind the creation of the YPA also had to do with the presence of 
divergent views within the Movement camp, the least orthodox of which were looking for 
appropriate channels of expression. The concern was to protect the standpoints taken by 
individual MPs from uncalled-for external interference:
“the 1996 parliamentary election brought in new members of parliament... The president 
still wanted to use the past tactic to talk to members in the Movement caucus. But the 
‘young Turks’ in the Movement (who are mostly YPA, like me, Byaniyma, Musumba and 
so on) thought that some issues on which we were asked to give support to the government 
were either not transparent or needed some improvement That is where the problem 
emerged. For example, on corruption, the methods we wanted to use were different. The 
executive wanted the suspects to be thoroughly investigated by other, existing and
96 Amongin Aporu, interview (Kampala, 28 June 1999).
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‘appropriate’ mechanisms. But these were not being carried out. That is why parliamentary 
investigations began. And that created some frictions”97.
The tensions generated on similar issues by the presence, within parliament, of 
independent-minded individuals with loose or non-existent partisan commitments prompted 
the emergence of the YPA. While partly overlapping in membership with the Movement 
group, the YPA is a new and distinct political entity:
“for example, when there was a proposal by the president for raising the number of 
ministers, we opposed it. It was rejected by parliament. And, there, it was a YPA success 
and a Movement caucus defeat. In any case, the Movement has to come and talk with YPA 
first, as we want to be independent”98.
But the relationship between the Movement caucus and YPA is not merely one of 
division of labour or complementarity:
“most MPs of YPA also belong to the Movement, so there’s no antagonistic relationship.
Though perhaps it might have been so with certain cases of corruption, as the Movement 
caucus includes people in the government”99.
The membership of YPA, which straddles between the multipartist and movementist 
sides, provides the association with the advantage of appealing virtually to the whole 
parliamentary spectrum. Therefore, on top of its formal members, the Young Parliamentarians 
claim the support of at least 50 ‘well-wishers’, MPs who are relatively unbounded by party- 
like affiliations and often lend their support to the YPA:
“normally there’s lobbying, which we see as convincing somebody about the rightness of 
your argument, but it might also be seen as putting pressure on MPs ... When YPA has a 
position there’s a lot of pressure in the way of mobilising for lobbying. Then, one other 
major thing is also public opinion, since we are very engaged in the anti-corruption crusade.
Wc have a lot of backing for that and MPs may want to identify with YPA [i.e. not 
challenge its line] for fear of being misinterpreted as going against such crusade”100.
97 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
98 Salamu Musumba, interview (Kampala, 16 June 1999).
99 Adolf Mwesigye, MP, interview (Kampala, 17 June 1999).
100 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
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On occasions, the association was allegedly able to assemble the necessary majorities 
and influence the outcome of a vote in the House101. The significant influence built up by the 
YPA is largely an accepted fact. Among the alleged benefits of its increased authority are, for 
example, the fact that all key positions within the Movement caucus are occupied by YPA 
people (or is it the other way round?), and that an increasing number of ministerial positions 
was assigned to members of the association102.
The very cross-sectional nature of the YPA, however, also accounts for its 
limitations. Discussions and efforts to work out common positions have been constrained by 
the need not to alienate any of the internal tendencies. Because debates on politically- or 
ideologically-charged issues are mainly avoided, some conclude that “there’s very little 
politics talked about in YPA”103:
“it’s been mostly ‘developmental’ issues. When it comes to controversial parliamentary 
matters it risks dividing members, and so we leave it to individuals ... we don’t take a 
position”104.
“We rarely discuss bills, but we try to influence the parliamentary committees individually.
We can, but I don’t remember a single time when we discussed a bill, nor when we took a 
position on voting. Well, we’ve mobilised for the votes of censure, but it was never 
unanimous. In the end, MPs are totally free to vote as they see fit: there is no whip, it’s 
impossible to ensure to impose the vote”105.
As a result, even in a relatively effective organisation such as the Young 
Parliamentarians Association, a consistent co-ordination of parliamentary initiatives is heavily 
restricted by fears of undermining co-operation in those areas where agreement among 
members can be reached.
What happens to other, minor caucuses is not very different from the above picture. 
Their difficulty in acting cohesively and shaping the vote suggests to conceive the meetings of 
these groups almost exclusively as information gathering forums106, with frequently low 
turnouts that may reveal the doubts that many members hold with regard to the effectiveness 
of having a caucus107.
101 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
102 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
103 Ben Wacha, MP, interview (Kampala, 9 June 1999).
104 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
105 Mao, interview (Kampala, 7 June 1999).
106 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999), with reference to the Buganda Parliamentary Association.
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Organised action in parliament: the balance sheet
A few members of parliament are strongly opposed to the very idea of setting up 
caucuses. The latter are condemned as an inexcusable and dangerous attempt to curtail the 
freedom of MPs and the independence of the House at large. This kind of criticism is 
obviously raised by multipartist members of the assembly, who denounce the executive’s 
endeavour to discriminate among parliamentarians and leave them out of forums where the 
ground for key parliamentary decisions is prepared. But the same point is also made by those 
Movementists who see the caucuses as a betrayal of the original individual-merit principle:
“I don’t belong to any caucus. I don’t believe there’s a need for it  If the constitution says 
that the system is based on individual merit you don’t come here to be whipped into line.
Although, I know that in practice it’s partly different They set up the Movement caucus.
But I don’t attend the meetings of the caucus, I don’t believe in it. Otherwise, we can go 
bade to multipartism”108.
The concern with the manipulative use of parliamentary associations goes beyond the 
Movement caucus, and involves government interference with other groups. As a matter of 
fact, any co-ordinating arrangement that is set up in the House may be instrumentally used by 
the executive to reach out to the MPs and try and put pressure on them:
“many caucuses have been used by the president to meet them and exert influence.
Especially at the beginning, up to 1997. YPA the Movement, the women, even the 
districts. I mean, like the Acholi. You just get a letter from the cleric of parliament that your 
group will meet the president, without any solidtation! Why?! Why should we?!”109.
In spite of all these criticisms, there is no lack of MPs who think that caucuses do not 
detract in any significant way from the members’ capacity to behave in an autonomous way. 
As much as political groups struggle to shape the way members will vote, the bottom line is 
that MPs are formally independent. In the end, they can by and large do what they see fit, 
rather than what they are told. This is evident, the argument goes, in the alleged autonomy of 
the House as a whole as well as of individual MPs. In other words, whatever they do,
107 Bagunywa, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
108 Ogalo, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
109 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 11 June 1999).
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caucuses do not have much of an impact, and parliamentary politics largely remains an 
individualistic affair:
“the proper work of a caucus is for a multiparty situation, where you have to stick to your 
party position. These are loose organisations without any binding rules”110.
“On specific issues, you find individual MPs in the lobby who tell you their position and 
seek your support”111.
“In the House ... you generally don’t know how many people are behind a position”112.
Moreover, although the Movement parliamentary leadership can certainly make use 
of patronage resources -  “they are the party in power, they have all the resources...”113 -  for 
most caucuses “it is a matter of persuasion rather than control”114. There are only weak 
inducements and deterrents that can be employed to enforce a commonly agreed position (if 
and when the latter is achieved). The meetings of most parliamentary associations remain 
quite intermittent and issue-dependent. And a high degree of overlap in membership between 
different caucuses hinders the formation of clear-cut expectations with regard to a 
parliamentarian’s voting behaviour. Thus, an MP’s endeavour to preserve his independence is 
somewhat facilitated by caucus boundaries that are largely crosscutting as well as porous:
“even if whipping is informally there, it’s not effective. You know, you end up sitting in 
different caucuses so that you receive different inputs and pressures, different positions.
And whipping it’s not even by the government, it’s by interest groups. For example the 
Young Parliamentarians Association or the Buganda Parliamentary Association, it is them 
who ask members to vote this or that way. I don’t know whether you can call it whipping.
It’s just a matter of persuasion. You cannot isolate anybody, penalise him because he hasn’t 
stuck to a group’s position. It’s not like parties in Britain”115.
“But in the plenary session no, I don’t think the presence of caucuses appears very clearly.
Many caucuses simply split, people shift positions and vote differently. Or you simply fail 
to get consensus on an issue in the caucus itself!”116.
10 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 11 June 1999).
11 Kaggwa, interview (Kampala, 14 May 1999).
12 Bagunywa, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
13 Omodi Okot, MP, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
14 Lyomoki, interview (Kampala, 8 June 1999).
15 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
16 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
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All this points at a considerable degree of autonomy for MPs, and it also implies that 
the organisation of collective support for specific measures is not easily achieved:
“the drawbacks are lengthy discussions and negotiations by the government to persuade 
MPs for support Though, again, they have no guarantee of succeeding. For example, the 
government privatisation plan met a lot of parliamentary opposition. But parliament is not 
strong enough to create a stalemate as the US Congress might do. Especially on financial 
issues by an immediate shut off, because the government has a right to four months of non­
authorised spending. In practice, it is the government which knows what the budget has to 
be like and must approve it, and thus, for mere lack of information, parliament has not 
much of a say on it”117.
As a matter of fact, there has been an increasing awareness of the need to improve 
collective co-ordination and to devise sanctions for its enforcement. Evidence of this were, for 
example, the creation of the caucuses, the adoption of the Movement’s codes of conduct, the 
collection of caucus membership fees, the conditional disbursement of government money to 
MPs, and so on. The issue of discipline, however, has not fully come to the fore yet for two 
basic reasons. The first one is that, when confronted with the presidency, parliament is still 
too weak to actually cause a deadlock. The weakness of parliament meant that the executive’s 
concern with the discipline of MPs, though visibly increasing, started off from being 
relatively modest. This was evident, for example, during the debate on the army’s 
involvement and dealings in the Congo war. In spite of the fact that there was widespread 
opposition, both at the popular and the parliamentary level, this opposition did not find any 
significant expression, nor it raised any institutional obstacle for the government to prolong 
the war at will. The second reason is that, as with legislative parties in parliamentary systems, 
“party cohesion is a direct function of the degree of competition”"8. But effective competition 
is hardly a feature of Uganda’s hegemonic politics. The multipartist opposition in parliament 
is so small that, even in those instances when the Movement’s ranks split and embarrassing
117 Augustine Ruzmdana, MP, interview (Kampala, 28 April 1999). Given the comparative weakness of information 
networks — also due to the absence of party structures — individual MPs find it useful to rely on the expertise of the 
specialised committees of the House. The lack of a whip system implies that the Movement has little formal input in the 
process of assigning committee membership and chairs: committees are elected by the House from among members who 
submit their names, and no minister can be a member (Robert Law, legal consultant at the Office of the Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Affairs, personal communication, 29 May 2001). Committees thus enjoy quite a good reputation not only 
for careful examination of the issues tabled in parliament but also for their relative independence from external intrusions. 
Their reports and recommendations can be a good indicator of the views of the House as a whole, and they also significantly 
shape the way MPs vote. Because committees have to mediate among different positions, however, they present more or less 
‘technical’ analyses — to the extent that the term can be used with reference to the parliamentary  process. While a 
committee’s work may have important political implications, its role is not to be read as an alternative way of forming voting 
blocs.
118 Golombiewski, quoted in Bowler -  Farrell -  Katz (1999:13).
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situations may emerge, the government is still likely to get away with it. And where a ruling 
group has a large majority and no prospects of an electoral threat, it may simply decide “not 
to enforce discipline where there is no point”119.
Yet, the concern with discipline survives because any governing party needs to 
preserve a minimum of unity to secure retention of power. On those occasions when the 
Movement faced serious challenges on critical issues, it opted for forcing its way through. In 
the case of the Referendum Bill, for example, this was done through a straightforward 
manipulation of parliamentary voting. Because several perplexed movementists avoided 
turning up when the issue was being decided upon, the bill was passed without the required 
quorum120. In addition to the manipulation of rules, the physical and political presence of 
powerful ministers in parliament, which goes against the ideal separation of executive and 
legislative powers of presidential systems, was also instrumental to whip MPs into line. This 
was the case, for instance, when the parliamentary committee failed to have the Political 
Organisations Bill scheduled before the Referendum Bill. Alternatively, ministerial positions 
have been left unfilled for some time after cabinet reshuffles, “left hanging to whip parliament 
back into good behaviour”121. On a further occasion, when educational qualifications for local 
councillors were being discussed, Museveni allegedly used the Resident District 
Commissioners to mount pressure on MPs by telling people that sitting parliamentarians were 
trying to prevent others from getting to positions of power122.
These buffer solutions, however, are neither a guarantee of success nor likely to last, 
as “MPs are becoming more and more independent, on any issues”123:
“in the past, the caucus was so scared by the image of Museveni -  they didn’t even ask him 
questions when he was with them -  but this is gradually diminishing”124.
“Previously it was the president who gave directives to parliament. Now even if he gives 
directives some people may oppose him or just stay quiet and do things differently”125.
More generally, the absence of direct sanctions has enabled individual MPs to 
actually retain a degree of autonomy. In a similar context, Museveni’s charisma -  oiled with a
119 Bowler -  Farrell -  Katz (1999:13).
120 See Chapter Three, note 60.
121 New Vision (Kampala, 17 May 1998). See also New Vision (Kampala, 30 May 1998). This was made possible by the fact 
that, against the separation of executive and legislative authorities of an archetype presidential system, the Ugandan president 
can and does pick his ministers from among MPs.
122 Ogalo, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
123 Benedict Mutyaba, MP, interview (Kampala, 26 May 1999).
124 Omodi Okot, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
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pragmatic combination of patronage and intimidation, mediated by the Movement caucus, and 
enforced by bending legislative and constitutional rules -  has been functional to overcoming 
parliamentary oppositions and organisational vacuums. Yet, in some extreme instances, the 
Movement’s strategy of bulldozing opposition to government measures when important 
legislation is tabled brought about constitutional crises, as in the case of the 1999-2000 
wrangles around the referendum laws.
125 Kakoba, interview (Kampala, 16 July 1999).
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M aking policy for land reform
The organisation of interests in a  no-party poiicy process*
In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I focused on the organisation of political actors in 
party and party-like arrangements. Chapters Six and Seven shifted attention to two junctures 
on the input side of the political process -  electoral activities and parliamentary interactions -  
to find out how and to what extent individual politicians organise collective actions. This 
chapter carries the analysis forward by focusing on the production of specific policy measures 
-  i.e. those concerning land reform -  to shed light on how policy-making is carried out under 
Uganda’s no party politics and, especially, to understand what kind of organised interests 
make an impact on policy reforms.
In political science as much as in common sense, it is frequently assumed that 
political parties are key actors in modem and participatory policy-making processes. Parties 
justify their existence and bids for government by presenting policy programmes to the 
electorate -  or at least they are supposed to do so -  and it is largely party personnel that, after 
an election, take the top executive positions. Thus, what a government does is often perceived 
as something that the parties in power want and plan it to do.
As intermediary organisations, parties are meant to aggregate and channel key 
demands of the electorate into the state administrative structure. While they may not always 
be an original source of policy proposals, parties can be in a privileged position to take up 
initiatives started by other organisations: party activities are largely devoted to formulate 
appealing electoral programmes by bringing together demands and policy suggestions that
* I would like to thank professor Patrick McAuslan, a legal adviser to the Ministry in charge of land affairs when the Land 
Bill (1998) was being drafted, for discussing the topic with me and for making unpublished material available to me. This 
chapter owes a lot to his analyses of land reform in Uganda and in Africa at large.
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were initially articulated by other actors'. As a matter of fact, this is what parties, their 
functions and the mandates they receive are all about: “interest groups cannot aggregate 
interests as broadly across social groups and political issues as political parties can. Nor can 
they provide the discipline necessary to form and maintain governments and pass legislation. 
Only political parties can fashion diverse identities, interests, preferences and passions into 
laws, appropriations, policies and coalitions”2.
If it is the party government model of policy-making that insists on the primacy of 
parties, virtually any other explanatory scheme of the policy process takes party leadership, 
personnel and programmes into account3. Where parties are not directly involved in 
articulating the content of a policy, for example, they are often perceived as providing critical 
support to policy-making by promoting the legitimacy of government policies.
That political parties always have a role to play in policy-making, however, can be a 
questionable generalisation. The idea that parties are actively involved in formulating and 
negotiating policy reforms may well belong to normative views, rather than being upheld by 
empirical evidence. The notion that parties elaborate, mediate, and channel social inputs may 
be an idealistic interpretation of the policy process and its outputs as due responses to 
demands raising from the society. Even in political systems where parties hold a central 
position, they are not necessarily nor significantly involved in making policy. Indeed, we are 
warned that “the claim made for the role of parties in policy-making ... seem to be broadly 
correct. Parties can make a difference. But there is an important caveat... they are likely to 
make far more difference with respect to the general direction that public policy takes than in 
the development of distinct, detailed, policies. The reason for this is quite simple. Parties lack 
the resources -  in terms of information, research staff and so on -  to develop detailed policies 
on their own”4.
We should not expect the absence or marginalisation of political parties to imply 
necessarily a lack of diverse views on and organised struggles around policy issues. Neo- 
corporative processes, for example, may be an alternative or complementary way of 
channelling the inputs of large interest groups into the core decision-making arenas. 
Alternative paradigms have theorised the key role of issue networks, policy communities or
| Hill (1997:116).
'  Diamond (1999:97).
1 Pasquino (2000:201).
4 Ware (1996:357). The point I am making is, more speciticallv, that parties may Tack the resources to develop detailed 
policies'.
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iron triangles in accounting for policy-making processes in ways that significantly reduce the 
room for a direct intervention of political parties5.
An analysis of policy-making under Uganda’s no-party electoral politics will have to 
be entirely open-ended. While the notion of no-party politics implies the idea of a no-party 
policy process, in the case of Uganda, it is to be demonstrated that:
□ parties ‘are not there’ and cannot take part in making policies;
□ those political organisations that are there -  if any -  do provide meaningful
inputs;
□ organisations that are not primarily involved in the struggle for and capture of 
government positions do not have a significant say in a policy process.
The above issues, as pointed out, will be addressed through an investigation of 
Uganda’s process of land reform. But why choose land reform as a case study of policy­
making? Land is a critical issue in Uganda, as it also is in most African countries. Its direct 
relevance to the subsistence of the great majority of the population as well as to any seriously- 
conceived development strategy makes it a highly-charged political issue. On top of the 
objective importance of land, a subjective value is also attached to the issue by pervasive 
ethnic and communal symbolism and historical antagonisms. The struggle for the control of 
land fosters antipathies and increases the stakes of conflict among key social groups. In the 
case of Uganda, in particular, land issues have a tendency to generate or reinforce ethnic, 
class and gender divides within the population. There is no doubt that land has been and will 
be a central question -  possibly the paramount question -  for any of the country’s past and
future governments. Indeed, land was one of the key issues debated by the constituent
assembly and one of the matters that the first no-party parliament was mandated to legislate 
upon.
The choice of a single and specific policy issue cannot but be a mere example of 
what policy making can be like under no-party politics: aspects and actors that played an 
important part in the process of reforming land (say, for example, NGOs) may be entirely 
irrelevant or non-representative of other cases of policy-making. The limitations of the 
analysis which is carried out hereafter, therefore, have to be recognised from the outset, and 
generalisations must consequently be avoided.
'  Ct'.. for example, Hill (1997:65IT.).
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A background to policy-making for land reform: context and actors
The following analysis of land reform in Uganda aims at understanding how interests 
have been organised to influence the reform process and the extent to which they actually 
affected the new policy. The process of land reform is reconstructed up to the stage of 
outputs, i.e. when constitutional and legislative texts were produced (in 1995 and 1998, 
respectively) which re-shaped land affairs in Uganda. These new laws will be seen -  to the 
extent that it is possible and reasonable -  as score- or balance-sheets on which the impact that 
different interests had on the reform is recorded. At the same time, unsuccessful attempts at 
influencing the reform will also be traced and investigated. Table 8.1 provides an overview of 
the key stages of the land reform process.
Timing Stage Activities Output
1989 on Ministerial teams general investigations 




1989-92 Uganda constitutional commission popular consultations; 
drafting a new constitution
UCC Report and 
draft Constitution 
(1993)
1994-95 Constituent assembly lobbying and caucusing; 
general debate;




1997-98 Cabinet & ministerial teams general investigations 









1998 (June-July) Parliament lobbying and caucusing; 
general debate; 
amendment of the Land Bill
Land Act 
(1998)
Table 8.1: The main stages in Uganda’s land reform process
Before setting out to reconstruct the politics of land reform, we need to try to frame 
the broader context in which political bargaining took place. In the case of Uganda’s land
1 8 8
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reform, three sides delimited the field where the policy process was played out6. The first side 
was the set of pre-existing norms -  inclusive of collective practises as well as legal provisions 
-  dealing with land issues. The second was the broader social context in which land affairs are 
embedded. And the third was the specific political-institutional framework, as the chessboard 
on which the different actors related to each other.
For a start, land affairs in Uganda are complicated by the presence of a highly 
differentiated, multifarious set of tenure systems. While in most areas land is held under some 
form of customary tenure, freehold, leasehold and a fourth tenure system specific to some 
parts of Uganda -  known as ‘mailo’7 -  are also in use.
Customary tenure itself differs from area to area. Everywhere, however, this form of 
tenure is strongly entrenched in local practices, ideology and power relations. Thus, 
regardless of whether ‘custom’ is a genuine reflection of age-old historical practices or an 
instrumental creation of recently-established hierarchies, it is almost by definition fiercely 
resistant to any changes dictated by statutory law. For example, traditional stances and 
practices in gender relations constituted a cultural resistance to the adoption of the egalitarian 
provisions that women’s coalitions and international donors supported. The symbolism 
attached to tenure practices is further reinforced by the perception that land and control over 
land are the foundations of the life and the survival of any community.
In addition to resistance to change, the sheer complexity and indeed confusion in 
land tenure makes reforming them an even more difficult task. The differentiation of tenure 
systems is the result of the overlap between traditional forms of tenure and a complex history 
of statutory regulation. This overlap began with the 1900 Anglo-Bagcmda Agreement, the first 
British attempt at regulating land affairs in the protectorate, and with similar agreements 
signed with the kingdoms of Toro and Ankole in 1900 and 1901. Alongside regulating 
relations between colonial authorities and local communities, these agreements introduced 
mailo (mostly in Buganda) and freehold land (mainly in Ankole, where the agreement 
allocated 26 square miles to the Omugabe and his chiefs and 50 sqm to private individuals, 
and in Toro, with 122 sqm to the Omukama and the chiefs and 255 sqm to private individuals; 
in addition, just before independence, a few smallholders in Kigezi, Bugisu and Ankole were 
‘adjudicated’ freehold through local pilot schemes)8.
0 Cf. Grindle -  Thomas ( 199IV
See Chapter Two, p.48.
s Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:677), cf. World Bank (1993:23). Doombos (1978:80) provides somewhat 
ditferent figures for Ankole.
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Once started, the statutory regulation of Uganda’s land affairs went on decade after 
decade, with the progressive adoption of new measures overlapping with existing ones. Thus, 
the 1928 Busuulu and Envujjo Law (again, concerning Buganda only) and the 1937 and 1947 
Landlord and Tenant Laws, which reshaped tenure relations in Toro and Ankole respectively, 
contributed to laying down this intricate puzzle. At independence, in 1962, the constitution 
and the Public Lands Ordinance tried to deal with the issue, but they were soon replaced by 
the 1967 constitution and the 1969 Public Lands Act. Finally, land tenure and relations in the 
country were further complicated by the comprehensive Land Reform Decree issued by Idi 
Amin in 1975.
Some structural features of the Ugandan society constituted a second element that 
shaped and affected the process of reforming land. The country’s high levels of inequality, 
poverty, illiteracy and ruralism, for example, systematically act as barriers to the organisation 
of interests. The consequent weakness or relative absence of non-state organisations means 
that there are few limits to a complete control over decision-making on the part of central 
institutions. Where few financial and organisational resources are available outside state 
administrative structures, core state actors have a disproportionate capacity to shape the 
policy process:
“uncertain information, poverty, pervasive state influence in the economy, centralisation of 
decision making ... a large rural population, limited communications, low levels of literacy 
and a limited adult population tend to mean that a much larger percentage of the population 
is out of touch with what is happening, especially when the government is strongly 
centralized... enhances the role of policy makers while tending to isolate them”9.
Finally, Uganda’s political-institutional set up contributed to the definition of roles 
and resources in the reform process: “institutions do not allow one to predict policy outcomes. 
But, by establishing the rules of the game, they enable one to predict the ways in which policy 
conflicts will be played out”10. The constitution is the bottom line in defining formally who is 
to take part in a policy process and in what capacity. Accordingly, institutions such as the 
presidency, the ministry in charge of land affairs, parliament, and the parliamentary 
committee were in privileged positions to direct or affect the policy change. By contrast, the 
participation of political parties was hindered by the broader limitations on their political
9 Grindle -  Thomas (1991:45,49-51).
10 knmergut (1992:63), quoted in Hill (1997:89).
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activities, something which is the very object of this study. Similarly, the decentralised 
arrangements adopted by the Ugandan state -  and their specific form, e.g. the lack of a direct 
political recognition for traditional kingdoms -  were also a key element affecting policy­
making and implementation. And so was the administrative capacity of the state: the actual 
possibility to disseminate information, to carry out processes of registration, titling, 
monitoring, disputes settlement, and so on, or the ability to fund the reform were all important 
constraints to take into account when designing new land regulations.
Political and developmental views In reforming land
The initial framework for land reform in Uganda was outlined by the 1995 
constitution, which also required the first directly-elected parliament to legislate the details of 
the reform and to provide for its implementation. By the time the constituent assembly and 
then parliament took centre stage, however, a less visible discussion was already underway. 
This was articulated through academic research, ministerial work and more open 
consultations. All along, one could observe two main approaches behind the process of land 
reform: “they may be called the World Bank force and the constitutional force. The former 
represents the forces of the market; the latter the political force”11. The original economic 
development views that emerged at the outset were progressively diluted by political factors. 
The market approach was openly put forward by the supposedly ‘technical’ or low-political- 
content reports produced in the early 1990s. But, as the debate moved on to the actual 
decision-making arenas, this approach had to come to terms with the accommodation of more 
explicitly political interests. This occurred, first, with the debates and the decisions of the 
constituent assembly -  which also opened up the discussions to a wider public and set of non­
state actors -  and then with the legislative politics of the new parliament.
In June 1989, a World Bank-commissioned and USAED-funded research programme, 
carried out jointly by academics of the Makerere Institute for Social Research (Misr) in 
Kampala and the Land Tenure Centre of the University of Wisconsin, had produced an 
influential report on Land tenure and agricultural development in Uganda. The study, part of 
a number of publications on land matters in Uganda, developed an early argument for a tenure
11 McAuslan (2000:4).
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reform largely inspired by orthodox economic thinking12. It recommended the repeal of the 
1975 Decree, the uniform adoption of freehold tenure and the contextual promotion of a land 
market. But the report also justified, from an economic perspective, the security and 
protection of tenure for people with no opportunities other than tilling the land, on the ground 
that their displacement would disperse and reduce the country’s productive forces13. Thus, for 
example, mailo tenants were to become freehold owners of the land they occupied (with the 
government and the beneficiary tenants sharing the costs of compensations), whereas mailo 
owners would only retain freehold titles to land that was not held by any tenants14. This was 
meant to break the impasse between mailo owners and A? tarw/tf-holders, so that markets could 
facilitate the efficient and flexible allocation of land which is crucial to development: “the 
land market serves an extremely important function ... because it allows progressive farmers 
[i.e. those farmers who invest the most in land, albeit not necessarily large-scale farmers] 
access to land, a critical step in the economic development of agriculture”15. The arguments 
articulated in the MisrAVisconsin study were to influence the subsequent stages of the policy 
process, and notably the work of the constitutional commission as well as the numerous bills 
which were drafted in the early 1990s.
Between 1989 and 1992, the Uganda Constitutional Commission, which was 
mandated with drafting a new constitutional text that an elected assembly would then discuss, 
also set out to address the land question. In 1993, the commission completed its task by 
publishing a long-awaited Report -  the result of widespread and widely publicised 
consultations -  which contained a section dealing with the land issue. The report largely drew 
upon and referred to the MisrAVisconsin study. It pointed out Ugandans’ concerns with 
equity, access, protection, security and development of land, and concluded that, to achieve 
these objectives, “the state should hold land in Uganda in trust and for the benefit and well­
being of all the people of Uganda”16. Key among the report’s proposals were the phased
12 Neo-liberal assumptions concerning land reform are summarised as follows by a World Bank study on Uganda: “(a) a 
freehold title is necessary to encourage investments in and sound management of land; (b) the possession of a freehold title 
facilitates the use of land as collateral for credit — which, by implication, can be directed to long-term capital investments; (d) 
a land market can be created—or restored—where none exists; (e) Uganda needs a uniform land tenure system rather than the 
current myriad systems; and (f) a freehold system with registration of titles would permit Government to capture some of the 
rents to which it is entitled, and to introduce a land tax to spur further development” (World Bank 1993:24).
13 Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre (1989:xiv, 155-157,209).
14 Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre (1989:xvii, 174ff., 210).
15 Makerere Institute for Social Research — Land Tenure Centre (1989rxv; also pp. 156, 209). In pre-colonial Buganda, a 
peasant would get, under a chief of his choice, a kibanja (plot) land over which he would enjoy inheritable rights of 
occupation ( ebibanja), subject to “his maintaining the correct social and political behaviour”, Uganda Constitutional 
Commission (1993:674).
16 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:682).
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introduction of a uniform system of freehold for rural areas and leasehold for urban areas17 
and a decentralised system of land management, an alleged response to complaints about the 
“long, costly and complicated process of acquiring title to land” that an overcentralised 
system had imposed upon Ugandans for years18. The most relevant recommendations included 
in the UCC Report were the following:
□ land should be vested in the state;
□ in the long run, all mailo (‘already a freehold tenure’) and leasehold land in rural
areas was to be converted into freehold, with leasehold to be retained in urban 
areas only19;
□ legal occupation of land was to be formally recognised and protected through 
registration and titling;
□ kibartja occupants were to obtain freehold titles, with mailo owners to be 
compensated by the government;
□ an equitable distribution of land was to be promoted -  with the size of 
landholdings subject to control and limitations -  while avoiding divisions into 
uneconomic units;
□ customary tenure should continue to exist, but customary tenants were to be 
encouraged to acquire titles in land20;
□ the Uganda Land Commission would be retained, while ensuring its 
independence from political interference when implementing government policy;
□ existing District Land Committees would also be retained but further empowered, 
making them autonomous entities (only co-ordinated by the ULC) able to issue 
titles; decentralisation was to be promoted by establishing Sub-county Land
Committees to facilitate land titles applications and local Land Tribunals to settle
land disputes;
□ a land tax should be introduced, notably for idle or undeveloped land;
17 Phasing the process of tenure reform was meant to limit the ‘hardships’ and ‘upheavals’ that an abrupt abolition of 
customary tenure might generate, Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:673,684).
18 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:672). The decentralisation of some land management functions was also 
recommended by the MisrAVisconsin study (Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre 1989:xviii, 203). 
“Before 1969 every district controlled its land and issued land titles. Then the UPC government decided to centralise control 
over land -  the idea was that this would speed up the development of the country -  and the district land was abolished”, John 
Livingstone Okello-Okello, MP, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
19 The MisrAVisconsin study had suggested that all leasehold be transformed into freehold automatically (save for very large, 
illegally-acquired or government-sponsored leases); Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre 
(1989:xviii).
20 The MisrAVisconsin study had deemed an ‘indigenous customary land tenure system’ inappropriate to agricultural 
development, and suggested that customary tenants be given freehold titles over land rights certified by their communities; 
Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre (1989:xvii-xviii).
193
Making policy for land reform
□ ownership by foreigners should not be confined to leasehold, albeit subject to 
controls21.
A third report was produced by a 10-member technical committee on Land Tenure 
Law Reform -  the Agricultural Policy Committee -  which was set up by the government, 
over the same period when the Uganda Constitutional Commission was looking into land 
matters, to carry out a country-wide study in accordance with the recommendations of the 
MisrAVisconsin Report:
“when the CA was elected, the first document that the delegates were given, just after 
swearing in, was the report by the technical committee. Because land was a very important 
issue. The committee had been literally in all the districts -  except one, Kalangala. We had 
a programme on the radio, where we would announce that we would hold a meeting at this 
place at this time, so that people could gather. We were selecting people, telling them that 
we wanted to meet so and so (religious leaders, women leaders - all leaders). Because we 
didn't want to hold rallies, where you cannot really have discussions, but we wanted around 
100 people”22.
The committee allegedly used the demands raised in the public meetings, as 
expressed in the report, to draft a number of bills23. While some of these drafts were submitted 
to the government, however, none of the bills was tabled in parliament for enactment. A civil 
servant from the Ministry in charge of land affairs recalls the situation as follows: “what 
happened ... we had tried to table a bill in 1993. But, at the time, there was the constitution- 
making process under way. And we feared that we may have ended up with a land law which 
contradicted the constitution, as it was not clear yet what the constitution would say on 
land”24.
Since the debate in the constituent assembly would start off from the constitutional 
text drafted by the Uganda Constitutional Commission, it was the latter’s work, including its 
long report, which set the direction of the land debate during the constitution-making process. 
To a significant extent, the stands expressed in the UCC report reflected and legitimised the
21 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:686-692).
22 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000). Loice Bwambale-Biira (Women, Kasese) referred to the June 1993 
report of the Technical Committee on Land Tenure Law Reform “which all of us have”, in Proceedings o f die Constituent 
Assembly (8 May 1995, p.4219).
23 The 1990 Tenure and Control o f Land Bill, for example, suggested that freehold be extended to the whole country (also 
implying the elimination of mailo), retaining leasehold in urban areas only. At the same time, it also aimed at restoring some 
security for customary tenure. For the management of land affairs, die bill suggested subcounty-level land committees to 
replace the district-level ones established in 1969, as well as the establishment of district land tribunals. See Uganda 
Constitutional Commission (1993:679-680); Marquardt -  Sebina Zziwa (1998:179).
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World Bank approach, as elaborated by the MisrAVisconsin study, and introduced more fully 
and openly the land issue in the political as well as in the constitutional agenda.
The constitutionallsatfon of land affairs
It was in the constituent assembly that the issue of land reform was first addressed in 
an open national debate. Because the agenda of the assembly was set by the draft constitution 
formulated by the constitutional commission, land became automatically a constitutional 
issue. Indeed, as a delegate observed, “the question of land is probably the most central in the 
process of constitution-making”25. The statement is worth a few considerations.
The inclusion of a chapter on ‘Land and Environment* in the 1995 constitution runs 
against the notion that constitution-making is about the regulation -  i.e. the organisation, 
allocation and limitation -  of political power, not of political issues. The need to avoid issues 
that had nothing to do with a general recognition of rights nor with the organisation of 
political institutions was pointed out by a delegate: “there has been so much a tendency of us 
trying to describe everything. A constitution is not a dictionary!”26. Over-stretching the reach 
of a constitutional text is an inherently risky operation, as one Italian political scientist has put 
it:
“the more we establish all-regulating and all-promising constitutions, the more we prompt 
their infringement and a country’s ddbacle. ... Constitutions are, first and above all, 
procedures designed to ensure a controlled exercise of power. Therefore, and conversely, 
constitutions are required to be content-neutral. A constitution that takes it upon itself to 
establish policies preempts the popular will and tramples upon the policy-making bodies 
(parliaments and governments) to which the policy decisions are constitutionally entrusted.
We must beware, therefore, of ‘aspirational constitutions’ ... ‘target constitutions”’27.
But the inclusion of land affairs in the constitution reveals the crucial relevance 
attributed to the issue. After all, “land reform is about restructuring existing power relations
24 K.S.B. Mubbala, Director for Lands and Environment at the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment, interview 
(Kampala, 30 May 2000).
25 Cyril Agard Didi, in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (3 May 1995, p.4095).
26 Rhoda Nsibinva Kalema, in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (11 May 1995, p.4292).
27 Sartori (1997:197,200).
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around land”28, and, as mentioned, to most Ugandans land is more important than politics: 
“people are even more concerned about land than power”29.
“Land is viewed by the people as a vital natural resource and common heritage which 
cannot be matched by any other natural resource. Ownership of land by the individual, 
family or community confers real or potential wealth, social prestige and a sense of 
economic security. Population growth continues to put a great deal of pressure on land”30.
The tough debates on the proposed chapter 15 of the constitution, however, could not 
sort out all the thorny aspects of land reform. Rather, the constituent assembly confined itself 
to pointing at the direction of change, and required parliament to legislate on the matter within 
two years. Nevertheless, the CA did make some crucial decisions.
By stating that “land belongs to the citizens of Uganda”31, the constitution abolished 
public or state land and restored people's ownership of land, which had been modified by the 
1900 Agreement with the colonial authorities. The restoration was allegedly the response to 
the peasants’ fervent desire to possess their land. The support that the latter seemed to enjoy 
among the delegates resounded in the rhetoric of the constitution-making debates:
“owning... this is what all of us have been asked to come here and get The peasant in our 
villages wants to own the land that he tills, where he is or which he uses for sustenance.... 1 
do not think there is anybody here who will say that the people he represents told him that 
they do not wish to own land”32.
A constituency in favour of the retention of some government control over land 
emerged in, and was largely confined to, the south-west. People from these areas, which 
largely lack cultivable soil, hoped to get hold of better land via government redistribution33. It 
was claimed that Museveni himself, who hails from western Uganda, was backing such 
demands. As a matter of fact, the recommendations of the government-inspired constitutional 
commission envisaged a significantly broader role for the intervention of state organs in land
28 Khosa (1994:50).
29 Maria Nakyanzi, in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (3 May 1995, p.4095).
30 Uganda Constitutional Commission (1993:671, emphasis added).
31 The new formulation -  “land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them” (art 237, Constitution of 
the Republic o f Uganda, 1995) -  was a significant shift away from the recommendation of the Constitutional Commission 
that land be vested in the state in trust for the people (“all land in Uganda belongs to the people and its use shall be regulated 
by the Uganda Land Commission”, art 271 of the UCC draft constitution).
32 Fabius Byaruhanga (Kitagwenda County), in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (4 May 1995, p.4105).
33 Okello-Okello, interview (20 June 2000). See, for example, Mbarara MP Winnie Byanyima’s contribution to the debate, in 
Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (11 May 1995, p.4286). Dick Nyai and Yusuf Okulo-Epak, both MPs, also pointed
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affairs than was finally agreed. Nevertheless, the support for re-vesting land in the people 
turned out to be overwhelming.
The lengthy discussions on the content and the exact wording of the provisions 
vesting land in the people reflected the awareness that the proposed one was a revolutionary 
change, that is, a counter-revolution to restore what had been there in the past. The notion that 
land is public was allegedly inherited by the 1900 Agreement with the British, which replaced 
people’s land with state land. State ownership had later been re-asserted with the 1962 
constitution, and again with the Land Reform Decree of 1975, which had reduced land tenure 
to state leasehold only34. Thus:
“what we did in 1995, by re-introducing people’s land with the constitution, was to go back 
to what was there before. This was a major step and it is going to have great implications.
The power of the state is reduced to regulation only. This is very important, because before 
they could -  and, in fact, they did -  come and dispossess you without adequate 
compensation for the land. Now, that land which previously was public land, is now handed 
back to the citizens as freehold, as customary or whatever may be”35.
Aside from restoring people’s ownership, the constitution recognised the four 
existing forms of tenure. If vesting land in the people was the biggest change, stating that land 
“shall be owned in accordance to .;. customary, freehold, mailo, leasehold”36 systems was the 
main guarantee that current practices would not be turned upside down. The formal 
restoration of mailo and freehold was an important step to re-establish a degree of order and 
legality after the failed implementation of the Land Reform Decree. To some extent, ‘reform’ 
in this case was more about setting up regulations that reflected existing practices, rather than 
changing existing practices by means of new regulations.
The continuation of all four forms of tenure, however, did not go unquestioned. In 
particular, hard-line modernisers, who favoured a complete rationalisation through the 
country-wide adoption of freehold and leasehold, clashed with traditionalist views that 
demanded the protection of customary and mailo tenure systems.
Popular support for established practices ensured the retention and the 
acknowledgement of a legal status for customary tenure. At the same time, certificates of 
customary ownership were envisaged for customary owners. This measure was partly linked
at Museveni’s will to retain government control over land, interviews (Kampala, 14 June 1999 and 19 June 2000 
respectively).
34 Okulo-Epak, interview (Kampala, 19 June 2000).
35 Okulo-Epak, interview (Kampala, 19 June 2000).
36 Art. 237, Constitution o f the Republic o f Uganda (1995).
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to the idea of vesting land in the people. Certificates were meant to formalise the ownership 
rights of occupants on customary land and thus shelter them from government and 
administrative interference: “no longer are they customary tenants on public land, subject to 
the whims of officials willing to grant that land to whomsoever they see f i t ... Given tha t... all 
customarily occupied lands were public lands, the effect of this provision is virtually to 
eliminate public land as a category of land in Uganda”37.
The fate of mailo land, recognised as a de facto form of freehold, turned out to be 
very controversial. Again, there was no lack of delegates ostensibly putting forward the 
demands of the tenants:
“the peasants of Buganda have not been having a big voice because there is a lot of 
intimidation ... [But] one of their messages ... was ‘We would like to be the owners of the 
land that belonged to our ancestors without undue interference from the absentee landlord 
who carries the title but has never grown a single banana tree or even a coffee tree or 
grazed the cow over the land’”38.
The point was made that the idea of giving land to the peasants was not merely based 
on a redistributive rationale. Developmental objectives would also be achieved -  the 
argument was -  by enhancing the security of tenure of those primarily responsible for 
agricultural production and thus, in the long run, promoting their capacity for investment:
“it's unfair to say that the peasants don’t want the land, that they are happy as they are. It 
maybe true that peasants in Buganda now don’t want land, but, as the country develops, 
they will not sit down and say ‘I’m happy to be landless’. It’s just that they fear to be 
thrown out if they ask for it, if they disturb the landlord. But titles are an asset. You can 
borrow money. At the moment it is not there, the banks are not lending. But the first 
purpose of a land title is security of property -  nobody will come and claim it -  not that of 
borrowing money. But there are situations where people may want to borrow money, and 
you don’t walk in a bank empty-handed and borrow”39.
The opposite claim was made, however, that the cultural particularity of land 
relations in Buganda had to be respected, and that the bakopi themselves would actually
37 McAuslan (2000:6).
38 Maj.Nuwe Amanya Mushega (Igara County East), in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, pp.4152-3). 
Several other delegates -  some from areas as diverse as Toro, Bunyoro, Buhweju, Ankole or Apac -  intervened in favour of 
mailo tenants, see Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, pp.4156-75).
39 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
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defend mailo relations “as the case may be with federd”40, that is, the kingdom’s political 
autonomy. Key to this argument was the notion that the bakopi did not own land prior to 
colonial rule -  itself a contentious notion41 -  and, thus, that they did not see the introduction of 
mailo as the origin of their deprivation. The very significance attached to the term ‘mailo’ 
restrained actual possibilities of change: “it was assumed that if this word does not appear, the 
next day, headlines in the Luganda papers would say ‘Mailo abolished’, and yet we had no 
intention of abolishing mailo”42. In the end, mailo land ownership was restored, with security 
of tenure guaranteed for lawful or bona fide occupants of mailo, as well as for occupants of 
freehold and leasehold land. The detailed regulation of landowner-tenant relationships and the 
registration of the interests of occupants, however, were left for future parliamentary 
legislation.
The assembly also devoted a great deal of attention to the question of the former ‘lost 
counties’. The committee dealing with land issues, led by a Munyoro chairman, argued that 
Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties constituted a special case, the result of a historic wrong 
which the assembly had to redress without any further delay, rather than postpone it for 
parliament to regulate. The committee suggested that the government should pay 
compensations for absentee Baganda landlords to give up ownership of land to the local 
peasants. On this point, a number of other delegates tried to jump on the wagon by adding 
their own areas for ‘special’ consideration45. The difficulty and the risk of singling out parts of 
the country for special attention and funding, however, was pointed out by members of the 
assembly concerned that a common settlement of tenant-landlord relations for all mailo areas 
should be found44. Extending compensations to all mailo through a general land fimd would 
create new problems, they argued, for it would in fact constitute an indirect form of taxation 
on Ugandans living in non-mailo areas45. Eventually, and in spite of the committee’s 
recommendations, the question of the former lost counties was dropped and left for 
parliament to settle.
40 Mulindwa Birimumaso (Bukoto West), in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4169); cf. William 
Senteza Kajubi (Kyadondo North), Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4172).
41 See Chapter Two, page 49.
42 Augustine Ruzindana, in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4151).
43 The areas for which special attention was requested included, for instance, the 900 square miles that the British had handed 
to the Omugabe of Ankole and his supporters as mailo and freehold laud (Mwesigwa Rukutana, Rusheny County, in 
Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly, 6 May 1995, p.4196), Buruli of Buganda (Mukasa Muruli in Proceedings of the 
Constituent Assembly, 9 May 1995, p.4240), Tooro and Mbale (Byamhanga, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly, 6 
May 1995, p.4204), Bwamba and Busungora in Kasese (Kule Muranga, Busungora North, in Proceedings of the Constituent 
Assembly, 11 May 1995, p.4255).
44 Anthony Ssekweyama (Mawokota), in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (6 May 1995, p.4198).
45 George Masika (Mbale Municipality), in Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (9 May 1995, p.4237).
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All four existing systems, as already mentioned, were acknowledged with equal 
status by the constitution. Yet customary and public land leaseholds were also made 
convertible into freehold. The rationale behind the transformation of leases into freeholds was 
evidently “consistent with the aim of eliminating public land”46. For customary tenure, on the 
other hand, it was assumed that, notwithstanding the protection accorded to it, the long term 
goal should remain its gradual conversion to freehold tenure47.
Finally, a set of national and local bodies was re-established to administer land 
affairs. An independent Uganda Land Commission was given the task of managing state- 
owned land at the national level. Locally, independent District Land Boards -  no longer part 
of the Uganda Land Commission -  would operate at the district level to supervise land 
matters and to hold and allocate non-owned land. These boards would be supplemented by 
local Land Tribunals in settling land disputes, so that the handling of the latter, which used to 
take years for courts to hear, could be speeded up. The overall result was the introduction of 
“a strong orientation towards democratisation of property relations ... manifest in the removal 
of ... authority over property titling and transfer from government to district-level 
autonomous Land Boards [and] dispute resolution ...[to] independent land tribunals”48.
The constitution left the details of the new land policy and the implementation of the 
changes that it introduced to the incoming parliament, which was mandated to legislate on 
these issues within two years from its election. As much as the work of the constitutional 
commission had somewhat forced the Constituent Assembly to address the land issue, the 
agenda of the government was also pre-determined by the deadline for new land legislation.
Government policy and the politicisation of the land debate
The Land Bill was published for debate in March 1998, after an earlier version had 
been unofficially circulated in the second half of the previous year without raising much 
discussion. It was only in late May, however, that a redrafted version was tabled in 
parliament. At this point, there was little more than a month to the constitutional deadline of 
July the 2nd.
46 McAuslan (2000:6).
47 Matia Baguma Isoke, in Proceedings o f the Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4148; see also p.4081).
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The bill was the result of the work of a technical committee that had been formed in 
1997 by the ministry with the task of drafting the new legislation. Once again, the work of the 
drafting committee was key in shaping the agenda, largely deciding what the reform was 
going to address and what would be left out: “they are the ones who decided which were the 
issues on which they wanted to legislate. ... by putting some issues on the table and not 
others”49. Later in the drafting process, a cabinet committee (consisting of representatives 
from a few concerned ministries, including land, finance, local government and agriculture) 
was also formed to work out compromises on some of the most controversial issues50. Thus, 
while president Museveni largely forced his stance upon cabinet, the different departments 
and their civil servants -  notably at the Ministry in charge of land -  had a significant say in 
the formulation of the bill. Within bureaucratic circles, some went as far as claiming that:
“there was no interference from the outside [i.e. from outside the Ministry]. We were using 
the constitution and we didn't want an influence aside from the constitution. So, in effect, it 
was to put into effect the constitutional provisions on land, so why should we accept other 
influences? Though, of course, parliament then changed a few things. Cabinet had accepted 
most of it, it only changed something”51.
But it was the president himself who forcefully spelled out the position of the 
government and the terms of the debate. Museveni argued in favour of the reform on the 
ground of pressing needs to rationalise land affairs, develop land markets, and protect poor 
Ugandans from social and economic subordination. He pointed out that:
“land had no value because the economy was asleep. But now... land has become precious 
... Uganda is now a capitalist country. We should get out of this feudal system... The 
present law creates a paralysis between owners and poor peasants in villages”52, whereby 
“no one owns land in Buganda, even Buganda landlords are landless because they cannot 
use land from which they cannot evict their tenants: it means that it has no commercial
48 Palmer (2000278).
49 Rose Mwebaza, leader of Uganda Land Alliance, interview ( K a m p a la ,  9 June 2000). Towards the end of the process, a few 
representatives of NGOs (the Uganda Law Society, die Uganda Land Alliance and Uganda Women’s Network) also took part 
in the twelve-member team alongside the technical heads of the ministry. But their request for more time was turned down, 
and they were invited to put their demands to the subsequent parliamentary stages. Mubbala, interview (Kampala, 30 May 
2000), and Eddy Nsamba-Gayiiya, Acting Chief Government Valuer at the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment, 
interview (Kampala, 13 June 2000).
50 The committee consulted: ULA mid UWONET; representatives of Lukiiko; mailo owners from Kibaale; freeland-holders 
from Mbarara, Ntungamo, Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kasese; the Lango community on the issue of customary tenure; MPs 
from Kibale; MPs from Mbarara, Bushenyi, Kabarole and Kasese; MPs from Gulu, Kitgum, Apac, Lira, Nebbi, Moyo, 
Adjumani, Arua, Kotido and Moroto; MPs from Buganda. The Committee also visited the districts of Kibaale, Mbarara 
Bushenyi, Nakasongola, Luwero, Mbale. Francis Ayume MP, in Parliamentary Debates (20 June 1998, p.4044).
51 Mubbala, interview (Kampala, 30 May 2000).
52 Museveni, quoted in New Vision (Kampala, 19 May 1998).
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value. The tenants themselves cannot optimally use the land because they do not have title 
deeds”53.
The exact ‘extent’ of the rights of both landlords and tenants needed to be clarified, 
with new and unambiguous rules for tenancy and eviction.
The government’s plan was outlined by Museveni in a landmark speech at a 
workshop organised by the Forum for Women in Democracy (Fowode)54, in which he focused 
the debate around four well-defined key points. First, whatever the tenure system, the 
rationalisation of land affairs should start from the recognition of the ownership titles of 
landlords. At the same time, the president opposed the idea of granting the landowners a right 
to evict tenants at pleasure and to charge commercial rents55. Rather, it was the peasants 
actually living on and working the land that -  so long as they were legitimate occupants of the 
land -  had to be protected against eviction. Their protection, in turn, required the emission of 
‘certificates of occupancy’ to acknowledge and register the interests in question. Moreover, 
the controlled or nominal rents (i.e. non-commercial fees) which had been abolished by the 
1975 Land Reform Decree would be re-introduced: “in the villages”, the president argued, 
“there are no capitalist relations. People do not have adequate income. How can you charge 
them economic rent?”56. Finally, and further developing this latest point, Museveni wanted the 
establishment of a land fund from which poor peasants would be able to obtain loans to buy 
or invest in land.
The impact that president Museveni had by coming out explicitly on some of the 
most contentious issues cannot be underestimated. Any public statement about his political 
views would constitute the bottom line for scores of politicians who would hardly consider 
challenging his positions. Museveni, for example, was “the one solely responsible for pushing 
the nominal rent down to Shs. 1,000 ($0.6)”57, ipso facto dashing most objections (if at all, 
many were oriented towards fixing a nominal rent closer to commercial value)58.
Certificates of occupancy, nominal rents and land fund all worked towards 
strengthening the position of poor peasants. A well-known Ugandan commentator provides a 
possible interpretation of why the president was promoting these measures: “there are a few 
thousand substantial land owners in Uganda, but millions of squatters, the landless, and
53 Museveni at Fowode, quoted in New Vision (Kampala, 27 April 1998). Cf. Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land 
Tenure Centre (1989:xvi).
54 New Vision (Kampala, 19 May 1998).
55 New Vision (Kampala, 19 May 1998).
56 New Vision (Kampala, 19 May 1998).
57 Nsamba-Gayiiya, interview (Kampala, 13 June 2000).
58 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
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people with quasi-legal rights to the land they live on. In gratitude, they will vote for 
Museveni. Museveni, whose popularity has taken a beating lately, is manufacturing votes for 
himself’59. The pro-peasants choice was consistent with other positions taken by the president 
in the past. On the qualifications for the chairmanship of sub-county councils, for example, 
the president pressed parliament to modify its previous decision by abolishing the requirement 
of school certificates: “it was because of the semi-illiterate people who had campaigned for 
him: he wanted them to get those sub-county positions”60.
On the other hand, advocates of the reform described it as a way of restoring pre­
colonial ownership by the people. Non-customary tenure systems -  including mailo -  were 
the result of colonial agreements that had brushed aside traditional land tenures. The 1900 
Agreement originally signed and now defended by Mengo (the site of the traditional 
government of the Buganda kingdom, and thus of the Baganda establishment) had actually 
dispossessed the ordinary people. It “overthrew the traditional Kabakaship, Bugabeship, etc; 
and also overthrew the traditional clan-based land owning system in order to replace it with 
commercialised serfdom which was very different from the traditional tribute system”61.
In reaction to the proposed changes, a loose and informal coalition of conservative 
interests emerged, centred in Buganda. The Mengo establishment, its media, the regional 
MPs, the Church of Uganda, and also Buganda members of the Democratic Party and 
Conservative Party62, they all denounced Museveni’s policy as a ‘foreign’ plot, anti-Buganda 
and pro-Banyankole. The president and his cronies in government, the argument went, were 
deliberately promoting land-grabbing by westerners (i.e. Banyankole and Banyarwanda). At 
one point or another, people such as DP leader Paul Semogerere, CP Ken Lukyamuzi and 
Nsubuga Nsambu, the first deputy Katikkiro Godfrey Kkaaya Kavuma, the bataka leader 
Emmanuel Musoke Kayita and many others, all hinted at ‘a deliberate plan of the government 
to dispossess the Baganda ... the non-Baganda are likely to own all the land in the kingdom’; 
‘to impoverish Baganda, a conspiracy by the old communist personality of Museveni to rob 
landlords and settle foreigners, “intruders” on Ganda land’; ‘to use women and squatters to 
grab Buganda land from the rightful owners’; ‘to use money it put aside for non-Baganda to 
buy land’; ‘to seek to reinstate Idi Amin’s 1975 Land Decree which attempted to take away
59 Charles Onyango-Obbo, in East African (3 June 1998).
60 Okulo-Epak, interview (Kampala, 19 June 2000).
61 New Vision (Kampala, 2 June 1998).
62 See, for instance, New Vision 27 April, 17 and 30 May, 2 June 1998, and The Monitor, 14 April 1998. A few years earlier, 
prospective delegates to the constituent assembly had been asked by the katikkiro, the prime minister of the Buganda 
‘government’, to commit themselves to fighting for the recognition of mailo and the return, for land ownership, to the pre- 
1975 situation, The Monitor (Kampala, 19 October 1993). At the time, the katikkiro was still Jehoash Mayanja-Nkangi. By 
the time the land bill was tabled in 1998, Mayanj a-Nkangi had been appointed minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
which made some Baganda believe that he would be in a key position to shape the reform.
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land rights from free-holders without compensation’63. In an effort to shield the interests of the 
Buganda establishment from the redistributive intentions of the government, when the 
parliamentary debate on the land bill got started they tried to obtain a one-year postponement 
of the constitutional deadline on the ground that more discussions were needed64. Fears of an 
anti-Baganda scheme went as far as to suggest that the manoeuvre hid an attempt by the 
ruling south-western group to break the political and financial power of the Baganda by 
grabbing their land and making sure that the landed bourgeoisie of the central region could 
not earn more than nominal rents65. On occasions, even northern (opposition) politicians 
familiar with land issues would join in to criticise land-grabbing on the part of the ruling 
group:
“when this government came to power, in 1986, there was a rush to get land. Everybody 
was getting land - the Kagame [i.e. the current president of Rwanda] and everybody. People 
felt that their land was threatened. Go to Mityana and see the map of the area and who owns 
land in Buganda! Yes, people from the south-west and many others - Banyarwanda.... You 
know, when Buganda was divided into mailo and public land, in 1900, public land was 
mostly in Mubende and Luwero. So that is were you got easily land from the government.
Land was being leased by the government to these people. You applied and you were then 
allocated and shown on the map - in yellow - with your name. So there was no secret Of 
course it was a matter of connections. At one point somebody also told me that even the 
chairman of Mubende land committee was a Munyankole!”66.
A particular aspect of the controversy concerned squatters who occupied land 
between 1975 and 1986. According to the Land Bill, if the landlords made no effort to remove 
them, these people (including the large Banyarwanda immigrant community which, the 
president argued, were brought to Buganda as cheap labour by mailo landlords, not by the 
NRM) should now get certificates. But Mengo wanted legitimate tenants only to be 
recognised67. While conceding that they did not formally consult the bakopi, Mengo denied 
that the latter had any interest in changing the status quo to have their rights better protected 
than was the case under the existing arrangements:
“before the land reform, there was no outcry that peasants did not have access to land.
Under the traditional mode, a kibanja-holdei was entitled to hold virtually forever that land,
63 See, for example, New Vision (Kampala, 27 April 1998) and The Monitor (Kampala, 26 May 1998).
64 Ken Lukyamuzi, in Parliamentary Debates (22 June 1998, p.4062).
65 John Katende, Attorney General of the Kingdom of Buganda, interview (Kampala, 21 June 2000).
66 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
61 New Vision (Kampala, 16 June 1998).
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he could also sell or lend it, and -  up to 1975 -  he would pay a nominal rent of Shs.8.5.
Less than an American dime! After 1975 they were not paying anything. And nobody was 
being chased from the land, nobody was being prevented from occupying land. No, 
absolutely, tenants were not demanding it  And they are actually totally indifferent to it. It 
is not true that they were afraid to be kicked out”68.
But the question was not confined to the conflicting rights of landlords and tenants 
over individual plots of land. On the contrary, the issue soon developed into a broader 
problem of how to protect the kingdom and the Buganda community from the widely 
perceived danger of foreign intrusions. Beside the preservation of each landlord’s rights over 
his own mailo, the argument began to circulate that the defense of the kingdom hinged on 
whether 9,000 square miles of public land would eventually be handed back to the kabaka to 
be autonomously administered by the Buganda Land Board69. The Baganda coalition claimed 
that a simple restoration of the pre-1975 situation was required, and that land should be vested 
in the kabakaship in trust for the people:
‘the issue was political pure and simple: who was to control land within Buganda? Was it 
to continue to be the traditional landlord class, individually on mailo and collectively, via 
the Lukiiko, on public land or was it to be the peasants -  the erstwhile tenants who were 
being given ownership rights in the land? ... politicians and leading public figures in 
Buganda, by claiming that the bill is designed to facilitate taking land away from the 
Baganda, have aimed at getting the peasants to throw their lot in with the landlords and 
support the maintenance of the status quo on mailo land”70.
The 9,000 square miles of former public land, however, were not a consolidated and 
unoccupied plot of land. Rather, they were scattered under the homes of the largely unaware 
peasants who were supporting the very idea of ‘returning’ it to the kabaka: “the local 
people... many of them thought that this 9,000 sqm was a clearly defined piece of land 
somewhere in Entebbe, or Mpigi or Luwero, and thus they were in favour of its return to the 
kabaka. But then, when they realised it was the very land under their feet, that was a different 
story”71.
68 Katende, interview (Kampala, 21 June 2000). According to the MISR/Wisconsin study, by contrast, “the registry survey 
confirmed that tenants are exposed to eviction by mailo owners or leaseholders, based on official records of eviction 
disputes” (Makerere Institute for Social Research -  Land Tenure Centre, 1989:xv).
69 McAuslan (2000:13). When the kingdoms were restored as cultural institutions, in 1993, the Buganda Land Board had also 
been re-established to manage the 350 sqm of land returned to the Kabaka.
70 McAuslan (2000:13).
71 Lt. James Kinobe, MP and secretary of the Movement parliamentary caucus, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999). “The 
Baganda, they wanted the 9,000 sqm. But how do you return them? They are scattered all over the places as mailo”, Okulo- 
Epak, interview (Kampala, 19 June 2000).
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The government wanted land to be administered by district land boards, and claimed 
that kings and chiefs had no traditional rights over land because, before colonial authorities 
introduced mailo ownership, land was held communally by the people through their clans. 
Since public land was established, the landlord had been the state. Mengo only controlled the 
contentious 9,000 sqm for a few years during the 1960s. But, now, public land had already 
been abolished by the 1995 constitution, and customary law ownership of land had been re­
introduced in its place. Formally, in other words, there was no longer Buganda public land to 
be vested in any authority72. In addition, Museveni also rejected Baganda demands for 
compensation for former public land which had been leased to other citizens, claiming that 
public land which had been leased by the state to individuals according to the constitution was 
now freehold73.
What made these issues explosive were their ethnic implications. The president 
attacked Mengo for using its CBS radio to sow ethnic hatred and misinform people about 
migrant settlers by declaring that “the Banyankole are oozing with money, [and] will buy all 
the land of Buganda”74. He warned that the controversy over land could spark off a civil war, 
especially in Buganda, Mbale and in Sheema, Kashaari and the Ankole/Masaka ranching belt 
in western Uganda75. The minister for information went as far as to comparing CBS radio with 
the infamous Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, responsible of genocidal propaganda 
in Rwanda76.
At the same time, the president tried to meet the Buganda caucus to cajole Baganda 
MPs into backing the bill, but his invitation was reportedly turned down. Allegations were 
also made that, in a cabinet re-shuffle, Museveni left some ministerial vacancies to use them 
as convenient inducements77. Divided between their loyalty to Mengo and support for the 
government or the districts, parliamentarians from Buganda did not manage to behave 
consistently as a cohesive group. The Buganda caucus, for example, struggled to have MPs 
show up at crucial meetings, let alone to command their unconditional loyalty78. At times, 
opposition voices were heard from Buganda districts such as Mubende, Ssembabule, Luwero 
or Nakasongola, partly orchestrated by non-Baganda from these areas (including some
72 McAuslan (2000:13) and interview (London, 16 May 2000).
73 Ugandanews, 14 April 1998.
74 New Vision (Kampala, 2 June 1998).
75 New Vision (Kampala, 19 May 1998).
76 Human Rights Watch (1999:114).
77 New Vision (Kampala, 30 May 1998) and Kakungulu (Bulisa, Masaka Municipality), in Parliamentary Debates, 22 June 
1998, p.4069).
78 New Vision (Kampala, 30 May 1998).
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parliamentarians) or by envoys of the Movement secretariat who would organise tenants 
associations to put the case for the peasants79.
To cap the question of land in Buganda, there was the problem of Kibale district, 
where absentee Baganda landlords owned mailo land that was occupied by Banyoro people. 
Museveni, the Uganda Land Alliance (ULA), government-sponsored tenants associations, and 
some Bunyoro royal organisations had suggested the legalisation of occupation and the 
institution of a land fund to help local people in the former ‘lost counties’ buy the land they 
lived on. Again, however, the Baganda rejected the idea of recognising bona fide occupancy 
as such, without the consent of the landlords.
If the regulation of mailo land -  and, more broadly, the relationship between 
landowners and land occupants on mailo, freehold or leasehold -  was of concern for only a 
few small areas outside Buganda, questions of customary and communal land ownership were 
a major issue for most of the country. World Bank-inspired studies, as pointed out, had 
suggested the conversion of customary ownership into freehold. This raised conservative and 
conservationist concerns which were articulated by the ULA, by groups of northern MPs, and 
by the parliamentary committee itself. These insisted on the actual recognition, for customary 
tenure, of a status equal to other forms of tenure, as granted by the constitution. The very idea 
of issuing certificates of customary occupancy was challenged: “the people in Acholi say if 
you want to give certificates don’t call it ‘customary’. That is not our custom. We don’t 
register customs in a government office”80. There were also concerns that, because people 
were not used to hold such kind of certificates of ownership and because the land in question 
was not surveyed (a pre-requisite for any meaningful certificate to be issued), it would be 
difficult to implement the proposed arrangements.
The question was further complicated by the fact that, while northern MPs and 
organisations such as the Uganda Land Alliance were on the same side with regard to the 
recognition of customary ownership (and against other organisations such as the Uganda 
Women’s Network), they clashed with each other on the related issue of women’s land 
ownership rights (over which ULA and Uwonet joined forces, for example, in mobilising 
support for pre-defined quotas of woman representatives in land bodies). Should women’s co- 
ownership and inheritance rights over family land be recognised? Were spouses to have a say
79 The Monitor (Kampala, 26 May 1998) and New Vision (Kampala, 27 May and 17 June 1998).
80 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
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in family land management and sale? An economic argument was also made for empowering 
women. Because the largest share of agricultural output was the direct result of the work of 
women, the proper incentive to productivity and modernisation could only be found in the 
specific mention and defence of their role as land owners81. But a strong pro-customary 
feeling emerged, shared and supported by many MPs -  especially male MPs -  and explained 
as follows by a parliamentarian from Lango:
“we Langi, we are traditionally satisfied with the land being owned by the man as head of 
the family, on behalf of the family. That was a little too much, what the government was 
proposing. We prefer to remain as we are. There were a series of meetings we held at our 
respective areas. Women’s groups, councils - they all agreed to maintain the status quo”82.
As an organisation whose rationale and focus was on women’s rights, by contrast, 
Uwonet systematically addressed the various issues involved in the reform agenda from a 
gender point of view. The fact that women have been generally supportive of Museveni’s 
government, under which they have made significant advances, may explain why the 
approach was never fully confrontational. While Uwonet cooperated with the ministry, 
however, it also took clear oppositional stance on some of the land issues. Advocating a better 
protection of women and other vulnerable groups, Uwonet’s programme demanded co- 
ownership of land for spouses and a guaranteed representation of women in land management 
bodies. Such demands clashed with traditionalist views, which led the organisation to take a 
broader, critical position “against any kind of customary tenure, because they basically 
discriminate against women”83. This kind of reasoning was further elaborated to the point that 
even mailo ownership was rejected -  Uwonet, for example, backed the proposals for a 
Shs. 1,000 ground fee and for certificates of occupancy -  as was the idea of vesting land in the 
kabakaship.
The Uganda Land Alliance, on the other hand, focused on land in a broader sense. 
The activities of the Alliance were allegedly driven by a consistent design: “our idea was 
always that people didn’t really know what is happening, so we needed to find it out and let 
them know”84. Thus, a key objective of the alliance was to go out to the districts. In order to 
do this, independent funding was obtained from the British Department for International 
Development. In addition, the institutional affiliation of some existing NGOs (such as the
81 Mina Matembe, in Parliamentary Debates, 23 June 1998, p.4097
82 Omodi Okot, MP, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
83 Sheila Kawamara, coordinator of Uganda Women’s Network, interview (Kampala, 15 June 2000).
84 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
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Forum for Women in Democracy, controlled by prominent MP Winnie Byanyima) became 
essential, alongside that of the founding individuals, to use the latter’s grassroots 
organisations, reach out to the different parts of the countiy, and gather the necessary 
information on land affairs in Karamoja, Lira or wherever else85. In the end, the ULA opted 
for a position different from that of Uwonet and closer to emerging views86 about the need to 
respect land use traditions. From local consultations in Lango, for instance, the ULA derived 
the idea that, while some form of titling could be contemplated, clan control over access to 
land was to be preserved as the ultimate safeguard for community survival. The clan would 
ensure that land was not grabbed by outsiders nor amassed by greedy members of the 
community, so that the Lango people would not be deprived of their most important resource 
and become landless87. But the ULA’s pro-customary approach was extended to other aspects 
of the reform, such as the mailo issue, leading to some surprising positions: “I would have 
thought they would try to protect the marginalised group, but they were in fact defending the 
landlords!”88. The alliance coordinator -  a Muganda lawyer and university lecturer -  claims 
that the issue was simply not a priority to the ULA: “the decision not to be involved on the 
mailo issue was taken rather randomly. In a sense, we simply happened to focus on other 
issues”89. Yet, her argument closely resounds Mengo’s when she points out that, “if you talk 
to ordinary Buganda peasants they say they feel safe. For them there is no issue of lack of 
security on mailo (aside from Kibale). People know exactly what their rights are”90.
The Land Bill also spelled out the organisation of the decentralised structures 
originally established by the constitution. While the latter already contained the principle of 
decentralising the management of land affairs, the question of how actually to do it was mixed 
up with other contentious issues. Mengo*s demands for handing the 9,000 square miles of 
former public land to the kabakaship, for instance, hid a struggle with district administrations, 
which, in the government’s scheme, were supposed to manage land affairs on behalf of local 
people. Moreover, the land bureaucracy at the ministry was not happy at all with the 
prospected decentralisation of land administration. The ministry wanted control of the 
implementation process, whereas devolution meant that powers and resources were being
85 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
86 According to Alden Wily, for instance, “if there were a single point of radicalism in tenure reform as occurring in Sub- 
Saharan Africa it is this: for the first time in one hundred years, states are slowly being forced to recognise customary rights 
in land (and therefore customary regimes) as legal in their own right” (quoted in Palmer 2000:271).
87 Uganda Land Alliance (1998).
88 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
89 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
90 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
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moved away from the centre -  whether in favour of the districts or in favour of cultural 
institutions91.
The publication of the Land Bill generated very intense and heated public 
discussions. At times, the debate seemed set to dig deeper divisions and to be escalating 
towards more open and possibly violent conflict. Parliament played an important role in 
working out compromises, bringing together the different groupings, and building some kind 
of consensus to legitimise the new legislation.
The parliamentary process: negotiations, deadline and the Land A ct 1998
Following standard parliamentary procedures, the Land Bill had to be examined by a 
sessional committee which would then report to the plenary assembly. Given the late tabling 
of the bill, however, the committee was hard pressed by the time constraints imposed by a 
constitutional deadline set for early July. And even more pressure fell on parliament, which 
only started debating the proposed law on the 20th of June. As it did on other occasions, the 
government counted on the pressure the deadline would put on parliamentarians to have the 
measure passed with minimal amendments92. In the end, the bill was literally rushed through 
parliament to meet the constitutional deadline.
As much as the teams involved in drafting a bill have an impact on the selection of 
the issues that the law will address -  and of those that will not be part of the reform -  
parliamentary committees are often extremely important in shaping parliament’s reaction to 
government policy. In a situation where parliamentarians are relatively isolated, they tend to 
rely very heavily on a committee’s authoritative inquiry into the issue which is on the table 
and expect it to provide crucial information and guidelines for the debate in the assembly. 
Consequently, if a committee decides to introduce important amendments, the government 
may run into troubles as it only has relatively weak instruments to streamline support for its 
policies. The absence of whips and the lack of rigid alignments means that members have a 
relatively large scope for manoeuvre both in the assembly and in the committee, and decisions 
will often be supported by uniquely arranged coalitions.
91 McAuslan, interview (London, 16 May 2000).
92 The government recently adopted the same strategy, for example, with the Referendum Acts 1999 and 2000 and with the 
Constitutional Amendment Act 2000. But the strategy itself dates back at least to October 1989, when a bill titled “A statute 
to amend Legal Notice n.1/1986 so as to extend the term of office of the National Resistance Movement for five years from 
the 25th January 1990” was passed by suspending the rules of procedures that require a minimum period of time between the 
first and the second reading; see Nsibambi (1994a:24).
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The parliamentary committee which examined the land issue included several MPs 
with experience in the field and, facilitated by the British Department For International 
Development, it carried out a public consultation tour involving several districts93. Reflecting 
the extreme relevance attributed to the bill and the number of interests that it touched upon, 
the committee complained in its report that members had been subject to “numerous 
outbursts, intimidation and attempted blackmail”94. The report also described the bill as 
‘contradictory’, as most provisions “leave lingering doubts and uncertainties on what its 
intentions are”, and complained about its hurried and late introduction or “the muddled way in 
which [the bill] was presented”95. With regard to the content of the proposed legislation, the 
committee’s considerations had the effect of moderating the reformist zeal of the government. 
In particular, it was pointed out that the conversion of leasehold and customary tenure into 
freehold might encourage “the growth of a class of rural proletarians depending on the 
decisions of land owners for their existence”, and that the focus should be shifted on tenure 
security, “which can be delivered by both customary and formal systems”96, rather than on the 
formal land title per se. Tenure security, in turn, required the proposed certificates of 
customary ownership to be given a status equal to that of other titles, otherwise the conversion 
to freehold would undermine customary tenure by assuming the latter’s inferiority and 
insecurity.
The Land Act (1998)
The final Land Act (1998), one of the most ambitious pieces of legislation passed 
under Museveni, aims at a comprehensive re-organisation of the tenure, ownership and 
management of land97. The new law not only spells out the details and provides for the 
implementation of what was decided when the constitution was passed, it also addresses 
issues that had previously been left hanging. Through its most significant provisions, the act 
alters the status and protection of land occupants; it provides for the formalisation of 
customary land tenure; and it arranges for the upgrade of leasehold into freehold. With “a 
challenging and ambitious programme. It seeks to provide security of tenure to all land users
93 The British DFID also sponsored a seminar for MPs on the land bill organised by the Forum for Women in Democracy, 
and provided the assistance of a British legal expert, Professor Patrick McAuslan, to refine the drafts of the bill.
94 Parliamentary Committee on Works, Trasport, Communications, and Lands, Housing and Physical Planning, Report on the 
Land Bill (1998:3).
95 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (1998:15).
96 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (1998:23).
97 The Land Act (1998) repeals the Public Lands Acts (1965/1969) and the Land Reform Decree (1975).
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under a pluralistic tenure system ... and ... also provides for the protection of tenants’ rights”98 
and for a decentralised system of land affairs management. In spite of the several 
compromises that it required, the Act was deemed “in many respects a revolutionary law, 
overturning a century of land relations in Uganda and laying the groundwork for the evolution 
of a market in land based on individual ownership”99.
Crucial changes are introduced concerning peasants who occupy land that they do 
not own. The reform acknowledges as bona fide those peasants who occupied or used land 
unchallenged for at least 12 years ‘before the coming into force of the constitution’ (i.e. since 
1983), as well as small farmers who were settled on the land in question by government 
authorities (in which case, the government will compensate landowners)100. Not only lawful 
and bona fide occupants are now entitled to obtain certificates of occupancy, but they are to 
be charged a nominal ground fee only, as opposed to a market-determined commercial rent. 
Such fees are to be established by the districts, but a ceiling is set nationally at a very low 
Shs. 1,000 per year. These formal titles are meant to protect occupation and thus to provide 
incentives for farmers to invest in the development of land and increase productivity101. The 
combination of the above measures -  certificates and nominal fees -  not only formalises and 
transforms occupancy into statutory tenancy102, it also enables recognised occupants to inherit, 
to have a first option to buy in the case of sale, and, with the owner’s approval, to sub-divide 
or sub-let the tenancy103. By contrast, landlords will only be able to evict their tenants if the 
ground fee is not paid, or the plot is abandoned, for three consecutive years104. Albeit limited 
to land use rather than formal ownership, the explicit redistribution of rights over land -  
“giving security of tenure to the tenants of mailo land and reducing landlords’ rights to ‘bare’ 
ownership” -  was held to follow “the political undertakings made to the tenants during the 
guerrilla struggle of the NRM in the early 1980s”105.
The Land Act provides for the conversion of leasehold into freehold, with leasehold 
tenure to be retained only for expatriates and for concessions for mining companies. Again, 
the final version of the act is somewhat different from the original content of the bill. The 
change was made with regard to the upgrade of leasehold into freehold. The concern was that
98 Quan (2000b:204).
99 McAuslan (2000:1).
100 Ait30, Land Act (1998).
101 The rationale behind titling was that, while it might have been true that “even if we gave these tenants the rights to get 
titles they could not afford it. But-that does not stop us from doing the right things, because ... while the tenants of today 
might not afford to get titles, their sons will, or their grandsons”, Hope Kabirisi Luberenga (Women Bushenyi), in 
Proceedings of die Constituent Assembly (5 May 1995, p.4174).
102 Cf. McAuslan (2000:8).
103 Aitt35-36, Land Act (1998).
104 Aitt32 and 38, Land Act (1998).
105 McAuslan (2000:12).
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people who obtained plots of land on lease out of political influence would be allowed to get 
full ownership for free106. Whereas officials at the Ministry wanted people to pay for such 
upgrade, MPs decided that there would not be a need to pay for the conversion for plots 
smaller than 100 hectares107. In a slightly different reconstruction of what happened, it was the 
parliamentary committee which, objecting to the fairness of private gains derived from an 
automatic conversion of leasehold into freehold as a wrong and unfair misapplication of the 
constitution108, suggested that market-rate payments be imposed for leaseholds of over 100 
hectares. Again, this was meant to include and accommodate political demands and fears that 
outsiders could freely come into possession of land in an area ‘belonging’ to a specific 
community109.
A third major change introduced by the act concerned customary tenure. While 
customary tenure was recognised by the constitution, the act envisaged the possible 
individualisation, through the emission of certificates of customary ownership, of customary 
land which was occupied or used by individuals or households. Subject to the payment of a 
fee, these same households or individuals were even allowed to acquire freehold titles. 
Supporters of these arrangements expected important benefits to be derived from issuing 
certificates, since they provide “conclusive evidence of customary rights ... subject to the 
limitations identified within each certificate”110: certificates should improve security of tenure 
and thus both the incentive and the possibility to develop land.
The new law also takes up some concerns expressed by the parliamentary committee 
and makes it clear that decisions which limit ownership, occupation or use by women, 
children and disabled are to be null and void, in line with the constitutional protection of the 
rights of these categories111.
Finally, the act draws a distinction “between communally used land [e.g. common 
grazing land] and communally owned land which may be used by individuals”112. The 
possibility to establish Communal Land Associations is envisaged for communal land 
ownership or management -  on customary or other tenure -  which is occupied or used for 
communal purposes such as grazing or woodfuel113. These associations are inspired by a 
principle of self-organisation by local communities that was already embraced by the South
06 Lt.Col. Mudoola (Kigulu North, Iganga), in Parliamentary Debates (22 June 1998, p.4073).
07 McAuslan, interview (London, 16 May 2000).
08 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (199822).
09 McAuslan (2000:15).
10 Toulmin and Quan (2000226).
11 A rt 28, Land Act (1998).
12 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (1998:19).
13 Artt. 16 and 24, Land Act (1998).
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African reform of 1996 and the Tanzanian reform of 1997, both of which are explicitly 
referred to in the report by the parliamentary committee. The punctilious procedures that are 
to be followed when forming such associations (e.g. arrange a first meeting, understand the 
meaning of the association, provide a model statute, etc.), however, point at a concern that, at 
the local level, people may actually lack the capacity to organise for themselves, and may 
give district authorities undue control over supposedly-autonomous communal organisations 
(e.g. through the registration process).
The way land affairs are managed is also radically changed by the Act, which 
decentralises administration to local governments and other local bodies. The land law 
establishes the independent District Land Boards envisaged by the constitution. These will 
include representatives drawn from the local government councils that exist at the different 
levels (district, county, etc.) and are meant "to hold and allocate land in the district which is 
not owned by any person or authority1 -  i.e. to administer former public land and manage 
related issues. As a concession to Baganda requests, these tasks may be done in the name of a 
cultural or traditional leader114.
Two further sets of local bodies are created by the act. When issuing certificates of 
customary ownership, the above District Boards are to be assisted by Parish Land 
Committees, while District, Sub-County and Urban Land Tribunals are instituted to 
adjudicate land disputes.
The land that remains vested in the national government is to be held and managed 
by a Uganda Land Commission115. The Commission will also be responsible for a land fund 
for loans to tenants by occupancy who want to acquire lease- or freehold or, alternatively, for 
the government to buy land and redistribute it to these same target groups or to re-settle 
landless people. Those concerning the land fund are among the major changes brought to the 
original bill. The parliamentary committee suggested to drop the discrimination between areas 
that would get grants and others that would only receive loans116, and thus the fund was 
broadened to serve the whole population, rather than being confined to sort out compensation 
problems in selected areas.
114 Art. 51,Land Act (199%).
115 Ait. 47, Land Act (1998).
116 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (1998:38).
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Who got what?
In spite of the positive comments that the new legislation has attracted, the settlement 
agreed with the Act left a number of unsolved controversial issues on the table. The latter 
include, for example, the question of women’s ownership of land, the position of 
unrecognised occupants (‘squatters’), and the problem of tenants living in the former ‘lost 
counties’. The comprehensiveness of the act was also questioned in radical terms by some 
opposition politicians: “as a matter of fact, we don’t really have land reform in this country. I 
mean, we don’t have provisions dealing with land use, with land consolidation, and all the 
rest. Those things are not there. What we had is change in tenure systems”117; “vesting land in 
the population, that may be reform ... But the rest is something done to capitalise politically, 
and that does not last”118. While these radical views are relatively isolated, two main critiques 
have been moved to the Land Act from several quarters. They concern the decentralised 
arrangements for land administration and the protection of women’s rights over land.
The risk of increasing institutional confusion by creating a new set of decentralised 
structures for the management of land affairs was pointed out during the parliamentary 
debate. The isolated cry of a member of the House, for example, warned, with regard to the 
proposed parish land committees, “not to introduce another monster into land management... 
Let that job be done with the structures in place, along with the customary authorities, they 
resolve most of the issues at that level. It is cheap. It is not subject to manipulation ...”119. But 
the advice was not taken, and it was only after the law established the new organs that doubts 
began to emerge. The arrangements adopted were criticised for being based upon an entirely 
new set of structures, rather than building on what already existed at the local-level or trying 
to integrate traditional authorities. It was also claimed that the relationships between the 
districts and the national government and between district- and parish-level bodies contained 
built-in elements of hierarchical control (as opposed to leaving room for locally specific 
solutions to emerge)120. Most importantly, it was soon pointed out that the creation of a multi­
tiered structure implied budgetary expenses and required an administrative capacity that had 
not been fully considered in advance. It was calculated that the establishment of 52 district 
land boards and as many land tribunals would require 260 and 156 officials respectively; the
117 Okulo-Epak, interview (Kampala, 19 June 2000).
118 Okello-Okello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
119 Kirunda Kivenjinja (Bugweri County, Iganga), in Parliamentary Debates (23 June 1998, p.4102).
120 Quan (2000b:203).
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917 new sub-county tribunals needed a 2,751-strong personnel, and the 7,000 parish land 
committees demanded an astronomic 28,000 functionaries. On top of it, office facilities and 
an undetermined number of ad hoc mediators were also necessary. In other words, the entire 
setup required, to be up and running, the recruitment, training and remuneration of over 
30,000 Ugandans with some formal education121. Huge, probably unsustainable financial 
estimates corresponded to these figures, and the question of how actually to implement the 
Act became an issue which would itself take time to solve. Accordingly, a Land Act 
Implementation Unit was established at the ministry for land to facilitate the implementation 
process and, in late 2000, a Land (Amendment) Act was passed which protracted the 
responsibility of magistrates and local council courts over land disputes until proper land 
tribunals could be established at district and sub-county levels122.
The object of a second important criticism was the lack of protection for women’s 
rights. The activities of groups concerned with women’s rights -  especially the Uganda 
Women’s Network, and the Uganda Land Alliance, but also others such as Fida (the 
Association of Uganda Women Lawyers) or the Uganda Law Society -  did produce some 
effects. Among their important achievements were the requirement of the children’s and 
spouses’ consent for the sale of land where a family resides, the introduction of quotas for the 
representation of women in land bodies, and the provision ruling out as (null and void’ any 
discriminatory practices based on customary law.
A major embodiment of gender concerns which did not make it into the final Act, 
however, was co-ownership of land by spouses. During the land debate, the issue stirred the 
opposition of traditionalist groups such as the Acholi parliamentary association. According to 
these groups, altering the position of women with regard to land would be against customary 
tenure, which is not only prevalent in several areas of the country but also constitutionally 
recognised123. This position enjoyed the more or less tacit support of a broader spectrum of 
parliamentarians who thought the time was not yet ripe for such a radical change in customary 
and family practices. To face this strong opposition, the demand for co-ownership only had a 
weakly organised backing, mostly on the part of NGOs such as Uwonet: “what strikes us is 
that the demand came from outside, not from government or from parliament. It came from
121 Adapted from The Monitor (Kampala, 4 October 1998), which was based on the old figure of 45 districts. As recently as 
late 2000 — just ahead of the 2001 presidential election — five new districts were created.
122 The Monitor and New Vision (Kampala, 6 December 2000). The Land Regulations were also contextually passed to
operationalise the Land Act.
The Monitor and New Vision (Kampala, 4 June 1999).
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people hardly organised, from outside, in a rough form”124. The effort that these advocacy 
organisations made to articulate the issue was not enough to gather and mobilise the necessary 
support. This is revealing of how difficult it can be, under individualised politics, to organise 
the backing required for similar initiatives successfully to go through the different stages of 
the policy process. In spite of the support it usually lent to gender issues, the government had 
never explicitly included co-ownership in its agenda, since the well-known opposition of a 
large section of male MPs was bound to emerge and would have split the pro-government 
ranks. The comment of a minister in charge of land affairs on the ‘Matembe amendment* (an 
amendment granting land co-ownership to spouses, which was allegedly left out of the Act 
despite apparently being passed by parliament) is quite telling: it “was really a hand of God to 
the government!”125. To add to the controversy, some donors lent their support to women’s 
groups who suggested the amendment was intentionally omitted from the final text. The 
British Department for International Development, for example, refused to release funds to 
implement the Land Act before the co-ownership clause was restored126.
Another category of vulnerable people whose interests did not make it into the final 
settlement was that of the squatters, or undocumented tenants, ‘the weakest and most 
vulnerable sections of society’ for whom there is no mention in the Act. Squatters were left 
out of the ‘deal’ between Museveni and the peasants of the central area. This was largely due 
to the position taken by the parliamentary committee, which pointed out that the definition of 
bona fide occupants, as spelt out in the original bill, was problematic, because it implied a 
questionable protection of trespassers127. Such definition was thus restricted to the two 
categories mentioned above (unchallenged occupants for more than 12 years or people settled 
by the government), and scrapping those who settled on land “genuinely believing that no 
registered owner ... was available from whom the occupant could obtain consent”, as this was 
considered hardly an eventuality in Buganda128. Accordingly, the latter remained unprotected 
squatters who would have to negotiate their own agreements with the landowners through the 
newly established figure of a ‘mediator’. This was introduced after the recommendations of
124 Matia Baguma-Isoke, MP and Minister of State for Lands and Environment, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000).
125 Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 16 May 2000). The true story of the Tost amendment", however, has never been 
entirely clear. The proposal for the amendment had been drafted together by parliamentarians and organisations concerned 
with women’s rights. Later, the MP who tabled the amendment, Miria Matembe, privately admitted she a mistake with 
parliamentary procedures. She thought the amendment had been passed, whereas it had only been accepted in principle and 
sent for the draftsman to refine it. But then, when the issue was to be sorted and approved as a precise provision in the text, 
Matembe was not in the house and the amendment was thus dropped. The rumour soon spread that she had been set up 
(Baguma-Isoke, interview, and McAuslan, interview, London, 16 May 2000).
126 New Vision (Kampala, 5 December 1998).
127 Parliamentary Committee, Report on the Land Bill (1998:27-31).
128 McAuslan (2000:12).
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the parliamentary committee and was meant to recognise the role of local-level traditional 
leaders and elders in the settlement of land disputes.
Similarly to the squatters, people living in the former ‘lost counties’ of Kibale district 
did not obtain all they were hoping for. During the land debate, some prominent Banyoro 
managed to steer the work of the cabinet so to have the Kibale issue addressed by a specific 
clause of the Land Bill, from which it was initially missing. But no mention of the area was to 
be found in the final version of the Act. The fear was that a land fund that would issue 
compensations or loans in favour of some selected areas would foster the perception that 
public money were being used in a discriminatory way, and thus it was agreed to drop 
specific references to Kibale or any other districts.
Most prominent among the voices raised during the reform process were those of the 
Baganda elite. Public appeals from people like the Katikiiro of Buganda, Joseph Ssemogerere, 
or the Attorney General, John Katende, frequently appeared on the media, and it was never a 
secret to anybody that “someone from the palace was putting pressures”129. On occasions, 
lobbying allegedly reached the level of intimidation:
“individual Constituent Assembly delegates -  and later MPs -  were threatened to toe the 
line of Mengo. They let them know that they would find their homes or plantations burnt 
down, destroyed. And to those non-Baganda MPs from Buganda, that they would not be 
able to go back to their homes!”130.
Mengo wanted and obtained the legal recognition of mailo tenure which existed prior 
to the 1975 Land Reform Decree, but they were penalised on the issue of the protection of 
tenants’ rights131. Neither did Mengo manage to get it its own way on the question of vesting 
the 9,000 square miles of former public land in the Kabaka, as pointed out. The attempts at 
orchestrating support through the instrumental use of the Buganda caucus was only partly 
successful:
“we had been meeting the Katikiiro twice. Then we were invited by the Lukiiko, and they 
presented the position they wanted us to defend. We studied it and found out what was in 
line with the constitutional provisions. For example, the idea of handing the controversial
129 Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000). The palace, in this case, is that of the Baganda establishment.
130 Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000). The Muganda chairman of the parliamentary committee who 
examined and reported on the bill claims that “Mengo, die Katikiiro and the bataka, they put a lot of pressure, through the 
radio, the press, submissions and so on. They vilified me”, Benedict Mutyaba, MP, interview (Kampala, 26 May 1999).
After the Act was passed, it was claimed that Baganda landlords were trying to boycott its implementation by refusing to 
collect the nominal fees they are entitled to. While it is true that fees are so low that landlords hardly have an interest in
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9,000 sqm to the Kabaka was unfeasible, as this would have meant the Kabaka to perform 
an administrative function, which is unconstitutional. But we managed to work out and pass 
a slightly different motion, suggesting that the body in charge of managing that land would 
have done so in the name of the king. This was a representative function, a symbolic 
recognition. And the caucus agreed on that. But the house was against us, and it took us 
some lobbying until we managed to convince them. Even Mengo realised our proposal was 
not as bad”132.
From the point of view of legislators, however, parliament did play an important role 
in “ensuring that local, ethnic or class interests figure in resource allocation decisions and in 
mediating political conflict”133. The two key bridges between the legislature and the executive 
were the Movement caucus and the parliamentary committee. The first one was used by the 
government to rally support for the proposed law and to lobby recalcitrant groups, especially 
those Baganda MPs who were not favourable to government policy. The parliamentary 
committee turned out to be a critical player because, in the absence of highly institutionalised 
and binding political groupings, individual MPs tend to rely a lot on the information and 
recommendations that committees produce. In addition, the committee provided an entry 
point for external inputs in the form of submissions. Other than these two forums, 
parliamentarians largely assembled through ethnically- or district-based groups. While a 
comparative lack of information may have restrained members of the House from challenging 
the views of the executive, they did try to consult with the population and among themselves 
and then to put forward some specific points. The Baganda and a group of northern MPs 
concerned with protecting customary practices, in particular, were prominently vocal.
Political parties never appeared to play any significant role in the reform process for 
the adoption of a new land policy. In spite of the relevance of the stakes, parties did not 
articulate their position on the land issue nor did they enter the debate through formal 
submissions, lobbying or any other activities. When some multipartists took a position on the 
issue, this was done exclusively on an individual basis. At most, in a couple of cases, the gist 
of these individual contributions could be traced back to the political culture of the party the 
specific politician belonged to. Ken LukyamuzTs attempt at having the deadline for the land 
law postponed of one year, for example, reflected the views of the Conservative Party 
(although Lukyamuzi had a point when he claimed that the reform was being hurried through
collecting them, not doing it may imply that there is no recognition of the tenancy; Mubbala, interview (Kampala, 30 May 
2000).
132 Kinobe, interview (Kampala, 3 June 1999).
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parliament). Similarly, Yusuf Okulo-Epak’s insistence that it was necessary to vest land in the 
people was in line with the traditional social pledges of his party, the Uganda People’s 
Congress (the point about vesting land in the people, however, was a widely shared rather 
than a partisan one).
Contextual explanations of why parties were not involved in the process have been 
advanced. According to some multipartists, for example, the Land Bill did not contain 
anything that was really new, and thus multipartists did not need to make up their minds or 
coordinate their actions because they had already discussed land issues in the Constituent 
Assembly134. Individual action was enough. A leading member of the UPC also claims that the 
party thought it strategically wise to keep out of a debate that was pitting against each other 
its two historical enemies -  Museveni and the Buganda kingdom. Why not just wait, let them 
clash and then “collect the pieces”?135
The Democratic Party, on the other hand, contend that they organised a few meetings 
at the local level in which the land issue was discussed. Some prominent members of this 
moderate party also raised concerns regarding land in Buganda, where they supported the idea 
of entrusting the controversial 9,000 square miles in the Buganda Land Board and limiting the 
notion of bona fide so as not to include squatters. But this was never articulated in any party 
document, and its status remained that of the party leader’s informal interventions. The party 
president explains this choice by claiming that, when the bill was debated, parliament and 
parties had not yet developed the constructive relationship that would emerge over the 
following couple of years. Parties were not taken ‘seriously’, and no submissions of policy 
proposals were really expected from them136.
The position of the Movement group was quite intricate. The land issue risked 
splitting the bulk of the ruling coalition along a Baganda-versws-westemers cleavage, with the 
latter accused of trying to grab land in the central kingdom. The few voices that were raised in 
favour of a stronger role of the state over land affairs came from people from the south-west, 
where good land is notoriously scarce. Allegations were made that these people aimed at 
using their control of the government to put their hands on the fertile land which is abundant 
in Buganda. In spite of Museveni’s attempt to have the members of the Movement caucus toe 
the government line, Movement supporters were also divided between those favourable to the 
Baganda establishment and those supporting Museveni’s attempt to link directly with the
133 Grindle -  Thomas (1991:62).
134 Nyai, interview (Kampala, 14 June 1999).
135 Patrick Mwondha, interview (Kampala, 22 June 2000). After the Act was passed, the UPC hinted at the need to join forces 
with the Baganda in opposing its implementation, The Monitor (Kampala, 13 October 1998).
136 Paul Ssemogerere, interview (Kampala, 12 July 1999).
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peasants. But these positions were in favour or against government policy, rather than against 
anything coming from the Secretariat. The Movement as an organisation, which at the time 
was in the process of being revived and did not have functioning structures in place, did not 
articulate a specific position.
Among NGOs, the Uganda Land Alliance attracted a lot of attention as the strongest 
advocacy coalition emerged in the land reform process. The Alliance contributed to changing 
a few provisions of the proposed law. They raised questions concerning communal holding of 
customary land and women’s representation in land bodies (a demand promoted together with 
Uwonet). The land fund was also strongly supported by the ULA, albeit they meant to use it 
for Kibale district only137. In addition to the ULA, as already mentioned, other civil 
organisations were involved as well, including FID A, the Uganda Law Society, the Forum for 
Women in Democracy and the Uganda Women’s Network. Both in the case of the ULA and 
of these other organisations, however, it was virtually only NGO groups (or individuals) 
based in Kampala who put forward their views, albeit they would claim that such views were 
supported in this or that area of the country. There was hardly any attempt, at the local level, 
to organise autonomously. No real grassroots organisation emerged in spite of the fact that the 
stakes were very high for poor peasants.
While a number of broad consultative processes were carried out, their relevance to 
the process should not be overestimated and they should be looked at with some scepticism. 
Anything can be labelled ‘consultation’, and consultations can often be manipulated or access 
to them restricted. In its tour of Uganda’s districts, for example, the technical committee that 
investigated land issues in the early 1990s was not exactly open and available for anyone to 
make an input: “we were selecting people, telling them that we wanted to meet so and so”138. 
Later on, a cabinet committee working on the draft bill visited a number of problematic areas 
-  including Ankole, Kibaale, Mbale and parts of Buganda -  to hear from the people on some 
controversial issues. Perhaps of necessity, however, this committee would inform in advance 
local opinion leaders, “so that they would tell the people and mobilise them”139. But who 
would be mobilised? And who would not be? And to say what? These questions brings us 
back to the broader issue of how interests are organised. According to an official involved in 
the reform process, for example, some groups were more adept than others in organising and 
mobilising their constituencies:
137 Mwebaza, interview (Kampala, 9 June 2000).
138 OkelloOkello, interview (Kampala, 20 June 2000).
139 Nsamba-Gayiiya, interview (Kampala, 13 June 2000).
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“the most organised was a group from the north who was advancing requests to leave 
communal land as it was. They were opposed to land titling to individuals, to avoid creating 
entry points for foreigners. They also spoke with one voice, always backing the one who 
was speaking for the group. ... They used to caucus and also to go back to their areas to 
form a uniform view, so that when officials would visit, they would get a consistent 
demand, everywhere the same”140.
But, again, these opportunities -  and the search for a single voice -  may be skilfully 
used to guide what people ‘say’. The question goes well beyond control over consultative 
processes. Some groups claim that they were entirely left out of widely publicised 
consultative tours: “the argument was that women do not want to own land. But that’s not 
true. The women we met had never seen the consultations that the Ministry carried out!”141. 
The less local groups have an opportunity to organise for themselves, the more easily popular 
‘voices’ can be selected and manipulated.
Finally, western donors and advisers entered the frame by providing seemingly 
neutral technical expertise and promoting the study of aspects of the existing use of land in 
the country. This was notably the case with the World Bank and the British Department For 
International Development (DFID). The reports from which the land debate took off were 
‘sponsored’ by the Bank, and, as pointed out, they duly reflected a largely market-friendly 
approach to reform. These studies displayed a crucial concern for the rationalisation and 
formalisation of land affairs, promoting titling and tenure security as key factors for the 
creation of efficient land markets, the improvement of incentives to invest in land, and the 
development of agriculture at large. These views, legitimised by ‘indigenous’ research and 
properly divulged, appear to have significantly shaped the way many Ugandan decision­
makers looked at land reform. As for DFID, high level Ugandan officials either deny an 
hidden agenda or they claim that they “do have their agenda -  the poverty thing and the co- 
ownership, the gender issue -  but they didn’t push it at the time”142. The most direct 
intervention that DlFD made was probably the one subsequent to the approval of the reform, 
when it put pressure for the question of women’s rights to be addressed. Otherwise, the 
legislation which was being debated, and the line of the government, were probably going in a 
direction that pleased the British department, so that there was not necessarily much more to
140 Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000).
141 Kawamara, interview (Kampala, 15 June 2000).
142 Nsamba-Gayiiya, interview (Kampala, 13 June 2000).
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do than to support the whole process. In addition, DFID had only entered the frame towards 
the end of the process, some three or four months before the reform was passed143. The 
Uganda Land Alliance and the Forum for Women in Democracy received assistance as 
representatives of civil interests, with an eye to issues of poverty reduction or women’s rights. 
But, while DFID supported the poverty eradication programmes of the Ugandan government, 
it was still elaborating its own policy guidelines with regard to land reform in African 
countries. A general approach began to be articulated only around 1999, and thus, it was 
claimed, “Uganda itself has actually been very much a lesson learning experience”144.
Political organisations were not supposed to participate to (no-party) decision­
making, and they did not: Ugandan parties were almost completely absent from the land 
reform process, in spite of the fact that they are to some extent involved in political 
competition and that party-like arrangements have been emerging in parliament. How did the 
palpable absence of parties afreet the formulation of the new land policy? Land issues are, to a 
significant extent, ‘basic’ and everyday issues. Understanding the position of the tenants, the 
question of the ‘lost counties’ or the rationale behind the land fund was probably easier than, 
say, pondering what state assets to privatise. In addition, the ‘consultations’ and the research 
that were carried out, and the dissemination of the findings they produced (at least to 
decision-makers, but also through the media), helped to clarify the content of the proposed 
reform. The presence of a free press nurtured a lively public debate. Thus, it is unlikely that 
the participation of political parties to the process would have significantly added to the 
formulation and the understanding of the policy options. It may be speculated that, in a 
process that lacked autonomous grassroots inputs, well-functioning political parties might 
have provided a better channel for local-level concerns to be expressed, linking the 
countryside with the core decision-making arenas. Even parties of local notables such as those 
that were present in Uganda in the 1960s could have contributed to give representation to the 
countryside. Yet, the alleged ‘interests’ of non-urban groups nevertheless found their way into 
the process. While the land reform that the country adopted in the 1990s was largely directed 
by the government, the policy-making process was, by African standards, relatively open. 
Museveni provided the main political input, backed by Western donors concerned with 
promoting the rationalisation of institutional arrangements. But parliament did contribute to 
the substance of the legislative process; non-governmental organisations were allowed to have
10 Mubbala, interview (Kampala, 30 May 2000) and Baguma-Isoke, interview (Kampala, 29 May 2000).
144 Joanne Bosworth, member of the Land Act Implementation Unit at the Ministry of Land, Waters and Environment, 
interview (Kampala, 2 June 2000).
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a say on the proposed measures; a number of other informal groupings, often united by a 
common background or cultural focus rather than actually organised (as in the case of the 
loosely co-ordinated Baganda elite), exerted some pressures to shape the new policy; different 
actors taking part to the process also carried out more or less open ‘popular consultations’. As 
a result, the reform process was a reflection of a semi-liberal regime which is open enough to 
allow debate on policy measures, but limits the organisation of inputs so to retain clear control 




The dem ise of a  democratic model and 
the organisation of political hegem ony
The democratic value of Uganda’s no-party experiment must be assessed in the 
context of the history of the country and of the region at large. These have hardly been 
hotbeds for democracy and political stability. With these terms of comparison, the progress 
that Uganda has made in the last fifteen years must be acknowledged. Under the Movement 
regime, the country has experienced important breaks from the dictatorships and human rights 
abuses of the past. Albeit progress and reform have been too slow and limited in the political 
sphere1, popular participation and the rule of law have been significantly improved. In 
particular, the achievement of relative political stability and the regularisation of electoral 
practices should not be overlooked. If it is true that “tenure strengthens democracy”2, the 
institutionalisation of elections is a crucial component of such process.
The problem with the current system is that, so far, elections have been open to 
individual contestation only. Moreover, during the 2001 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, political violence, intimidation and violations of basic rules were on the increase3. It 
is of primary importance that the regime is brought to account for all this if malpractice is to 
be avoided in the future. But, there is no need to throw away the baby with the bath-water. 
The contests for individual parliamentary seats remain essentially open and, while Museveni’s 
69 per cent presidential majority was probably enhanced by the government’s interference
1 Human Rights Watch (1999:3,42).
2 Kohli (1990:8).
3 The controversial presidential campaign was epitomized by a remark made by Museveni: ‘Tm not ready to hand over power 
to people or groups of people who have no ability to manage a nation ... Why should I sentence Ugandans to suicide by 
handing over power to people we fought and defeated? It's dangerous despite the fact that the constitution allows them to run 
against m e... At times the constitution may not be the best tool to direct us politically for it allows wrong and doubtful people 
to contest for power”. The quotation can be found, alongside a detailed account of many instances of violence that 
characterised the campaign, in Human Rights Watch (2001). On the criticisms raised by Ugandan and international election
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with the election, nobody seriously doubts that the president still enjoys a wide consensus 
among the rural masses.
The picture that emerges from this study is nuanced, and in my conclusions I do not 
wish to simplify this nuanced portrait. If opposing supposedly fully-fledged ‘democratic’ 
states to ‘non-democratic’ ones can be a useful strategy in political science modelling, and 
sometimes in political prescription, in reality “there exists no simple dichotomy between a 
few ‘true’ democracies and the rest which are labelled sham or pseudo-democracies”4. Rather, 
electoral regimes that combine coercive and constitutional practices and lie between 
authoritarian systems and formal democracies can often be found5. A cardinal component of 
this complex picture is the presence, in Uganda, of a party-like hegemonic organisation such 
as the Movement. Relatively open and competitive systems in Africa have frequently been 
associated with the presence of an overwhelmingly dominant organisation, as in the case of 
the Botswana Democratic Party, the Senegalese Socialist Party (until recently), and the 
African National Congress (albeit South Africa is still a very young ‘democracy’). While 
these polities may only experience a limited practice of political competition and democratic 
rule, the presence of paramount organisations allegedly brings ‘mixed blessings’ that may 
include, for example, an increased stability and legitimacy for the political system6.
The investigation in the politics of Uganda between 1994 and 2000 which was 
carried out in this thesis reveals important inconsistencies in the current system. The research 
set out to explore the practical implications of the notion of no-party electoral politics. At the 
more general level, the focus was on the following questions: how is Uganda’s no-party 
system working, in practice? What is the actual presence and scope for manoeuvre for 
political parties? What kind of arrangements, if any, have been adopted to cope with the need 
for organised political action in the absence of parties? Starting from these questions, the 
empirical investigation followed two steps. First, an organisational analysis of the Movement 
and of the political parties. Then, an examination of the electoral and parliamentary stages of
monitoring organisations with regard to “maladministration malpractices and excessive violence” during the parliamentary 
elections, see New Vision (Kampala, 29 June and 1 July 2001).
4 Giliomee -  Simkins (1999:xvi).
5 Diamond refers to these electoral regimes as ‘pseudo-democracies’. These are “less than minimally democratic but still 
distinct from authoritarian regimes ... cutting point between electoral democracies and electoral regimes that have multiple 
parties and many other constitutional features of electoral democracy but that lack at least one key requirement an arena of 
contestation sufficiently fair that the ruling party can be turned out of power.... They include... Sartori’s ‘hegemonic party 
systems’ in which ... the ruling party regularly wins massively and controls the overwhelming bulk of legislative seats and 
subnational governments. Mexico (until 1988), Senegal and Singapore are classic examples” (1999:15).
6 Cf. Giliomee -  Simkins (1999:xv). Botswana, South Africa and, until 2000, Senegal display ‘dominant-party systems’ -  
rather than ‘hegemonic party systems’ -  which are formally competitive, i.e. a challenge to the ruling party is conceivable. 
On the similarities and the differences between the two categories, see Chapter Four, pp. 90-91.
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the political process -  as well as of the land reform experience -  to learn about the role of 
party and non-party organisations in Ugandan politics. The findings of the inquiry reveal that 
there is an evident discrepancy between word and practice. A political system which is 
claimed to be based on individual-merit and no-party participation actually had to come up 
with forms of organisation to address unanswered political needs. Some of these 
organisational forms belong to the old parties themselves; some are closely linked to the 
parties; and others are entirely independent surrogate arrangements. More specifically, the 
thesis and the evidence of my fieldwork suggest three important points:
The no-party framework is largely no longer in place -  if it ever was -  since the 
Movement organisation itself has progressively adopted a party-like apparatus and mode of 
conduct.
Political reality prompted the Movement ruling group, in practice, to move away 
from notions of individualised politics and to undertake crucial organisational changes. In 
spite of its anti-party ideological claims, the attempt to entrench its hegemonic status led the 
Movement to undertake continuous organisational developments. With the Movement Act 
passed in 1997, these developments reached the point where a fully-fledged -  albeit still very 
weak -  party-like organisation was devised, both at the national and the local level, for 
purposes of political mobilisation. .
Opposition parties themselves have tried to retain some kind o f organisation, while 
also adopting new organisational stratagems; parties are legally and practically obstructed 
but they exist and may develop and flourish if these restrictions were removed.
Uganda’s political discourse rotates around a movementists-versz/s-multipartists 
dichotomy. The latter term of this dichotomy has largely been articulated by the country’s two 
historical political parties, i.e. the Uganda People’s Congress and the Democratic Party. 
Under the current regime, it is the organisational activities of political parties that are declared 
illegal, rather than parties per se. An investigation into the actual organisational presence of 
parties was required to figure out the organisational forms and strategies that parties have 
adopted as a response to the no-party framework. Evidence shows how opposition parties 
have struggled to survive. Their trajectories are a direct reflection of the hegemonic context in 
which they have to operate. The Democratic Party’s reliance on the informal politics of 
kakuyege, on a newly-established youth wing, and on an NGO, for instance, are part of its 
effort to cope with and by-pass a prohibitive political environment. Similarly, the split of the
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UPC leadership and the establishment of extemporaneous arrangements reflect the party’s 
coming under duress and its attempt to endure and organise in times of Movement dominance 
and repression. The bottom line confining the endeavours of the UPC and the DP, however, is 
the Movement’s own hegemonic ambition, that is, the notion that ‘other’ parties are to be 
impeded from having any significant organisational presence in the state and the electoral 
arena.
A systemic drive towards the formation o f party-surrogate organisations becomes 
apparent when examining the politics o f a parliament that tries to operate without parties.
The inquiry into the way politics is played out in Uganda’s legislative arena was 
driven by the concern to find out:
a) what kind of arrangements individual MPs have devised to articulate collective 
actions in parliament, and
b) what has been the impact of these arrangements in actually binding 
parliamentarians to group decisions.
The evidence collected on the formation of caucuses illustrates how alternative 
organisational devices have emerged within parliament as surrogate political parties. Such 
arrangements are largely aimed at replacing parties by providing opportunities for legislative, 
office-seeking and deliberate collective action. Pro-Movement MPs, for example, were 
gathered in a parliamentary caucus to facilitate the government’s effort to orchestrate support 
for its policies in an individualised assembly.
But why did party-like structures not emerge outside parliament as evidently as they 
did inside it? My findings concerning Uganda seem to be in line with broader arguments that 
stress the primacy of party-like legislative organisations over ‘the party in the electorate’ and 
‘the party as an organisation’7. Accordingly, the fact that party-like groups have emerged in 
parliament proves that “their ability to reduce transaction costs and solve collective action 
problems in the legislative arena may be their ultimate rationale and source of strength”8. In 
spite of the individual-merit principle, legislators face powerful incentives to organise and act 
together. Common action increases dramatically their payoff prospects when compared to 
acting on their own9: parliamentarians maximise the benefits they enjoy if they support or 
oppose a government collectively; they need to join forces if they are to influence policy­
making or to get hold of prestigious positions; they add to their chances of being re-elected if





they pool together their resources. In this sense, the quasi-party arrangements that have 
appeared in Uganda’s parliamentary politics -  the Movement caucus, the Young 
Parliamentarians Association, the women’s caucus, and so on -  validate the idea that, by 
origin, “the political party is a purposefully designed organisation of, by and for legislators”10.
The urgency to develop extra-parliamentary organisations was probably weaker than 
the need for co-operative arrangements inside parliament. “Like other political institutions, 
political parties are as attractive as the alternatives permit”11, and ad hoc, independent 
electoral machines made of temporary agents could easily be adopted as a surrogate option.
Partly the outcome of incipient parties in parliament being stronger than incipient 
parties in the countryside is a consequence of the ‘law of anticipated reactions’. Ordinary 
Ugandans are much more vulnerable to harassment on the part of the government than is any 
MP. The clampdown on party arrangements and personnel was largely directed towards 
citizens or party-citizen activism: all the limitations on party activities refer to actions of the 
parties outside parliament (i.e. conferences, branches, rallies and so on). The constituency- 
based electoral system, which only requires candidates to campaign in a relatively limited 
area, and the large availability of unemployed people, mean that a local campaigning 
arrangement can be quickly and smoothly set up and then dismissed. A nation-wide electoral 
district or a more expensive workforce would have reduced the attractiveness of temporary- 
agents devices. But in the face of government harassment and of widespread poverty, these 
turned out to be cost-effective and efficient alternatives.
In so far as the ideal of individual-merit politics promised a system with no need for 
political organisation, Uganda’s regime therefore displays a serious incapacity to fulfil its own 
premises and promises. The ‘hegemonic party system’ model, elaborated by Sartori12, fits the 
evidence of the country’s recent politics better than the no-party ideal. The former model 
captures the crucial features of Uganda’s politics: dominance on the part of one privileged 
organisation, with minor political organisations allowed to exist albeit systematically and 
strategically marginalised.
The hegemony of the Movement becomes manifest at different levels. For a start, 
dominance over central institutions and local authorities is virtually unchallenged. Individuals 
belonging to the opposition are only allowed occasional electoral successes insofar as these do 






is pre-empted through a selective restriction and repression of civil and political freedoms -  
notably through the limitations on party activities, but also, for example, through a 
discriminating licensing for the activities of NGOs13. The individual-merit election system 
legitimates an electoral process that, in spite of relatively open constituency contests, impedes 
the emergence of any strongly organised opposition bloc. Relatively isolated 
(‘individualised’) politicians are an easy prey for cooptation on the part of the Movement. The 
latter’s ascendancy over the legislative body is then organised -  if not always effectively -  
through a pro-government parliamentary caucus. The atomised opposition and the use of the 
caucus increase the control over the policy process on the part of a ruling group that allows 
debates and inputs to emerge only insofar as they do not hinder the achievement of its 
fundamental objectives. In turn, the tight control over state resources permit a skilful use of 
patronage to generate and reinforce popular consensus for the regime14. At the societal level, a 
careful action for reaching out to and mobilise the populace, especially by means of mchaka 
mchaka political education courses and of the state media, contributes to the diffusion of pro- 
Movement political propaganda. These processes of political mobilisation are increasingly 
coordinated by a renewed Secretariat, and are meant to be boosted by the establishment of 
new local and national party-like structures.
The fact that the ‘no-party ’ political system is actually best understood through the 
lenses o f a framework for party systems analysis -  as the combined examination of the 
organisation of the Movement and of the political parties suggests -  points at the difficulties, 
in practice, of having participatory politics without political organisations. The no-party label 
is used to cover a semi-organised hegemony. There are thus clear limits to thinking of the no­
party model as a ‘democratic’ alternative, and this is a critical point that donors may take into 
consideration when dealing with the current regime. In addition, aside from raising questions 
concerning the democratic content of the regime, ‘eliminating’ political parties, as pointed 
out, is likely to open gaps in the wider political system and to turn the spotlight on the need 
for organisation. Some of these gaps -  notably those that emerged in parliamentary politics -  
became so evident that Ugandans promptly tried to fill them with surrogate organisational
13 All third sector organisations are required to apply to the National Board fo r NGOs for registration. The Board is used to 
control non-governmental organisations, for example, by delaying or suspending registration or by interfering with details of 
NGO activities. This, in turn, can be an excuse for the authorities to curtail workshops or similar activities. As an NGO 
activist put it, “they often remind us of our registration, which requires us to be nonpolitical, nonpartisan, noneverything” 
(Human Rights Watch 1999:104,5). On the 27th of May 1999, for example, the police stopped the NGO Forum at the 
International Conference Centre in Kampala because, formally, it was operating illegally: in spite of the fact that the Forum 
had presented its papers to the NGO Board two years before and it then paid its registration fees, the registration procedures 
had not been completed yet (New Vision, Kampala, 10 December 1999). This kind of controls further weakens the political 
impact of NGOs (c£ Dicklitch 1998).
14 On how the patronage practices of many African regimes often answer ‘d e m a n d s  from below’, and thus help generate 
popular consensus, see, for example, Barkan (2000232-234).
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arrangements. But the fact that such arrangements are basically hindered by the country’s 
political system raises new questions concerning the full stabilisation of a no-party set up 
beyond a transitional period.
Finally, the value of no-partism as a specific conflict management tool is normatively 
undermined, if the no-party system is not functioning, in practice, as an organisation-free 
system -  i.e. the no-party prescriptions are in practice distorted. That which does not meet its 
own defining standard is hardly likely to be an honest recipe for others.
The depth of democratic control and the accountability of the policy-making process 
are inevitably limited in a no-party system that does not allow the opposition to organise. 
Human rights abuses continue and the enduring political instability of some areas of the 
country is frequently ascribed to the political and economic marginalisation of certain forces, 
groups or communities -  or their straightforward exclusion15. At the dawn of the new century, 
Museveni’s rule was increasingly coming under attack. Parties had progressively gained 
legitimacy in the public discourse, and there was growing discomfort within the Movement’s 
own ranks at the ongoing and manipulative confinement of opposition forces. This was 
prominently evident in the latest political campaigns. The run-up to and the aftermath of the 
June 2000 referendum on multipartism were marred by constitutional crises. Col. Kizza 
Besygie’s decision, in the March 2001 presidential campaign, to challenge Museveni ‘from 
within’ the Movement was a manifestation of the uneasiness among supporters of the regime. 
A few months later, the parliamentary election campaign saw the president engaged in a 
systematic effort to promote pro-Movement stalwarts against not only declared multipartists 
but also disloyal or critical movementists.
The dilemma for the Movement remains twofold. On the one hand, a struggle 
between the temptation to retain its hegemonic status and the need to prepare for pluralist 
politics16. On the other, the effort to portray itself as an inclusive force while also ensuring the 
political and organisational cohesion of its core supporters. The need to develop a better
15 Ssenkumba, for example, observes that there is a “link between the collapse of the federal platform and the defeat of the 
IPFC [i.e. the defeat of the multipartists] to the resurgence of rebel activity not only in central Buganda, but also in western 
Uganda and renewed insurgence in northern Uganda.... the crux of the matter lies in the belated recognition by various forces 
which aspire to control the state that it is practically impossible to defeat NRM through constitutional avenues” (Ssenkumba 
1997:26). Human Rights Watch points out that, “despite these important reservations about the purported political 
motivations of Ugandan rebel groups, it would be a mistake to suggest that rebel activity is completely unrelated to the 
suppression o f political opposition activity in Uganda. The movement system of government deprives nonviolent political 
opposition of some of its effectiveness because it does not allow organised political opposition ... [According to] Okello 
Okello ... ‘This system is a declaration of future war. When you close all avenues of opposition, where do you want them to 
go? They will go back to the gun, obviously”’ (Human Rights Watch 1999:127-128).
Main waring -  Scully (1995:21) talk of‘liegemonic party systems in transition” for cases such as, at the time, Mexico and 
Paraguay, where it was difficult to establish the extent to which fully competitive party systems were being institutionalised 
or else authoritarian hegemony remained the dominant feature.
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Movement organisation has been repeatedly recognised17 and, in the course of the 1990s, 
quasi-party Movement structures have been set up and candidates and results have been 
increasingly dealt with in partisan terms. As late as mid-2001, however, prominent Movement 
leaders would stick to the original idea that “the Movement cannot become a political party ... 
The whole doctrine and concept of the Movement is anti-political organisations”18. Caught 
between real competition and hegemonic tendencies, the regime may be on the verge of 
addressing the issue of political institutionalisation, albeit it is not yet clear which direction 
the latter will take.
17 Mamdani (1995), Kasfir (1994:173). In June 1995, Museveni wrote a famous letter to the movementists of the CA in 
which he suggested that the NRM might have to transform itself into a different political organisation in the near future, if 
competition for power should require it. Contextually, a Movement parliamentary caucus was “specifically created to bring in 
‘discipline’... a whipping process, which is why it expressly excludes multipartists (although ill Ugandans are members of 
the Movement) ... all Movement politicians have rallied without a squeal to the party line” (Charles Onyango-Obbo, 
columnist of The Monitor, Kampala, on Ugandanet, 1998, exact date missing)
18 Col. Kahinda Otafiire, MP for Ruhinda, quoted in New Vision (Kampala, 30 June 2001).
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APPENDIX 1
Interviews with officials of the Movement and of the political parties
Fifty-one officials belonging to the main political organisations -  i.e. the Movement, the 
Uganda People’s Congress, the Democratic Party, and the small Conservative Party and 
National Democrats Forum -  were interviewed. The focus of these interviews was a party’s 
organisational map (both at the central and at the local level), the selection of candidates for 
elections, the way an election campaign is approached, and the specific policy formulation 
initiatives of the parties. A geographically-representative sample of four districts was also 
selected for a closer investigation of the extensiveness of party organisations. Accordingly, 
local party representatives were interviewed in the centre-south district of Mukono, in Gulu in 











Wapakhabulo James 55 Mumasaba/ Anglican National Political MP, legal expert
Mbale Commissar
Kampala, 19 July 1999 M East
Kasaija Matia 45 ca. Munyoro / Catholic Deputy Director politician (former
Kabale Mass Mobilisation UPM), commercial
Kampala, 28 May 1999 M West cattle business
Lagada Beatrice 46 Langi/ Protestant Deputy Director education officer,
Apac Mass Mobilisation politician
Kampala, 16 June 1999 F North
Magode Ikuya James 55 Jopadhola-Itesot / Anglican Deputy Director politician,
Tororo Information administrator
Kampala, 1 July 1999 M East
Henry Matsiko 40 Mukiiga/ Protestant Deputy Director civil servant/military
Kabale in the NPC office
Kampala, 20 June 2000 M South-West
Bukenya Gilbert 51 Muganda/ - Caucus Chairman MP, former
Mpigi university professor
Kampala, 2 July 1999 M Central
Kagodo Paul Kalule 68 Muganda/ Protestant District Committee fenner/businessman,
Mukono Chairman politician
Mukono, 24 June 1999 M Central
Odora Oryem Charles 46 Acholi / Catholic District Committee local politician and
Gulu Chairman administrator
Gulu, 6 July 1999 M North
P’Odur John Mills 44 Acholi / Catholic District Committee teacher, local
Gulu Secretary politician and
Gulu, 5 July 1999 M North administrator
Tumusiime Fred 42 Munyankole / Catholic District Committee school
Mbarara Secretary headmaster/LC5
Mbarara, 15 July 1999 M South-West councillor
Walimbwa Charles 46 Mugisu/ Catholic District Committee civil servant, LC5
Mbale Chairman chairman
Mbale, 9 July 1999 M East
Wasukira Lawrence 47 Mumasaba/ Catholic District Committee local civil servant
Mbale Secretary and politician
Mbale, 9 July 1999 M East
1 Age in the year 2000.
2 Religious denomination as indicated by the respondent
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1 Badru Wegulo 61 Munyole / 
Tororo
Muslim Chairman politician, former 
civil servant
Kampala, 22 June 2000 M East
Rubaihayo Patrick 60 Munyankole / Protestant Member PPC university professor 
and consultant in
Kampala, 12 June 1999 M South-West agriculture




Kampala, 2 June 1999 M -
Ochwo Edward






Christian Chief Admin. 
Secretary
former civil servant
Kasirye-Mayanja Paulo 55 ca. Muganda/
Masaka
Catholic Principal Assistant former civil 
servant, small local
Kampala, 4 May 1999 M Central business interests
Masaba Mustafa























Labara Oola Peter 76 Acholi / 
Gulu
Protestant District Chairman politician
Kampala, 23 June 1999 M North
Sakwa Darlington



























Christian IEC Chairperson MP, food processing 
and farming business
Wacha Ben






Protestant IEC Secretary MP, lawyer
Mwondha Patrick
Kampala, 22 June 1999 





Protestant Secretary of IEC politician, computer 
scientist/ business
Wako Fredrick






Anglican District Chairman small trade
Natifu Abna
















Catholic District Vice- 
chairman
farmer, former civil 
servant and local 
councillor
(Official who requested 
anonymity)






Anglican Interim District 
Chairperson
Twamuhabwa Wilson


























Catholic President politician, tourism 
business
Zachary Olum






Catholic Vice-President MP, former 
university professor
Byanyima Boniface






Anglican Chairman farmer, politician
Drametu Mariano






Catholic Secretary General politician
Mutagamba Maria






Catholic Deputy Secretary 
General
bank director and 
restaurant owner
Kitariko Robert Kikomo


















Catholic Organising Secretary lawyer, civil servant
Ssekweyama Anthony






Catholic Publicity Secretary NGO director, 
former politician and 
civil servant
Rainer Kafiire Juliet






Catholic Women Leader MP, investment 
farming
Komakech Leander






Catholic Leader of Uganda 
Young Democrats
teacher and deputy 
headmaster
Michael Mabikke






Catholic Secretary of Uganda 
Young Democrats
(Official who requested 
anonymity)














Catholic District chairman semi-retired
headmaster
Mayeku Peter


















Catholic Member local councillor
Kaishaija Emmanuel






Catholic District chairman small business
Mugisha John










































Catholic Secretary General MP
Mubiru Mugnmba Ali




Muslim Youth Leader part-time assistant
Senku Daniel






Protestant District chairman medical doctor

















none Chairman development 
consultancy firm
(Official who requested 
anonymity)






Protestant District Chairman private company 
manager I
| Bagwa Mathias






Catholic Regional General 
Secretary and Youth 
Co-ordinator “  1
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APPENDIX 2
Interviews with Members of Parliament
Thirty-three Members of Parliament were interviewed. The sampling criteria was access to 
them, with attention to retaining a certain balance between regions, gender, and political 
partisanship. Yet, because of the broader interests of this study, multipartists are over­
represented in the sample. The interviews focused on electoral networks, parliamentary 









Religion2 Political affiliation Personal
background
Akello Grace


















Catholic Movement education officer
Bagnma-Isoke Matia


























































Protestant Critical Movementist journalist, politician
Karuhanga Elly















(claims close to DP)
army officer
Logiro-Ngorok Peter






Catholic Movement teacher and social 
worker
Lukyamuzi John Ken









1 Age in the year 2000.





































Movement politician, lawyer, 
minister
Mutyaba Benedict








lawyer, civil servant, 
lecturer
Mwesigye Adolf















Nsubuga May an j a Sazir




















former teacher, | 
editor, social worker
Ogwal Atim Cecilia












Kampala, 11 June 1999 








former civil servant, j 
now consultant I
Okulo-Epak Yusuf





























civil servant and 
farmer
Ruzindana Augustine
















Catholic Movement social worker
Wacha Ben


































Anglican Movement politician, MP
Wassva Lule











Interviews with NGO representatives and policy-makers
Representatives of non-governmental organisations and officials of the Ministry of Water, 
Lands and Environment were also interviewed. The sampling criteria was their relevance in 
the land reform process (or, in a few cases, their privileged position as observers of other 
phenomena studied in the thesis). The interviews largely focused on the negotiation and 
formulation of the new land policy, and on the specific inputs produced by the different 











Kampala, 20 and 27 
May 1999 M
(German) administrator Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation
Knirsch Thomas
Kampala, 25 May 1999 M
(German) administrator Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation
Sekweyama Anthony












London, 16 May 2000 M


















Kampala, 2 June 2000
35 ca.
F














co-ordinator Uganda Land Alliance lecturer and 
qualified lawyer
Oloya J. J.






































1 Age in the year 2000.
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